1. The appellant has challenged in this appeal the Order of the IVth Additional District Judge, Hyderabad, passed in 1st Rent Appeal No. 149/1974 whereby he reversed the ejectment order passed by Civil Judge, and A. C. M. Hyderabad directing ejectment of the respondent from the premises bearing No. D/1397 situated in Juman Shah Jo Pir Lane, Hyderabad.
2. Brief facts of the case are that property bearing Survey No. D/1391 situated in Juman Shah Jo Pir Lane, Hyderabad was purchased through a registered sale-deed by the present appellant on 9th October, 1967. After purchase of the property notices were served on the respondents intimating then about the transfer of the property in favour of the appel--lant and rent was also demanded at the rate of Rs. 15 and 20 respectively per month. As no rent was paid by the respondents, ejectment application No. 180/68 was filed against the present respondents as well as one Sardar Ali. Sardar Ali died during the proceedings of rent case before the Rent Controller and thereafter his son Nasir Ali was joined as party in his place in the rent case. The Rent Controller granted the ejectment application both on the ground of default as well as personal and bona fide requirement against the respondents as well as against Nasir Ali. The ejectment order was challenged in appeal by the present respondents only and Nasir Ali son of Sardar Ali did not file any appeal against that order.
3. The first appellate Court on the appeal of respondents came to the conclusion that the default committed by respondents was not willful and on plea of personal and bona fide requirement the first appellate Court came to the conclusion that the notice of transfer having been served on the respondent by the appellant on 19th January, 1968, and the application for ejectment having been filed on 31st July, 1968, the period of protection of 6 years available to the tenant under the provision of section 30 of the D.P. (Comp. & Rehb.) Act had not expired and therefore the application for ejectment on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement was not maintainable. As a result of above findings the order of Rent Controller was reversed by the first appellate authority an the application filed by appellant was rejected, Mr. Jamil Ahmed Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that the order of first appellate authority holding that there was no wilful default on the part of the respondents is contrary to the evidence on record. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the reversal of the findings of the Rent Controller on the plea of personal and bona fide requirement is wholly misconceived as on the admitted facts of the case the period of protection available to the respondents was lost due to their failure to tender the rent in respect of the property within three months of the service of notice. Mr. Nooruddin Sarki, the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the reasoning given by the first appellate authority for reversal of the finding of the Controller are convincing and since the findings of first appellate Court relate to questions facts, they are binding on this Court to second appeal. No doubt the finding of first appellate Court on questions of facts are generally binding on this Court second appeal but when such findings are at variance with the findings of the Court of first instance, the two findings will naturally come up for a comparative assessm ent in a second appeal and if the first appellate court while reversing the findings of the court of first instance has failed to take into consideration all the reasons given by the Court of first instance in support of the findings or has failed to record any logical basis for coming to a contrary finding or has arrived at a finding contrary to evidence on record or the finding is arrived at in ignorance of some important piece of evidence on record then such findings of facts by first appellate Court are not immune from attack before the second appellate Court (See Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari (PLD 1969 SC 617)). In the case before me in so far the question of default is concerned the main consideration which prevailed with the first appellate authority while reversing the finding of Rent Controller and holding that the default committed by the respondent was not wilful was that the status of the property remained in dispute as the Evacuee Trust Board had filed an application before the Settlement Commissioner, seeking a declaration that the property was an evacuee trust property. I have gone through the evidence on record in this case and find that the order of the Settle--ment Commissioner rejecting the application of Evacuee Trust Board vas passed on 24th November, 1969. The ejectment application was instituted by the appellant on 31st July, 1968, a certified copy of the above order of Settlement Commissioner holding the property as non-trust property was produced in evidence before the Controller on 23rd January, 1971. The application for ejectment was rejected by the Rent Controller on 4th November, 1971, on the ground of absence of notice under section 30 of the D. P.
4. Act. It is an admitted position in the case that in spite of production of certified copy of the order of Settlement Commissioner holding the property as non-trust and rejection of rent case on 4th November, 1971, no rent was tendered by the respondents until passing of the' tentative rent order by the Rent Controller on 2nd August, 1973. The order of Rent Controller rejecting the application of appellant for want of notice was set aside by the first appellate authority and the case was sent back to Rent Controller for decision according to law. The order of first appellate authority admittedly was not challenged by the respondents any further. In view of the admitted position it can not be argued that the respondents were unaware about the status of the property as the certified copy of the order holding the property as non trust property was produced in the Court of Rent Controller during the course of evidence of the appellant on 23rd January, 1971, and at least from that date onward the respondents were aware about the non-trust character of the property, and therefore, there was no justification for them for not tendering the rent to the appellant. In these circumstance the findings of the first appellate authority that the default on the part of the respondents was not wilful cannot be sustained. The Rent Controller was right in holding that the respondents were guilty of wilful default in payment of rent. In so far the plea of personal and bona fide requirement is concerned the only ground on which the first appellate authority set aside the order of the Rent Controller was that the 6 years period of protection available to the respondents under section 30 of the D. P. (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act had not expired and therefore the application was not maintainable. The notice under section 30 of the D. P. Act has been held to have been served upon the respondents on 29th January, 1968 the application for ejectment was filed on 31st.July, 1968.. It is an admitted position that no rent was paid or tendered by the respondents within three months of the service of notice of demand on them. In these circumstances the protection under section 30 of the D. P. (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act available to respondents was lost and the case was to be governed under the normal law applicable to landlord and tenant. The reversal of the finding of the Rent Controller by the first appellate authority on the ground that the protection period was not over was therefore not correct. On merits the order of Rent Controller on the ground of personal and bona fide need of appellant is not shown to be defective in any manner.
5. I, accordingly accept this appeal, set aside the order of first appellate authority and restore the order of Rent Controller. After I have dictated the order` Mr. Nooruddin Sarki, the learned counsel for the respondents stated that the respondent No. 1, is a poor lady whose livelihood depends on teaching of Quran to the children and therefore some reason--able time may be granted to her to vacate the premises. Mr. Jamil Ahmed Khan, the learned counsel for appellants consents that eight months time may be granted to respondents to vacate the premises. I accordingly, while allowing this appeal and ordering ejectment of the respondents allow them eight months time with the consent of appellant's counsel to vacate the premises. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.