' AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, J.---Through this revision petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and decree dated 25-8-2004, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, whereby appeal filed by the respondents/ plaintiffs was accepted and the judgment and decree dated 2-1- 2004, dismissitig the suit of the plaintiffs was set aside.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/respondents on 28-10-2000, filed a suit to pre-empt the sale of land through registered sale deed dated 1-7-2000, in favour of the petitioner/defendant.
Written statement was filed, suit was contested, the learned trial Court framed the issues and invited the parties to produce their respective evidence. Both the parties produced their oral as well as documentary evidence and vide judgment and decree dated 2-1-2004, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit. While recording findings on Issues Nos.2 and 5 the learned trial Court held that talbs have not been performed in accordance with law, therefore, dismissed the suit. The learned Ist Appellate Court reversed the findings on these issues and decreed the suit, hence, this revision petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant argues that none of the witnesses has stated about the date and time of gaining knowledge of sale by the plaintiffs and also their announcement of exercise of right of pre-emption, therefore, states that basic demand, i,e, Talb-i-Muwathibat, has not been proved, that when Talb-i-Muwathibat has not been pleaded and proved in accordance with law the plaintiffs cannot succeed in the exercise of right of pre-emption; that the statements as well as report of P.W.4, who is part time postmaster, is not reliable with regard to the refusal of acceptance of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad; that the provisions of sending notice of Talb-i-Ishhad have also not been complied with, no receipt of sending registered notice through acknowledgement due has been produced and that there is no acknowledgment due with the envelope which has been produced before the Court, therefore, while relying upon Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Yousaf (2012 SCM R 911) and Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs, and others (PLD 2007 SC 302) prayed for the setting aside of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/ respondents has stated that the findings recorded by the learned Ist Appellate Court are valid and with reasons, therefore, cannot be set aside by this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction; that when the report upon the registered envelope, which has been produced as Exh.P-2, and also the statement of postmaster who appeared as P.W.4, are available, there is no necessity to produce the receipt of sending notice issued by the post office and also registered notice sent through acknowledgement due card. In the circumstances of this case this is not a defect as well as fatal against the plaintiffs/ respondents.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record with their assistance. So far as sending of notice through registered post acknowledgement due is concerned, as the original envelope which was sent through registered post without acknowledgement due was returned back to the plaintiffs un-served and the same has been produced and exhibited in evidence of the plaintiffs as Exh. P-2 is not a substantial compliance of section 13 of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991. In my view sending of registered notice be proved by the plaintiff through acknowledgment due, producing the receipt of delivery of notice to the addressee or the refusal to receive the notice by the addressee. So far as the reports upon Exh. P-2 are concerned, the person claiming to be the author of reports dated 21-10-2000 as well as 24-10- 2000, upon this registered letter, appeared before the Court as P.W.4. Abdul Aziz P.W.4 is employee of Education Department and part time postmaster. His statement is that he has sent children of the school to inform the addressee about the registered letter and the children informed him that the addressee has gone to meet her relatives and second time the children through whom the message was sent for addressee told that there is refusal on the part of the addressee when the defendant has claimed inimical relations with P.W.4..P.W.4 admitted that he never went to the addressee to deliver the registered post envelope, he has even not mentioned the name of any witness and also the name of the child who was sent to the addressee is not in his memory. This report cannot be relied and cannot be used against the defendant/ petitioner. In these circumstances of the case if there would have been report of refusal proved against the petitioner/defendant then it could have been presumed that it is a substantial compliance of section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, but in these circumstances when the receipt of sending notice has not been produced and admittedly the registered letter produced as Exh. p-2 does not contain acknowledgement due, therefore, it is not a substantial compliance of section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, with regard to sending notice under registered acknowledgement due. The other point relevant in this case is that for proving Talb-i-Muwathibat it is basic duty of the plaintiffs to plead and prove the exact time, date and place of gaining knowledge of the impugned sale and then to plead and prove the making of jumping demand forthwith after gaining the knowledge. If the time, date and place is not pleaded or proved through evidence the plaintiffs cannot prove the jumping demand because first they have to prove the gaining of knowledge at specific place, time and date. In this case though time, date and place has been pleaded but the plaintiffs failed to prove the same through evidence. Even one of the plaintiffs, namely, Muhammad Asghar, who appeared as P.W.3, states that 2-1/4 years ago when they were sitting on the Dera of Rafique Lambardar came to know about the sale, in this way specific time and date has not been said in his statement. It is settled principle of law that pleadings cannot be used as evidence for proving the specific time, date and place, the statements of the plaintiffs and their witnesses are relevant. None of the witnesses has narrated the date and specific time which is mandatory for proving of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat. In this way the performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat has also not been proved in accordance with section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. Furthermore, when questioned to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/ respondents that there are three plaintiffs and only one of the plaintiffs appeared as P.W.3 whether he was holding any power of attorney on behalf of other plaintiffs, the answer is in negative. The learned counsel for the respondents/ plaintiffs tried to argue that it was sufficient that one of the plaintiffs appeared and has stated about the performance of Talb-i- Muwathibat. I am afraid that announcement of exercise of right of preemption is a personal act of every plaintiff, if announced that can be proved if he appears before the Court himself or through attorney. When there were three plaintiffs, statement of only one of the plaintiffs without holding power of attorney on behalf of other two plaintiffs is fatal defect in proving the performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat on behalf of two other plaintiffs who never appeared as a witness before the Court.
' In view of what has been discussed above, this revision petition is accepted, findings recorded by the Ist Appellate Court with regard to performance of talbs are against law as well as result of misreading and non-reading of evidence produced by the parties before the Court, therefore, same are set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents stands dismissed with no order as to costs.