GULZAR AHMED, J. --- These Civil Review Petitions have been filed seeking review of the judgment of this Court dated 04.12.2013, by which Constitution Petition No. 5 of 2011, filed by Khawaja Muhammad Asif against the Federation of Pakistan & others and Human Rights Case No. 15744-P of 2009 were decided. The Civil Review Petition No. 305 of 2013 is filed by M/s. Jamshoro Joint Venture Limited (JJVL). In this very Review Petition, CMA No. 7997 of 2013 and CMA No. 270 of 2014 were filed. The earlier one is filed by the Province of Sindh with a prayer that it may be allowed to become a party in the Review Petition and the latter one is filed by JJVL for suspending the operation of letter dated 08.01.2014 issued by the Assistant Registrar (Imp.) of this Court. CMA No. 221 of 2014 is filed in Civil Review Petition Nil of 2014 by Munawar Baseer Ahmed for permission to file and argue the Review - Petition. CMA No. 746 of 2014 is for restoration of CMA No. 221 of 2014. Civil Review Petition No. 27 of 2014 is filed by M/s. Home Gas (Pvt.) Ltd. & another against dismissal of its CMA No. 6247 of 2013 in Constitution Petition No. 5 of 2011.
2. The facts necessary for dealing with the above-noted listed matters are that the Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL) invited Expression of Interest (EOI) through public advertisement, inter alia, in daily Dawn dated 13.03.2000. Bids for pre-qualification of prospective bidders were invited through public advertisements including the daily Express dated 11.11.2000. The invitation to bid was for an LPG Extraction Plant on Build Operate Own (BOO) basis. Bidding documents were obtained by as many as 9 parties but only 6 of them were pre-qualified and only the JJVL submitted a bid.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties extensively. The main submissions were advanced by Kh. Ahmed Tariq Rahim, learned Sr. ASC. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel and have gone through the record.
4. We will deal with the submissions of the learned Sr. ASC as he has formulated before us. The first submission of the learned Sr. ASC was with regard to our findings in relation to deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the Implementation Agreement (IA). He has initially contended that though Article 18 Schedule 5 has been made part of the judgment under review but no arguments on this Article were advanced during the course of hearing of the Constitution Petition. He was, however, informed that arguments on Article 18 Schedule 5 were made by him during the course of hearing of the Constitution Petition to which he replied that it was not advanced in the manner as has been dealt with by the judgment under review. He, however, did not elaborate on it any further. He proceeded further with his arguments and contended that the deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA was not made on the asking of JJVL rather SSGCL itself proposed this deletion. He admitted that this deletion did change the obligation of both the parties in case of default. While referring to various documents, he contended that the discussion of this Court and the finding regarding the deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA is based upon non-reading and mis-reading of the material made available to the Court which is an error floating on the surface of record. He further contended that issues raised in the Constitution Petition were very limited and main thrust of grievance of the petitioner was on a single bidder, no Bid Bond submitted with the bid and changes made in Article 2 of the IA. He contended that there is no mention of Article 18 Schedule 5 in the very Constitution Petition and therefore if the petitioner had a grievance in respect of deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA, petitioner ought to have amended the Constitution Petition. Learned Sr.
ASC in this regard relied upon the case of Qaiser Abbas v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. & others (2013 SCM R 1035). A written note was also filed by the learned Sr. ASC. We will deal with the arguments of the learned Sr. ASC on this point.
5. The deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 as it existed in the original draft of IA is admitted. The only question is whether deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA was legal and did not amount to undue favour to JJVL putting SSGCL in total disadvantageous position where it lost recourse of acquiring the LPG Plant in the event of default by JJVL.
6. We have minutely examined the documents referred by the learned Sr. ASC which mostly comprised of documents such as original draft of IA and amended draft of 1A and finally signed version of IA. No new material whatsoever was shown to us, which may throw new light on the point the consideration of which would justify reviewing our decision on the subject considered and dealt with in the judgment. Rather on perusal of the judgment under review, we find that it has thoroughly dealt with and discussed all the documents and there appears to be no mis-reading or non-reading of record nor is there any error-floating on the surface of record.
7. We may also note the following facts from the record which were brought to our attention by the learned Sr. ASC during the course of hearing of this Civil Review Petition. The minutes of 325th meeting of BOD held on 22.06.2003 does not refer to the management note, its number and date on the basis of which this meeting was held. In this meeting the MD had informed the Board of the meeting held with JJVL on 23.05.2003 and on 14.013.2003 and the matters discussed were only in respect of royalty calculation and compensation to JJVL in case there is a loss of supply of gas to it.
The Board advised the management to finalize the IA, discuss the same with the Finance Committee of Directors (FCD) and advise the Board and Ministry of P&NR of the decision finally taken, In the minutes of 14th meeting of the FCD there is reference to a note No. 326/2670 dated 09.06.2003 and thereafter the MD has explained the background of the project to the Committee in which specific reference is made to a meeting of 19.05.2003 with JJVL to finalize the project including removal of certain clauses related to acquisition of plant by SSGCL in the event of default by JJVL/SSGCL and that the removal of these clauses was also suggested by the MP&NR and that JJVL agreed to remove all these clauses but in return they requested certain concession and compensatory clauses to provide comfort to their lenders and JJVL also requested for using the highest of local LPG quoted price in lieu of Saudi Aramco CP price as per earlier understanding. This note also refers to the meeting of the Board dated 22.06.2003 and the two matters discussed in the said meeting and also decision of the Board. The matters which were placed before the FCD for approval are as follows:---
(i) "To use highest LPG local ex-refinery price among the four designated LPG producers (i.e. NRL, PRL, OGDC & PARCO) with a floor of US$ 250 per MT for royalty calculation as against international price suggested by the bidder at the time of bid submission.
(ii) Compensation to JJVL in case supply of gas to JJVL is less than 160 MMCFD @US$ 100 per MMCF (@ US$ 0.1 per MCF). This is applicable only if the supply of gas is available to SSGC system by BP and there is an intentional curtailment/diversion by SSGC.
(iii) Acceptance of Performance Bond of Rs. 58 million from Metropolitan Bank Ltd."
The approval given by the FCD is as follows:---
(i) "To use highest LPG local ex-refinery price among the four designated LPG producers (i.e. NRL, PRL, OGDC & PARCO) with a floor of US$ 250 per MT for royalty calculation as against international price suggested by the bidder at the time of bid submission.
(ii) Compensation to JJVL In case supply of gas to JJVL is less than 160 MMCFD @US$ 100 per MMCF (@ US$ 0.1 per MCF). This is applicable only if the supply of gas is available to SSGC system by BP and there is an intentional curtailment/diversion by SSGC.
(iii) Acceptance of Performance Bond of Rs. 58 million from Metropolitan Bank Ltd. And consequently approved the signing of the IA. With JJVL."
8. On the very next day of the meeting of FCD i.e. On 12.08.2003 the IA was signed between SSGCL and JJVL. It is very intriguing to note that the JJVL has not filed copy of note No. 326/2670, dated 09.06.2003 mentioned in the minutes of 14th Meeting of the FCD. So the only thing that is available on the record as per the minutes of this meeting is what the MD himself explained to the FCD with regard to the project. The reference to the meeting of 19.05.2003 with JJVL and what transpired in it was never brought to the attention of the BOD of SSGCL nor is there any resolution of the Board on it. It may be noted that; deletion of certain clauses from the IA being a very material subject and having the consequence of materially changing the nature of the agreement was necessarily required to be placed before the BOD of SSGCL but it was not done by the MD and as to what happened in the said meeting of 19.05.2003 remained only in the knowledge of the MD and JJVL.
The more striking factor is that the question of deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 though seems to have been mentioned in the minutes of 14th Meeting of the FCD but no approval of FCD on deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA was ever sought nor was it approved by the FCD. No sooner the FCD has taken its decision on 11.08.2003, the management in post-haste signed the IA on the very next day i.e. 12.08.2003. This act of the management was in total disregard and violation of the decision contained in the minutes of 325th Meeting of BOD dated 22.06.2003 where the management has advised to finalize the IA with JJVL and advise the Board and Ministry of P&NR of decision finally taken. The Board did not authorise FCD to give approval for signing of IA with JJVL.
The management did not inform the Board of the decision finally taken by it nor there is anything on the record to demonstrate that the Ministry of P&NR was ever advised of the decision finally taken. We also note with grave concern that the MD has deliberately not placed before the meeting of BOD dated 22.06.2003 the matters which purportedly were finalized in the meeting dated 19.05.2003 with JJVL relating to deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA as the learned Sr. ASC did not show to us that at any point of time the BOD of SSGCL has approved what was finalized in the meeting of 19.05.2003 with JJVL. The net result of this discussion can only lead to only one conclusion that there was no approval of BOD or of the FCD for deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA and even we may go further step forward in concluding that final draft of IA to be signed between SSGCL and JJVL was not approved by the BOD of SSGCL nor the Ministry of P&NR was informed of the final draft of IA.
9. The learned Sr. ASC has contended that the issue with regard to deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA was not specifically raised in the Constitution Petition and without the petition being amended could not have been dealt with and considered in the judgment under review. Suffice it to note that in the course of hearing of Constitution Petition, the learned Sr. ASC has raised the point of deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA and when the learned Sr. ASC himself argued on this point, the matter falls within the competence and domain of the Court to deal with it and to arrive at a conclusion which is reflective of the record. Once the question on the subject which though not raised in the memo. Of Constitution Petition is argued by the Sr. ASC and such argument has important bearing on the subject not only on facts but on law also and the documents appearing on the record also show relevancy of the arguments, the Court will not in such situation shrink from its responsibility by leaving the matter unattended. In dealing with such issues which are reflective of the record and have bearing on facts and law, the Court will proceed to deal with the question on, the available record and as per law. The case-law cited by the learned Sr. ASC did not relate to proceeding under Article 184(3) of the Constitution but was in respect of election to the seat of National Assembly and proceeded on the question of concealment of material fact from the Court: which obviously is distinguishable from the present controversy. The Court in the judgment under review has expressed serious doubt that deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA was made at the behest of SSGCL. The above discussion further fortifies such observation.
10. The learned Sr. ASC has then argued that the change in Article 2 of the IA was of curative nature and was not meant to change the whole complexion and character of the IA. He contended that JJVL was not a party to the GSA which was between "BP Pakistan Exploration & Production Inc., Oil and Gas Development Company Limited. Occidental Petroleum (Pakistan) Inc., and Government Holdings (GOP) dated 28.11.1988" and went on to say that it was for a period of 10 years with extension of 5 years if the parties mutually agree to do so. He contended that the GSA directly affected the IA as the gas comes to the LPG plant only by virtue of GSA and thus relating the IA with GSA was valid and no advantage in this regard was drawn by JJVL.
11. We have thoroughly considered the submissions of the learned Sr. ASC so also the record and the judgment sought to be reviewed. From reading of the judgment under review, we find that each and every aspect and the documents relating to the change in Article 2 in the IA is well and thoroughly considered and addressed in sufficient detail and apparently nothing was lost sight of nor anything in this regard was demonstrated before us by the learned Sr. ASC. The fact of change in Article 2 is not disputed one and only the circumstances under which this change was brought about in the IA was the relevant question which has been effectively considered in our judgment and there is hardly any basis or justification supplied to change the view from the one expressed in the said judgment. The change in Article 2 was not merely of a curative nature but was a drastic departure from the original Article 2 of the IA which restricted the term of IA only upto 03.02.2011 and by changing it, the term of IA was extended beyond 03.02.2011 upto the currency of GSA. This has put JJVL in total advantageous position and left SSGCL with no opportunity to look for better and more favourable deal from the one offered by JJVL.
12. The learned Sr. ASC next took up the question of scope of negotiations. He contended that invitations to bid gave right to the owner to negotiate with the bidders and the instructions to bidders also contained provision of commencement of contract negotiations. He contended that there were three stages of negotiations that of before issuing of LOI and that of after issuing of LOI and that of after signing of the IA. He also referred to the provision of notification for contract negotiations contained in the instructions to bidders and also referred to clause 22.2 of the form of IA and also letter dated 27.06.2002 of the Legal Advisor of SSGCL containing opinion on the matter of negotiations. This argument of the learned counsel need not detain us for long as matter with regard to negotiations and their terminal point have been well and squarely defined in the document of instructions to bidders and it specifically provides that on successful completion of contract negotiations SSGCL will issue a Letter of Intent to successful bidders and the IA will be executed between the owner and the company within 30 days of acceptance of LOI. There is no reference to any negotiations in the instructions to bidders after issuance of LOI, which means that whatever negotiations that were to take place were until the LOI is issued. All the provisions of the instructions to the bidders referred to by the learned Sr. ASC leads only to this conclusion. Clause 22.2 of the form of IA does not on its reading suggest that there will be negotiations after issuing of LOI rather clause 22.2 is in a different context where the IA becomes entire document on which the obligation of the parties are to be determined. The three stages of negotiations as propounded by the learned Sr. ASC are not provided in the tender documents. The learned Sr. ASC also did not come up with any general principle with supporting law on the scope of negotiations in the matter of tenders of the kind involved in the present case and obviously in the absence of any such argument we would not like to make any exposition on it.
13. The learned Sr. ASC next contended that whether the Court was empowered to re-write the contract and in this respect referred to various parts of the judgment under review and stated that it was not the lenders who had asked for deletion of Article 18, financial plan was complete and so far Article 18 is concerned a new Article 18 was agreed upon and made part of the IA and further stated that paras 26 to 30 of the judgment under review are not founded on factual position. He also contended that civil suit filed in the High Court of Sindh in which the stay order has been granted against the decision of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly should be allowed to proceed and that there has been mis-reading and non-reading of the record by the Court in delivering the judgment under review. As a general proposition, we may tend to agree with the learned Sr. ASC that ordinarily the Court will not interfere with the contracts entered into by the parties, except in the case of dispute to give its finding on certain clauses of the contract or on whole of the contract on which the parties seek resolution from the Court. Re-writing of the contract certainly is not the job of the Court as it is within the domain of the parties to make any agreement/contract which is their fundamental right under Article 18 of the Constitution which provides that subject to such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law, every citizen shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business. Every profession, occupation and trade invariably is either based upon the contract or for its active engagement requires the citizens to enter into a contract. But the very right as given in the Article 13 of the Constitution is not an unbridled one but is subject to qualification as prescribed by law and the law applicable in general is the Contract Act, 1872. However, on examination of the judgment under review, we do not agree with the submission of the learned Sr. ASC that in examining the various clauses to the tender documents and the IA entered into by the parties, the Court in the said judgment has in any manner re-written the contract. The Court has only expressed its views on legality and propriety of various Articles and Clauses of the tender documents and the IA signed between the parties. It is settled law that the principle of judicial review applies to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness, favouritism or violation of the terms of the tender and absence of transparency in the award of the contract. Court has the power to decide on the question of legality i.e. Whether the authority has exceeded its powers, committed error of law, committed breach of rules of natural justice, reached decision which a reasonable person could not have reached or abused its power.
Besides the law cited in the judgment under review, on the power of this Court to judicially review, we may also refer to the case of M/s. Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation & others (AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2272) where it has been observed as follows:--- "12. If we bear these principles in mind the High Court is justified in setting aside the award of contract in favour of M/s. Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Because it had not fulfilled the conditions relating to clause 6(a) of the Tender Notice but the same was deleted subsequent to the last date of acceptance of the tenders, If that is so, the arguments advanced on behalf of M/s. Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd., in regard to allegation of mala fides of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation in showing special favour to M/s. Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd., or the other contentions raised in the High Court and reiterated before us are insignificant because the High Court had set aside the award made in favour of M/s. Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The only question therefore, remaining is whether any contract should have been awarded in favour of M/s. Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The High Court had taken the view that if a term of the tender having been deleted after the players entered into the arena it is like changing the rules of the game after it had began and, therefore, if the Government or the Municipal Corporation was free to alter the conditions fresh process of tender was the only alternative permissible. Therefore, we find that the course adopted by the High Court in the circumstances is justified because by reason of deletion of a particular condition the wider net will be permissible and a larger participation or more attractive bids could be offered."
Such factors have been examined in the judgment sought to be reviewed.
14. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution has ample power to adjudicate upon and consider the question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution and the jurisdiction of this Court will not be fettered or restricted merely for the reason that some suit is pending on any of the questions involved in the matter for that would be of subordinate consideration when dealing with the question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights which are of supreme importance and have a much wider connotation and implication to the public at large.
15. The next submission of the learned Sr. ASC was with regard to submission of financial plan by the JJVL. He has contended that it was complete in every respect and in the judgment under review the Court was mislead in coming to the conclusion that financial plan submitted by the JJVL was not in conformity with the instructions to the bidders. In the instructions to the bidders, the financial proposal was required to be submitted by the bidders alongwith the bid. The bid with financial proposal was submitted by the JJVL on 12.09.2001. In clause 1.2.2 of the financial proposal submitted by the JJVL provided that financing shall be sought from Saudi Pak Industrial & Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited for a period of 5 years on the basis of total 10 half yearly payments at approximately 16% rate of interest. Saudi Pak Industrial & Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited letter of intent was attached. The Saudi Pak Industrial & Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited letter is dated 14.04.2000 and it is as follows:- "Please refer to your letter dated April 14, 2000 and the discussion we had on the above subject. We would like to inform that Saudi Pak is agreeable in principle to examine the possibility to participate in the setting up of the proposed LPG Extraction Plant as secured creditor and/or as equity partner in a potential joint venture of Pro-Quip-USA; Ortloff-USA, Associated Group and Akbar Associates, Islamabad, Our agreement in principle is subject to the viability of the project, clearance, of our Credit Committee and final approval of our Board of Directors.
This letter is issued to indicate our preliminary interest In the proposed financing and is withOut any commitment on part of Saudi Pak." (emphasis added)
Yet again Saudi Pak Industrial & Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited letter dated 04.12.2000 contained almost the same wordings as are contained in the letter dated 14.04.2000.
These two letters of Saudi Pak Industrial & Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited do not remotely fulfil-the requirement of financial proposal as given in the instructions to the bidders and even in the financial proposal submitted by the JJVL no firmed up financial proposal is given. In the judgment under review various letters have been considered and on the basis of which it has been observed that for 21 months after the submission of the bid, JJVL was still unable to raise or firm up its financing and was seeking further indulgence from SSGCL for the comfort of JJVL's lenders. The learned Sr. ASC was unable to show us any material on the basis of which such observation of the Court could at all be said to be based on either misunderstanding or non-appreciation of the record Letter dated 28.06.2002 referred to by the learned Sr. ASC was a letter of intent and it was in consonance with the tender documents/instructions to the bidders which did not at all alter or relax the requirements of the financial proposal.
16. The next argument of the learned Sr. ASC was on royalty and his specific contention was that the letters dated 28.04.2003 and 05.09.2002 were mis-read and has further contended that the loss of royalty of Rs. 22 Billion is not the correct figure rather it will be of Rs. 4 Billion. He further contended that the LOI did not mention anything about the royalty and the Saudi Aramco CP Price with freight was not agreed. He also contended that the question of royalty was not a part of the Constitution Petition but conceded that it was argued before the Court. He further contended that there was no consensus on royalty and the same remained part of the negotiations between the parties until the IA was signed. During his submission, he has referred to correspondence and various drafts of IA. At the outset, we may note that in the judgment under review the letters dated 28.04.2003 so also 05.09.2002 were extensively considered and extracts from them were also quoted and it is altogether erroneous to suggest that these letters were misread. All correspondence and the drafts of IA have also been considered in the judgment under review and it has rightly been concluded that the JJVL has expressly agreed to "Reference price of LPG should be Saudi Aramco's price of Propane and Butane in the ratio of 60:40 published in international Butane-Propane Newsletter plus LPG freight cost or local refineries cost other than PARCO, whichever is higher shall be taken for calculation of royalty". Besides what is noted in the judgment under review, which altogether addresses the submission of the learned Sr. ASC, we may note that as has been done regarding deletion of Article 18 Schedule 5 from the IA, no approval of the ESOD of SSGCL was ever obtained for this material change of royalty payment which was the basic source of income for the SSGCL under the IA. Similarly, this change in the royalty payment in the IA signed between the parties was also not advised to the Ministry of P&NR. We, therefore, find no substance in the argument of the learned Sr. ASC that there has been any mis-reading, non-reading or non-appreciation of any document in the judgment under review on the question of payment of royalty.
17. The learned Sr. ASC then took up the matter of Bid Bond and has contended that late submission of Bid Bond was accepted by the SSGCL and in this respect referred to the Board Meeting dated 25.09.2001 and also to the minutes of the Board Meeting dated 15.11.2001. We have gone through the minutes of both the Board Meetings and find that there is no reference in the minutes of the Board Meetings of condoning the delay in submission of Bid Bond by the JJVL. No implied condonation in this regard could be inferred, more-so when the subject of such condonation was within the competence of the Board which was never expressly given. Thus, there is no mis-reading or non- consideration of record in the judgment under review even on the point of Bid Bond.
18. The learned Sr. ASC has further argued that the letter dated 08.01.2014 of the Assistant Registrar (Imp.) of this Court amounted to modify the judgment under review, who was not competent to do so. He further contended that the right of hearing ought to have been given to the parties before any action in this regard was to be taken. Perusal of letter dated 08.01.2014, amply shows that it was not the Assistant Registrar (Imp.) of this Court who has passed the order rather the letter itself manifests that the clarification noted has been passed by the Court; at the request of the Committee and the clarification given by the Court was not something which was out of context of the judgment under review but was in consonance with it. We may also and that para 40(7)(a) of our judgment sets out one of the terms of reference of the commission. It does not in any way effect the judgment. Furthermore, the Court can always modify or even enlarge the Terms of Reference of the Commission.
The petitioner has no locus-standi to argue that the TOR or mandates of the Commission should not be varied: more-so as in terms of para 40(7)(f) the Commission can seek clarification and it has not been shown that the clarification given by the Court was at all to the prejudice of JJVL or any other party.
19. As we have considered and dealt with each and every argument of the learned Sr. ASC and have found them to be not sustainable for review of the impugned judgment, therefore, it is unnecessary for us to discuss or to address case-law on the point of review jurisdiction of this Court. We may, however, note the argument advanced by the learned Sr. ASC that the review jurisdiction in a proceeding arising out of Article 184(3) of the Constitution should be considered in the nature of an appeal. With respect, we are unable to subscribe to this argument in that the jurisdiction of review and appeal are two separate remedial species under the law, jurisdiction of which is specifically conferred by law with its limits and boundaries and therefore review cannot be termed as an appeal. This is more-so, when the law has not provided for an appeal against a decision given under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. This Court has already held in the case of Ali Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal (2009 SCM R 394) that the scope of review by its very nature was not an appeal or rehearing merely on the ground that one party or another conceived himself to be dissatisfied with the decision of the Court.
20. At the conclusion of hearing, following short order was passed by us:--- "For reasons to be recorded later, Civil Review Petition No. 305 of 2013 in Constitution Petition No. 5 of 2011, CMA No. 7997 of 2013, CMA No. 270 of 2014 in Civil Review Petition No. 305 of 2013, CMA No. 746 of 2014 in CMA No. 221 of 2014 in Civil Review Petition No. Nil of 2014 in Constitution Petition No. 5 of 2011 and Civil Review Petition No. 27 of 2014 in CMA No. 6247 of 2013 in Constitution Petition No. 5 of 2011 are dismissed."
21. Above are the reasons for the same.