' SYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, J.---Through this appeal under section 417(2), Cr.P.C, the appellant has challenged the acquittal of 19 accused/ respondent, by the learned Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, Matiari in Case No, 18 of 2013, vide impugned judgment, pronounced on dated 15-12-2005.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned D.P.G. For the State and perused the impugned judgment, which appears to be elaborate and announced after appraisal of evidence and placing reliance on the case-law of superior courts. Even otherwise, learned counsel for appellant could not demonstrate any illegality, gross irregularity or infirmity in the impugned judgment. There is no A occasion to set aside the impugned judgment, which is speaking one.
Undisputedly, the prosecution is bound to establish its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt but since it appears that neither identification parade was conducted in accordance with law, in view of dicta as laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Advocate General Sindh Karachi v. Farman Hussain and others (PLD 1995 SC 1) and in the case of Farman Ali v. The State (1997 SCM R 971). Learned Trial Court has also placed reliance on the case of Rab Nawaz and others v. The State PLD 1994 SC 858), Nadeem-ul-Haque Khan v. The State (1995 SCM R 510). Learned Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate has correctly observed that each and every doubt arising out of the case of prosecution is to be resolved in favour of accused and for extending benefit B of doubt to an accused multiple circumstances are not required, only a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind, entitles accused to such benefit. Reliance in this regard was placed on the case of Tarique Perwaiz v. The State (1995 SCM R 45) and Loung through Central Prison, Hyderabad v. The State (1999 PCr.LJ 595).
3. It is not out of context to make necessary clarification that appeal against acquittal has distinctive feature and approach to deal with appeal against conviction is distinguishable from appeal against acquittal because presumption of double innocence is attached in latter case.
Order of acquittal can only be interfered with when it is found on the face of it as capricious, perverse, arbitrary in nature or based on misreading, non-appraisal of evidence or is artificial, arbitrary and led to gross miscarriage of justice. Mere disregard of technicalities in a criminal trial without resulting injustice, is not enough for interference. Suffice is to say that an order/judgment of acquittal gives rise to strong presumption of innocence rather double presumption of innocence is attached to such an order (1998 PCr.LJ 1576, 1985 PCr.LJ 2973, 1991 SCM R 2220, 1993 SCMR 28, 1985 PCr.LJ 457, PLD 1966 Supreme Court 424). While examining the facts in the order of acquittal, substantial weight should be given to the findings of the lower Courts whereby accused were exonerated from the commission of crime (1998 SCM R 1281). In 1997 PCr.LJ 477, it is held that acquittal would be unquestionable when it could not be said that acquittal was either perverse or that acquittal judgment was improper or incorrect as it is settled that whenever there is doubt about guilt of accused, its benefit must go to him and Court would never come to the rescue of prosecution to fill the lacuna appearing in evidence of prosecution case as it would be against established principles of dispensation of criminal justice.
4. Whatever mentioned above, the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court. Resultantly, the appeal filed under section 417, Cr.P.C. Against acquittal of respondents is having no merits dismissed. For consideration is hereby to merits for consideration is hereby dismissed.