' This order shall dispose of I.C.A. 180 of 2012 filed by the appellant to impugn the validity and legality of order dated 12-9-2012 through which the learned single Judge of this Court by accepting Writ Petition 12185 of 2011 held the respondents' entitled to re-instatement, into server under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, (hereinafter referred to as Act 2010).
2. Background of the litigation revolves around availing of Golden Handshake Scheme launched through Circular No,PS/PS0/97/5/59 dated 13-10-1997, (hereinafter referred to as GHS Scheme).
Respondents accepted the offer of said scheme through relevant option forms and they were accordingly relieved of their services in December, 1997 and January, 1998. Emoluments arising out of GHS Scheme were received by --the respondents. After enforcement of Sacked Employees (Re - instatement) Act, 2010, the respondents claiming themselves to be sacked employees under the GHS Scheme 1997 made applications soliciting their immediate re-instatement in service but their pleas were turned down by means of order dated 30-6-2011. Being aggrieved the respondents invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court culminating in acceptance of Writ Petition 12185 of 2011, hence, this ICA.
3. It was the case of the respondents that they were in service from 1-11-1993 to 30-11-1999 when they were forcibly relieved under GHS Scheme, hence, they fell within the meaning and definition of sacked employees under the Act, 2010. On behalf of the respondents reliance was also placed upon letter dated 13-10-1997 which speaks of force, coercion and pressure alleged to have been exerted upon them by the appellant bank so as to coax the respondents to accept GHS Scheme. As regards maintainability and competence of the Writ Petition before this Court, it was canvassed before the learned single Judge that since the respondents were not dismissed, removed or terminated from service, hence, the application before the Review Court in terms of section 3 of the Act, 2010 was coram non judice.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 (Act XXII of 2010) was promulgated on 8-12-2010. Its object has been articulated in its preamble in the following manner:--- Whereas it is expedient for the purpose of providing relief to persons who are appointed in a corporation service or autonomous or semi autonomous bodies or in Government service during the period from the first day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive) and were dismissed removed or terminated from service during the period from the 1st day of November, 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive).
5. For purposes of the applicability of the Act, 2010, learned counsel for the appellant says that period of appointment is of prime significance, inasmuch as, admittedly the respondents were never appointed during the relevant period from 1-11-1993 to 30-11-1996, rather all of them had already joined their respective duties between 1962 to 1973, therefore, they are precluded from being entitled to the benefit of reinstatement under the Sacked Employees Act, 2010 which was time specific. In this context, learned counsel contends that the learned single Judge through the impugned order erroneously held that respondents were being dealt with in a discriminate manner and unjustifiably extended the definition of the Sacked Employees even to the respondents whose appointments were not made during the period from 1-11-1993 to 30-11-1996.
6. Learned counsel also stressed upon the objective criteria, rationale and reasonable classification of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 by contending that it cannot be construed to have caused discrimination, for, the newly promulgated law itself created a valid distinction for a set of persons and the persons who did not fall within the specified ambit by operation of law automatically stood precluded from claiming any benefit and relief flowing from the Act, 2010.
Learned counsel also argued that 'equal protection of law' no where envisages that every citizen has to be dealt with alike in all circumstances but it contemplates that persons similarly placed are to be treated alike.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that no vested right stood accrued in favour of the respondents ipso facto merely on account of the promulgation of the Act, 2010, therefore, there was no apprehension of any irreparable loss and injury to the respondents. Adds that the learned single Judge misconstrued the mechanism of Golden Handshake Scheme and its enforceability was erroneously stretched to the ambit of discrimination and for that matter to the case of the respondents.
8. Conversely the learned counsel for respondents strenuously argued that Writ Petition was competent and maintainable and the order impugned being free from any ambiguity and illegality is unexceptionable. They also contended that newly promulgated Act, 2010 was specifically enforceable and the respondents were entitled to their forthwith reinstatement falling within the mischief of 'sacked employees'.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the facts of the case as well as history of litigation.
10. It remains admitted on record that Golden Handshake scheme was validly launched on 13-10- 1997 and was widely circulated for volunteer acceptance of its terms and conditions. In response, large number of employees including the respondents independently exercised their free option by offering volunteer acceptance of scheme, and on receipt of all pecuniary benefits towards full and final settlement also executed 'No Demand Certificate' and as such severed their relationship and lien with the appellant bank once for all. Legally speaking, the essential ingredients and pre requisites of a valid 'offer' and 'acceptance' were fulfilled, whereafter it attained finality and was binding on the parties for all times to come. None of the parties/ beneficiaries of the Golden Handshake Scheme was legally competent to rescind or revoke it at any subsequent event. It being a past and closed transaction, respondents had become functus officio and could not be permitted to wriggle out of their obligations and solemn commitments through substitution of their cause. Perusal of contents of Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 clearly indicate that its applicability was not retrospective rather time specific. In any case, respondents' case being a past and closed transaction did not fall within the domain of Act, 2010 which was exclusively promulgated for providing relief to persons appointed in a corporation service or autonomous or semi autonomous bodies or in Government service during the period from the first day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive) and were dismissed removed or terminated from service during the period from the 1st day of November, 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive).
11. It is admitted on record that respondents' dates of appointment and relinquishment of their charge are much prior to the dates conspicuously specified in the Act ibid itself. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, provisions of Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 were totally alien and inapplicable to the case of the respondents.
12. Record also reveals that at one point of time some of the respondents had earlier also invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court seeking a direction for rendition of their accounts. Thus it is loud and clear that respondents not only acknowledged the validation of Golden Hand Scheme but in fact had also solicited its enforcement and implementation in letter and spirit. Subsequently through Writ Petition 12185 of 2011, respondents took a somersault by substituting the original prayer for rendition of account to their forthwith reinstatement besides regularization of their services under the Act ibid. Owing to their contradictory and prevaricated stance, Writ Petition (12185 of 2011) filed by the respondent was not maintainable on the principle of estoppal but also on the basis of constructive res judicata. There is not an iota of evidence on record to demonstrate any element of coercion and forcible acceptance of Golden Handshake Scheme.
13. Respondents having exercised their option for Golden Handshake Scheme in 1997 were not entitled to their reinstatement under the newly enacted Act, for the simple reason that latter enactment was time specific. Its preamble categorically spells out the objectives for valid classification for the aggrieved employees. No fundamental or vested right of the respondents was infringed or abridged, and thus the respondents were not legally aggrieved persons for purposes of invocation of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
14. As regards 'discrimination' and the question of 'equal protection of law', we would respectfully follow the dictum of law laid down by the honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in its illustrious judgment reported as PLD 1993 SC 341 Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary v. Aziz Ullah Menon and 16 others wherein the rationale of class legislation and valid classification was encapsulated: "although class legislation has been forbidden, it permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. Permissible classification is allowed, provided the classification is founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others who are left out of the group, and such classification and differentia must be on rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act. There should be a nexus between the classification and the objects of the Act. "....
15. The honourable apex Court has time and again laid down the guiding principles for the courts for interpretation of statutes and laid down the litmus test. In the case reported as PLD 1995 SC 423 Multiline Associates v. Ardshir Cowsjee and 2 others the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan categorically emphasized that "a law should be interpreted in such a manner that it should be saved rather than destroyed. The Courts should lean in favour of upholding constitutionality of legislation, and it is therefore incumbent upon the D courts to be extremely reluctant to strike down laws as unconstitutional. This power should be exercised only when absolutely necessary, for injudicious exercise of this power might result in grave and serious consequences."
16. Similarly in the cases reported as PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 548 Syed Haidar Shah v. Mukhtar Hussain Shah and 2004 SCMR 456 DG Khan Cement Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan in the context of interpretation of Statutes it was held that "preamble of (A) statute has been said to be a good mean to find out its intent" and that "Harmonious construction is to be made keeping in view the different provisions of the statute after fully understanding the intention with with which the same had been made and object was intended to be achieved.
17. We have minutely examined the provisions of Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act,.
2010. Section 2(f) whereof postulates and defines 'Sacked Employees' to be germane for adjudication of the crucial issue which is reproduced as under:--- "(f) Sacked Employee" Means.--- (i) a person who was appointed as a regular or ad hoc employee or on contract basis or otherwise in service of employer during the period from the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive) and was dismissed, removed or terminated from service or whose contract period was expired or who was given forced golden hand shake during the period from the 1st day of November, 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive);
(ii) a person who was appointed as a regular or ad hoc employee or on contract basis or otherwise or who was a member of the civil service of the Federation or who held a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Federation, in a Ministry, Division or department during the period from the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November (both days inclusive) and was dismissed, removed or terminated from service or whose contract period was expired or who was given forced golden hand shake during the period from the 1st day of November 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive);
(iii) a person who was appointed or re-instated in service of employer during the period from the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November 1996 (both days inclusive) and who was subsequently dismissed or removed or terminated from service during the period from the 1st day of November, 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive) or who was intermittently dismissed, removed or terminated from service from time to time and reinstated through status quo order of judgment of any Tribunal or any court including the Supreme Court or a High Court or through any administrative order or through withdrawal of any order conveying dismissal, removal or termination or by any other way on any date after the 1st day of November, 1996;
(iv) a person who was appointed during the period from the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive) and dismissed, removed or terminated from Government or corporation service on any charges or allegations during or after the period from the first day of November, 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive), whether reinstated or taken back into service or not on orders of any tribunal or court including the Supreme Court or a High Court or any other authority;
(v) a person who was appointed or reinstated in service of employer during the period from the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive) and dismissed or removed or terminated or dissociated or was discontinued from service on account of closure of his or her employer or office or organization, irrespective of the fact that whether a letter or notification or anything in writing for sacked employees' dismissal or removal or termination or dissociation or discontinuation of service was issued or not or the status of sacked employee's service was turned inactive or otherwise; and
(vi) a person who was appointed or reinstated in service of employer during the period fron the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive) and dismissed, removed or terminated from service of employer on account of absence from duty, misconduct, misappropriation of the Government money or stock, or unfitness on medical grounds:"
18. Having examined the case from every angle in the perspective of the aforesaid provision of the Act, 2010, it becomes clear as crystal that none of the provisions of this Act is attracted and manifestly respondents fell outside the purview of the definition of 'Sacked Employees' therefore, respondents were debarred from claiming or seeking any relief under the Act supra. Nothing is discernible on record as to how and on what ground (s) respondents considered themselves to be the aggrieved persons within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution; and that which of their fundamental or vested right had been abridged and infringed. Once the respondents have exercised their independent option for volunteer acceptance of the terms of GHS Scheme and had received the financial benefits towards the full and final settlement of their obligation, they had severed their relations with the financial institution whereafter it became a past and closed transaction. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered view that relationship of the respondents with the appellant bank could not be revived or resurrected on any account at any subsequent stage. After consummation of contract how could the respondents be allowed to substitute their cause at a belated stage merely to take advantage of newly promulgated Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. Furthermore, writ petition filed by the respondents did not merit consideration, for, the contentious issue raised by both sides inevitably required detailed factual inquiry and recording of evidence into the disputed questions of fact which course of action ordinarily is not undertaken by this Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.
Courts are to enforce the rights of citizens and not to ratify their acts and omissions tainted with lurking pecuniary considerations. Respondents had invoked the equitable jurisdiction of this Court with unclean hands with ulterior motives to wriggle out of their contractual obligation with a substituted cause, therefore, they were not entitled to any relief. Reliance is placed on 2007 SCMR 1318 and PLD 2009 SC 28.
' For the foregoing facts and reasons, by accepting this 1CA we set aside the order impugned of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 12-9-2012 and hold respondents ineligible to claim any benefit under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. Consequently, Writ Petition 12185 of 2011 is dismissed.