1. This Revision Application arises out of a suit filed by respondent Mistry Shamsuddin to claim possession of a house bearing No. S. R. 8/2/2 (G-8), situated in Ramji Compound, Narain Veerji Street, Serai Quarters, Karachi. Mesne profits have also been claimed in regard to use and occupation of the said house. The suit was decreed by the Civil Judge, so that the appellants Sarwar Jehan and six others (children of one Abdullah deceased) were directed to hand over possession and also to pay mesne profits. An appeal was filed before the Ist Additional District Judge, Karachi, and the same also failed. Hence this Revision Application.
2. I have heard Mr. Abdul Alim K. Talib for the appellant, Mr. Rehmat Illahi for the respondent, and Mr. Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui as amicus curiae.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court had framed the following nine issues :-
(1) Whether the suit is not properly valued?
(2) Whether the defendent has heritable tenancy rights?
(3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession?
(4) Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of parties?
(5) Whether the defendant is an unauthorised occupant?
(6) Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
(7) Whether the suit is bad for want of notice?
(8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits, if yes, at what rate?
(9) Relief.
4. The main contest was in regard to Issues Nos. 2, 5 and 6. In fact, the basic question involved in this litigation is, whether the appellants could inherit tenancy rights, which admittedly vested in Mst.
5. Sakina, who is a sister of the father of the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that the rent receipt had ever been issued in the name of their father, or, that he was the tenant in respect of the premises. Mr. Abdul Alim K. Talib, however, submitted that, for the purposes of the civil suit, the legal representa--tives of Mst. Sakina bad locus standi in the litigation concerning eviction.
6. Initially, the case filed by respondent against Mst. Sakina was under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, because Mst. Sakina was a tenant. The word `tenant' is defined in section 2(i) of the Ordinance, and the relevant portion of the definition is as follows "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for building or rented land and includes (a) a tenant continu--ing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, and (b) the were and children of a deceased person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord . . . . ."
7. It would be seen that statute has specifically defined the word 'tenant', and therefore an extended meaning for this word is not possible. Mr. Abdul Aiim K. Talib has urged before me that the appellants were the legal representatives, but the question is, whether by the mere fact of being a legal Representative, a person can acquire the statuts of a tenant in case of death of the original tenant. On the plain meaning of section 2(i) of the Ordinance, the argument has to be repelled. Mr. Abdul Alim K. Talib has, however, relied on the case of Haji Muhammad Sultan v. M. M. Ispahani Ltd.
8. (PLD 1960 Kar. 132). This case is of very little help to the controversy in the present case, as the proceedings in that case arose out of the provisions contained in the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947.
9. That Act defined the word `tenant' differently, and such definition is as follows "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes every person from time to time deriving title under a tenant and also every person remaining in possession of the premises leased to him after the determination of the lease with or without the consent of the landlord."
10. The next case on which reliance has been placed is the case of Gouribala P.1 v. Kunolal Saha and others (PLD 1960 Dacca 355). This case is also clearly distinguishable, because the controversy in that case could be resolved only by reference to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
11. Paragraph 8 at page 358 of the report, would clearly show that this was the case which had to be decided on interpretation of the Transfer of Property Act. The next case on which reliance has been placed is a judgment of Lahore High Court in the case of Muhammad Azeem v. Muhammad Nawaz (PLD 1961 Lah. 137). The learned Single Judge, who decided that case, took the view that proceedings before the Rent Controller were proceedings of a civil nature and, as such, section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be invoked for regulating the procedure in regard to the trial of the application presented to the Rent Controller under the Ordinance. In that case, the question was, whether a legal representative of tenant could be brought on record by aid of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge answered this question in the affirmative. On a reading of the report, it would appear that the learned Judge had not considered the provisions of section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance and had mainly concerned himself with the rights of legal representatives. However, I may state that the word "legal representative" is also a term of law. And, if the statute by itself defines who the legal representatives shall be in a particular case, no extended meaning was possible. This case also is of very little assistance to Mr. Abdul Alim K. Talib. The last case cited before me is that of Fazal Ahmad v. Mst. Rarnzan Bibi. In this case, an order of eviction had been passed under the Rent Restriction Ordinance and such orders have to be executed by a civil Court as a decree. It seems that, while the children of the deceased tenant had been impleaded, the were of the deceased tenant had not been impleaded in the case.
12. The learned Judge held that the ejectment order could not be executed against the were of the deceased tenant. This case is also of very little assistance to Mr. Abdul Alim K. Talib, because the were is included in the definition of the word "tenant" in section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.
13. On a consideration of these cases, I am clearly of the view that the word "tenant" having been defined in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, no extended definition was possible, so that on the death of Mst. Sakina, the tenancy rights could only devolve on her children.
14. Admittedly, Mst. Sakina had no child, so that such rights, which Mst. Sakina had, died with her. It seems that the Legislature became conscious of the situation, so that section 2(i) of the newly enacted Sind Rentedl Premises Ordinance, 1979, extends the definition of the word "tenant" to embrace even the heirs of the tenant. Such was not the position in the~ West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Issue No. 2 was,! Therefore, rightly decided against the appellants by the learned Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge.
15. For the above reasons, I see no substance in this Revision Application, which is dismissed with costs.
16. I would wish to record my thanks to Mr. Saeeduzzaman Siddiqi (now Mr. Justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui) for the valuable assistance that he has rendered in this case.