MOHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, CJ. --- The titled appeals with the leave of the Court arise out of the judgments of the High Court dated 19th May, 2004, whereby the appeals filed by respondent No.1 have been accepted.
2. The respondent filed two suits; one for possession of suit land measuring 18 marlas and the other for declaration in the Court of Additional Sub-Judge, Mirpur. After necessary proceedings, the trial Court dismissed both the suits. The respondent filed separate appeals in the Court of District Judge Mirpur. The learned District Judge, Mirpur vide judgments dated 12th June, 2003, dismissed both the appeals filed by the respondent herein. Dissatisfied from t the judgments of the District Judge Mirpur, the respondent filed two appeals in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court. A learned single Judge in the High Court vide judgments dated 19th May, 2004, accepted both the appeals, set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and decreed the suits filed by the plaintiff, respondent herein.
3. On 30th April, 2013, when the appeal came up for hearing before the bench consisting of Justice Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia and Justice Raja Saeed Akram Khan, the learned counsel for the parties submitted that with regard to section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, there are two contradictory judgments of this Court; (i) Andleeb Sahir Butt vs. Raja Naveed Hussain and 2 others [2000 SCR 57] and (ii) Muhammad Amin vs. Muhammad Hameed & 2 others [2000 SCR 537]. Both the judgments were recorded by three members bench, therefore, the bench seized with the matter referred the matter to the Chief Justice for constitution of larger bench. Upon this the bench, now seized with the matter was constituted.
4. Ch. Muhammad Anwar, the learned counsel for the appellant in both the appeals, submitted that the District Judge dismissed the appeals on 12th June, 2003. The appeals in the High Court were filed on 22nd October, 2003, after the period of 134 days, while the limitation for filing appeal is 90 days. The appeals before the High Court were time barred. He submitted that under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the time requisite for obtaining the copy of judgment has to be excluded. The applications for obtaining copies of judgments and decrees were moved on 24th June, 2003 and the copies were ready for delivery on 29th July, 2003. The time requisite is from 24th June to 29th July, 2003, when the copy was ready for delivery. The respondent obtained the copies on 9th August, 2003. The time from 29th July to 9th August, 2003 cannot be excluded while callating the period of limitation. After excluding 11 days front 29th July to 9th August, 2003, the appeals before the High Court were time barred. He relied upon the judgment of this Court titled Muhammad Amin vs. Muhammad Hameed & 2 others [2000 SCR 537]. The learned counsel submitted that although the respondent herein moved an application before the High Court for condonation of delay, but he has not taken the ground that no notice for issuance of copies of judgments was issued to him.
He referred to para 8 of the memo of appeals filed by respondent in the High Court and submitted that the respondent has not taken the ground that no notice was issued to him to the effect that the copies are ready for delivery, therefore, he is not entitled for condonation of period from 29th July, to 9th August, 2003. He further argued that for the sake of arguments if it is admitted that the respondent is entitled for exclusion of time from 29th to 9th August, 2003, then too the appeals were time barred as the copies were delivered to him on 9th August, 2003, but the appeals were filed on 22nd October, 2003, after a period of 74 days. He failed to furnish explanation of delay of 74 days. The delay of each and every day has to be explained. He referred to a case reported as Cantonment Board Kharian cantt. Vs. Muhammad Shafi [1991 PSC 622]. He also referred to rule 146 of the High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 relating to issuance of copy. There is no concept of notice in the copying rules.
5. While controverting the arguments, Mr. Khalid Rasheed Chaudhry, the learned counsel for respondent No.1, argued that the judgments of the High Court are perfectly legal. The proposition nas since long been settled by this Court in a case reported.As Andleeb Sahir Butt vs. Raja Naveed Hussain and 2 others [2000 SCR 57], where in the Court in categorical terms has laid down that when an application for obtaining copy of judgment is filed before the copying agency, the copying agency shall fix a date for delivery of the same. If the copy is not ready for delivery on the said date, then a notice shall be sent to the party that the copy shall be ready for delivery on such and such date. The respondent moved applications for obtaining copies on 26th June, 2003. No date was fixed for delivery of copies. Under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of judgment or decree shall be excluded and time requisite is from the date of application till the copy is delivered to a party. The learned counsel tried to draw distinction between the date of preparation and date on which the copy is ready for delivery while relying upon rule 153 of the AJ&K High Court Procedure Rules relating to issuance of copy. He drew distinction between "preparation of copy" and "copy being ready for delivery" and argued that these two phrases are different altogether. When the copy is prepared, the copying agency has to intimate the applicant that the copy is prepared. He shall file Court fee and when the Court fee is filed, the copy is Teat/ for delivery. On 29th July, 2003, the> copy was prepared, it was not ready for delivery. After the said date, the respondent (applicant) was intimated to file Court fee. On 9th August, 2003 the copies were ready for delivery. After obtaining the same, 'the petitioner filed the appeals before the High Court. Forty seven days were spent in obtaining the copies of judgments and decrees. After excluding this period, the appeals before the High Court were within time. He referred to the cases reported as West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi vs. Aziz Qureshi [1973 SCMR 555] and Faisalabad Development Authority vs. Saeed Ahmad and another [1.988 CLC 1935]. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent was entitled for exclusion of 47 days which period was requisite for obtaining the copies of the judgments and decrees. After excluding 47 days, the appeals have been filed within a period of 90 days. It is a statutory right of 'the respondent that the time consumed in obtaining copies be excluded. The appeals are filed within time.
6. In rebuttal Ch. Muhammad Anwar, the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to sections 36 to 38 of the Civil Courts Act, 1977 and argued that there is no con pt of notice or intimation that the copy is ready for delivery, therefore, the respondent was not entitled for condonation of delay from 29th July to 9th August, 2003. The appeals before the High Court merit dismissal on the sole ground.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for The parties and perused the record. It is admitted position that the District Judge delivered the judgments on 12th June, 2003. The respondent filed applications for obtaining the copies of the judgments and 'decrees on 24th June, 2003. The record shows that the copies were prepared on 29th July, 2003. The Court fee was provided on 9th August, 2003 and the copy was issued on the same day. According to respondent he is entitled for condonation of delay of 47 days starting from 24th June, to 9th August, 2003. In the light of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree shall be excluded and after condoning the period of 47 days the appeals before the High Court are within time. While it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the light of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, the time requisite means .The time from filing of application, for obtaining the copy till the copy is ready for delivery.
8. The aforesaid proposition has been considered by this Court in a number of cases. In a case titled Shaheen Akhter vs. Muhammad Alam [Civil Appeals No.61 of 1999 and 62 of 1999 decided on 28th June, 1999], the Court while relying upon a number of judgments and 'instructions issued by the AJ&K High Court in 1965 observed that when an application for obtaining a copy is filed, the copying officer shall fix a date for delivery of copies 'applied for. When a date for delivery of copy has not been fixed or concerned applicant has not been informed in time about the supply of stamps or making up its deficiency, the period which is to be excluded for the purpose of limitation for filing an appeal etc. Would be reckoned from the date of application and not from the date of supplying stamps. The proposition then came under consideration of this Court in the cases reported as Andleeb Sahir Butt vs. Raja Naveed Hussain and 2 others [2000 SCR 57] and Muhammad Amin vs. Muhammad Hameed and 2 others [2000 SCR 537]. Before concluding Whether both the referred judgments are self-contradictory or both lay down same rule of law, firstly we will go through the case law referred to by the parties. In the case reported as Muhammad Amin vs. Muhammad Hameed & 2 others [2000 SCR 537], the term "time requisite" appearing in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act has been defined as "the interval, between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery". It was observed in para 6 as under:- "6. From the phraseology of sub-sections (2), (3) and 4 of section 121 of the Limitation Act, which have been reproduced above, time requisite for obtaining certified copy has to be excluded. As explained by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Fateh Muhammad's case, discussed above, time requisite for obtaining the copy means "the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery". It was thus laid down that the said interval was to be excluded. It was not laid down that the said interval has not to be excluded as has been canvassed by Ch. Muhammad Sharif Tariq."
In the referred case the facts were that the appellant moved an application for issuance of copy of judgment. It was delivered on the same day. The counsel for the appellant argued that the respondent is not entitled for condonation of delay of one day because the copy was supplied on the same day. The Court resolved that there is no concept of bifurcation of a single day, therefore the case of appellant is covered under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and the time requisite has been defined as the time from the date of application for obtaining copy till the copy is ready for delivery. Since in the referred case the copy was suppliec on the same day, therefore, the question of notice was no involved and had not been resolved by the Court.
In the case reported as Cantonment Board Kharia Cantt vs. Muhammad Shafi [1991 PSC 622] the expression "time requisite" for obtaining certified copies of necessar documents has been defined as the time that consume between the date the application for certified copies is mad and the date the same are ready for delivery by the copyin branch. It was also observed in the referred case that whet a number of dates under the Court or Copying Branch RulE are communicated to the applicant for delivering the cop "6. As held by this Court in Fateh Muhammad v.
Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 S.C.M.R. 157) and Mst. Jameela Khatoon v. Mst. Taiunnisa (PLD 1984 S.C.
208), "time requisite" for obtaining certified copies of the necessary documents required to be filed with an appeal is that consumed between the date the application for certified copies is made and the date the same are ready for delivery by the Copying Branch.
7. Where the rules of the Court or Copying Branch provide that a, date shall be communicated to the applicant when the certified copy will be ready the "time requisite" for obtaining the certified copy which can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act, would be the time which is taken between the date of application and the last date which is communicated to the applicant by the official of the Copying Branch for taking - delivery of the certified copy. The Lahore High Court Rules and Orders, Vol.1, Chaptei para 2, clause (ii), sub-clause (d) provide that "the date on which a copy is ready for delivery will be deemed for the purpose of such calculation, to be the day on which it is given". This sub-clause (d) was replaced by a Correction Pamphlet No.39 dated 3.6.1959, which was later replaced by Correction Pamphlet No.41 dated 3.9.1960, which reads as follows:- `Applicants for copies shall be given a date on which delivery of the copy is to be taken. If the copy is not then completed, such date shall be extended from time to time, under intimation to the applicant, until the copy is ready for delivery. The final date so intimated shall, for the purpose of the calculation required by this rule, be deemed to be the day on which the copy is given.'
In these circumstances, where a number of dates are given to the applicant for taking delivery of the certified copy by the Copying Branch, "time requisite" could be calculated upto this last date, if this be later than that on which the certified copy was ready for delivery." it was further observed in the referred case that the appellant failed to satisfy the Court that a wrong information was furnished to him that the copies will be ready on such and such date.
In the case titled Fateh Muhammad and others vs. Malik Qadir Bakhsh [1975 SCMR 157] it was held that the term "time requisite for obtaining copies" within terms of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act means the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when the copy is ready for delivery. It was observed at page 158 of the report as under:- "It is well settled that the time requisite for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 means only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery. Even during this interval, due diligence on the part of the litigant is required by law, and no delay, unless such as was caused by circumstance over which he had no control and which could not by due diligence be avoided, can form part of time "requisite" for obtaining the copy. The time between the date on which the copy is ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant chooses " to take delivery thereof is not a portion of the time "requisite" for obtaining a copy."
In a case reported as Andleeb Sahir Butt vs. Raja Naveed Hussain and 2 others [2000 SCR 57], it was observed by this Court that no date was fixed for delivery of copies by the copying agency. The applicant is entitled for exclusion of requisite time for obtaining copies from the date of application till the delivery of the copy. It was observed in para 6 as under:- "6. Even otherwise, when no date was fixed for delivery of the copies to the appellant on 27.3.1999 and 28.3.1999 to 30.3.1999 were closed holidays, the appellant is entitled to the condonation of delay........................................... In a Case titled West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi vs. Aziz Qureshi [1973 SCMR 555], it was observed that the time requisite for obtaining copies which can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act is time which is taken between the date of application and the date when the copies are ready. It was observed at page 557 of the report as under:-- "It has been submitted before us that the 3 days' delay that occurred in filing the petition for special leave was due to the fact that the office of the High Court did not notify that the copy was ready for delivery as required under the Sind Chief Court Rules, and, therefore, limitation should be computed from the date of obtaining delivery of the copy. This view finds support from the decision of the High Court in the case of Gul Muhammad v. Allah Ditta [PLD 1960 Lah. 443]. In the case under report it has been held that the time "requisite" for obtaining copies which can be excluded under section 12, Limitation Act, is the time which is taken between the date of application and the date when the copies are ready, but it can be further extended if further delay takes place by reason of the carelessness of the office in giving wrong information to the applicant as to the date on which the copies would be ready, or in giving no information at all. In any event, in my opinion, the delay has been satisfactorily explained and I would, accordingly condone the delay."
In a case titled Gul Muhammad vs. Allah Ditta [PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lahore 443], late Justice M. R. Khan Kiani, as he then was, while dealing with the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining the copies of documents under section 12 of the Limitation Act observed that under Sind Chief Court Rules it was not necessary to give applicant a notice of the fact that the copy was ready for delivery. The Lahore High Court Rules, Vol.1 provide that "the date on which a copy is ready for delivery will be deemed, for the purpose of such calculation, to be the day on which it is given". The rule however was amended by a correction pamphlet No.39 dated 3rd June, 1959, where it was made mandatory that the date be communicated to applicant for taking delivery of copy. It was observed in para 3 as under:- "Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Tolaram v. Jaffar Khan [38 I C 464] where it was held with reference to the Sind Chief Court Rules that it was not necessary to give the applicant for a copy notice of the fact that the copy was ready for delivery. Our on rules originally provided in Volume I, Chapter XIV-D, paragraph 2, clause (ii), sub-clause (d), that "the date on which a copy is ready for delivery will be deemed, for the purpose of such calculation, to be the day on which it is given". This, however was amended by a correction pamphlet No.39, dated the 3rd June 1959, to read thus: `The date communicated to the applicant for taking delivery of the copy or the date on which it is ready for delivery, whichever is later, shall be deemed, for the purpose of such calculation, to be the day on which it is given.'
In other words, it is implied that the copying agency will inform the applicant to take delivery of the copy on a certain date, and this amendment is evidence of a general feeling in this Court that it will be unreasonable to expect an applicant to call for a copy morning and evening everyday so as to ascertain whether it is ready. It may so happen that although at three 0' clock in the afternoon a copy is not ready, it is completed some time after four 0' clock; but if the applicant had called at three 0' clock he would have been sent away without the copy, and on the following morning his appeal might be time-barred."
In a case reported as Faisalabad Development Authority vs. Saeed Ahmad and another [1988 CLC 1935] while relying upon Gul Muhammad's case [PLD 1960 Lah. 443] it was observed that the period of limitation would commence from the date of delivery of copy to the petitioner.
9. From the survey of case law, referred to above, the consensus appears that the time requisite for obtaining copies which can be excluded under sub-sections (2) to (4) of section 12 of the Limitation Act is from the date of application till the date when the copy is ready for delivery. The distinction in the referred authorities is that under the Sind Chief Court Rules it was not necessary for copying agency to intimate a party that the copy is ready for delivery; the only requirement was that the copying agency shall fix a date for delivery of copy, but the Lahore High Court issued a pamphlet on 3rd June, 1959 that the date communicated to the applicant for taking delivery of copy or the date on which it is ready for delivery whichever is later shall be deemed for the purpose of such calculation. It is necessary under the rules to fix a date for delivery of copy when the application is presented and subsequently intimation that the copy is ready for delivery.
10. In Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the laws of Dogra regime have been adapted. Under section 3 of the AJ&K Courts and Laws Code, 1949 and the notification NO.3323 dated 16th December, 1949, all the laws and enactments of old regime inconsistent with the provisions of the said Code or with the enactments passed or adapted by the AJ&K Government have been repealed and all the remaining laws of the old regime, so far as applicable, have been approved to continue to remain in force. The Civil Courts Act, 1977 (1920 A.D.) was enforced during the Dogra regime. It is such a law which is not inconsistent with the provisions of Courts and Laws Code, 1949. Section 36 of Part (D) deals with the application for copies of record.. Section 37 provides for endorsement to be made .On application and registration thereof. Section 38 deals with the stamps and deposits. A perusal of section 37 shows that there shall be endorsed a date on p:esentation of application for copy. It snail be initialed and entered in the register and" Court fee, if any, shall be cancelled. Section 38 (i) provides that every application for a copy of ,record shall be accompanied by a stamp of the value which shall not be less than the costs of preparing and certifying such copy and sub-section (ii) of section 38 provides that if the application is not accompanied by requisite stamps, it shall be returned to person presenting it with an endorsement stating the value of stamp required. Such endorsement shall be dated and signed by the officer returning application and a note of return shall be made in the register. Sub-section (i.e) of section 38 deals with filing of Court fee on the copy. It postulates that the Court fee stamp shall not be taken from the applicant until the copy is ready for delivery. The rule provides that the copying agency at the time of receiving the application should inform the applicant about the value of Court fee, if any, required. The rule makes it clear that when a copy is ready for delivery, it shall not be delivered to the applicant till the Court fee is furnished. Although in the said rule there is no express provision that the applicant be intimated that the copy is ready for delivery and he shall file Court fee stamps, but the intention is clear that the applicant be intimated because it is not possible to come to the copying agency morning and evening for inquiring whether the copy is ready or not; that is why it is mandatory for the copying agency to fix a date when the copy will be ready for delivery. If the date is not fixed, then how a party can have knowledge that the copy is ready for delivery. In the case titled Muhammad Umar vs. Dr. Amina Ashraf [1983 CLC 1235], there was an endorsement on the application for supplying copies in terms "stamps not supplied", but there was no proof that the applicant was intimated to supply the stamps. The Court observed that as the requirement of supply of stamps was not communicated to the applicant and no pasting was made on the Notice Board, after preparation of copy calling upon the applicant to supply stamps, the time requisite for obtaining copy should be reckoned from the date of application and the delivery of copy, In a case reported as Madan Singh vs. Puran Singh [AIR 1926 Lahore 84], it was held that as the office did not inform the applicant about the date when the copy could be ready for delivery, the delay was condoned under section 5 read with section 12 of the Limitation Act while observing that no party should suffer due to mistake of the Court or its officer.
In the case reported as Gajpatilal & others vs. Mauliprasad and another [AIR 1933 Nagpur 218], it was observed that an applicant was not bound to deposit whole of the advance fee required for obtaining copy. He may deposit such fee according to his on estimation. In case of deficiency of deposit, he must be intimated to do the needful and the period between the notice of deficiency and delivery of the copy should also be regarded as requisite time and be deducted for the purpose of limitation.
In the case reported as Ghulam Nabi vs. Johan Muhammad [PLD 1960 B.J. 90], the applicant moved an application for supply of copies. No date was fixed by copying agency for delivery of copy. The Court observed that in absence of direction to take delivery of copy on a particular date, it cannot be said that the petitioner was negligent in getting copies.
11. Part VI of the instructions issued by the AJ&K High Court vide Circular Order No.1/65 deals with the supply of copies applied for. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant portions of the said instructions which are as under:- "(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx.
(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx.
(c) Thereafter the copying officer mil fix a date for supply of copy endorsing on the application under his on hand and signatures and such dates shall be fixed in accordance with the dates of presentation of the applications.
(d) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx.
(e) Copying clerk will daily put up on the notice board a list of applicants who are to receive the copies on that date. He will also put up before the copying officer all the prepared copies that are to be given on that date and the copying officer will himself call the applicants and deliver the copies to them. At the same time and in the presence of the copying officer, the clerk will obtain each applicants thumb impression/signatures on the copying register as a token of his receipt of the copy.
(f) In case the applicant or his duly recognized agent is not present on the date fixed, the file will be called for three consecutive days by the copying officer and if even then the applicant does not appear, his application will be consigned to the record room as provided in para 2 of the copying rule No.58 dated 4th March, 1963 B.K. If such a person wants a copy thereafter he will have to apply afresh with proper stamps.
(g) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx."
The scheme of the aforesaid instructions is that a date should be fixed by the copying officer for the delivery of copy applied for and when the copy is ready for delivery, it shall be intimated by affixing on notice board that the copy le ready for delivery.
12. We have perused the original record. The record reveals that the respondent moved applications for issuance of copies of grounds of appeals, judgments and decrees and copies of judgments of Civil Judge on 24th June, 2003. The copying officer ordered for issuance of copies under rules. It was registered under No.1788 on 24.6.2003. No date for the delivery of the copies was fixed nor the applicant was intimated that the copies are ready for delivery. The copies of judgments and decrees show that the applications were moved on 24th June, 2003. Copies were prepared on 29th July, 2003. The Court fee was furnished on 9th August, 2003 and the copies were also issued on 9th August, 2003. When no date was fixed by the copying agency that when the copies will be ready for delivery then it was mandatory for the copying agency to intimate the applicant that the copies are ready for delivery and he shall file Court fee and receive the copies.
13. We have also considered the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent in para 8 of the memo of appeals has not taken the ground that he was not intimated that the copies are ready for delivery, therefore, this argument is not available to him. The respondent has specifically taken plea in the memo of appeals before the High Court that he applied for issuance of copy on 24th June, 2003 and the copy was delivered on 9th August, 200a, therefore, the aforesaid argument has no force and is repelled.
14. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure- Rules, 1984 are also relevant'for the Purpose of issuance of copy. Under rule 147 of the said Rules, when an application for a copy is received, if' it does -not contain sufficient information or ~ fee paid is insufficient or the application is defective. In any form, the applicant shall be asked to do the needful. Under rule 149.a copy shall.
Be furnished not later than 1:30 p.m. On fifth day after the fee required underrules has been deposited. Under rule 153, on the last, sheet of every copy granted under the aforesaid Rules, the following particulars shall be carefully recorded
(a) date of application for the copy;
(b) date of notifying the fees chargeable;
(c) date of deposit of the requisite fees in stamps;
(d) date on which the copy was ready for delivery;
(e) date of making over the copy to the applicant.
A combined study of rules 147, 149 and 153 of the aforesaid Rules makes it clear that when an application for issuance of copy is received and if the Court- fee not sufficiently supplied, then it is mandatory for the copying agency to intimate the applicant for depositing the fee. ' A copy can only be considered to be ready for delivery when the applicant is intimated that he shall file Court fee stamps and copy shall be ready on such and such date.
15. We have minutely, perused the judgments of this Court delivered in the cases reported as Andleep Sahir Butt vs. Raja Naveed Hussain and 2 others [2000 SCR 57] and Muhammad Amin vs. Muhammad Hameed & 2 others [2000 SCR 537].
There are no divergent views in the rule of law laid down in both the judgments. In Andlib Sahir Butt's case, referred to above, it has been observed that no date was fixed for delivery of copies to the applicant, therefore, he was entitled for exclusion of time actually required -for obtaining copies of judgment. In Muhammad Amin's case,' referred to above, time requisite has been defined as the interval between the date, of application for supply of copy: and the date when it was ready for, delivery'.
Both the referred judgments were delivered by the same bench. Rule', of law laid down in both the judgments is not contradictory.", The only difference is that the words "time requisite" have been defined in Muhammad Amin's case while the same are not defined in Andleeb Sahir Butt's case.
16. From the foregoing we conclude that the respondent was entitled for exclusion of time actually spent in obtaining copies of judgment and decree from the date of application, i.e. 24th June to, 9th August, 2003, the date' When the copies were issued. The requisite time comes to 47 days and after exclusion of this period, the appeals before the High Court were within the period of limitation. The . Respondent also moved an application for condonation of delay. The High Court has correctly condoned delay while applying sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act. The respondent is entitled for exclusion of time consumed in obtaining copies. The appeals were filed within time in the High Court. Since arguments were heard only on the -question of limitation, which has been resolved, therefore, the arguments on merits shall be heard by the bench already seized with the case. The case shall be taken up by the bench on:25.6.2013.