' M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI , J.--- Through this civil revision, the petitioner have challenged the order dated 20 02-2004 passed by learned Civil Judge, 1st Class, Attock and judgment dated 03.07.2004 passed by Additional District Judge, Attock.
2. The facts of the case are that respondents filed a suit for possession with regard to the two properties on 14-06-1989. Preliminary decree was passed in this case in favour of the respondents on 14.11.1990. In appeal, the decree was set aside by the learned District Judge, Attock. The order passed by the learned District Judge, Attack was challenged before this Court and the decree passed by learned Trial Court was restored.
3. During pendency of execution proceedings, an application under Section 12(2) of CPC was filed which was initially rejected by the learned Trial Court and again the matter went upto the High Court. During the course of execution, local commission was appointed for separation of the shares of parties. Again an application was filed for alteration of mode of partition and prayer was made for appointment of new local commission. This application was rejected by the learned Civil Judge.
The appeal filed was also rejected by learned Additional District Judge. Attock, however revision petition filed before this Court was allowed and the case was remanded with the direction to determine the shares of the petitioners in the disputed property,
4. When the case taken up for determination of shares of the parties, petitioners No, 1 to 4 filed an application under Section 47 read with Section 151, CPC for correction of the shares. This application was dismissed by the executing Court through order dated 20.02.2004 and the appeal filed before learned Additional District Judge, Attock also met with the same fate, hence this revision petition.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that order and judgment of both the Courts below are against law. Both the Courts committed material irregularity while passing the impugned order and judgment.
6. It was further contended that upon an objection petition filed by the petitioners, the executing Court was under an obligation to frame necessary issue and call evidence before deciding the case to determine as to whether the predecessor-in-interest of the parties namely Muhammad Jee had three sons and not two. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon 2013 YLR case 1516 titled "Rashid Ahmad through L.Rs & others v. Nazar Hussain Malik & others" and 2013 YLR page 1890 titled "Rai Muhammad Riaz v. Ejaz Ahmad".
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has drawn attention of the Court to the plaint and written statement. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the suit for possession through partition was filed by the respondents claiming that they being the legal heirs of Ghulam Haider who was real son of Muhammad Jee (the actual owner of the disputed property) were entitled to the partition of the disputed property which was in exclusive possession of defendants No, 1 to 4 being the legal heirs of Sumandar who was also a real son of Muhammad Jee.
8. In the written statement, the petitioners took the defence that although Ghulam Haider was a real son of Muhammad Jee, but Sumandar was an exclusive owner of the suit property. It is not out of place to mention here that the petitioners who were defendants No, 1 to 4 in the suit never raised the objection that the suit was bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of the parties as Muhammad Jee had a third son also namely Sikandar who passed away issueless.
9. Upon divergent pleadings of parties and recording of evidence, the learned Trial Court passed the decree on 24.11.1990 determining the shares of the parties to the suit. Thereafter, during the execution proceedings, the matter went up to the High Court, the decree was upheld.
10. Now, I come to the issue raised in the present revision petition. The judgment-debtors/revision petitioners filed an application for further correction of shares while making the plea that original owner/predecessor-in-interest namely Muhammad Jee had three sons out of which Sikandar had passed away issueless in year 1932 and Ghulam Haider the predecessor of the respondents had also passed away. This application was filed in third round of litigation during the course of execution of the decree which was passed in year 1990.
11. I have perused the record carefully and have also given my consideration to the arguments advanced by both the counsel.
12. The filing of an application under Section 47, CPC for re-calculation of the shares at such a belated stage seems to be an afterthought without discussing the maintainability of application under Section 47, CPC which would be discussed in the later part of this judgment.
13. It is not out of place to mention that name of Sikandar never appeared during course of litigation which spread over a period of more than 15 years when the application under Section 47 was filed. The petitioners could have mentioned this fact at the time of filing of written statement or at the time of recording of evidence. The scope of filing of an objection petition has an entirely different concept under Section 47, CPC and the relevant provisions of Order 21, CPC. Rule 100 of Order 21, CPC reads as under:- "Rule 100. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser.---(1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession.
(2) The Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same."
14. In the present case, the petitioners are the judgment-debtors whose rights have already been determined by a decree passed by a Civil Court in the year 1990. I am afraid that the judgment 2013 YLR page 1890 is not applicable upon the case of the petitioners as the petitioners are not the persons other than the judgment-debtors and moreover, have not been, till the time of filing of an application, dispossessed from the disputed property.
15. I am constrained to observe that in an application under Section 47, CPC, the questions which could have been raised in the proceedings in the suit but were not raised, could not be urged by the judgment-debtors before the executing Court which was bound to execute the decree as it is.
16. The petitioners having failed to take a plea either in the written statement or during the proceedings before passing of decree; therefore, the petitioners in execution proceedings could not take up the plea which they had not taken before the Trial Court which was ultimately decreed and the decree became final.
17. Executing Court cannot extend its jurisdiction to go behind the decree except where the decree was silent as to which property was subject-matter of execution. Executing Court, no doubt, can look into the judgment in an application under Section 47, CPC, in order to find out that the property brought for the satisfaction of decree actually belongs to judgment-debtors but cannot entertain the application relating to the dispute which may change and alter the "terms of decree; as neither the executing Court could go behind the decree nor it would have jurisdiction to re-determine the liability of any party or re-consider the law-for that purpose.
18. The only intention regarding ' filing of an application under Section 47, CPC by the petitioners at such a belated stage seems to be another attempt to prolong their-possession and deny the respondents the fruits of the decree passed by the Civil Court as back as on 24.11.1990..
19. For what has been discussed above, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order and judgment passed by both-the. Courts below as no jurisdictional error or material irregularity has been committed.
20. Resultantly, this revision petition is dismissed. Civil revision .