' SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).---The question whether in the scheme of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), it is permissible to designate and authorise the same person as the authority and the authorised officer under sub- rules (2) and (3) of rule 2 of the Rules, has arisen in Appeals Nos. 1574(L)/1978 and 1841(L)/1978.
2. In Appeal No, 1574(L)/78 Abdul Karim Sheikh, who was a Signaller (Grade 7) was served with a charge sheet on 18th August, 1977. On receipt of the inquiry report, the Divisional Superintendent, Post Offices, Gujrat Division, on 8th May, 1978 passed the order of his dismissal from service. In Appeal No, 1841(L)/78, Mubarik Ali, who was a Sub-Postmaster (Grade 7) was served with a charge- sheet on 25th January, 1977 and on receipt of the inquiry report, the Divisional Superintendent, Post Offices, passed the order of his compulsory retirement on 30th April, ' 1978.
3. In these cases, in accordance with the provisions of sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 2, the President, by notification dated 23rd February, 1978, in respect of the Divisions and the Units, had designated the Head of the Division/Unit to exercise the power of authority and authorised the same officer to perform the functions of an authorised officer. Mr. Hamid Khan, Advocate appeared in Appeal No, 1574(L)/78, and also assisted the appellant, Mubarik Ali in Appeal No, 1841(L)/78, who was not represented by counsel. His main argument was that if the same person, as in the present two cases, performs the functions of the authorised officer and the authority, the provisions of clause
(iv) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 of the Rules becomes nugatory, and that in accordance with the established principle of interpretation, no construction which renders a provision nugatory can be put on the language of a statute and that if there is some repugnancy between two or more provisions of the same statute, then the Court interpreting the statute has to give that meaning to the provision which does not render any part of the statute as nugatory. It was contended that there are distinct functions of the authorised officer and the authority and that if the same person performs the functions of both, then the whole scheme of the Rules in this respect fails. Clause (iv) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 of the Rules provides that on receipt of the report of the Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, the authorised officer shall determine whether the charge has been proved. If it is so proved and he thinks that a minor penalty is called for, then he shall . If, on the other hand, the case is of a major penalty, then he shall forward the case to the authority, recommending penalty to be imposed and the authority shall pass such order, as it may deem proper. The substance of his argument is that the matter in case of major penalty has to be examined at two stages after the completion of the inquiry. The first stage is when the report is received by the authorised officer.
At this stage, if the authorised officer determines that the charge has been proved, but the act of the accusei officer calls for a minor penalty, he shall impose the same and close the chapter.
However, if in his opinion, the act of the accused officer is such that he deserves a major penalty, then he shall make recommendations to the authority that shall pass such order as it deems fit. At this later stage, the authority has three alternatives. First to inflict the major penalty. Second to inflict k minor penalty and the third is to exonerate the accused officer. It was further argued that by investing the powers of the authority and the authorised officer to the same person the safeguards envisaged under clause (iv) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 is taken away and the accused officer is prejudiced inasmuch as the same person acts as prosecutor and the judge.
4. The learned counsel referred to several cases in which it had been held that where the same person acts as prosecutor and the judge, the entire proceedings are vitiated. In the case of Rahim Jan v. Institute of Chartered Accountants (1) it was held that where two members of the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants had a grievance against the petitioner were present on the Committee which decided against the pettioner, their mere presence on the Committee was enough to vitiate the entire proceedings. Reference was also made to the case of Mohsin Siddiqui v. Government of West Pakistan (2). In this case, the District Judge who was the appointing authority in the case of a Stenographer imposed the penalty on Stenographer on charges including a charge that he had been discourteous to the District Judge and his behaviour to him was insulting. The Supreme Court held that the District Judge being himself the aggrieved person was a prosecutor and he could not, therefore inflict the penalty. The last case referred to in this respect is Cooper v. Wilson (3), in which it was held that where an authority against whose order the appeal is preferred is present at the time of hearing of the appeal, the proceedings of the appeal are vitiated.
5. The learned Deputy Attorney-General has rightly pointed out that this is not a case of the same person acting as prosecutor and the judge, {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) PLD 1977 Lah. 1450 (2) PLD 1964 SC 64
(3) (1937) 2 411 iE R 726 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' because the authorised officer is not personally interested in the case, nor he acts as appellate authority while deciding the question at issue, in his capacity as authority. When the two functions are being performed by the same person, then throughout he remains the judge and makes a decision after examining the report of the Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, if any. The arguments of the learned counsel, in this respect, are, therefore, of no avail.
6. However, the question still remains to be decided whether the same person, in the present cases, could act as the authorised officer and the authority. A plain reading of rule 5 (I)(iv) of the Rules does not admit of that interpretation, but the learned Deputy Attorney-General has pointed out that the definition of sub-rule (3) of rule 2 had been amended, and it has been provided that where no authorised officer is appointed, the authority shall act as the authorised officer. This amendment was made on 3rd July, 1978, and is not relevant to the present two appeals, the penalties in which were inflicted much earlier. Even otherwise, it is not a case of failure to appoint an authorised officer. In fact, the notification does name separately the authority and the authorised officer, but incidentally the same officer has been entrusted with the functions of the both. The learned Deputy Attorney-General then referred to rule 6-A of the Rules, according to which the authority has power to call for the record of any case pending before or disposed of by the authorised officer and pass such orders in relation thereto as it may deem fit. Rule 6 A ibid was inserted on 3rd July, 1978, and this too was after the two appellants had been punished. In their case, this rule is not relevant. However, even otherwise, it cannot be read in this rule that the same person can be appointed as authority and the authorised officer.
7. Reading sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 2, and rule 5 of the Rules, with particular reference to clause
(iv) of sub-rule (1) thereof, it would appear that the President himself is the authority. He can, however, designate another person to exercise the powers of the authority. Likewise. The authorised officer is the President or the authority designated by the President or a person who is designated by the President himself or by the authority to be the authorised officer. Where there is no other designation or authorisation, then the President himself is the authorised officer and the authority, but if an authority has been designated by the President, then the President ceases to be the authorised officer. The President is then to authorise a person to act as authority or leave it to the authority designated by him to authorise another person as authorised officer. Now sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 2 are declaratory in form, inasmuch as it is up to the President to decide whether he should act himself as the authority or authorised officer or should entrust the functions to some other person. Where he considers that he should act as the authority himself, he need not designate any other person as the authority. Likewise, he need not name any person as authorised officer if he himself wants to act as such. However, if he names an authority, then he has to name an authorised officer also, and if he only names the authority, but not the authorised officer, then the authority can act as authorised officer as well, but it is open to the authority to designate another person as authorised officer. Apparently, the two functions being performed by the same officer would render clause (iv) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 of the Rules as nugatory, but then the two provisions have to be reconciled. In our opinion, the reconciliation is possible by limiting the combination of authority and authorised officer only in those cases where the accused officer is not subordinate to anyone except the President for in such a case it would not be proper to name an officer of equal status or a lower status to perform the functions of the authority or of the authorised officer. However, when a person is immediately subordinate to an officer other than the President, then the same functions cannot, in our opinion, be performed by the same person as authority and the authorised officer for that would negate the provisions of clause (iv) .
8. The learned counsel, Mr. Hamid Khan, has referred to several authorities who lay down the principle that a statute should be construed in such a manner that no part of it should become superfluous, void or insignificant. There can be no dispute to this proposition. The rules of interpretation, in our opinion, are sometimes contradictory and sometimes overlapping. There are only two main principles of the interpretation of statute with regard to which there can be no two opinions. The one is that the statute should be read on its own language and the Court should avoid to add or to omit therefrom anything unless the working of the statute becomes impossible without such addition or omission. The second rule is that the intention of the law makers should be the prime consideration when interpreting a statute. Though these two rules appear on first impression as different in language, yet they often converge to the same point. The recent trend of interpretation of statute is that they should be construed on their plain language, and if there is any ambiguity, then that should be resolved by finding out the intention of the lawmakers. Obviously, in the present cases, there is some sort of ambiguity. If sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 2, and also rule 6- A are read on their plain language, then it appears permissible to appoint the same person as the authority or the authorised officer. However, this interpretation would totally negate the provisions of rule 5 (l)(iv) of the Rules, which lay down the procedure for infliction of penalty on an accused officer. The said clause (iv) in a manner gives protection to the accused officer, so that his case may be examined at more than one stage. If the same person is appointed as authority, and the authorised officer, then the accused officer is deprived of that double check. In a penal statute, the provisions have to be interpreted in favour of the person on whom the penalty is to be imposed and, therefore, we have to interpret this rule as well to mean that an authorised officer is a person different from the authority, but to reconcile it with the definition of the two terms and the revisional powers provided for under rule 6-A, we would enlarge the scope of the Rules to the extent that when the President himself chooses to act as authority, then he can also act as authorised officer, without naming any other person as such. However, if he names a person other than himself as authority, then he has either himself to name the authorised officer on if he does not so name, then the authority named by him has to designs any other person as the authorised officer.
9. The question involved is not of first impression. In the case of Farooq Ahmad Malik v. Central Board of Revenue (1), though the question was not directly involved, the ratio of the decision was that the same person could not act as the authority or the authorised officer. In the case of Shaukat Hayat Khan v. Director General, Immigration and Passports (2), it was held by this Tribunal that under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, there was no scope for {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1982 PLC (C. S.) 812 (2) 1981 PLC (C. S.) 37 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' combination of the functions of the authority and the authorised officer in one and the same person. Similar view was taken in the case of Zakir Ali v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1). The question was directly involved in the case of Mohammad Nawaz v. Government of Punjab (2). The single Judge of the Lahore High Court observed that the authority and the authorised officer were different entities. Though the decision is not based on the rules applicable to the civil servants of the Federation, nevertheless the Punjab rules which were being interpreted in that case, bore similarity to the Federal rules. ' le.- Coming to the present cases, we are of the view that in these cases the same person could not be designated as authority and also authorised to perform the functions of the authorised officer. In fact, in an earlier notification different persons had been so designated, but for reasons best known to the respondent department, a new notification- was issued combining the functions of the authority and the authorised officer in the same person.
' II. We would not have struck down the orders on this technical issue alone if no prejudice had been done to the appellants. However, since the appellants were deprived of the examination of their cases at two stages before the appellate stage, their interest was jeopardised, and it is difficult for us to uphold the orders of penalty passed on them. In view of the above facts, we accept these appeals, and set aside the impugned order in bath the appeals. The chapter will, however, not close here. If the notification is revised and different persons are named as authority and the authorised officer, then the report of the Inquiry Officer which had already been prepared, is to be examined first by the authorised officer so designated. If he finds the accused officials not guilty, he will close the chapter. If he finds the accused guilty, but he considers the case where only minor penalty should be imposed, he would do accordingly. However, if in his view major penalty is called for, he shall have to send his report to the authority along with the report of the enquiry officer and the explanation of the accused officer. While doing so the guidelines laid down in the case of Syed Mir Mohammad v. N.-W.F.P Government (3) shall have to be observed. The other course is to send the case to the President himself alongwith the inquiry report and the explanation of the accused officer for passing such order, as he deems fit, because in this case, there being no proper authorisation, the President himself is the authority and the authorised officer uptill now. The question of consequential relief to the appellants is being left open to the competent authority. If the proceedings are taken ahead, then the authority or the authorised officer will pass orders in respect of the consequential matters. If, however, no further proceedings are taken, then the appellants shall stand reinstated with all the consequential benefits.
12. Both the appeals are disposed of as above. However, there shall be no order as to costs. A.
0. RAZIUR RAHMAN (MEMBER).-In a similar case concerning the same department, the same point was raised regarding the permissibility of the same person being designated both as Authority and Authorised Officer. In appeal No, 34(K)/1979, Mohammad Kalimullah v. Postmaster (Central), New Town, Head Office, Karachi and others, it was contended {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1980 PLC (C. S.) 273 (2) 1981 PLC (C. S.) 194
(3) PLD 1981 SC 176 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' on behalf of the Appellant that the order of the Appellant's removal from service passed by the said Postmaster was not sustainable as he had acted both as Authority and Authorised Officer in the proceedings drawn up against the Appellant and passed a final order in the matter. It was held by the Tribunal that there was "no merit in the contention of the Appel-1 ant" that, because the Authority "and Authorised Officer were combined in the same person, prejudice was caused to the Appellant and proceedings vitiated on that account". I am inclined to think that the view taken by the Tribunal in that case ought to prevail for the reasons spelled out hereinafter.
2. It is an admitted fact that the expressions "Authority" and "Authorised Officer" have not been explicitly defined in the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, but have been only explained with reference to the functions assigned to them under the said rules. In other words, the powers and functions are to be viewed within the four walls of the procedure laid down in these rules. But, at the same time, there are certain meanings attached to certain words and expressions, which, considered in the context of the scheme of the rules, give an indication of the intention of the rule-makers. According to "Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Sixth Edition 1976 vide page 63. "Authority" means "power or right to enforce obedience" and "a person or body having authority". According to the same book, ''Authorise" means "give authority to" and "commission". According to another book, "Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition 1972, reprint 1976", vide page 86 ibid, the word "Authority" stands for "legal power or right"; "power derived from office"; "a person or body holding power". In the same book, the meaning of "Authorise" is given as : "to give authority to". Both the dictionaries give almost identical meanings in both eases.
From the meanings given by them, it is clear that "Authority", according to them, stands for a person or body having the power or right to enforce obedience and that the power exercised by such person or body has a legal basis, being derived from the office held by such person or body.
As distinguished from this, an "authorised" person is one to whom certain powers are granted for performing certain specific functions of exercising certain rights not inherent to the office itself but derived from special sanction or order. When the dictionary meanings of these two expressions are considered along with their definitions, as given in the (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, it becomes clear that the relationship of the "Authority" and the "Authorised Officer" is not that of two functionaries working separately and independently but of the latter assisting the former in the exercise of certain powers vested in him. To explain the position, under the (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, "Authority" has been defined as "the President or an officer or authority designated by him to exercise the powers of authority under these rules". The President being the person in whom all powers of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary action in respect of civil servants vest, his designation as authority is only in keeping with the dictionary meaning of the word as given in the two references quoted above. Likewise, the authorised officer has been defined in the Efficiency and Discipline Rules as "an officer authorised by the authority to perform functions of an authorised officer under these rules". Although certain specific jobs have been prescribed for the "Authorised Officer", it is clear from the nature of the unction's assigned to him that his job is that of an assistant to the "Authority", relieving him of part of the burden of work which, by virtue of his inherent powers, he has to shoulder. For example, when a Government servant is accused of subversion, corruption, or misconduct, the "Authorised Officer" cannot suspend him without the approval of the "Authority" and, if he wants to continue the suspension beyond three months, he has to obtain the approval of the "Authority" after every three months. The nature of these and other restrictions placed on the powers of the "Authorised Officer" clearly shows that he does not function entirely on his own, but as one authorised or commissioned by the Authority" to perform certain functions on his behalf. To elaborate the point further, while the Authorised Officer has been empowered to decide whether to order an enquiry or to issue a show cause notice to the accused Government servant, he has not been empowered to pass final orders in all categories of cases. He has been authorised to pass final orders only in cases where, in his opinion, a minor penalty is indicated and, in all cases where a major penalty is called for, he has to put up the case to the authority for final orders. From the nature of these punishments, it is clear that the intention of the rules is to relieve the "Authority" of the heavy burden of work it would be saddled with, if it had to undertake, single handedly, the conducting of the proceedings in all cases and to give decision in all matters whether they called for a major penalty or a minor one. It is a question of convenience and facility of work, not one of justice and fair-play, which is involved in the provision of an "Authorised Officer" to deal with disciplinary cases. Since it was not intended that the "Authority" should be burdened with the work of all disciplinary cases, whether of a major character or of a purely minor one, it was decided that, while punishment in cases of major character could be inflicted only by the "Authority", in those of minor nature, the work should be left to the "Authorised Officer". Since, however, unless an enquiry has been held and certain findings arrived at, it is not possible to determine whether a case calls for a major penalty or a minor one, it has been provided that, where the Authorised Officer, after considering the report of the Enquiry Officer, the explanation of the accused and the facts and circumstances of the case, comes to the conclusion that a major penalty is called for, we will not pass final orders himself but forward the case to the Authority for decision. In this way, his own powers are restricted to decisions regarding cases calling for minor penalty. For the reason either that the powers of inflicting major penalty are not to be exercised by an officer who is not sufficiently higher in status than the officer who is proceeded against or that such powers should be exercisable only by people possessed of a higher degree of experience and maturity of judgment, such categories of cases have been excluded from the purview of decisions by the Authorised Officer. To put it more simply, while the rule-makers could trust the Authorised Officer to dispose of cases of minor nature, they could not put the same trust in him in regard to cases of other categories. It would, perhaps, not be justifiable to infer therefrom that they also had in mind the reverse of this situation, namely, that they also wanted to keep the minor cases outside the jurisdiction of the Authority. Where, for administrative reasons, it was felt that it was not essential to provide the Authority with the help and assistance of an Authorised Officer to relieve him of the burden of his work relating to disciplinary matters, or where it was felt that suitable officers could not be found for the purpose, it was not necessary to have separate persons as the "Authority" and the "Authorised Officer"
3. Contrary to the view expressed by my learned colleare that in all cases where a major penalty is indicated, the provision for the examination of a case by two persons, namely, the Authorised Officer first and then the Authority, is to reduce the possibility of error to the minimum, my humble opinion is that the role of the Authorised Officer, being purely one of an assistant to the Authority, the application of two minds to the same matter is not essential to the scheme of the Rules. Since putting up of in the-case to the "Authority", wherever a major penalty is indicated, is only a sequel to the findings already arrived at by the "Authorised Officer", it is entirely because of lack of competence on his part that the "Authorised Officer" is required to put up such cases to the "Authority" and not because the intention of the rule-makers is that there should be application, of two minds to a particular case before the final orders are passed. Had that been the intention, the "Authorised Officer" would not have been empowered to pass final orders in cases calling for minor penalties. If, therefore, the "Authority" were to play the same role in respect of cases calling for major penalties as that played by the "Authorised Officer" in respect of minor penalties, there would be no violence done to the principle of natural justice and the accused officer cannot be prejudiced merely because the "Authority" initiates proceedings and takes decisions without the assistance of an "Authorised Officer". Since, as very succinctly explained by my learned colleagues, the position of the "Authorised Officer". An officer proceeded against, is not that of a Prosecutor, it would be wrong to assume that, if the role of the "Authorised Officer" and "Authority" were combined in the same person, it would amount to combining the role of Prosecutor and Judge in the same person.
4. It is true, as pointed out by my learned colleagues, that the definition of "Authorised Officer" was amended by a Notification dated 3rd July, 1978, to include the Authority if no officer is so authorised. It could, however, be wrong to infer from this that only after this date could the functions of the two officers be combined in one and the same person. We find that the combination of the two functions was also not ruled out earlier to this amendment, as is obvious from Notification No, SRO-1562 (1)/73, dated 7th November, 1973, by which, while in the case of officers of Grades 20 to 21, the Prime Minister was designated as the Authority and no officer had been designated as the Authorised Officer, in respect of Grade 16, the Secretary was designated as the Authority as well as the Authorised Officer, and, in respect of Grades 11 to 15, it was laid down that where there was a Secretary or Additional Secretary in the Ministry, the Authority would be the Secretary or Additional Secretary and the Joint Secretary would be Authorised Officer but where there was no Secretary or Additional Secretary, the. Joint Secretary would be both Authority and Authorised Officer. From this arrangement, it is clear that, in respect of certain categories of employees, the functions of the Authority and Authorised Officer were combined in the same person and that in those cases where the Prime Minister was the Authority, no Authorised Officer was designated, which for all practical purposes meant that the functions of the Authorised Officer were also to be performed by the Prime Minister. This position was merely clarified by the amendment to the definition made by the Notification dated 3rd July, 1978, referred to above. Even if no such formal amendment had been made, the factual position would have renlained the same, namely, that there being no other person designated as the Authorised Officer, all the jobs required to be done under the rules by the Authorised Officer would have had to be done by the Prime Minister. The amendment, therefore, was intended only to remove the vagueness that may have existed in some minds on account of the fact that no officer had been designated as the Authorised Officer. Even under the scheme of things, as laid down in the revised designation of Authority and the Authorised Officer, vide Establishment Division, Notification No, 7/1/73-DI, dated 5th July, 1979, the position is that, in respect of officers of Grades 23 to 21, the President is both the Authority and Authorised Officer and, in respect of employees of Grades 15 to 3, wherever there is no Secretary or Additional Secretary, the Joint Secretary is both the Authority and the Authorised Officer. In the face of these provisions in the rules and notifications made thereunder, it would appear that when, by the Notification dated 23rd February, 1978, the President in respect of the Divisions/Units designated the Head of the Division/Unit to exercise the powers of the Authority and authorised the same officer to perform the functions of the Authorised Officer, he did not make any departure from the rule on the subject and the practice in vogue even prior to the amendment of the definition of the Authorised Officer made by the Notification dated 3rd July, 1978. Even otherwise, since the Rules did not lay down that the same person could not be designated both as Authority and Authorised Officer, such designation made by the President could not be considered to be ultra vires of the Rules. Sub-clause (4) of clause (I) of rule 5, need not be considered as an impediment to this, because the procedure laid down therein obviously pertains to those cases where there are separate officers designated as the Authority and the authorised Officer and it cannot be considered as a mandatory provisions for having two officers separately designated for the purpose. Where there is no separate Authorised Officer and the functions of the two officers are combined in the same person, the necessity of forwarding the case from one to the otber does not arise at all and decision would be given by the Authority without the necessity of a reference being made to him by the Authorised Officer.
5. In this connection, it may be relevant to note that, in relation to many other matters, the powers of superior and inferior authorities are combined in the same person and one of the authorities is completely eliminated. For example, in the matter of A. C. Rs,, in quite a number of categories, there is no Countersigning Officer and the report of the Reporting Officer is treated as final. Similarly, in the case of certain categories of officers, they themselves are the Countersigning Officers or Controlling Officers for the purpose of sanctioning travelling allowance. In neither of the cases referred to is a second check exercised, which is otherwise considered to be essential in the interest of administration and financial discipline. Likewise, in the case of action under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, where the intention evidently is not to exercise a double check, no harm or prejudice would ensure with the combination of the two functions in the same person. As is well known, in respect of Government servants in Grades 21 to 23, the President is the Authority as well as the Authorised Officer. In these cases, it cannot be argued that less protection has been given to officers of these categories than to those of lower categories, in respect of whom functions of the Authority and the Authorised Officer are not combined but entrusted to different persons. Evidently, the rationale for the combination of the two functions in the person of the President in the case of the three grades mentioned is the same which has been mentioned earlier, namely, that the job of initiating disciplinary proceeding; and taking subsequent action is to be entrusted to a person of sufficiently highly status commensurate with the status of the officer proceeded against.
6. As already explained, if the same officer is designated as Authority and the Authorised Officer, what happens is that the Authority, instead of dealing only with cases involving major penalties, deals also with cases involving minor penalties here the principle involved is that the Authority does not want to trust even minor cases to judgments other than his own.
7. As already explained in paragraph 3 above, the intention of the rule-makers could not have been to invest the Authority with less powers in respect of cases involving major penalty than those given to the Authorised Officer in regard to cases requiring minor penalty. If the Authorised Officer could be trusted to exercise his independent judgment in disciplinary cases of a minor nature, surely the same amount of trust could be placed in the Authority in respect of those of a more serious nature. In fact, this principle has been explicitly embodied in rule 6-A, which enables the Authority to call for the record of any disciplinary case pending before, or disposed of by, the Authorised Officer and pass such orders as it may deem fit. From this it is clear that the inherent and residuary powers in respect of all disciplinary cases are vested in the Authority and that the Authorised Officer not, only functions as a delegatee of some of the powers of the Authority but is also subject to deprivation of the powers delegated to him in cases where the latter considers it necessary.
8. For the above reasons, my humble opinion is that we stick to the decision taken in the similar appeal already decided earlier (No, 34 (K)/ 1979, Mohammad Kalimullah v. Postmaster (Central), New Town, Head Office, Karachi and others), where in it was held that the designation of one and the same person as Authority and Authorised Officer does not militate against the principles of justice and does not cause prejudice to a Government employee proceeded against under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. As a sequel to this, the two appeals would deserve to be disposed of on their respective merits and not on the technical grounds relied upon by my learned colleagues.
' In view of the difference of opinion. The majority view, namely that of the Chairman and Brig.
Abdur Rashid, Member, shall prevail, and shall be the order of the Tribunal under section 3-A (2) (a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.