1. This appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) is directed against the order dated 8-9-1978, passed by the Controller, Hyderabad, in Rent Case No 2 of J 979, whereby he has allowed the application under section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 on the ground of default in payment of the rent. The facts giving rise to this appeal briefly stated, are as follows: The respondent was transferred a house bearing No. C. S. No. E/2286, situated at Mukti Gali, Hyderabad by the Settlement Department, vide Permanent Transfer Deed No. C SC. IV, page No. 69 Vol. V, C. S. C. V. Page 189, Vol. 20. The respondent served a notice dated 20-9-1978 (Exh. 20) on the appellant informing him of the transfer of the house and requiring him to pay the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.40 per month for the last 3 years amounting to Rs.1,440 and stating that he had demolished first floor of the house without obtaining her permission or even without notice and that he had caused damage to the building and requiring him to hand over vacant possession of the house by 15-10-1978. The notice was sent by registered post acknowledgment due and the same was replied to by the appellant through his Advocate's letter dated 10-10-1978 . (Exh. 23) wherein he admitted that he was statutory tenant and was liable to pay her rent from the date ofissuance of the transfer documents in her favour. He further stated therein that he had sent the rent at the rate of Rs.10 per month for the period commencing from July, 1977 to May, 1978, amount in to Rs.110, by money order in June, 1978 long before the notice (Exh. 201 but the respondent had refused to accept the money order. He denied the other allegations made in the notice and required the respondent to send copies of the transfer documents to him.
2. Thereafter, on 2-1-1979, the respondent filed an application under section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance., 1959 on the grounds of default in payment of rent, personal bona fide requirement of the house and making alterations in the house without her authority or permission.
3. The appellant in the written statement inter alia pleaded that the respon--dent never sent the copies of the transfer documents to him, and that the notice sent to him was not one under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation 8t Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) and that the rent of the premises was Rs.10 per month.
4. On the pleadings of the parties the Controller framed the following issues :-- "(1) Whether the opponent is wilful defaulter in payment of rent?
(2) Whether the applicant requires the premises for her bona fide personal use?
(3) Whether the opponent carried out additions and alterations in disputed house?
(4) Whether the notice under section 302, D. P. Act has been sent by the applicant to the opponent?
(5) Whether the application is not maintainable in law?
(6) What should the order be?
5. The Controller decided the Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 5 relating to default, validity of notice under section 30 of the Act, and maintainability of the application against the appellant but the remaining issues in his favour. The appellant has, therefore, come up in this appeal.
6. I have heard Mr. Aiyaz Ali Hakroo, Advocate. For the appellant and Mr. Iqbal Lodhi, Advocate for the respondent.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that notice dated 20-9-1978 (Exh. 20) was not according to law inasmuch as by it the respondent demanded rent at the rate of Rs.40 per month while he was paying rent to the Custodian at Rs.10 per month and also vacant possession of the house. It was, therefore, argued that the notice was invalid and consequently the application-was not maintainable.
8. PLD 1967 Lah. 683) and Abdul Qayyum v. Muhammad Ishaq (PLD 1967 Lah.1026). In the first mentioned case it was ruled' by Mushtaq Hussain, J. (as he then was) that "since the section 30 of the Act does not permit the charging of rent at a rate higher than described a notice demanding a higher rate would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 30, and if the tenant does not pay rent in accordance with it, he would not be liable to ejectment in pursuance of the provisions of that section". In the second cited case it is observed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore Court that service of notice under the above section (section 30 of the Act) in the prescribed manner is sine qua non for entertainment of a petition for ejectment against a tenant, who is occupying a building transferred to a displaced person.
9. Now, taking up the first submission I may say that the requirement of notice or notices under section 30 of the Act are two-fold; (1) the tenant should be informed of the transfer of the property by the Settlement Department to the transferee, and (2) demand for payment of rent by him. No doubt, the notice has to be served in the manner prescribed in section 30 of the Act. Here, it is not in dispute that notice was not served in the manner provided in section 30 of the Act. The learned counsel questioned the validity of notice on the grounds, that the respondent had made demand in excess of the rent which the tenant was paying to the Custodian and that the notice required the appellant to vacate the premises. Now, if the notice fulfils the requirement of section 30 of the Act and also contains some other demand or it demands rent in excess of the rent that a tenant is liable to pay under the Act that would not make the notice illegal for that demand which is beyond the scope of section 30 of the Act need not be met but that would not absolve the tenant from payment of the rent which he is liable to pay under the Act on receiving intimation of the transfer of the property and demand for payment of rent under the Act the tenant becomes statutory tenant on the same terms and conditions a to payment of rent or otherwise on which he held the property immediately before transfer and he loses the protection provided in section 30 of the Act., if be does not pay or tender the rent which he was paying to the Custodian or the Settlement Department, and where demand is made on the basis of clause (a) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 30 of the Act in accor--dance therewith. Further, if the notice contains more than what is required by law, the surplus would not make the notice which is otherwise accord--ing to law illegal unless the law itself declares it to be so. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of this Court in Hafiz Muhammad Hanif v. Niazuddin (PLD 1976 Kar. 1213), delivered by Z. A. Channa, J., which is relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent. I may quote the relevant passage therefrom immediately : "The mere fact that the demand of rent was excessive and was neither in accordance with the rent which was being paid by the appellant to the Custodian Department nor was according to the latest assessm ent carried out by the Hyderabad Municipality or any other local authority or that the notice made an averment, which was based on the observations of the Settlement Commissioner, that the appellant was a trespasser, do not make the notice invalid or ineffective."
10. The same view was taken by Zafar Hussain Mirza, J. In Tahir Ali v. Mst. Masoodi Begun and 4 others (1980 CLC 1332). I may quote the relevant observation which is as follows: "Mr. Anis Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the appellant first sought to impeach the validity of the notice under section 30 on the ground that the rent was not specified in the notice. This conten--tion has no merit as it is well settled that non-mention of the rate of rent or even demand of excessive rent does not have the effect of invalidating a notice under section 30. Reference in this behalf may be made to Ghulam Hussain v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal (1978 SCMR 269)."
11. This point was also urged before Qadeeruddin Ahmad, J. (as he then was) in Tahlr A. Khairullah v.
12. Zareefun Nisa (PLD 1968 Kar. 182), and following cases were cited before him Muhammad Sabir v.
13. Abdul Malik (PLD 1967 Pesh. 96), Sardar Begum v. Sarfaraz Khan (PLD 1967 Pesh. 176), Faqir Muhammad v. Muhammad Yasin (PLD 1964 Lah. 686). It was observed by the learned Judge at page 187 of the report as follows "All of those judgments are by learned Single Judges. I am unable to see bow under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordi--nance, 1959, it can reasonably be concluded that merely because excessive rent was claimed by the landlord, the tenant becomes relieved of the liability to pay any rent. There are provisions in the Ordinance for making payment by money order and by depositing rent with the Rent Controller. The purpose of these provisions is to make the tenant independent of the willingness or otherwise of the landlord to accept rent. In the event of a dispute and unwillingness on the part of the Landlord to accept rent, the tenant should deposit the rent with the Rent Controller, or send it by money order at the rate acceptable to him. Subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance is meant to resolve disputes in the first instance temporarily, and in the end, finally; but in no way relieves the tenant of his liability to pay rent."
14. As regards the first case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant namely, F. A. Saleem v. Muhammad Yaqub Khan Tokhi, it is laid down there that the notice demanding higher rent would not be sufficient compliance of provisions of section 30 of the Act because section 30 does not permit charging of rent at a rate higher than that mentioned therein. I have already stated that the requirement of section 30 of the Act, is that the transferee should inform the tenant of the transfer of the property by notice in the prescribed manner and he should demand rent from him and once this is done an obligation is cast on the tenant to pay or tender the amount of rent or arrears of rent due from him according to the Act, otherwise he loses the protection. Now, with utmost respect I may say, if the demand made by the transferee is in excess of what is legally due, it does not absolve the tenant from paying or tendering the due rent. I, therefore, do not find myself in agreement with the view taken in the cited case. Moreso, when the consistent view of this High Court is to the contrary and the same finds support from the dictum of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Hussain alias Zair v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal etc. I therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.
15. However, Mr. Hakroo prays that the appellants may be allowed 4 months' time to vacate the premises. Mr. Lodhi states that the respondent is a widow and has no accommodation of her own and has been residing in a railway quarter. These facts are not controverted by Mr. Hakroo, However, I think some time may be allowed to the appellant and in my view two months time would be reasonable. I accordingly, allow the appellant two months time to vacate the premises and hand over its posses--sion to the respondent, provided he continues to deposit rent as ordered by the Controller.