1. This revision application is filed against the judgment dated 14-12-1978 of learned District Judge, Larkana whereby appeal filed against the judgment and decree in a suit for declaration and injunction passed by learned Ist Senior Civil Judge has been dismissed.
2. Briefly stated the relevant facts are that the respondent namely Anwar Hussain Jatoi was appointed Junior Officer- II in Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (hereinafter to be referred as the said bank) vide terms and conditions contained in the letter of offer issued on 15-5-1974, which was accepted. Consequently respondent was posted as Manager in the said bank at Khairpur and executed agreement and furnished security in the sum of Rs. 2,000 and also completed training for four months. According to the terms and conditions of service, the respondent was required to serve for at least five years and during that period he was not allowed to resign from his service and if he did so, or abandoned the service, then he could have the amount of Rs. 2,000 deposited by him forfeited to the bank. The respondent vas posted at Kandhkot and he could not serve there as such he explained the circumstances in the notice, which he sent to the bank and further expressed his desire therein that his resignation may be accepted and that he was not liable to pay Rs. 2,000. It was further stated in that notice that if the bank did not require the respondent to pay Rs. 2,000 then his resignation may be accepted from 7-11-1976. However, before that date the respondent proceeded on medical leave and on 1-11-1976 sent a telegram withdrawing his resignation. On 3-11-1P76 respondent received a telegram from the bank that his resignation was accepted and he should pay Rs. 2,000 immediately and would stand relieved from 7-11-1976. The respondent sent a representation protesting as to how his resignation bad been accepted without the bank fulfilling condition precedent that it was to be accepted only if the bank agreed not to recover Rs. 2,000 from him. The respondent approached Chairman of the bank, who assured him that the acceptance of resignation was also conditional to the effect that if and when he paid Rs. 2,000, he would stand relieved, failing which he would be deemed to be in service for at least five years as per terms and conditions. It is the case of respondent that he was still on medical leave upto 14-11-1976 and m as awaiting posting order after the expiry of leave as assured by the Chairman but in the meantime on 8-11-1976 he received a letter from Regional Manager Larkana informing him that he has been relieved from 7-11-1976. On 8.11-1976 respondent made representation to tile bank requesting him to issue posting orders and explaining that his offer of resignation was conditional and that condition 'mentioned in the resignation has not been accepted by the bank as such be is deemed to be in service and there is no validity to the acceptance of resignation. , Consequently respondent filed a suit for declaration. And injunction being Suit No. 93 of 1976 in the Court of Civil Judge Larkana on 1-12-1976 with prayer for declaration that the impugned orders passed accepting his resignation and relieving him from service and making him liable to pay expenses of training are illegal, void, and inoperative and further that he continues to be in service and is entitled to all the emoluments ancillary to his service. Injunction was also sought by the respondent in the Plaint for his posting. In the Plaint apart from the bank three other officers have been impleaded as defendants.
3. Written statement has been filed in which it is admitted that respondent was appointed as such. It is also admitted that respondent was required to serve the bank for at least five years and could not resign before the expiry of that period as per terms of the agreement executed by him which included the condition that if he resigned before that period he would make himself liable to pay Rs. 2,000 to the bank. It is further stated in. The written statement that his request for medical leave for four weeks as partly granted upto 6-11-1976 only. The assertion of the respondent that he withdrew his resignation on 1-11-1976 by way of telegram is denied and even receipt of the copy of the telegram as alleged has been denied. It is further the case of the defendant in the suit that even if such telegram had been received. It would have been of no avail if such resignation stood accepted on 30-10-1976 which was communicated on 2-11-1976. It is admitted in the written statement that a representation was made on 5-11-1976 and plaintiff in the suit approached Chairman but it has been denied that the Chairman assured him that his resignation was to be deemed to have been accepted only when plaintiff in the suit paid Rs. 2,000, failing which he would be deemed to continue in service for five years. The stand taken in the written statement filed by the defendants in the suit is that resignation was accepted on 30-10-1976, according to the terms of the agreement and the bond and plaintiff in the suit has rendered himself liable to forfeiture of the bond. It is also denied in the written statement that offer of resignation was condi--tional that it was to be accepted only when the bank agreed to forego recovery of Rs. 2,000 from the plaintiff in the suit. It is further denied emphatically in the written statement by the defendants in the suit that the impugned orders were illegal mala fide or liable to be set aside or that the plaintiff in the suit was entitled to be deemed to be in service and to all emoluments incidental thereto.
4. Keeping in view the pleadings of the parties the trial Court vide order dated 27-4-1977 adopted recast, issues, which are as follows :---
(1) Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ?
(2) Whether the suit is not maintainable in law ?
(3) Is the acceptance of resignation incomplete because of non-acceptance of attached condition ?
(4) Was the plaintiff entitled to withdraw his resignation and what is the effect of such withdrawal ?
(5) Whether the orders impugned in the Suit are illegal. Ineffective and void ?
(6) Was the tendering of plaintiff's resignation against the terms of the bond ? If so, to what effect ?
(7) Did the plaintiff withdraw his resignation telegraphically on i-11-1976 ?
(8) Was the plaintiff's resignation accepted on 30-10-1975 ? If so, what is its effect of the withdrawal of resignation by the plaintiff on 1-11-1976 ?
(9) Whether the Suit is not in proper form ? .
(10) What should the decree be ?
5. Respondent, who was plaintiff in the suit, examined himself before the trial Court and produced a number of documents in support of his case. He did not examine any other witness and closed his side. On the other band defendants in the suit examined Mr. Mukhtar Masood, who was then Chairman of the said bank. He was examined on commission. After appraisal of evidence the trial Court took up Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 9 together, which related to jurisdiction, maintainability and form of the suit and gave negative finding in respect of them. The trial Court took up together Issues Nos.
6. 4, 7 and 8 as they were inter-connected and gave positive finding in respect of issues Nos. 4 and 7 and in respect of Issue No. 8 held that offer of resignation was duly revoked by plaintiff in the suit before the offer was accepted as contemplated under sections 4 and 5 of the Contract Act, The trial Court gave findings in respect of remaining issues in the affirmative and decreed the suit as prayed. The Ist Appellate Court after hearing the counsel for both sides dismissed the appeal by upholding the judgment and decree of the trial Court.
7. The question as to what is the scope of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is very ably described in the celebrated case of S. Zafar Ahmed v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 1964 Kar. 149, by a Full Bench of seven judges. In this judgment history of case law on the subject and intent of legislature on language used in section 115, C. P. C. Is highlighted. The relevant portion from the judgment in the reported case is reproduced as under :- "Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not concern itself directly with justice or injustice. !t is not a power to substitute what appears to the revisional Court to be correct view of the merits of a case whether legal or factual for a view of the merits of the case that appears to it to be erroneous. Section 115 is not concerned with these matters. It is on the contrary, concerned only with the exercise of jurisdiction. If so jurisdiction that is not vested is exercised ; if no jurisdiction that is vested is declined and if in the exercise of a jurisdiction that is vested, no one has acted illegally or with material irregularity, the question of using powers under section 115 does not arise, however gross an error of law or fact might have been committed in the determination of the merits of the claim and however grave the injustice might be. The converse is not always true. The word used in the opening part of section 115 is "may": The Court is not bound to act under that section, though it is hard to imagine cases falling under clause (a) and the first part of clause (c) in which the Court, on being satisfied that a jurisdiction not vested is being exercised, or that illegal action is being taken in the exercise of jurisdiction, will still refrain from exercising its powers under section 115. With reference to (b) and the second part of (c), however, there is no difficulty in thinking of examples where a Court, in spite of being satisfied regarding the failure to exercise a jurisdiction which is vested, or the grossness of an irregularity of the procedure adopted in the exercise of jurisdiction, would still refrain from exercising its powers under section 115. In such cases, if the Court is of the opinion that no injustice has been done or it likely to be done, it may refuse to act under section 115.
8. The idea of justice is thus relevant to the provision of section 115 only as an additional factor affecting the discretion of the Court. Nor does the concluding portion of section 115 `the High Court may make such order in the case as thinks fit', enlarge the discretion of the Court. In the context, it does not mean that the Court has the discretion to disregard the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and
(c) or to go beyond the limits laid down in theseclauses, but only that the discretion is restricted to the field covered by these clauses. The Court has a discretion to refuse relief in spite of the conditions mentioned in clause (a), (b) or (c) being present, but it has no jurisdiction to grant relief, unless the conditions mentioned in clause (a), (b) or (c) are present however just it may be to grant relief in any particular case. If this distinction is clearly borne in mind, many of the situations' in which the High Court is tempted to interfere with the proceedings of the lower Courts in revision will be dealt with satisfactorily."
9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicant before me is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which wad not competent for the reason that the question of enforcement of terms and conditions of the contract against cannot be decided in a suit for declaration and injunction and remedy in such case lies in a suit for damages. In the instant case suit is filed under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act in which declaration is sought that the orders of the Bank accepting the resignation of the applicant and relieving him from service are illegal, void and inoperative and also there is a prayer for injunction. On the other hand it was contended by Mr. Mohanlal, counsel for the respondent that the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and objection of such legal nature was not taken by the applicant in the trial Suit. Perusal of the pleadings indicate that when written statement was filed and objection was taken in paragraph 19 that the suit is not in proper form. Issues adopted by the trial Court also indicate that Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 9 relate to jurisdiction maintainability and form of suit, which have been called in question. Mr. Mohanlal further pointed out that before the trial Court only territorial jurisdiction was questioned and not in the form as is now claimed by Mr. Malik Gul Nawaz. Judgment of the trial Court shows that the learned trial Judge had taken up for consideration together Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 9 as stated above. He has dealt with the objection of the defendants in the Suit that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the Suit for the reason that the cause of action to file the suit had arisen in the Islamabad where resignation of plaintiff in the suit was accepted by the Chairman of the bank.- Reliance was placed on section 20 of C. P. C. Which relates to the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Court where a suit is to be filed. The learned trial Judge has also made a reference to Explanation 11 to section 20, C. P. C. Which relates to the cause of action arising at a place where a corporation has its sole or principle office or at any other place where the cause of action has arisen and the corporation has its subordinate office. On the question of maintainability of the suit. It appears from the judgment of the trial Court that the objection was taken by the defendants in the suit that the suit way not maintainable in its present form and the plaintiff should have filed a suit far damages and not a suit for declaration under section 42 of Specific Relief Act. Case law for and against the proposition has been discussed by the learned trial Judge, who ultimately gave negative findings on issues Nos. 1, 2 and 9. This clearly shows that such objection was taken before the trial Court and was dealt with in the judgment. The learned counsel for the applicant before me has made a grievance of the fact that the first appellate Court has not adverted to the., legal aspect of the jurisdiction of the trial Court and has left out Issues Nos. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 from consideration. It is further stated on behalf of the applicant that before th6 first appellate Court arguments were addressed on all the issues but the first appellate Court has given judgment only in respect of issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and has not touched upon the remaining issues particularly Issue No. 2 and issue No. 9 which relate to maintainability and form of the suit. It appears from the judgment of the first appellate Court that the learned Judge has dealt with Issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 after observing that only these issues are material on which the fate of appeal . Turns. There is no indication in the record of the first appellate Court whether this was conceded by the counsel who appeared for the appellants/defendants in the suit. Mr. Mohanlal has pointed out that the learned first appellate Judge has discussed this aspect' of the case in paragraph 17 of his judgment. Perusal of the judgment of the first appellate Court shows that in paragraph 17 , there is discussion of applicability of the rule of "Master and Servant" or not to the facts of the instant case when the bank is a body corporate and service of its employees is regulated by rules and regulations. In this context it is contended on behalf of the applicant that the first appellate Court was bound under the law to give finding on each issue, which was contested. Before it. Mr. Malik Gul Nawaz referred to Order XX, rule 5, C. P. C. In support of his contention. This provision in the Civil Procedure Code relates to the suits only and it requires the trial Court to give findings upon each issue separately unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is found to be sufficient for the decision of the suit.
10. Powers of the .Appellate Court are defined under section 107, C. P. C., which invest appellate Court with the same powers as are to be exercised by the trial Court, which includes powers under Order XX, rule 5, C. P. C. Providing for giving finding on one or more of the issues, if found sufficient for the decision of the suit. Moreover Order XLI, rule 31, C. P. C. Provides that the appellate Court shall give judgment in writing and state the points for determination, decision thereupon and reasons for the decision. The first appellate Court has dealt with Issue No. 1 which relates to the jurisdiction of the trial Court to try the suit. Issue No. 3 which relates to the question of acceptance of resignation by the bank and Issue No. 4 which relates to the effect of withdrawal of resignation by the employee.
11. These three issues appear to be main issues and the other issues are incidental to them. For these reasons no fault can be found with the judgment of the Appellate Court with the findings are given on all the material and important points involved in the matter and no prejudice is caused. The judgment of the appellate Court does contain discussion in all the relevant points in controversy.
12. On the question of jurisdiction the contention of the learned counsel is that in the instant case suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration and injunction is not competent and the remedy for the plaintiff in the Suit is to file a suit for damages. It is further submitted by him that the terms and conditions of service between the employee of the bank and the bank arise from a contract as such the remedy f .r the employee is available to him only either in the terms of the contract or in the rules and regulations of the bank or in the suit for damages. Section 42 of Specific Relief Act contemplates relief of declaration to a person who is entitled to any legal character or to any rights as to any property. In this context it has been held in the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Muhammad Izharul Hassan Qureshi (PLD 1979 Kar 640that a declaration could be sought in respect of rights and liabilities under a contract of service under section 4 of the Specific Relief Act as that section applied only to a legal characte or status apart from a contract.
13. The legal character or status denotes ' character or status conferred by law and not one created by a contract. The rights and liabilities under the service contract could not, therefore, for the subject-matter of a declaratory suit under the Specific Relief Act. In another case of Muhammad Afzal v. House Building Finance Corporation (PLD 1976 Kar. 1121my learned brother Zafar Hussain Mirza, J., has held that the employees of public corporations are not treated as Civil Servants and the power to dismiss them must be found in, the statutory powers of the corporation or the board or in contract of employment in question. It is now, in Pakistani well settled that the employment of employees of statutory corporations is governed by the "Master and Servant Law". Relying upon PLD 1974 SC! 146 the learned Judge has further stated that the Constitutional safeguards available to the generality of the civil servants against the arbitrary dismissal or removal from service are not available to the servants of a registered company or a statutory corporation. The general law of "Master and Servant" is applicable and the only remedy available to the aggrieved servant in such cases is to file suit for damages for wrongful; dismissal.
14. It was contended on behalf of the respondent before me that in the instant case neither there is question of wrongful dismissal from service nor of removal but a declaration is sought by the employee from the Court, whereby a particular set of the bank is challenged accepting resignation. Which was conditional and the condition was not fulfilled and also that it was withdrawn before the date on which the resignation was to be accepted, To appreciate this argument it will be necessary to go into relevant facts so far this point is concerned. The said Bank is established under Agricultural Development Bank Ordinance, IV of 1961 (hereinafter to be referred as the said Ordinance). Under this Ordinance a board is set up consisting of Chairman and some Directors and the Chairman has been given the powers of Chief Executive Officer to exercise on behalf of the board in order to control the affairs of the bank. Under section 30 of the Ordinance provision is made for appointment of officers and advisers by the bank on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by regulations. Section 37 of the Ordinance provides for making rules under the Ordinance by the Central Government for carrying out purposes of this Ordinance.
15. Section 39 further provides for making of regulations by the board not in-consisting with the said ordinance or the rules framed thereunder. Section 39(2)(e) provides that the regulations may be made for recruitment of employees of the Bank and their terms and conditions of service. The Agricultural Development Bank (Staff) Service Regulations 1961 have been framed and Chapter II thereof relates to the appointment and termination of service of different classes of officers and other staff. The post of Manager Grade I is indicated at Serial No. 28 in the Officers of Class I to which the respondent before me claims to have been appointed by way of direct recruitment Regulation 14 relates to resignation and it provides that a permanent employee in Class I or Class II post shall not resign from the service of the bank without giving three months previous notice to the Chairman in writing. Power has been given to Chairman for termination of service, in respect of Class I posts under regulation 13(1) (4). It may be pertinent at this stage to point out that the bank has published and is following manual of administrative instructions, paragraph 3.22 whereof provides that before accepting resignation of an employee, all relevant facts specially service, agreement surety bond etc. Should be carefully examined and taken into account. Paragraph 3.23 provides that once a notice of resignation has been accepted, it will not normally be permitted to be withdrawn. The employees should, therefore, give notice of resignation after considering fully its consequences. Paragraph 37.1 in Chapter XXXVII relates to training of employees and requires service agreement to be obtained from these employees, who are given preliminary training before regular appointment in the bank's service with the stipulation inter alia to serve the bank during, the period of training and for at-least five years after completion thereof. In the event of resignation or quitting the service for one reason or the other before expiry of the stipulated period -of five years, the employee concerned will have to compensate the bank by refunding the cost of the training at the rates shown below against each category of staff. Annexure 46 is the Manual, of Adminis--trations shows proforma of service agreement.
16. Respondent who is Plaintiff in the suit has produced before the trial Court letter of appointment offer dated 15-5-1974 which is Exh. 39 on the record. According. To this letter he has been offered to be appointed as Junior Officer-I in the terms and the conditions specified therein. It is stated in this letter that before joining he would be required to execute service agreement in the form enclosed and to give a personal surety from a Gazetted Officer to serve the bank for at least five years after the completion of the training during which period he will not be allowed to resign. The service agreement and personal surety of Rs. 2,000 shall remain operative for five years. It is also mentioned in this letter that he will be governed by rules, regulations and orders of A. D. B. P. In force and as amended from time to time in all matters in respect of his service not specifically mentioned in this memorandum. The rules, regulations and orders of the bank shall prevail if there is any conflict between the conditions laid down in this office memorandum and the rules regulations. The respondent has produced before the trial Court service agreement Exh. 40 which is executed by him as an employee, It contains specifically requirement of service for five years after the training period is over as stated above in the letter of offer. It is further stated in this agreement that the .Employee further agrees that he will not on any account and of his own accord discontinue, give up or abandon the service of bank before the expiry of the period of his training and the stipulated period of five years. It is also stipulated in the service agreement that the employee binds himself to compensate and reimburse the bank in the event of his terminating and discontinuing service of his own accord or without the bank discharging or dismissing or terminating his service before the expiry of the period of his training and the said period of five years. Such security bond in the sum of Rs. '2,000 executed by surety in favour of respondent to the bank is produced as Exh.
41. It is the case of the respondent/employee that he submitted resignation with notice Exh. 44 to be accepted on 7-11-1976 and that acceptance of resignation was conditional in the sense that it could be accepted if the bank agreed not to hold employee liable to pay Rs. 2,000 as per agreement. It is further stated in this letter of resignation that if this plea is accepted then resignation may kindly be accepted from 7-11-1976. This letter of resignation is addressed to the Chairman of the bank at Headquarters at Islamabad. It is further the case of employee that on 1-11-1976 he withdrew his resignation by sending a telegram from Karachi Exh. 47 but he received a' telegram Exh. 56 on 3-I1-1976 whereby he was intimated that his resignation was accepted on usual terms and he was supposed to pay Rs. 2,000 and further that he was relieved from service on 7-11-1976. The Plaintiff in the suit has deposed before the trial Court that this telegram was despatched on 2-11-1976 at 5-37 p.m. From Islamabad. On 5-11-1976 he sent an application to the Chairman that he was not liable to pay Rs. 2,000 as his offer for resignation was conditional. He then sought interview from the Chairman who assured him that if he did' not pay Rs.
17. 2,000 he would be deemed to be in service and would not be relieved. In such circumstances he was waiting for the posting orders as his medical leave was to expire on 14-11-1976 plaintiff is the suit received letter dated 4-11-1976 from the Regional Manager, Larkana intimating him that he had been relieved from 7-11-1976.
18. The main contention of the Plaintiff in Suit is that his resignation was conditional and could not have been accepted if that condition mentioned therein was not fulfilled by the bank. This grievance does not appear to be justifiable if the contents of the notice of resignation are read, which . Speak for themselves and give an impression that the Plaintiff in the suit wanted his transfer from Kandhkot to some other place near Larkana and since his request was not being accepted he levelled allegations of corruption against the Officers of the bank and tendered his resignation but added in the last paragraph that he is not resigning voluntarily but has been compelled to resign as such he was not liable to pay Rs. 2,000 as per agreement. The contents of the letter of resignation Exh. 44 are reproduced :- "I have the honour to submit that I hereby give one month's notice for tendering the resignation which is essential in case of probationary Maniger. The period of this notice will be counted from today and will expire on 6-11-1976. As such my resignation may kindly be accepted from 7-11-1976 for which 1 have been compelled by our organisation to tender by creating following circumstances
(1) That I have been personally approaching the worthy Chairman and the E. D. (S) for my transfer from Kandhkot to any other Branch nearer to Larkana since about last 16 months under some circumstances which were explained by me personally from time to time, but even after tae promise by the worthy Chairman and E. D. (S) I were kept on empty hopes for my transfer since March last. Finally in September, 1976 situation at Kandhkot became such that my life at Kandhkot was in danger which fact I brought into the knowledge of the E. D. (S) personally at Karachi yesterday the 5th instant. But E. D. (S) clearly refused to give me a hearing which is clear proof that E. D. (S) has ill-motive against me.
(2) That every body is being given the posting of his choice place whoever is the sweet person of E.
19. D. (S) and the Joint Director Administra--tion, Zonal Office, Karachi. But since I am not paying anything to the above officers, I am being victimized at every occasion. In this regard I can quote an instance of refusal of allowing me a T. A. Bill for my official tour by the Zonal Office, Karachi.
(3) That the worthy Chairman though has allowed all the Bank employees and officers to report their grievances direct to him for its removal but these instructions are only placed in the circular riles and practically it is not such. I met the worthy Chairman at Islamabad in March last in connection with my transfer problem and the worthy Chairman promised for transferring me from Kandhkot to nearer place to Larkana. But I am sorry to submit that thereafter in every week I was being inforn7ed on my asking on telephone by the Zonal Office and the Head Office that my proposals for transfer have been lying on the Chairman's table but it were never approved.
20. Frequent transfer orders are being issued by the Zonal Office Karachi in case of Asstt. Manager and other officers but my case of transfer has never been considered. This is a worst instance of favouritism by which corruption is being encouraged in the Organization as corrupt officials are being given facilities only, who pay something :o E. D. (S) and Mr. B. A. Siddiqui.
(4) That at present I am on leave on medical grounds but my posting has remained at Kandhkot where there has arrived an enmity of local people with me. My life at Kandhkot is in a danger.
21. Whereas the worthy E. D. (S) has refused to consider my transfer from Kandhkot. As such I give preference to save my life rather than save my service. In such a way I have been compelled to resign. Had I been transferred from Kandhkot to Larkana or nearer to Larkana, I could have continued to serve.
(5) That as per agreement I have been made to serve for the minimum period of 5 years in other case I have to .Pay Rs. 2,000. Put since I am not resigning from the post voluntarily but I have been compelled to resign by creating above-mentioned circumstances, hence I will not be liable to pay Rs. 2,000 as per agreement. And if my this plea is acceptable, my resignation may kindly be accepted from 7-11-1976."
22. The other grievance of the plaintiff in the suit is that before his resignation became due for acceptance, he withdrew the same by telegram which he bad sent to the Chairman of the Bank at Islamabad as such he had withdrawn his resignation and may be deemed to continue in service. It may be pointed out in this context that according to the service agreement Exh. 40 and Bond Exh.
23. 41 executed by to plaintiff in the suit he has given a clear undertaking in writing that he would not on any account and of his own accord discontinue, give up or abandon the service of bank before the expiry of the period of his training and the stipulated period of five years, and further that if he did so he would reimburse the bank the amount of Rs. 2,001 The import of the undertaking is very clear and plaintiff in the suit is bound down by it as it; arises from the contract which he has himself executed. There is no provision in it for resigning whether voluntarily or involuntarily. He has to serve the Bank compulsorily for five years during which period he could not resign or give up the service for any reason whatever, as such he is bound by that condition in that agreement which is executed by him. On the other hand Chairman of the bank is competent under paragraph 3.22 of the Manual .Of Administrative Instructions to accept the resignation after considering all the relevant facts specially service agreement and surety bond, which he has done as for evidence on the record. Paragraph 3.23 of the Manual further provides that once notice of resignation has been accepted, it will not normally be permitted to be withdrawn. The employees who, therefore, give the notice of resignation do so after considering fully its consequences. The import of this paragraph is that once the employee tenders his resignation. He has to consider all the pros and cons before taking such action and normally such resignation once tendered could not be permitted to be withdrawn. It is contended on behalf. Of the Bank that on his own pleadings plaintiff in the suit never applied for permission to withdraw the resignation but as alleged by him be sent a telegram declaring that he had withdrawn his resignation. There is no need to go further into this question for the reason that the case of the bank is that telegram regarding withdrawal was not received by the Bank and before that the resignation was accepted in accordance with the procedure laid down under the paragraphs of the Manual as stated above.
24. The question that arises for consideration is whether in view of the grievances made by the plaintiff in the suit as mentioned above, is it competent for him to file a suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration from the Court that his resignation was conditional as such it should not have been accepted by the Bank without fulfilling the condition and that resignation should not have been accepted because it as withdrawn before it was due for acceptance and further4hat the Bank was not competent to make him liable to pay Rs. 2,000. The answer is that these questions as stated above relate- to the terms and conditions of the service as are incorporated in the contract of service and rules and regula--tions of the bank which is a statutory body- and the law is very clear as stated above that the only remedy available to the servant of a registered Company or statutory Corporation is to file a suit for damages. Although the plaintiff in the Suit has not said so specifically in Plaint that he seeks remedy against his wrongful dismissal but the facts of the case as stated above indicate that result. In the circumstances and for the facts and reasons mentioned above I hold that Suit for declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act filed by the respondent in the trial Court was no competent and his remedy lies in the suit for damages as such the revision application is allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court and that of appellate Court are hereby set aside. There will be no order as to the costs.