' NASIR-UL-MULK, J.---This appeal by leave of the Court has been filed by the Province of Punjab, through District Officer Revenue Rawalpindi and five others, impugning the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 9-7-2013, whereby Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellants against the judgment of the Appellate Court was dismissed on the ground of being barred by time. At the leave granting stage the Additional Advocate-General Punjab had relied upon the recent judgment of this Court in the case of Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others (PLD 2012 SC 400) to contend that notwithstanding the appellants' Revision Petition was barred by time, the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was required to examine the merits of the case so as to see whether the judgment impugned before it suffered from any material irregularity.
2. Leave to appeal was granted on 10-12-2013 in the following terms:-- "After hearing the learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab leave to appeal is granted in this petition to examine whether the ratio of judgments in the cases of Province of Punjab through Collector, T.T. Singh and others v. Muhammad Farooq and others (PLD 2010 SC 582), Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and `others (PLD 2012 SC 400) and Farnan Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq and others (PLD 2013 SC 392) is applicable to the facts of the present petition or otherwise."
3. Before proceeding further, it will be appropriate to take a look at section 115, C.P.C., which reads:-- "115 Revision.---(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies therein, and if such subordinate Court appears--
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it think fit; ' Provided that, where a person makes an application under this subsection, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court, and the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the subordinate Court.
' Provided that such application shall be made within ninety day of the decision of the Subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within three days thereof, and the High Court shall dispose of such application within three months.
(2) The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject-matter whereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court.
(3) If any application under subsection (1) in respect of a case within the competence of the District Court has been made either to the High Court or the District Court, no further such application shall be made to either of them.
(4) No proceedings in revision shall be entertained by the High Court against an order made under subsection (2) by the District Court."
4. The first proviso to subsection (1) was added by Ordinance X of 1980 and the second proviso by Act VI of 1992. Since the learned Assistant Advocate-General Punjab has relied solely upon the case of Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others (ibid) some details of the case need to be stated. The question before the Court was whether the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred as to the Act), relating to extension of time, and sections 4, 9, 18 and 22 of the Act are applicable to revision petitions filed under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Upon examining the relevant statutory provisions, the Court concluded and held that sections 4, 9, 18 and 22 of the Act would apply and the time spent in obtaining certified copies of the documents and orders required in support of such petitions would thus be excluded. It was however declared that section 5 of the Act would not be applicable to such petitions.
5. After deciding the question for which leave was granted, this Court in Hafeez Ahmad's case (supra) went on to examine the exercise of supervisory powers by the Revisional Courts under section 115, C.P.C., particularly its suo motu powers.
' Upon examining the case-law from our own and that of Indian jurisdiction, in Paragraph No,17 of the judgment it was observed:-- "Now question arises whether suo motu jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code could be exercised by the High Court or the District Court in a case where a revision petition has been filed after the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The answer to this question depends on the discretion of the Court because exercise of revisional jurisdiction in any form is discretionary. Such Court may exercise suo motu jurisdiction if the conditions for its exercise are satisfied."
6. Elabdrating further it was held that 'since the proceedings before the revisional Court is a proceeding between the Court and Court, for ensuring strict adherence to law and safe administration of justice, exercise of suo motu jurisdiction may not be conveniently avoided or overlooked altogether'. Concluding in Paragraph No,23 of the judgment the Court held that:-- "23. The case of Banori v. Jillani (PLD 2010 SC 1186) being close to the text covers all the essential aspects of the provision including suo motu exercise of jurisdiction with reference to its origin and background. It also highlights the purpose behind prescribing the period of limitation and fixing the outer limit of time for final disposal of such petitionsbut what is the occasion for the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction has not been elaborately dealt with. We, therefore, while summing up hold that suo motu revisional jurisdiction as vested in the High Court as well as of District Court may be exercised if conditions for its exercise are satisfied notwithstanding the revision petition is filed beyond the .Period prescribed."
7. It thus appears that the above conclusion was drawn from the pronouncement made in the case of Mst. Banori v. Jilani (PLD 2010 SC 1186). It will be helpful to see what was held in that case. A three Member Bench headed by the then Chief Justice of Pakistan had laid down a number of principles regarding entertainment of revisions petitions and exercise of revisional powers by the Court. The principles, eight in numbers, are listed in Paragraphs Nos.8 and 13 of the judgment numbered as Clauses (a) to (h) in each Paragraph. Relevant for our purpose are Clauses (c), (d) and (e) in Paragraph No,8 and (a), (b) and (c) in Paragraph No,13. In Paragraph No,8, after reproducing the provisions of section 115, C.P.C. The Court deduced therefrom eight principles. Clauses (c), (d) and
(e) state:- "(c) that no law prescribed any limit of time for such a Court within which such an error could be rectified;
(d) that there was, however, no bar on any person, laying, through an application any information before the revisional court about any such error, illegality or irregularity in any of the decisions of the subordinate courts and seeking correction thereof;
(e) that a person making such an application had, however, been bound to do so within ninety days of the decision sought to be revised;"
8. The ultimate conclusions drawn were mentioned in Paragraph No,13 of the judgment, the Court after taking into consideration the judgment in the case of Province of Punjab v. Muhammad Farooq (PLD 2010 SC 582) held:-- "(a) any person seeking revision of a decision made by a subordinate court could do so through an application to be filed by him for the purpose;
(b) such an application was required to be accompanied by the copies of the pleadings, other documents and by a copy of the order sought to be revised;
(c) suck an application was to be filed within ninety days of the decision in question;
(d) ......................................................
(e) .........................................................
(f)
(g) ..............................................................................
(h) ..............................................................................
9. Whether in Paragraph No,8 or No,13 of the judgment, it was clearly declared that an application by an aggrieved party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Court must be filed within 90 days.
In Hafeez Ahmad's case (supra) as well it was never declared that there was no time limitation for an aggrieved person to move the Court for exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The hurdle of limitation was not done away with. If the argument of the learned Assistant Advocate-General is accepted that a time barred revision petition must be entertained, heard and decided by the High Court in its suo motu jurisdiction in the same manner as a petition filed within time, the second proviso to subsection (1) of section 115 of C.P.C. Would be rendered redundant. Obviously the pronouncement in the case of Hafeez Ahmad (supra) cannot be construed so as to lead to such a consequence. The very adjudication by the Court of the question posed in the leave granting order regarding application of certain provisions of the Limitation Act to the filing of the revision petitions had proceeded on the premise that time limitation was relevant to the filing of such petitions.
10. The revisional suo motu powers had earlier been discussed by this Court in Haji Rehmdil v. The Province of Balochistan (1999 SCM R 1060) wherein it was recognized that section 115(1), C.P.C.
Confers two distinct kinds of jurisdiction; one the normal where the revisional powers are invoked by an aggrieved party and the other where the Court acts on its own motion. More recently in the case of Province of Punjab through Collector T.T. Singh and others v. Muhammad Farooq and others (PLD 2010 SC 582) after drawing the said distinction it was held:- "It is a matter of commonsense and simple logic that if such power is vested in a High Court, it should not be restricted by any period of limitation. So it does when section 115, C.P.C. Was originally enacted. The controversy seems to have cropped up because of the amendment in the year 1992 when, through second proviso, a period of 90 days was fixed for filing a revision petition, A plain perusal of first and second proviso would indicate that a limitation of 90 days is relevant only when some Revision petition is filed by some person or party to the proceedings. Such impediment is non-existent when Court itself exercises the power of Revision under subsection (1) of section 115, C.P.C."
11. Even before the incorporation of the second proviso to section 115, C.P.C. By the amendment in the year 1992, prescribing the 90 days period for filing application, a practice had evolved in the High Courts not to entertain revision petitions filed beyond the period of 90 .Days of the passage of the impugned judgment and order. Reference may be made to some of the case-law where such practice was recognized not only by the High Court but by this Court as well. In the case of Riasat Ali v. Muhammad Jaffar Khan (1991 SCM R 496) it was held:-- "6. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the presentation of a revision petition in the Limitation Act. The Lahore High Court has for many years adopted a thumb rule of 90 days within which revision, petitions should be filed, failing which the discretion may not be exercised in the petitioner's favour on grounds of unreasonable delay."
Later in the case of Abid Hussain v. Aziz Fatima (PLD 1995 SC 399) the Court recognized the practice by observing:-- " ...... ..No doubt no period of limitation has been provided by the law for filing a revision before the High Court, but this difficulty was ultimately resolved by this Court by granting its approval to the practice earlier adopted by the Lahore High Court of fixing the period of ninety days for filing a revision before the High Court."
12. The principle laid down in Riasat Ali v. Muhammad Jaffar Khan (ibid) was also followed in Muhammad Mian v. Syed Shamimullah (1995 SCM R 69), where this Court had referred to 90 days period as a practice adopted by the High Courts. In this contest three judgments from the Lahore High Court also deserve to be mentioned in the same context, namely, Akbar Khan v. Muhammad Khan (1990 CLC 1828), Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Sadiq (1987 CLC 1631) and Ch. Maqsood Ahmad v. Khalid Pervaiz (1990 CLC 1536).
13. In the case of Government of N. -W.F.P. v. Abdul Malik (1994 SCM R 833) Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian, as he then was, stated the rationale why the High Courts prescribed the 90 days time limit for filing revision petition.
"9. We are in respectful agreement with the above two judgments of this Court. We are also inclined to hold that though there is no period prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act for filing a civil revision but it is to be filed diligently within a period of 90 days, but the same can also be filed after the expiry of 90 days provided the petitioner makes out a good case for condoning the delay. If we were to take a contrary view, it will prolong the agony of the adversary who succeeded in the Court below as the losing party will be able to file a revision petition at any time at his sweet will. This will run counter to the basic concept of justice, i,e, litigation should be finalized as early as possible without any delay."
' The revision petition by the High Court in the above case was dismissed before the addition of the second proviso to section 115, C.P.C. However by the time the judgment was delivered by this Court in the year 1994, the statutory amendment had been brought about. The Court thus observed that by the said amendment the practice that prevailed in the High Courts was accorded statutory recognition.
14. It follows from the above discussion that there are two situations in which the Court can exercise its revisional powers; on its own motion; or on the application by an aggrieved party. The former is the general supervisory power and discretionary in nature where the Court is empowered to examine the record of any case decided by a Court subordinate to it to rectify any error or irregularity. Such power is exercisable where the Court itself finds any error of the nature provided in section 115, C.P.C. Without there being any right in favour of a party aggrieved of an order or judgment of a subordinate Court. However, when the revisional jurisdiction is invoked by an aggrieved party, it is subject to the statutory provisions now incorporated in section 115, C.P.C. The second proviso thereto in unambiguous terms lays down the period of limitation for applying to the Court by mentioning that "provided that such application shall be made within ninety days". Like all other statutory provisions prescribing time period in which a matter is to be brought before the Court the second proviso to section 115(1), C.P.C. To be applied, with the same vigour. Thus, where an aggrieved party seeks redressal against the Judgment or order through the revisional powers of the Court under section 115, C.P.C. He has ninety days to make the application, failing which the application is liable to be dismissed.
15. The High Court had thus rightly dismissed the revision petition of the appellant as the same was not filed within 90 days, prescribed in the second proviso to section 115, C.P.C. This appeal, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed.