1. ' The appellant has filed this appeal in the proceedings filed under section 20 of the Arbitration Act in which application for interim injunction was filed seeking restraining order with regard to encashment of the bank guarantee that was submitted to cover the amount of the performance bond. The trial Court dismissed the injunction application on the ground that let the bank guarantee be encashed as in case of success of the appellant in the arbitration proceedings the respondent would return the amount. Against such judgment present appeal has been filed. The only ground that has been taken in this appeal is where there is a dispute with regard to the performance of a contract and performance bond has been executed then as a rule bank guarantee cannot be allowed to be encashed in terms of the undertaking given in the performance bond. In support of this contention learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgments reported in PLD 1997 Karachi 636, PLD 1996 Karachi 183, 2011 CLD 1625, PLD 1976 Karachi 644 and 1989 SCMR 379.
2. ' We have seen that in the judgment reported in PLD 1996 Karachi 183 (Messrs Zeenat Brother (Pvt.)
3. Ltd v. Aiwane-Iqbal Authority and 3 others) the encasement of bank guarantee was restrained only on the consideration that a prima facie case is made at as there was material available on record to show that the person in whose favour the performance bond was executed has, also committed default in the performance of the contract. Similar is the position in the case reported in 2011 CLD 1625 (Messrs Continental Cable (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs China Harbor Engineering Co. Ltd. And another).
4. In this judgment it is clearly held that when prima facie case is made out then Courts can restrain the encashment of the bank guarantee. In the present case the time for performance was extended from time to time but the appellant failed to discharge his contractual commitment and after granting extension when contract was not performed even in the extended period then the bank guarantees were invoked. Hence we do not find any justification to interfere with the order passed by the learned single judge. This appeal is therefore dismissed in limine.