QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J.--- In six of these petitions (C.Ps. Nos.226 of 2012, 893 of 2011, 425 of 2012, 117 of 2013, 205 of 2013, 761 of 2013) the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 has been assailed and it is contended that it is ultra vires the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan ("the Constitution"). In C.P.
No,725 of 2011 (and also C.P. No,893 of 2011), the Government of Balochistan is called upon to constitute the Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") pursuant to subsection (1) of section 25 of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 ("BIRA"). In C.P. No,902 of 2013 the question is whether the Provincial Trade Union Registrar under BIRA could have registered the NADRA Employees Union Balochistan in respect of a Federal body (NADRA) and in the presence of a Federal law, i,e, the Industrial Relations Act, 2011 whereas in C.P. No,479 of 2013 the said trade union seeks directions pursuant to its registration. In view of the same and interconnected legal questions in these petitions they are being decided together by this common judgment. The brief facts of each petition are as under:---
(1) C.P. No,226 of 2012: ' Mr. Muhammad Raman Achakzai, who used to be the Deputy General Secretary of the 'Pakistan Workers Federation', set up the 'Pakistan Workers Federation Balochistan' (the petitioner, and alleged that the 'Pakistan Workers Federation' had become 'defunct' after the Eighteen Amendment and sought to, "declare that I.R.A., 2012 [the Industrial Relations Act, 2012] is ultra of the Constitution"; consequently, the election proceedings initiated by the National Industrial Relations Commission ("NIRC") and Registrar of Trade Unions (NIRC) were "null and void of no legal effect" and sought a direction against the Pakistan Workers Federation to submit details of the funds received and to distribute the same to all the provinces.
(2) C.P. No,725 of 2011: ' The petitioner is the 'Quetta Supply Company Ltd. Labour Union' and states that section 25 of BIRA requires the Government of Balochistan to "constitute an Industrial Relations Commission" but the same was not set up, therefore, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, to declare that the President (Mr. Muhammad Ramzan Achakzai, who is the petitioner in C.P. No,226 of 2012) of the 'Pakistan WAPDA Hydro Electric Union Balochistan' is an 'officer' and not a 'worker' and therefore could not be the President of the said union. The reply filed by the Government of Balochistan conceded that it had not constituted the IRC as it was wanted to amend BIRA and transfer the powers of IRC to the labour court and the labour appellate tribunal on the pattern of the other provinces. However, till date the said amendments have not been made to BIRA.
(3) C.P. No,893 of 2011: ' The petitioner is the 'WAPDA Hydro Electric Union Balochistan' and seeks a declaration that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is unconstitutional in its application to the provinces and its scope is limited to the extent of the Islamabad Capital Territory. The petitioner also seeks the constitution of IRC pursuant to section 25 of BIRA, and to restrain the Registrar Trade Union, Government of Balochistan (respondent 5) "from initiating any proceeding with regard to referendum in absence of IRC". 'QESCO Labour Union Balochistan' submitted an application to be arrayed as a respondent, which was granted by consent, and it was arrayed as respondent No,6 and submitted its counter affidavit alleging that the Quetta Electric Supply Company Limited ("QESCO") is a sole establishment situated within the territorial limits of Balochistan and as such its employees are to be governed by BIRA, therefore, the holding of referendum should not be restrained. The Government of Balochistan in its reply conceded that the IRC has not been constituted since it was seeking to amend BIRA to transfer the powers of IRC to the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal.
(4) C.P. No,425 of 2012: ' The petitioner herein too is the 'WAPDA Hydro Electric Union Balochistan' and sought a declaration that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is unconstitutional; consequently, the further declaration that NIRC and the Registrar of Trade Unions. NIRC's order certifying 'Pakistan WAPDA Employees Pegam Union' (respondent 7) as the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) was "null and void". 'QESCO Labour Union Balochistan' submitted an application to be arrayed as a respondent, which was granted by consent, and it was arrayed as respondent 8, and it and respondent 7 have opposed the petition.
(5) C.P. No,117 of 2013: ' The petitioner who is 'QESCO Ittehad Worker Union' has sought a declaration that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is ultra vires the Constitution after the amendments made to the Constitution by the Eighteenth Amendment, and that the said law also contravenes the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.P. No,24 of 2011 (AIR League of PIAC Employees v. Federation of Pakistan, 2011 SCM R 1254).
(6) C.P. No, 205 of 2013: ' This petition has been filed by 'QESCO Labour Union' seeking a declaration that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is ultra vires the Constitution, after the amendments made to the Constitution by the Eighteenth Amendment, and that the, said law also contravenes the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR League of PIAC Employees (above). A declaration that NIRC has "no jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding of referendum" has also been sought.
(7) C.P. No,761 of 2013: ' This petition has been filed by 'Pak Telecom Union Balochistan Quetta seeking a declaration that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is ultra vires the Constitution, after the amendments made to the Constitution by the Eighteenth Amendment, and that the said law also contravenes the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR League of PIAC Employees (above); consequently, the NIRC and Registrar of Trade Unions (NIRC) "have become defunct". It is also sought, that, "the elections/referendum" called by Registrar of Trade Unions (NIRC) is "of no legal effect to the extent of province of Balochistan".
(8) C.P. No,479 of 2013: ' This petition has been filed by the NADRA Employees Union Balochistan seeking a direction against the National Database Registration Authority and its Director General, "to consider the petitioner union in NADRA Balochistan region as CBA and entertain the genuine grievances in accordance with BIRA, 2010." A declaration that section 43 of the National Database Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ("the NADRA Ordinance") is ultra vires to the Constitution has also been sought.
Section 43 of the NADRA Ordinance stipulates as under:--- "The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 shall not apply to or in relation to the Authority or any person in the service of the Authority. " .
' The referred to Authority is defined in Section 2 (b) as the National Database Registration Authority ("NADRA").
(9) C.P. No,902 of 2013: ' This petition has been filed by NADRA against the NADRA Employees Union Balochistan and the Registrar Trade Unions Balochistan under BIRA, assailing the registration of NADRA Employees Union Balochistan on the ground that a provincial functionary could not register a trade union in respect of a Federal body (NADRA) under BIRA and in doing so contravened the National Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and the same is without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. ' The Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was enacted by Parliament and received assent of the President on 14th March, 2012, and was published in the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary of 14th March, 2012. The Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 was passed by the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan on 14th October, 2010 and assented to by the Governor on 15th October, 2010, but was published in the Balochistan Gazette of 22nd February, 2011. Notices under Order XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure were issued to the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan and the Advocate General Balochistan. Unfortunately, despite the importance of the issues involved, neither the Attorney General nor the Advocate-General attended. However, we had appointed Messrs Raza Rabbani and Mahmood Abdul Ghani, Advocates as amici and both of them rendered valuable assistance. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, learned amicus, supported the challenge to the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and submitted a written note and also his book 'Labour and Industrial Jurisprudence' (published by Pakistan Law Rouse, second edition June, 2012). Mr. Raza Rabbani opposed the challenge to the law and stated that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was in accordance with the Constitution. He also submitted a written synopsis and provided us 'The Report on the Constitution (Eighteenth) Amendment Bill, 2010' prepared by the 'Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms' (undated, published by the National Assembly of Pakistan, printed by Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, Islamabad). A photocopy of a document titled 'Final Report of the Implementation Commission constituted under Article 270-AA of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan' (published by the Inter Provincial Coordination Division of the Secretariat of Implementation Commission) was also submitted.
3. Mr. Muhammad Aamir Rana, the learned counsel for the petitioners in five petitions, led the attack against the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and the other counsel challenging the said law adopted his arguments. He contended that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution as it had purported to legislate in respect of trade unions and industrial and labour disputes, which after the amendments brought about by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 ("Eighteenth Amendment") to the Constitution was within the exclusive domain of the provinces. He stated that before the Eighteenth Amendment Item 27 of the Concurrent Legislative List (contained in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution) mentioned, "Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes", however, the Eighteenth Amendment omitted the Concurrent Legislative List and the entries contained therein, including Item 27, from the Fourth Schedule with effect from 19th April, 2010. He referred to clause (a) of Article 142 of the Constitution which stipulates that, "Parliament shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative List" and that clause (c) of Article 142 stipulates that, "Parliament shall not, have power to make-laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List". Reference was also made to Article 144 of the Constitution, which provides for legislation by Parliament in respect of any matter not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List if "one or more Provincial Assemblies pass resolution to the effect" and stated that the Balochistan Provincial Assembly had not passed a resolution in this regard that could have empowered Parliament to legislate in respect of trade unions and labour disputes.
4. Mr. Rana also referred to Article 37(i) of the Constitution (Principles of Policy Chapter), which requires that the State shall, "decentralise the Government Administration so as to facilitate expeditious disposal of its business to meet the convenience and requirements of the public."
Reference was also made to the second preamble of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment)
Act, 2010, reproduced hereunder:-- "And whereas the people of Pakistan have relentlessly struggled for democracy and for attaining the ideals of a Federal, Islamic, democratic, parliamentary and modern progressive welfare State, wherein the rights of the citizens are secured and the Provinces have equitable share in the Federation."
' Reliance was placed upon the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR League of PIAC Employees v. Federation of Pakistan (2011 SCM R 1254) and the judgment dated 12th April, 2012 of a learned Single Judge of the Hon'ble Lahore Court in the case of Imran Ali Shah v.
Government of Pakistan (2013 PLC 143). The note submitted by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, the learned amicus curiae, was also relied upon.
5. The note submitted by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, the learned amicus, contained in detail what Mr. Rana had urged reference was made to paragraph 18 of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR League of PIAC Employees (above) and that even the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court must be abided by as Article 189 of the Constitution stipulates that the same is also binding on all courts in Pakistan. It was further contended that not only is the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ultra vices to the Constitution but, "is also in clear breach and violation and in contempt of the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of AIR League of PIAC Employees"/. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment in the case of Imran Ali Shah (above) and order of this court in the case of Merck (Pvt.) Ltd v. Merck Employees Union (SBLR 2012 Bal. 89).
6. Mr. Raza Rabbani brought a rare insight into the deliberations as he was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms (herein after referred to as "the Committee") whose report dated 31st March, 2010 resulted in the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010.
The Committee comprised of 26 Members representing all political parties, including those political parties which did not have representation in Parliament.
' We were informed that the first meeting of the Committee took place on 25th June, 2009, when the Committee elected its Chairman, namely Mr. Raza Rabbani. Mr. Rabbani stated that all the decisions of the Committee were by consensus and only notes of reiteration were recorded by 'dissenters'. The Committee proposed 102 amendments to 97 Articles of the Constitution, primarily with a view to do away with the mischief of the Eighth and Seventeenth Amendments to the Constitution that had been enacted by dictators, Section 96 of the Constitution (Eighteen Amendment) Act, 2010 substituted Article 270-AA; the earlier Article 270-AA had been validated and substituted by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003 and had been inserted by the Legal Framework Order (Chief Executive Order No,24 of 2002).
7. Mr. Raza Rabbani referred to clauses (6), (8) and (9) of Article 270-AA, which are reproduced hereunder:-- "(6) Notwithstanding omission of the Concurrent Legislative List by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, all laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the said List (including Ordinances, Orders, rules, bye-laws, regulations and notifications and other legal instruments having the force of law) in force in Pakistan or any part thereof, or having extra - territorial operation, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, shall continue to remain in force until altered, repealed or amended by the competent authority."
"(8) On the omission of the Concurrent Legislative List, the process of devolution of the matters mentioned in the said List to the Provinces shall be completed by the thirtieth day of June, two thousand and eleven."
"(9) For purposes of the devolution process under clause (8), the Federal Government shall constitute an Implementation Commission as it may deem fit within fifteen days of the commencement of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010."
' The Implementation Commission, referred to in Article 270-AA(9), held 68 meetings and devolved 17 ministries in three phases, as per notifications issued by the Federal Cabinet Establishment Division dated 2nd December, 2010 (First Phase), 5th April, 2011 (Second Phase) and 29th June, 2011 (Third Phase). The process of devolution was required to be completed by the 30th June, 2011, as stipulated in Article 270-AA (8), thus stood concluded one day before the last date.
' Mr. Rabbani stated that, to the extent that Parliament can make laws for Islamabad Capital Territory there is no objection or challenge to the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. He submitted that Parliament can also legislate in respect of the subjects mentioned in the Federal Legislative List including Item 31 of Part I in respect of 'corporation' and matters related therewith.
' He also referred to Items 4 and 13 of Part II of the Fourth Schedule respectively "Council of Common Interests" and "Inter provincial matters and co-ordination". Article 154 of the Constitution provides that, "the Council shall formulate and regulate the policies in relation to matters in Part II of the Federal Legislative List and shall exercise supervision and control over related institutions" and that the highlighted words are noteworthy. Part II of the Fourth Schedule includes 'railways'
(Item 1), 'mineral oil and natural gas' (item 2), 'development of industries' (item 3), 'electricity' (item 4), 'major ports' (item 5) all regulatory authorities established under a Federal Law' (Item 6).
' In his opinion Parliament could legislate in respect of inter or trans-provincial bodies or institutions that covered any of the said items. Reference was then made to Article 38(a), which requires that the State shall ensure "equitable adjustment of rights between employers and employees" and that the definition of 'State' is to be read in the context, and could mean Federal Government/Parliament or a Provincial Government/Provincial Assembly (Article 7 of the Constitution); however, as "inter-provincial matters and coordination" fell within the domain of Parliament the 'State' means Parliament, which is competent to enact laws in respect whereof.
8. Mr. Rabbani stated that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is a valid piece of legislation and is not ultra vires the Constitution: In this regard he referred to its preamble and section 2(x) and section 2(xxxii), which respectively define the term 'establishment' and 'trans-provincial', reproduced hereunder:--- "An Act to consolidate and rationalizes the law relating to formation of trade unions, and improvement of relations between employers and workmen in the Islamabad Capital Territory and in trans provincial establishments and industry."
"(x) 'Establishment' means any office, firm, factory, society under taking, company, shop or enterprises which employs workmen directly or through a contractor for the purpose of carrying, on any business or industry and includes all its departments and branches in the Islamabad Capital Territory or falling in more than one Province, whether situated in the same place or in different places and except in section 62 includes a collective bargaining unit, if any, constituted by any establishment or group of establishments; "(xxxii) 'trans-provincial' means any establishment, group of establishments, industry having its branches in more than one province."
' Mr. Rabbani, the learned amicus, stated that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is applicable only in respect of the Islamabad Capital Territory and to those establishments that are in more than one province (section 53, section 54, explanation of subsection (5) of section 57, sub-clause (a) of subsection (ii) of section 66 and section 88). He referred to the following passage from A.D. Dicey's 'Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution' (third chapter titled 'Parliamentary Sovereignty and Federalism' at page 143): "A federal State is a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power with the Maintenance of "State rights." The end aimed at fixes the essential character of federalism. For the method by which federalism attempts to reconcile the apparently inconsistent claims of national sovereignty of a constitution under which the ordinary powers of sovereignty are elaborately divided between the common or national government and the separate States. The details of this division vary under every different federal constitution, but the general principle on which it should rest is obvious. Whatever concerns the nation as a whole should be placed under the control of the national government. All matters which are not primarily of common interest should remain in the hands of the several States...."
' With reference to trade unions that are established in respect of inter-provincial establishments and factories Mr. Rabbani referred to his note wherein the following important aspects were mentioned:-- "(a) That if trade unions were to be registered in each Province under their respective IRAs. it would divide the trade union movement, which would have adverse effect and was not acceptable to the various Labour Federations in the country.
(b) Such a situation would create confusion and chaos. As a consequence, in one institution or establishment or a factory or an office or a unit in various provinces, that many unions would, be functioning under their respective laws.
(c) ' This would mean that the management of these institutions would have to enter into a separate Charter of Demands with each union individually as they would be registered separately in each province.
(d) This would create an absurd situation and chaos would prevail. Therefore, as in similar matters such as the "Drug Regulatory Authority" was formed to have unified standards and prices of drugs throughout the country". The Environmental Authority" was envisaged to give implementation to the various International Agreements entered into by Pakistan. Similarly, it was consciously, decided that those establishment, institutions, factories etc., which were trans-provincial in nature and which were covered under the Federal Legislative List Part I and Part II should have one unified law."
9. That it would be appropriate to trace the constitutional history of the subject in Pakistan and also consider the constitutional provisions in India. Before the Eighteenth Amendment the Constitution of Pakistan had two Legislative Lists, respectively the Federal Legislative List, which listed those subjects in respect whereof the Federation could legislate, and the Concurrent Legislative List contained the subjects in respect whereof either the Federation or a Province could legislate; and any subject which was not found in either of these two lists was within the exclusive domain of the provinces. The Concurrent Legislative List, included Items 26, 27, 28, 30 and 31, which related to trade unions, labour disputes and matters pertaining to labour welfare.
' In the Government of India Act, 1935 trade unions, labour disputes and labour matters were mentioned in Items 26, 27 and 29 of Part II of the concurrent Legislative List, which was placed in the Seventh Schedule thereof and was controlled by subsection (2) of section 126 of the Government of India Act, 1935, reproduced hereunder:-- "The executive authority of the Federation shall also extend to the giving of directions to a Province as to the carrying into execution therein of any Act of the Federal legislature which relates to a matter specified in Part II of the Concurrent Legislative List and authorizes the giving of such directions: ' Provided that a Bill or amendment which proposes to authorize the giving of any such directions as aforesaid shall not be introduced into or moved in the Federal Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General."
' In the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956 labour related matters and trade unions were mentioned in Item 5 of Part II of the Concurrent Legislative List in its Fifth Schedule, which was controlled by Article 126(2)(d) and stated that, as to the carrying into execution in the province of any Act of Parliament which relates to a matter enumerated in Part II of the concurrent Legislative List and authorizes the giving of such directions" is within the executive authority of the Federation.
' The Constitution of Republic of Pakistan, 1962 in its Third Schedule enumerated items that the Central Legislature could legislate upon. The subjects pertaining to labour, including trade unions, were not mentioned in the said Schedule therefore the same were residuary subjects and fell within the competence of the provincial legislatures. However, the Third Schedule was controlled by Article 131, paragraph (c) of clause (b) whereof stipulated that in the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan the Central Legislature shall have power to make laws in respect of any matter not enumerated in the Third Schedule.
' The Constitution of India contains three legislative lists: List I which is the Union list, List II which is the State [our provinces] list and List III which is the Concurrent List. Trade unions (item 22) are mentioned in the Concurrent List; therefore, the Union [our Federation] also has powers to legislate in respect thereof.
10. That it may also be appropriate to refer to the history of the industrial relations laws in Pakistan.
The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was enacted to amend and consolidate the laws relating to reformation of trade unions and to achieve uniformity; the East Pakistan Trade Unions Act, 1965, the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965, the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 and the West Pakistan Trade Unions Ordinance, 1968 were repealed in terms of section 67 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, whilst saving the existing trade unions which were deemed to be registered under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Thereafter, section 22-A was inserted in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 by the Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 and the National Industrial Relations Commission ("NIRC") was constituted, for settlement of disputes between employers and workers The National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1973 promulgated the mechanism for the functioning of NIRC. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was repealed by section 80 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, however, all registered trade unions, were saved and deemed to have been registered under the new Ordinance. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 was in turn repealed by the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, however, once again the registered trade unions were saved and were deemed to have been registered under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. Section 87(3) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 provided that, unless repealed earlier, the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 shall seize to exist on 30th April, 2010. Thus, by virtue of the said sundown clause the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 stood repealed on 30th April, 2010.
11. That before considering the constitutionality of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR League of PIAC Employees (above) needs examination since all those assailing the said law relied upon it. However, the order passed therein does not cover the present controversy and the Hon'ble Supreme Court states as much:--- "27. Now turning towards the submission of the learned amicus curiae on the vires of Provincial Labour Laws on the ground that there are many Institutions/Corporations which have their branches all over the country and there were country wide Trade Unions but now Trade Union can only be registered under the legislation of a specific province. It is to be noted that instant proceedings have been initiated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution with a limited purpose of having a declaration that. IRA, 2008 on the basis of Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment stood protected and continued till 30th June, 2011, therefore, the vires of the same cannot be considered in such proceedings. However, as stated earlier Article 144(1) of the Constitution has provided mechanism for making central legislation in respect of matters not covered in the Federal Legislative List." (paragraph 27, page 1279)
"29. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, it is held that IRA, 2008 ceased to continue in force w,e,f, 30th April, 2010, as a consequence whereof petition is dismissed." (paragraph 29, page 1279)
' The Hon'ble Supreme Court's order concluded by stating that the proceedings had been initiated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution with the, "limited purpose of having a declaration that IRA, 2008 on the basis of Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment stood protected and continued till 30th June, 2011, therefore, the vires of the same cannot be considered in such proceeding." The Hon'ble Supreme Court consciously left open the question that we are faced with Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that every decision of the Supreme Court to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law is binding on all other courts in Pakistan, however, the question/principle of law we are considering, i,e, the constitutionality of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was not determined by the Supreme Court. The Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was also not in the field at the time of the pronouncement of the order by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded by holding that the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 shall seize to continue to be in force with effect from 30th April, 2010, as was stipulated in the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 itself.
12. That none of the petitioners have assailed the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 on the ground that any fundamental right of the petitioners had been violated. The petitions in fact are disputes between different groups of workers and/or trade unions. Whilst vigorously contending that Parliament had encroached upon the domain of the Provincial Legislatures, the learned counsel for the petitioners did not assert that the Balochistan Legislature or the Government of Balochistan took umbrage with the purported intrusion, let alone the Government of Balochistan assailing the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. On its part the Government of Balochistan, even after expiry of over three and half years, has failed to constitute the Industrial Relations Commission pursuant to section 25(1) of BIRA; the Government has instead proposed to abolish the said Commission by amending the law.
13. That amongst the different jurisdictions enjoyed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it also has original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of every other court, with regard to, "any dispute between any two or more governments" (Article 184(1) of the Constitution). Article 143 of the Constitution attends to inconsistencies between Federal and provincial laws and the said Article provides that if any provision of an Act of a Provincial Assembly is repugnant to any provision of an Act of Parliament, which Parliament "is competent to enact", then the Act of Parliament shall prevail over the Act of the Provincial Assembly, which shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void. The question however before us is not whether BIRA is repugnant to the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 but whether the Federal Legislature or Parliament could have enacted the Industrial Relations Act, 2012.
14. The Industrial Relations Act, 2012 has legislated in respect of Islamabad Capital Territory and in respect of such establishments and industry which are in more than one province, which it terms as 'trans-provincial'. The challenge to the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is on the ground that it is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. This point has not been specifically decided as yet by any High Court, though references have been made to it in a number of decisions. In this regard reliance was placed on the case of Imran Ali Shah (above), however, the same did not consider the constitutionality of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The said judgment was concerned with the legality of notifications issued by the Cabinet Division with regard to the Employees Old Age Benefit Institution ("EOBI"), which were held to be violative of the Constitution and of no legal effect; however, certain observations were made in the said judgment with regard to the omission of the Concurrent Legislative List and the consequences of the Eighteenth Amendment. As regards this court's decision in the Merck case (above) the National Industrial Relations Commission's Quetta Bench had passed an order on 31st December, 2010, i,e, before the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and the short order of this court held that the NIRC had passed the impugned order dated 31st December 2010, i,e, after the last date of the operation of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 (30th April, 2010) and before the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012; the decision therefore is not relevant in the determination of the present controversy. The Sindh High Court's judgment in the case of Shaheen Airport Services v. National Industrial Relations Commission (2011 PLC 105) was delivered before the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, however, certain observations were made therein (paragraph 22, pages 119 and 120) which drew an analogy with the Commerce Clause in the Constitution of the United States.
15. That the task before us is to determine whether Parliament could enact the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, after the Eighteenth Amendment had omitted the Concurrent Legislative List, including Items 26, 27, 28, 30 and 31 which related to trade unions, labour disputes and matters pertaining to labour welfare. However, the subjects that remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, and are relevant include Item 31 in Part I and Items 3 and 13 in Part II of the Federal Legislative List, reproduced hereunder: "31. Corporation, that is to say, the incorporation, regulation and winding-up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations, but not including corporations owned or controlled by a Province and carrying on business only within that Province, or co-operative societies, and of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to a Province, but not including universities."
"3. Development of industries, where development under Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest; institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations administered or managed by the Federal Government immediately before the commencing day, including the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation; all undertakings, projects and schemes of such institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations, industries, projects and undertakings owned wholly or partially by the Federation or by a corporation set up by the Federation:7 [emphasis added] "13. Inter-provincial matters and co-ordination."
' The above items may for the sake of brevity be referred respectively as the "Corporations Clause", the "Federally Controlled Institutions Clause" and the "Inter-province Clause". If the subject of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 is covered by any of these Clauses then Parliament can legislate in respect thereof. However, before determining the constitutionality of the said Act it would be useful and helpful to examine how the courts have addressed the issue of interpretation of legislative lists.
16. In the case of United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (AIR 1941 FC 16) the legislative lists in the Government of India Act, 1935 were under consideration. The judges of the Federal Court who heard the case gave their opinions with regard to different aspects of the case. Chief Justice Maurice Gwyer observed:--- "I think however that none of the items in the lists to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. I deprecate any attempt to enumerate in advance all the matters which are to be included under any of the more general descriptions; it will be sufficient and much wiser to determine each case as and when it comes before the court."
(page.25 column 2) Justice Sulaiman wrote:--- "If there are two possible interpretations, it is the duty of a Court to accept that one which is more reasonable, more consistent with ordinary practice and less likely to produce impracticable results." (page 31)
"Their Lordships of the Privy Council have repeatedly stressed the fact that we must look to the pith and substance of the Act in order to ascertain its true nature and character. As laid down in (1882)
7 AC 829, the true nature and character of the legislation in the particular instance under discussion must always be determined, in order to 'ascertain the class of subject to which, it really belongs. In (1937) AC 355 at p.367; Lord Atkin laid down:--- ' In other words, Dominion legislation, even though it deals with Dominion property, may yet be so framed a to invade rights within the province, or encroach upon the classes of subjects which are reserved to provincial competence. It is not necessary that it should be a colourable device, or a pretence. If on the true view of the legislation it is found that in reality in pith and substance the legislation invades civil rights within the province, or in respect of other classes of subjects otherwise encroaches upon the provincial field, the legislation will be invalid." (pages 35 and 36)
' And from the judgment of Justice Varadachariar the following portion is helpful:--- "A point was made by the learned counsel for the respondents that S.100, Constitution Act used the expression "with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the list" and not words like "relating to the matters enumerated in the list " It seems to me that the words "with respect" are not by any means less comprehensive than the words "relating to." ... The significance of these expressions may become important in a case where the impugned legislation contains a number of provisions relating to different matters and a question arises as to whether one set of provisions can be described as "passed in respect of a forbidden subject" or can be considered as only incidentally affecting such a subject while forming part of an Act which in the main deals with an authorised subject." (page 45)
' The same bench of the Federal Court in the case of Subramanyan v. Muttuswami (AIR 1941 FC 47) observed that: "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with a subject in one list touches also upon a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely interwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its 'pith and substance', or its 'true nature and character' for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that" (page 51, column 1)
' In re: C. P. Motor Spirit Act (AIR 1939 FC 1) the Federal Court was called upon to determine whether the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of. Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 or any part thereof was ultra vires the provincial Legislature. Gwyer C.J. in his opinion (pages 4-5), stated, that:--- "I conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose 'duty' it is to interpret it; but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the purpose of, supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors A Federal Court will not strengthen, but only derogate from its position, if it seeks to do anything but declare the law; but it may rightly reflect that a Constitution of government is a living and organic thing, which of all instruments has the greatest claim to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat." [which means, 'That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed'] ' Sulaiman J, concurred with the opinion of Gwyer C.J. and set out the principle which emerged from the precedents, as under:--- "In a Federal Constitution, Provincial Legislatures are independent within the spheres allowed to them and within the prescribed limits. They are coordinate Governments and possess full legislative power and capacity to pass laws, so far as the matters assigned to the Provinces are concerned. The Provinces are entrusted with the exclusive authority in certain specified Matters, not of an all-India concern, but of Provincial interest." (page 27)
17. That the constitutions of both Pakistan and India, comprising of Provinces and states respectively are modeled on the written American Constitution where Congress and the States have their separate legislative domains and the courts have had to interpret competing jurisdiction clauses. Article 1, section 8., Clause 3 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power, "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" (hereinafter the "Commerce Clause"). The Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that any powers that are not enumerated in the Constitution are reserved for the States. However, Congress has often used the Commerce Clause to make federal laws in matters that do not appear 'to regulate commerce'.
18. In the 1941 case of United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (312 U.S. 100) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was assailed. The Act established a minimum wage and maximum hours for employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce and imposed criminal penalties for violations of the Act. Darby, a lumber manufacturer, was arrested for violations under the Act in respect of some goods shipped interstate. The District Court held that the Act sought to regulate manufacturing activity within a state and was therefore Unconstitutional for exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court however held that Congress has the power to establish and enforce labor standards for the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce even though manufacture was not interstate commerce because interstate commerce should not facilitate competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions and Congress may exercise power over interstate activities as a means to exercising its legitimate power to regulate interstate commerce. The Tenth Amendment was held not to be a limitation upon the authority of Congress to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote:--- "Such legislation has often been sustained with respect to powers ... when the means chosen, although not themselves within the granted powers, were nevertheless deemed appropriate aids to the accomplishment of some purpose within an admitted power of the national government ... ."
' The Supreme Court overruled its majority view in Hammer v. Dagenhart (22 US 1) and upheld the Minority view of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, which Justice Stone categorized as "the powerful and now classic dissent". The facts of the Hammer case were that, the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 prohibited interstate commerce of any merchandise that had been made by children under the age of fourteen, or merchandise that had been made in factories where children between the ages of 14 and 16 worked for more than eight hours a day worked overnight, or worked more than sixty hours a week. A District Court ruled the statute unconstitutional, and the case went to the Supreme Court to consider the question whether Congress had the authority to regulate commerce of goods Manufactured by children under the age 14. The majority held that it could not because manufacture did not constitute interstate commerce. However, Justice Holmes classic dissent, which 23 years later became the view of the Supreme Court, was that:--- "... if an act is within the powers specifically conferred upon Congress, it seems to me that it is not made any less constitutional because of the indirect effects that it may have, however obvious it may be that it will have those affects, and that we are not at liberty upon such grounds to hold it void."
".. the statute in question is within the power expressly given to Congress if considered only as to its immediate effects, and that, if invalid, it is so only upon some collateral ground. The statute, confines itself to prohibiting the carriage of certain goods in interstate or foreign commerce.
Congress is given power to regulate such commerce in unqualified terms."
"So I repeat that this statute, in its immediate operation, is clearly within the Congress constitutional power."
"The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products across the state line, they are no longer within their rights."
' The Commerce Clause was also applied to save labour rights in the 1937 case of NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. (301 U.S. 1). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in proceedings under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 concluded that Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation had violated the Act by engaging in unfair labour practices affecting interstate commerce. The defendant argued that the NLRB's actions were unconstitutional because defendant's plants were engaged in manufacturing and not interstate commerce, therefore, Congress had no power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress can regulate activity related to manufacturing that significantly affects interstate commerce and that it can also regulate relations between labor and management under the commerce power.
19. That the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 legislates in respect of establishment and industry which are "trans-provincial", defined as those establishments "having branches in more than one province". The Constitution however uses the term "inter-provincial". In our opinion the two terms, i,e, trans-provincial and inter-provincial, can be used interchangeably and nothing is to be gained by looking for artificial distinction of meanings between them. The real question that requires determination is whether Parliament can legislate in respect of establishment (as defined, above) under the Corporations Clause the Federally Controlled Institutions Clause or the Inter-province Clause. The trade unions which are the subject matter of these petitions are in respect of companies (QESCO and PTCL) and statutory authorities (WAPDA and NADRA) that were set up by the Federation or under Federal laws. The said companies would come within the domain of the Corporations Clause and also of the Federally Controlled Institutions Clause and since PTCL has establishments in all the provinces it would also be covered by the Inter-province Clause. As regards WAPDA it is specifically mentioned in the Federally Controlled Institutions Clause. NADRA would be covered by the Inter-province Clause and so too would PTCL having establishments in all the Provinces.
20. In the case of Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. The Government of N. -W.F.P. (PLD 2002 SC 460) the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that in interpreting the constitutional provisions the approach of the court should be dynamic, progressive and liberal. The petitioners who challenged the constitutionality of the industrial Relations Act, 2012 and even the private respondents appear to have lost sight of the welfare and interest of workers, whose interest they are supposed to be protecting. There are a number 'of companies and statutory corporations that have establishments in more than one province or throughout Pakistan; the underlying assumption of a central bargaining agent and industrial relations is that workers are dealt with in a uniform manner in respect of such companies and statutory corporations. The negotiating power of workers and also their interest will be undermined, if they are dealt with separately or there is more than one collective bargaining agent and different terms of employment and conditions of work are negotiated. Consequently, unfair labour practices on the part of employers would become difficult to contest so too to redress worker grievances. It would also become difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate differences between the employer and workers though a single collective bargaining agent representing the same class of workers in respect of companies and corporations having establishments in more than one province; the determination of a legal and illegal strike or lockout too would be fraught with difficulty. Both the employer and the workers of inter-provincial establishments would face untold complications and problems if there are a number of collective bargaining agents representing the interest of the same class of workers and will "produce impracticable results" which is to be avoided (per Sulaiman, J in United Provinces v.
Atiqa Begum (above) page 31).
21. We need to ensure that the infringement of worker rights do not take place whilst determining disputes between different trade unions. The Principles of Policy (Chapter 2, Part II of the Constitution) requires the State to ensure the promotion of the "economic interests of backward classes" (Article 37(a)), "just and humane conditions of work" (Article 37(e)), raising the "standard of living of workers" (Article 38(a)), the provision of "adequate livelihood with reasonable rest and leisure" (Article 38(b)) and the provision of "basic necessities" (Article 38(d)). These Principles must as far as is practicable be adhered to, and permitting different collective bargaining agents representing the same interest in inter-provincial establishments would detract from the stated Principles.
22. The trade unions, labour disputes and matters pertaining to labour welfare relating to inter- provincial establishments could also be categorized as being incidental or ancillary to the Inter- province Clause, the Federally Controlled Institutions Clause and/or the Corporations Clause. Item 59 of Part I and item 18 of Part II of the Federal Legislative List, specifically provides for "matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in the Federal Legislative List (or the "Matters Incidental Clause"). There is a similar power vesting in the I American Congress-- "To make all laws which shall be necessary and I proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of United States...". In the 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland (17 US 316) the question arose whether the law by which the National.
Bank was created was within the legislative competence of Congress. Chief Justice John Marshall held that though such a power was not specifically granted to Congress it was, "a right incidental to the power [of carrying into execution the sovereign powers], and conducive to its beneficial exercise."
"We do not find the word 'bank', or 'incorporation', we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce--- But it may with great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted with-such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution. ... The government, which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; ... No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them."
"The sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
' Chief Justice Muhammad Haleem, writing for the apex court in Abdur Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 Supreme Court 670), held, that:--- "Although the words 'incidental' and 'ancillary' literally mean things of lesser or subordinate degree or of consequential nature but in the legislative interpretation they mean more than this. While interpreting the words 'incidental' and 'ancillary' in Messrs Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1969 SC 623), it was observed:--- "The items in the legislative list, as was observed in the case of United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum and others are not to be read in any narrow or pedantic sense. Each general word therein should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended within it. These items describe only comprehensive categories of legislation by a word of broad and general meaning."
' Justice Fazal Karim in his definitive two volume book 'Judicial Review of Public Actions' (published by Universal Law Publishing Co. 2006) writes (page 1225, volume 2), that:--- "In sum, the doctrine of 'incidental or ancillary' powers is like the American 'necessary and proper' doctrine a doctrine of implied power and as James Madison put it-- "Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the government by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that whenever the end is required, the means are authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included."
We have already determined that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was within the legislative competence of Parliament, however, the Act would also be saved by the Matters Incidental Clause as trade unions, industrial disputes and worker welfare matters in respect of inter-provincial establishments could be construed as incidental or ancillary to the Corporations Clause, the Federally Controlled Institutions Clause as well as the Inter-province Clause.
23. We therefore conclude that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 could have been enacted by Parliament and that the same is within the legislative domain of Parliament.
24. We now turn to the question raised in two of the petitions (C.Ps. Nos.725 and 893 of 2011), which is to direct the Government of Balochistan to constitute the Industrial Relations Commissions as prescribed in subsection (1) of section 25 of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010, that,'
"The Government shall constitute an Industrial Relations Commission". Mr. Tariq Ali Tahir, the learned Additional Advocate General, informed us that the Government wants to delegate the stipulated powers of the said Commission to the Registrar Trade Union, the Labour Courts or the, Labour Appellate Tribunal as deemed appropriate by amending the said Act. We want to make it clear that we do not question the decision of the Government in this regard nor want to encroach upon the domain of the Balochistan Legislature to amend the law, however, the law as it stands requires the Government to constitute the Commission, therefore, whatever the Government proposes to do it must do sooner rather than later. In decision in this regard continues to create legal complications, and in the Absence of the Commission, and till the law is amended, burdens the High Court with unnecessary petitions. The Government must either constitute the Commission or seek to amend the Act. We are confident that the Government will attend to this matter urgently and no later than ninety days from the date of this judgment.
25. Messrs Misbah-ul-Mustafa and Nadeem Akhtar Afghan, Advocates appeared on behalf of NADRA in C.Ps. Nos.479 and 902 of 2013. They referred to the NADRA. Ordinance and mentioned the functions being performed by the NADRA and stated that the same were extremely important and sensitive and as such section 43 of the NADRA Ordinance had rightly disallowed the application of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 was repealed by the Industrial Relations Act, 2008; section 87(3) whereof provided that it shall seize to exist on 30th April 2010. The law presently governing the subject is the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. It was stated that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 mentioned in section 43 of the NADRA Ordinance, should be deemed to be read as the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 by virtue of section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Reliance was also placed upon the cases of Civil Aviation Authority v.
Union of Civil Aviation Employees' (PLD 1997 SC 781) and M.C.B. Staff Union of Pak. v. Federation of Pakistan (1997 PLC 771).
' The learned counsel for NADRA further stated that NADRA has offices throughout Pakistan and formation of trade unions at the local/provincial level cannot be permitted as the same would be contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and in this regard adopted the arguments of Mr. Raza Rabbani, the learned amicus curiae.
' Mr. Aamir Rana, Advocate appearing for NADRA Employees Union Balochistan stated that section 43 of the NADRA Ordinance was ultra vires Article 17 of the Constitution. He further stated that as the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was also repugnant to the Constitution the said trade union was rightly registered under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010.
26. That since we have determined that the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was properly enacted by Parliament and is not ultra vires the Constitution, therefore, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 (mentioned in section 43 of the NADRA Ordinance), which was succeeded by the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, cannot be categorized as being unconstitutional. NADRA" was setup pursuant to a Federal law, i,e, the National Database Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 and its reach is throughout Pakistan. NADRA also has offices throughout the country, therefore, it would come within the domain of the Inter-province Clause. Inter-provincial (termed as 'trans-provincial') and 'establishment' are respectively defined in clauses (xxxii) and (x) of the National Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (reproduced herein above). Therefore trade unions in respect of NADRA cannot be registered by the Registrar Trade Unions Balochistan under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The NADRA Employee's Union Balochistan was registered on 25th July, 2010, whereas the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 was enacted on 14th March, 2012 and as such on the day when the trade union was registered the Industrial Relations Act; 2012 was in the field. Article 143 of the Constitution provides that Parliament can make laws in respect of the whole of Pakistan and Article 142 stipulates that Parliament shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter within the Federal Legislative List. The Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which also provides for the registration of trade unions in respect of inter-provincial establishments, was validly made, therefore, a trade Union in respect of NADRA could not be registered by the Registrar Trade Unions Balochistan under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. Article 143 of the Constitution further provides that a Federal law will prevail over a provincial law, whether enacted before or after a provincial law. That having concluded that the registration of the NADRA Employees Union Balochistan was ultra vires the law and the Constitution we need not examine the question of the constitutionality of section 43 of the National Database Registration Authority, Ordinance herein.
27. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, C.P. No,226 of 2012, C.P. No,425 of 2012, C.P. No,117 of 2013, C.P. No,205 of 2013 and C.P. No,761 of 2013 are dismissed and C.P. No,725 of 2011 and C.P. No,893 of 2011 are disposed of in terms of paragraph 24 (above). We allow C.P. No,902 of 2013 on the ground that the Registrar Trade Unions Balochistan (respondent No,1 therein) had no legal authority to register the NADRA Employees Union Balochistan (respondent No,2) under the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 and direct the Registrar Trade Unions Balochistan to immediately cancel the registration of the said trade, union. Consequently, C.P. No,479 of 2013 which was filed by a trade union, the registration whereof has been cancelled, stands dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
28. We would like to acknowledge the most able assistance provided by the learned amici. Mr. Raza Rabbani also came to Quetta and provided a rare insight into the working of Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms, the precursor of the Eighteenth Amendment, and the Implementation Commission that followed it.