1. DORAB PATELJ.-The dispute in this petition for leave relates to a property on Lawrence Road, Karachi consisting of a main building and outhouses and garages. The main building was in the possession of Syed Ali Amir, the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents in this petition, who had, therefore, filed a C. H. Form for the property, according to the judgments under appeal.
2. However, according to Mr. Imdad Ali, Syed Ali Amir had first filed a C. H. Form only for the main building of the property and had later filed a form for the entire property. Be this as it may, one Mirza Yousuf Beg, the father of the second petitioner and father-in-law of the first petitioner, had filed a N. C. H. Form for the building consisting of the garages and out houses. But as Mirza Yousuf Beg had filed this application on 17-11-1959, it was rejected by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner on the ground that the entire property had already been transferred to Syed Ali Amir. Although Mirza Yousuf Beg, who was then alive, was aggrieved by this order, he did not take any proceedings to challenge it. Instead the first petitioner filed an appeal against the order before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, which was dismissed on 24-3-1960 on two grounds, that this petitioner had no locus stand! And that the appeal was time-barred. Only the first petitioner challenged this order in a Revision before the Settlement Commissioner, but this Revision too was dismissed on 27- 6-1960 on the ground that it was time-barred. Meanwhile, the Additional Settlement Commissioner had issued a suo motu notice of revision to Syed Ali Amir, because it would appear that be had some doubts as to whether the property transferred to Syed Ali Amir was divisible or not. He, therefore, inspected the property and after satisfying himself that the property was indivisible, he discharged suo motu notice of revision issued by him. We may also add here that in passing this order, he was conscious of the N. C. H. Form filed by Mirza Yousuf Beg, now deceased, and the appeal filed by the first petitioner, which had been rejected "by this Court on 24-3-1960." A second Revision was then filed, once again, by the first petitioner only, which was dismissed on 21-2-1962 on the obvious ground that this petitioner had not filed any claim for the transfer of any part of the property and on the further ground that the property was indivisible. This order was challenged in a review by the first petitioner, but as the Review application was also dismissed on 13-9-1962, the petitioners filed a writ petition in the Karachi Seat of the West Pakistan High Court against the orders by which they were aggrieved.
3. The petitioners have not cared even to file a copy of the writ petition filed by them, but it was opposed by the respondents as well as by the Settlement Authorities, and came up for hearing before Waheeduddin Ahmad, C. J., (when his Lordship was the Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court) on 20th January 1969. Waheedudin Ahmad, C. J., held that the question whether the property was indivisible or not was a question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities, and he saw no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Settlement Authorities against the petitioner. He also held that the writ petition was barred by gross laches, and he dismissed the writ petition on the further ground that the petitioners bad no locus satanic to file it.
4. The petitioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against this judgment on 10-2-1969 which was dismissed, in the events that happened, by a Division Bench of the Sind High Court on 31-3-1977.
5. Hence this petition for leave which has come up for admission before us today, but it is relevant to observe here that the petitioners had obtained a stay from time to time from or with the aid of this Court.
6. Mr. Imdad Ali submitted that the property in dispute consisted of two houses, and in support of this submission, he relied on the site plan contained in this Paper Book and on the allegation that the main building and the building consisting of the garages and out houses had been separately numbered by the Settlement Department. The fact that the two portions of the property were given separate numbers by the Settlement Department is only one of the many circumstances relevant to the question whether the property in dispute was one house or not, and on the other hand, the site plan filed in this Paper Book goes against learned counsel's submission and supports the concurrent findings of the Settlement authorities against the petitioners. Another insuperable difficulty in the way of the petitioners is that although the appeal was filed almost a year ago, and although it had been placed for admission in this Court earlier, they have not cared to file copies of the orders of the Settlement Department rejecting their clam that the property was divisible into two houses. Mr. Imdad Ali, therefore, submitted that we should adjourn the case and summon the record as he thought the record might support the claim of the petitioners. But we were informed that the petitioners were not prepared to have the petition placed for admission in Rawalpindi, it is clear that an adjournment of the case would have led to a delay of many months, and as the private respon--dents had, on this Court's request on 25-1-1978, undertaken "not to eject the petitioners till the hearing of this case", we declined to adjourn the case.
7. It is also difficult for us to understand the submission that the record supports the case of the petitioner, because the concurrent findings of the Settlement authorities were against the petitioners, and these findings are supported by the site plan. Be this as it may even if we assume for the sake of argument that the Settlement authorities had misread the evidence, and that Syed Ali Amir had really not sought the transfer of the entire property as submitted by learned counsel, the petition must nontheless fail, because of the gross delay by the petitioners in filing their writ petition. Learned counsel did not advance any argument on this aspect of the case and even though the second petitioner addressed us, she was silent on this aspect of the case. We have, therefore, examined the judgments under appeal and we fully agree with the reasons given in both the judgments under appeal for holding that the writ petition was barred on account of the gross delay of the petitioners in filing the writ petition .
8. Additionally, neither of the petitioners had any claim to any part of the property in dispute, because they had not filed any claim form for it. Learned counsel relied on the fact that the second petitioner was the sole heir of Mirza Yousuf Beg, but, it was Mirza Yousuf Beg, who had filed the N. C.
9. H. Form, and it is not the case of the petitioners that he had died before the form was rejected.
10. Hence our observation that it was forMirza Yousuf Beg alone to challenge 'the transfer of the property to Syed Ali Amir. Accordingly, we agree with the view taken in the judgments under appeal that the petitioners had no locus stands to file the writ petition, and on this ground also the writ petition was rightly dismissed.
11. However, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the first petitioner was competent to challenge the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order transferring the property to Syed Ali Amir, Wahidudin Ahmad, C. J., has pointed out in his judgment that the first petitioner's appeal against the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order was dismissed as time-barred on 24-3-1960 and that the Revision against this order of 24-3-1960 was also dismissed as time-barred. The finding, that the appeal and Revision filed by the first petitioner were time-barred, was not challenged before us, and the question, whether this petitioner's delay in prosecuting his remedies should be condoned, was a question of fact within the discretion of the Settlement Authorities. Perhaps, because the petitioners have not cared to file the relevant orders, learned counsel was not able to explain why the first petitioner had delayed in prosecuting his alleged remedies. But as no attempt has been made to explain the delay, it is clear that the petitioners are precluded from challenging the finding of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and of the Settlement Commissioner that the appeal and the Revision filed by the first petitioner were time-barred. Accordingly, on this ground also, the writ petition filed by the petitioners was only fit to be dismissed.
12. In the result, this petition for leave is utterly devoid of merit and is dismissed.