' MALIK ZAWWAR HUSSAIN (MEMBER).I- Abdul Hameed, ex-foot constable has filed this appeal on 7th April, 1979 in which he has impleaded T.-G. P. Punjab, Lahore, D. L-G. Of Police, Bahawalpur and S. P., Rahim Yar Khan, as respondents. By virtue of this appeal be has prayed that the order of the S. P, dated 6th August, 1976 by which he was dismissed from service and the order of the D. I. G. Dated 9th March, 1978 and the order of Additional I. G. P. Intimated to him on 10th March, 1979 be set aside and he be re-instated in service with all back benefits.
2. The facts of the case are that the S. P., Rahim Yar Khan issued a charge-sheet on 14th July, 1976 upon the appellant on the allegations that while posted at Dauwala check post he absented himself from duty on 12th April, 1976 and at about mid night between 12-30 p.m. He was apprehended in the company of Mst. Dilshad in a state of intoxication and exhibited disorderly, behaviour in public. Consequently he was arrested and prosecuted vide F. I. R. 182/76 under section 61 of the Excise Act. It was also alleged against him that on 18th November, 1975 during his posting at Police Line Rahim Yar Khan, he was also apprehended while drunk in the Red Light Area at about 8-30 p.m. And was prosecuted by H. C. Abdul Latif and the case was registered vide F. I. R. 545/75 under section 61 of the Excise Act at Police Station, City, Rahim Yar Khan. In view of these allegations it was alleged that the appellant committed misconduct and was guilty of behaviour which was unbecoming of a Police man. The S. P., R. Y. Khan, considered the allegations and decided to proceed against the appellant under Rule 6 (3) of the Punjab Police (E & D) Rules, 1975, by way of general Police proceedings without appointing an enquiry officer. By virtue of this charge-sheet, the appellant was called upon to show cause as to why one or more of the major penalties as provided in the rules be not imposed upon him. The appellant submitted written reply to the charge-sheet, and also appeared for personal hearing before the S. P. On 6th August, 1976. The reply and the verbal explanation submitted by the appellant did not find favour with the S. P. And he dismissed him front service with effect from 6th August 1976. The appellant filed an appeal to D.
L-G. Which was dismissed on 9th March, 1978. His mercy petition/revision petition is also stated to have been dismissed and the decision thereof was communicated to the appellant on 10th March, 1979. Hence this appeal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned D. A. On behalf of the respondent. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was falsely implicated in the case by H. C. Abdul Latif who was inimical towards him and that in the second case registered against him on 12th April, 1976, he was also maliciously arrested by S. I. Muhammad Akram who was under the influence of H. C. Abdul Latif. It has also been argued that simultaneously with the departmental enquiry instituted against him he was also prosecuted in the Criminal Court.
In case F I R. No, 545/75 dated 18th November, 1975 although he was convicted and sentenced by Mr. Zaheer-ud-Din Babar, Magistrate, Rahim Yar Khan, vide order dated 21st June, 1977 but ultimately in appeal he was acquitted by Mr. Lutaf Ali Malik, Sessions Judge, Rahim Yar Khan, vide judgment dated 15th August, 1977. With regard to the case filed as F I R 182/76 it has been asserted that he has also been acquitted by Ch. Muhammad Majid Akhtar, City Magistrate, Rahimyar Khan, vide judgment dated 30th November, 1976. In view of these judgments the learned counsel has submitted that since the allegations in the charge-sheet and the criminal cases are the same so the verdict of the Trial Courts should have the precedence over the findings in the departmental enquiries. On the other hand, the learned D. A. Has confronted the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. At the very outset he has submitted that the present appeal is time- barred because according to the appellant his revision/mercy petition was rejected by the Inspector General of Police vide order dated 13th July, 1978 issued vide endorsement No, 18426- 28/M V, dated 13th July, 1978 and the present appeal has been filed on 4th July, 1979 after a period of about 9 months as against the prescribed period of 30 days. He has also submitted that realizing that his appeal had run out of time the appellant intentionally submitted an application to I.-G. P. On 25th February, 1979 requesting for the copy of the order dated 13th July, 1978 in order to bring his case within the limitation and the I.-G. P. Very wisely only enclosed the copy of the order dated 13th July, 1978 vide his memo. Dated 10th March, 1979. With regard to merits of the case, the learned D A has read out the judgments of the concerned Courts whereby the accused having been convicted by the Magistrate in case F I R No, 545/75, dated 18th November, 1975 was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, Rahimyar Khan only by giving him the benefit of doubt.
Similarly, he has submitted that in the second case also the appellant was acquitted on the benefit of doubt while his co-accused, Mst. Dilshad was convicted and sentenced by the learned Magistrate.
4. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments of the parties and have also perused the record of the case so produced before us with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties.
We are in agreement with the learned D. A. That the appeal filed before us is time-barred because the Annex. D, which is an order of Inspector-General of Police, clearly showed that it was passed on 13th July, 1978 and its copy was endorsed to the appellant at his given address vide endorsement No, 18426-28/M-V, dated 13th July, 1978, while the present appeal has been filed before us on 4th July, 1979. We also find that there is no 'application for the condonation of delay in this appeal. In view of the aoove we hold that the appeal is time barred and is liable to A be dismissed on this score only. However, we would also advert to the merits of the case. We have gone through the 3 judgments so relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as by the learned District Attorney. The perusal of the judgment dated 21st July, 1976 of the learned Magistrate clearly establishes that the prosecution had felt in this case against the appellant and he was convicted and thus con viction was set aside by the learned Sessions Judge only on one ground that the Medical Officer gave concession to the appellant that in a statement before the Magistrate that he was not sure whether the appellant was produced before him on the relevant time for examination or not but the fact remains that the other witnesses so produced before the trial Court including the investigation officer has categorically stated that the appellant was found drunk and was arrested at the spot. The fact remain that the appellant was acquitted only on a concession being given by the Medical Officer and on benefit of doubt. Similarly the judgment dated 30th November, 1976 passed by Ch. Muhammad Majid Akhtar also reveals that the caucused of the appellant Mst.
Dilshad was convicted while the appellant was given the benefit of doubt. The perusal of all the three judgments would reveal that the appellant was never acquitted honourably and his acquittal was only due to benefit of doubt which is of no avail to him either in the departmental proceedings or in the present appeal. So the appellant has not been able to make any case on merits.
' In view of what has been stated above, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with no orders as to costs.