1. ABDUL HAFEEZ MEMON, J.-This is a High Court Appeal against the judgment dated 22-11-1972 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the application filed by the appellant under section 151, C. P. C. In respect of succession certificate granted by the Court to the respondent.
2. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that on the death of her husband Abdul Majid on 12-3-60, the respondent Mst. Zubaida Khatoon made an application on 16-4-1960 for grant of succession certificate to her to receive an amount of Rs. 30,000, which was lying to the credit of her deceased husband in the Saving Account maintained with the Habib Bank Limited Idgah Branch, Karachi. In the application she showed herself and her two minor daughters and two minor sons as the legal heirs of her deceased husband. The legal formalities having been observed and no objection having been raised, the application was allowed and the respondent was granted the succession certificate on furnishing security to the extent of shares of the minors. As however she failed to furnish security she undertook to deposit the shares of the minors in Court.
3. Accordingly on 1-6-1966; an order was passed by the Court dispensing with the furnishing of the security and she was directed to deposit shares of the minors in Court within two days of the withdrawal of the amount. The respondent accordingly withdrew the amount from the Bank and duly deposited the shares of the minors in Court. ,Subsequently, in the guardianship proceedings the respondent wanted to be appointed guardian but on objection being raised by the brother of deceased Abdul Majid, Nazir of this Court was appointed -as guardian, and with the money so deposited a house was purchased for the minors.
4. Thereafter, on 4-8-1970, appellant Abdul Rehman's made an application claiming himself to be the son of deceased Abdul Majeid and stating that the deceased had two wives and from his first were he had two sons and one daughter which fact was however suppressed by the respondent Mst.
5. Zubaida Khatoon in her application for grant of succession certificate and they were not impleaded. On these facts he made the following prayer: "It is prayed an inquiry be made and notice be issued to the opponent to show cause why the applicant and other sister and brothers of his should not get the share in the property of the deceased.
6. The property in this case is the share of minors (step brothers and sisters) deposited with the Nazir of High Court. He should also be directed to abstain from paying anything to the opponent."
7. The application was resisted and it was denied that the deceased had any other were or that the applicants were his children. It was further pleaded that the application filed by the applicant was not maintainable and that the applicant should have filed a suit to establish their claim. Thereafter evidence led by both the parties was recorded. The learned Single Judge, however, did not find it necessary to go into the merits of the evidence as be took the view that the application was not maintainable in law. After referring to the various provisions of the Succession Act, 1925, the learned Single Judge held that a succession certificate could be granted to a person who had some title or interest in the debt to collect and not to a stranger, that inquiry to be held as to the entitlement of the person applying for the certificate was of a summary nature, the intention being that there should be a rapid decision to administer the estate of the deceased and that it was not intended to afford to the 'litigant parties an opportunity of litigating contested questions of the relationship with the deceased or title to the property which could be done by a suit; and since the respondent was a widow of the deceased who had interest in the property she could be granted the certificate for the said purpose. He further held that the relief sought by the appellant being not for revocation of the certificate granted to the respondent but for determining the relationship of the applicants with the deceased and awarding due share to them according to law of inheritance, it was not possible to grant such relief in the proceedings before him which were for a limited purpose. The learned Single Judge further held that the entire amount in question having been withdrawn from the Bank after the grant of the succession certificate, the estate of the deceased had been fully administered in so far as the grantee of the certificate was concerned and, therefore, question of revocation of the certificate also did not arise, although no such prayer had been made. In the end, the learned Single Judge relying on the decided cases reported as 17 I C 155 and 5 I C 395 dismissed the application filed by the appellant by his order dated 22-11-1972. Hence this High Court Appeal.
8. The only contention raised by Mr. Ansar Hussain, learned counsel for the appellant, was that the learned Single Judge should have decided the application on the basis of the evidence and not on the legal grounds.
9. We see no merit in the contention. It was conceded by the learned counsel that the relief sought by the appellant in the application filed under section 151, C. P. C. Was not for revocation of the succession certificate earlier granted to the respondent but of determining the relationship of the applicants with the deceased Abdul Majid and granting them their share in the estates on the basis of inheritance. He was also unable to dispute that such questions could not be appropriately gone into in such a application filed by the appellant under section I51, C. P. C. That being so, the learned Single Judge was eminently right in rejecting the application filed by the appellant on the grounds so elaborately stated by him in the impugned judgment. The learned counsel lastly requested that a direction be given permitting him to file a suit in the matter. We, however, feel that no such direction is called for in view of section 387 of the Succession Act, 1925, which reads as under:---- "No decision under this part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefor to the person lawfully entitled thereto."
10. Indeed, the learned Single Judge had himself held that for the relief brought by the appellant a suit was the proper remedy and not the applica--tion. In this view of the matter, no such direction is called for from this Court.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss it with costs.