Briefly stated, the factual background of the controversy is that in the plaint facts showing that the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit were not set out in a separate para as is usually done in view of clause (f) of rule 1 of Order VII, C. P. C. The appellant/defendant therefore in the written statement took the objection and pleaded that as the plaintiff in the plaint has not recorded the facts on account of which the Court will have the necessary competence to try the suit, the plaint therefore cannot be proceeded with and the same be either returned or dismissed after awarding costs. In view of this objection an application for amendment was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff seeking permission to add the necessary jurisdiction clause in the plaint. The learned trial Court vide order dated 2-3-1980 dismissed the application observing that the amend--ment, if allowed, would work injustice to the respondents (appellants) because it will take away the right accrued ' to the defendants by lapse of time. The suit was dismissed accordingly: The plaintiff/respondent then filed an appeal and the learned District Judge, Sialkot vide order dated 2- 5-1981 set aside the order of the trial Court and- remanded the case to it after allowing the amendment prayed for on payment of Re. 200 as cost. The learned appellate Court observed :- " . . . . No doubt, the plaintiff had not specifically mentioned in the plaint that civil Court at Shakargarh had the jurisdiction to try the case but it is clear from the heading of the plaint that it had been presented in the Court of Civil Judge, Shakargarh. The property in dispute is stated to be situated in the area of village Jattar, Tehsil Shakargarh and the addresses of the parties have also been given as residents of Jattar, Tehsil Shakargarh. The facts showing that the Court at Shakargarh had the jurisdiction to try the case, there--fore, were there in the plaint. The plaintiff inadvertently could not specifically mention in the plaint that civil Court at Shakargarh had the jurisdiction to try the case. It was merely a clerical mistake on the part of the person who drafted the plaint which could be rectified at any time."
3. The aforesaid order of remand has been challenged by the appellants/ defendants and the learned counsel contended that the learned District Judge acted arbitrarily in setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Civil Judge as the plaint was not a plaint in the eye of law, as the same was not drafted in accordance with the provisions of Order IV, Order VI and Order VIII, rule 1(f), C. P. C. Relying on Ramprasad Chimanlal v. Hazarimull Lalchand (AIR 1931 Cal. 458), learned counsel argued that it was not sufficient to state the residence or place of business of the defendants in the cause title because the cause title is not covered by the verification of the plaint and the facts attracting the jurisdiction of a Court are to be detailed in the body of the plaint itself.
He also referred to Shafiq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Anwar Beg (PLD 1968 Lab. 367). It was observed in this case that "under clause (e) of rule 1 of order VII, C. P. C. It is necessary that the plaint should contain the particulars as to the" facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose. If the cause of action is not disclosed, it can hardly be a plaint. Similarly, under clause (i) of the aforesaid rule, it is necessary to give "a statement of the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court-fee so far as the case admits and before the plaint is entertained by the Court, it must bear the. Requisite court-fee as required under the Court Fees Act.
If these things re not complied with, there is no plaint in the eye of law and for that reason there is no suit instituted. The plaint in such cases can be rejected under Order VII, rule 11,C. P C.
4. Elaborating the submissions learned counsel for the appellants argued that right of pre-emption is a predatory right being a drawback on freedom of contract of sale and as such the technicalities of law are to be given effect to against a pre-emptor especially when the amendment sought will have the effect of depriving the defendants of the right accrued due to lapse of time. In support of this plea learned counsel referred to Lal Khan v. Ghulam Muhammad (1973 SCMR 752), Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Muhammad Bakhsh and another (PLD 1979 Lah. 766), and Sharaf-ud-Din etc. v.
Ghulam Sabri etc. (1980 CLC 108). The observa--tions of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Khan v.
Abdul Khaliq Khan (PLD 1981 SC 153), as quoted hereunder were alto pressed into service :- " . . . There exists ample case-law on the subject which says that if in a pre-emption suit a necessary party is added after the relevant period of limitation, then the whole suit being time barred will have to be dismissed. The High Court in the circumstances rightly held. That the omission to implead Mst. Sarwar Khatoon in these cases was fatal."
5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel and have also gone through the reports of the cases cited. The submission that the right of pre-emption being a predatory right, technicalities of procedural law are to be strictly construed against a pre-emptor so as to refuse relief to him always cannot be accepted, as what is being suggested does not flow even from the precedents cited by the learned counsel. It is well established that the mere fact that right of pre- emption is predatory in nature will not be sufficient to refuse relief to a pre-emptor as the grant or refusal of relief will depend entirely on the nature of the non-compliance com--plained of and the provision of law violated. Every failure or default need not be visited with penalty as it is equally well established that the formalities and technicalities of the procedural law are not to be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. (See Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD1975SC678). I may also add that reported cases in which amendment application seeking permission to add additional grounds for claiming right of pre-emption after expiry of period of --- limitation were refused, cannot be cited in support of the argument that the provisions of rule 1 of Order VII, C. P. C. Are mandatory pd any non-compliance of the same will attract the penalty of rejection 'of plaint, specially in a suit for possession through pre-emption as technicalities of procedural law are to be strictly construed against these pre-emptor. Provisions cannot be interpreted in the manner suggested, as all rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose and as such these provisions are to be liberally construed so as to advance the remedy and curb the mischief. Moreover as regards the pleadings, the rule laid down by the Supreme Court is that the plaint drafted by a Mofassal lawyer is ordinarily to be construed liberally and lack of precision in pleadings in Mofassal cases is to be ignored. See Sri Manmatha Nath Kurt v. Maulvi Muhammad Mokhlesur Rehman's and others (PLD1969SC565), and Badrul Haque Khan v. The Election Tribunal, Dacca and 2 others (PLD 1963 SC 704).
It is equally true that a person seeking from a Court an adjudication of a dispute must allege in the plaint and where disputed prove that the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and if such averments are not there, the plaint is deficient and defective and it has to be amended If the amendment is not made, the Court may reject the plaint unless the Court is satisfied from the other averments in the plaint that it has 'prima facie jurisdiction to entertain the plaint and that the plaintiff's omission to make averments in the plaint as to jurisdiction is a mere clerical o accidental error. It may be added that in suitable cases power of amend--ment is to be liberally exercised as the procedural provisions of law are intended to secure proper administration of justice and the real question in deciding as to propriety of allowing an amendment of the pleadings is, we--there the amendment is necessary for the purpose of determining real question in controversy between the parties. See Syed Akhlaque Hussain and another v. Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore (1977 SCMR 284). No doubt in Bhagwanji Morarji Goculdas v. The Alembic Chemical Works Company Ltd. And others (PLD 1948 P C 73.) it was observed that the Court of Appeal was right to refuse leave to amend, since at the time when leave to amend was sought, any claim under the alleged implied agreement would have been barred by limitation. However, in Zubaida Begum v, Wali Muhammad (1974 SCMR 181). Supreme Court allowed the amendment in a suit which was pending for the last 12 years and in L. J. Leach & Co. Ltd. And another v. Messrs Jarding Skinner & Co.
(PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 307), it was observed that Courts as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to 'order it, if that is required in the interest of justice. Reference may also be made to Mehr Allah Ditta and another v. Muhammad Ali and another (PLD1972SC59). It was observed that the mistake in joining as a co-plaintiff is procedural and is remediable by amendment under Order 1, rule 10, C. P. C, even at appeal stage. Under sub- clause (2) of Order I, rule 10, C. P. C, the Court has power to strike out or add parties at any stage of the proceedings with or without an application, It is quite true that the provisions of the Pre- emption Act are technical and the pre-emption is a piratical right but this would not mean that in procedural matters the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable. The joining of a stranger as co-plaintiff is a procedural defect and can be remedied by striking of the name of such a person under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C. At any stage of the proceedings.
6. Likewise in the instant case in the plaint land in dispute was described as situated in the area of village Jattar, Tehsil Shakargarh, District Sialkot and in the prayer clause aiso, decree of pre- emption sought was in respect of the land so situated. The land in dispute admittedly falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge in whose Court the suit was instituted. In the circumstances the non-inclusion of the jurisdiction clause in the plaint in a separate para was a mere omission. The District Judge was, therefore, justified in allowing the amendment prayed for.
This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed in limine.