' SHEZADA MAZHAR, J. --- Through the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged, the vires of order dated 31.05.2013 passed by respondent No, 1 Secretary Health, Government of the Punjab, Lahore whereby the petitioner's services were terminated under Punjab Employees, Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA, Act 2006).
2. Facts necessary for the disposal of present writ petition are that petitioner was appointed as Lady Health Supervisor under Prime Minster's Programme for Family Planning and Primary Health Care in the year 1996 on contract basis, which was extended from time to time and petitioner's service was regularized vide notification dated 01.07.2012. On 12.05.2010 the petitioner was charge- sheeted alleging therein that she alongwith others had taken participate in the public demonstration on 15.04.2010. The petitioner replied the charge-sheet wherein she denied the allegation. An inquiry officer was appointed who held the petitioner as guilty and case was forwarded to National Programme for FF& FHC for taking action against the petitioner on the basis of inquiry report. Respondent No, 1 imposed the penalty of termination vide order dated 31.05.2013.
The said order has been assailed through the present writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No, 1 was not the competent authority to pass the impugned order, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. In this regard learned counsel referred to the contract of employment as well as notification dated 14.07.2012 wherein it is mentioned that the competent authority for the purpose of Lady Health Supervisor (LHS) is EDO (Health). Learned counsel further submits that as per law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Executive Council Allamat lqbal Open University Islamabad through Chairman and another v. M.
Tufail Hashmi (2010 SCM R 1484), the Punjab Employees, Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 is not applicable to the contract employees. Learned counsel also referred to Sections 1(4) and 2(h) of the PEEDA, Act, 2006 to state that the PEEDA, Act is not applicable to the contract employees. Learned counsel while referring to case-law reported as lbrar Hussian and others v.
Government of N.W.F.P through Secretary Board of Revenue and others (2001 SCM R 914) submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that statute has to be read as a whole and not in bit of pieces.
With regard to the appeal filed by the petitioner againt the impugned order, learned counsel states that the same was filed on misconception and that the same has already been withdrawn by the petitioner. In this regard placed on record copy of letter which was dispatched to Chief Secretary on 31.07.2013. Submits that even otherwise in view of law laid in Sargodhe Textile Mills Limtied through General Manager v. Habib Bank Limited through Manger and another (2007 SCM R 1240) and Muhammad Raza and others v. Jammu and Kashmir Cooperative Housing Society and others (PLD 2013 Islamabad 49) writ petition is maintainable in presence of alternate remedy. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that respondents claimed that the order impugned has been endorsed by the EDO (Health) the competent authority for the petitioner, however no such endorsement is available on the impugned order. Further states that no where such claim has been made in writing by the respondents. Learned counsel also referred to Nighat Yasmin v.
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi and another (2004 SCM R 1820) to state that in absence of endorsement and in absence of any such reflection in the impugned order, the same is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel also referred to the inquiry proceedings and states that the case against the petitioner is of no evidence, therefore the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
In this regard learned counsel also referred to Sabur Rehman and another v. Government of Sindh and 3 others (PLD 1996 SC 801) to state that case of the petitioner is of no evidence and this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 can look into the evidence. Learned counsel also relied upon Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.W.F.P Government through Chief Secretary (PLD 1981 SC 176) to state that inquiry report was not provided to the petitioner therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel lastly submits that recording of statement of the witnesses in question and answer form has been disproved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in this regard relied upon Jan Muhammad v. The General Manager, Karachi Telecommunication Region, Karachi and another (1993 SMR 1440) and states that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Assistant Advocate-General submits that the impugned order has been passed by the competent authority; that PEEDA Act, 2006 is applicable to the petitioner being employee of Health Department; that the order impugned is an appealable order therefore, in view of said alternate remedy the present writ petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed:
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record as well as the law applicable to the present matter.
6. The main arguments of the petitioner is that PEEDA, Act, 2006 is not applicable to the contract employees and in this regard learned counsel has relied upbn Executive Council Allamat lqbal Open University Islamabad through Chairman and another v. M. Tufail Hashmi (2010 SCM R 1484).
The judgment referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the case in hand firstly on the ground that in the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered provisions of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and not the PEEDA, Act, 2006.
Secondly as per petitioner's own admission in para NO. 1 of the writ petition, his services were regularized on 24.02.2013 with effect from q1.07.2012. Thirdly on the ground that the said judgment only deal with the right of appeal as provided in Section 10 of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and held as under:--- As far as the remaining categories of employees, including the contractual ones, are concerned, if they are aggrieved of any adverse action, the Service Tribunal is not the appropriate forum for redressal of their grievance, in view of above conclusion, because it is a forum constituted under Article 212 of the Constitution for the redressal of grievances of those employees, whose terms and conditions are settled under Article 212(1)(a) of the Constitution. Similarly, any action taken against such persons shall not be questionable before the Service Tribunal as it is not meant to provide a forum to the employees, who services are governed by non-statutory rules or who do not fall within the definition of a person in `government service' as defined in Section 2(d) of the RSO, 2000.
7. In the case in hand the matter is not related to the appeal and therefore the said judgment is of no help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. Even otherwise, bare perusal of the definition as given in Section 2(h) of the PEEDA Act, 2006 which states as under:---
(h) "employee" mears a person. -
(I) in the employment of a corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization of institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Government, by or under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Government has a controlling share or interest and include the chairman and the chief executive and the holder of any other office therein; and
(ii) in government service or who is a member of a civil service of the province or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the province or any employee serving any Court or tribunal set up or established by the Government, but does not include a Judge of the High Court or any Court subordinate to the High Court, or any employee of such Courts;
8. The use of words "employee" and "in the employment of a corporation " includes all employees whether contract or otherwise and therefore action can be taken against a contractual employee of a corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization under PEEDA Act, 2006.
9. The second ground of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No, 1 is not the competent authority of the petitioner and therefore the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
10. In this regard, perusal of the inquiry report dated 29.10.2010 as well as the impugned order dated 31.05.2013 reveal that the same is a joint inquiry/proceeding and in view of first proviso to Section 2(f) of the PEEDA Act, 2006 in case of joint proceedings the competent authority in relation to senior most employee in rank shall be the competent authority in respect of all the accused. Section 2(f) states as under:-
(t) "competent authority" means--
(i) the Chief Minister; or
(ii) in relation to any employee or class of employees, any officer or authority authorized by the Chief Minister to exercise the powers of competent authority under this Act provided that such officer or authority shall not be inferior in rank to the appointing authority prescribed for the post held by the employee against whom action is to be taken; or
(iii) in relation to an employee of a tribunal or Court functioning under the Government, the appointing authority or the chairman or presiding officer of such tribunal or Court, as the case may be, authorized by the appointing authority to exercise the powers of competent authority under this Act: ' Provided that where two or more employees are to be proceeded against jointly, the competent authority in relation to senior most employee in rank shall be the competent authority in respect of all the accused.
' Provided further that where the competent authority, other than the Chief Minister, has any interest in the result of proceedings under this Act, and does not desire to act as competent authority due to personal reasons, he shall not proceed with the case and shall report the matter to the next higher authority who shall authorize another officer of the corresponding rank and status to act as the competent authority in a specific case;
11. The bare reading of the above definition of word competent authority reveals that when any proceeding is initiated against more than one employee then the competent authority for the senior most employee will become competent authority for all the employees.
12. In the case in hand the joint inquiry/proceedings were initiated including Dr. Noor Muhammad Sagu, Medical Officer whose competent authority was Secretary Health and therefore in view of the above clause 2(f) of the PEEDA, Act, 2006 becomes the competent authority for the employees against whom inquiry is being conducted including the petitioner.
13. The other contention of the petitioner's counsel with regard to the endorsement of the impugned order and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court becomes irrelevant as under the PEEDA Act, 2006, the impugned order has been passed by the competent authority. Even otherwise, the facts and circumstances of the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court i,e, Nighat Yasmin v.
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi and another (2004 SCM R 1820) are different and not applicable to the present case as in the referred judgment order was passed by an authority which was not the competent authority. In the case in hand, as mentioned above, impugned order is passed by the competent authority in view of statutory provision.
14. The case-law referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition i,e, Sargodha Textile Mills Limtied through General Manager v.
Habib Bank Limited through Manger and another (2007 SCM R 1240) and Muhammad Raza and others v. Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative Housing Society and others (PLD 2013 Islamabad 49) are also not applicable to the present matter. In both the referred judgments, the writ petition was held to be competent if the order is passed without jurisdiction or if there is violation of . Rules and regulation. In the case in hand, as discussed above, the order has been passed by the competent authority and there is no issue of violation of rules or regulations.
15. The objection raised by the petitioner's counsel with regard to the evidence can be raised in appeal, therefore, this Court deemed it appropriate not the discuss the same. Even otherwise, this Court while examining a case in exercise of jurisdiction provided under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 does not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the competent forums.
16. The present writ petition is liable to be dismissed not only on the ground that the impugned order has been passed by the competent authority on the ground that against the said order, petitioner has an alternate remedy of appeal.
17. In view of what has been discussed above, the impugned order dated 31.05.2013 passed by respondent No, 1 is in accordance with law and facts of the matter and does not require interference by this Court. Hence the instant petition stands dismissed.