CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J. --- This appeal is addressed against the judgment of the Shariat Court dated 7.6.2012 whereby the bail granted to the appellant by the Trial Court vide order dated 12.7.2011 on the ground of statutory delay in conclusion of trial, has been recalled.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that a case was registered on the report of Muhammad Bashir, complainant under Sections 302, 324, 147, 148, 149 & 337, A.P.C. On 30.3.2009 at 1:15 p.m. At Police Station, Mirpur. It is stated in the report that at about 10:30 a.m., a procession against Mangla Dam upraising lead by Chaudhry Allah Ditta started from Kharik. When it arrived nearby Khambal Chowk, Jahanzeb s/o Qurban and Majeed, armed with 30-bore pistols and other accused-persons, Tanveer s/o Ayub, Qurban, s/o Adalat, Idrees and Shoaib sons of Sajawal, Jameel s/o Javaid, Abbas s/o Muhammad Bashir, Muhammad Siddique s/o Muhammad Alam, also armed with 30 bore pistols, who were present there, raised objection for leading the procession and they came ahead of the procession to lead it. Majeed, Tanveer and Qurban, accused-persons were mounting on the Jeep of Jahanzeb, accused, whereas the other accused-persons were riding on motorbikes.
All the accused-persons started firing from the front side with the intention to murder. Jahanzeb, accused fired a shot with 30-bore pistol upon Ameen whereas Muhammad Yousaf, Saqib and Arif who were mounting on the Jeep of Muhammad Ameen, alighted from it to rescue him but due to fire-arm injury on his chest, he fell on the ground, Thereafter, Majeed accused fired a straight shot upon Muhammad Yousaf which hit him upon his right shoulder and left thigh. Tanveer, accused- fired a straight shot upon Muhammad Rasheed which hit him on right side of his abdomen, whereas Shoaib, accused also fired second shot which hit Muhammad Rasheed on his left thigh.
Idrees, accused fired a straight shot which hit Saqib upon his left thigh, Qurban, accused fired shot which hit Ajaib on right side of his bladder, Jameel, Abbas and Siddique, accused-persons also fired straight shots upon Arif which hit him on his right chin, left thigh and right heel. On account of firing, the aforesaid persons due to the injuries fell down whereupon the accused fled away from the scene by firing shots. The occurrence was witnessed by Chaudhry Allah Ditta, Chaudhry Maroof s/o Raj Muhammad Qadeer s/o Nazeer and many other persons present at the place of occurrence.
3. After completion of, investigation, challan was presented on 8.5.2009. The appellant alongwith some other accused-persons filed an application for grant of bail on 6.6.2011 on the ground of statutory delay in completion of trial. The learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 12.7.2011 granted bail to the accused-appellant by observing that his period of detention is more than two years and two months whereas the application of other accused was rejected on the ground that the period of their detention is less than two years. Feeling aggrieved from the order dated 12.7.2011, the complainant-party challenged the propriety of the judgment of Trial Court through a revision petition before Shariat Court. The learned Shariat Court, through the impugned judgment has recalled the bail granting order of the appellant while observing opinion that he is a hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal and also contributed in causing delay in conclusion of trial of the case, hence, this appeal has been filed.
4. Raja Khalid Mehmood Advocate, the learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that in this case, F.I.R. Was lodged on 30.3.2009 and the accused-appellant since then is behind the bars. Almost more than 4 years' period has been elapsed but the trial has not yet been completed.
He further submitted that no delay has been caused due to any conduct of the accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant neither is previously convicted person nor there is any thing on record to bring him within the definition of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. He has been implicated only in the case under trial due to enmity. Even, according to prosecution story, the act attributed to the accused-appellant does not bring him within the definition of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. The learned Shariat Court has failed to properly appreciate the statutory provisions as well as facts of the case which resulted into miscarriage of justice.
According to statutory law, the appellant is entitled to the concession of bail on the statutory grounds. He further submitted that according to celebrated principle of law, every person is presumed innocent until and unless proved guilty. According to prosecution version, the accused may be convicted but at the same time, chances of his acquittal are very much there, In case, if the accused is proved guilty, the Court may impose appropriate punishment but in case of acquittal, there will be no remedy for the injury caused to the legal rights of the appellant, especially, the curtailment of his right of liberty. The impugned judgment is legally not sustainable.
He further submitted that the prosecution is intentionally causing delay in conclusion of trial. There is long list of witnesses but despite passage of considerable period, the prosecution has failed to produce the evidence and only few witnesses have been produced. According to prevailing situation and conduct of the prosecution, the case requires further decade's period for conclusion of trial, therefore, by accepting the appeal, the accused-appellant be enlarged on bail. He has placed reliance upon the cases reported as Abdul Majeed and another v. The State [2011 MLD 490] and Muhammad Mumtaz v. The State & another [2012 YLR 1603] in support of his version.
5. Conversely, Mr. Khalid Rashid Chaudhry, Advocate, the learned counsel for the complainant, strongly opposed the appeal on the ground that the conduct of the accused disentitles him from concession of bail. He also submitted that the accused is also responsible for causing delay in conclusion of trial, therefore, he is not entitled to concession of bail. It is further submitted that the overt-act attributed to the accused-appellant is such which clearly speaks that the accused is hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. The Court below has rightly formed the opinion regarding the accused which is well-reasoned and supported from the record, therefore, this appeal has no merits and same is liable to be dismissed. He further submitted that all the ingredients of commission of offence are admitted in reply of the charge-sheet. The offence has been committed in the broad day light even at public place "Bazar" (urdu), in which three innocent persons have lost their lives, therefore, this appeal is not maintainable. He referred to the case reported as Muhammad Suleman v. The State [1996 P.Cr.LJ 22] and Nooruddin v. The State [PLD 1995 Karachi 518].
6. Mr. Muzaffar Ali Zaffar, the learned Additional Advocate-General, owned and supported the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant. He forcefully defended the impugned judgment of the Shariat Court and submitted that the accused-appellant is not entitled to concession of bail as he falls within the definition of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal, therefore, the appeal may be dismissed.
7. We have considered the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record made available. According to prosecution version, the occurrence took place during the procession arranged in relation to Mangla Dam Up Raising where the dispute to lead the procession was raised by the accused party armed with 30 bore pistols, mounted on the appellant's jeep and some of them riding on motorcycles, all of a sudden started firing. The appellant fired at first which hit Muhammad Ameen, whereas the other accused have been attributed the firing on some other persons. The investigating agency also after completion of investigation attributed only one fire to the accused appellant and accepted the story as stated hereinabove and nothing extraordinary has been brought on record. Neither any previous conviction order of accused-appellant nor any other extraordinary or abnormal thing relating to the manner of commission of offence has been made part of the record. Therefore, we would first like to deal with the proposition whether the accused-appellant is hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal or not.
8. We have made a tentative assessment of the material collected by the Investigating Agency.
Any detailed or deep expression of opinion at this stage is not deemed appropriate as it may adversely effect the ultimate decision of the case. However, for determination of the legal status of the accused-appellant that as to whether he falls within the definition of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal, in our opinion in this case; except the narrated story of incident, no other material has been brought on record by the prosecution to satisfy the Court for making 'opinion in this regard. No doubt, even without previous conviction, the accused can be treated as hardened and desperate criminal while keeping in consideration the manner of commission of offence. In the present case, as it has already been observed that except a single fire shot, there is no other attribution against the accused-appellant. The Courts have in some cases formed the opinion relating to the accused being hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal where the accused's manner of commission of offence was extraordinary, brutal and highly conspired with preplanning but in absence of these factors, the Courts normally avoided to form opinion to declare the accused as hardened and desperate criminal. It is settled that while making any opinion, the Court has to take into consideration the material placed before it. In a most recent judgment titled Muhammad Mumtaz v. The State & another [2012 YLR 1603], it has been held that onus is on the prosecution and the complainant to bring on record some material to show that the accused is hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:--- "6. Admittedly the petitioner is not a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life nor is he an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. No record has been provided to this Court to demonstrate that the petitioner is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or that the conclusion of the trial has been delayed by some act of the petitioner. An argument raised by the learned counsel for the complainant that the petitioner is essentially a hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal as he fired upon and caused the death of the deceased would not hold any water. It would be incumbent on the other side to establish that there are allegations of similar or any other dastardly acts stated to have committed by the accused person. In the absence of material which would establish that the petitioner has previously also been guilty of having committed a heinous offence or having committed a serious offence or any dastardly act out of sheer desperation, it would be wrong to deny petitioner solely on the ground that in one solitary case he fired at and caused a fatal injury with a pistol. After incorporation of the latest amendment the onus would be on the prosecution as ell as the complainant to bring on record some material other than the case in hand to show that the petitioner is a hardened, desperate and a dangerous criminal. The right of the petitioner to get bail on account of the amendment incorporated in Section 497, Cr.P.C. Is not left to-the discretion of the Court but is controlled by that provision. In any case-law can never be stretched in fulfilment of the prosecution as has been held by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in Amir v. The State PLD 1972 SC 277."
In this context the authoritative judgment of the apex Court of Pakistan is reported as Maundar and others v. The State [PLD 1990 SC 934] wherein it has been observed:--- "It is quite plain that the normal rule stipulated in the Third proviso to Section 497 was that an under trial prisoner shall be released after expiry of the respective period, without the trial concluding. The fourth proviso is in substance an exception to the aforesaid general rule contained in the third proviso. Before the Court applies the exceptional provisions of the fourth proviso, it has to form an opinion that the accused was a previous convict or a criminal of one of the categories described therein. The words are in the opinion of the Court", Such opinion cannot be obviously subjective but must be based upon materials placed before the Court, reasonably supporting the conclusion that the person concerned is a, criminal of the classes described. The word "criminal" has not been defined. It will not be proper and indeed would be difficult to define it or give it a specific meaning.
However, it is a common word of the English language. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word carries several meanings including the meaning---a person accused of a crime. In the context of the provisions under construction, we feel that the word cannot be construed in the technical sense, namely, that a formal accusation must be made against the person or that he should have been adjudged guilty of a charge in a Court or law. It appears to have been used in the sense of a person who violates the law of the land. The three adjectives qualifying he word "criminal" may also be examined.
According to the same dictionary the word "harden" has been defined to mean, inter alia, (1) to render or make hard; to indurate, (2) to embolden, confirm, (3) to make callous or unfeeling, and
(4) to make persistent or obdurate in a course of action or state of mind. The word "hardened" has also been defined to mean "made hard, indurated; rendered callous; hard-hearted; obdurately determined in a course".
The same dictionary gives the meaning of the word "desperate" inter alia in relation to person; driven to desperation hence reckless; violent, ready to risk or do any thing.
'The same dictionary gives the meaning of the word "dangerous", inter alia, as fraught with danger or risk; perilous, hazardous, unsafe.
These appear to be the meanings intended to be conveyed by the legislature by using the words "hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal". Accordingly the view taken by Sajjad Ali Shah, J., appears to be correct and the construction placed by him is in consonance with the intention of the legislature underlying the provision in question in the context of the whole Section. In the circumstances we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Muhammad Hayat Junejo that the facts and circumstances of the prosecution case in which the accused person seeking release on bail is facing trial cannot be taken into consideration, The proposition relied upon in support of the contention to the effect that a finding in a criminal trial can only be reached upon the assessment of entire evidence produced in the Court, is inapplicable, insofar as the opinion reached by the Court for purposes of the 4th proviso has nothing to do with the findings of the Court at the trial, Indeed the conclusions drawn for the purpose of disposal of a bail application cannot be used to the prejudice of the accused as the sam are tentative in nature. However, there is no justification for the argument that such an exercise undertaken by the Court, violates the principle that an accused person is presumed innocent until proved otherwise. In subsection (1) of Section 497 the legislature has already empowered the Court even before the commencement of the trial to make a tentative assessm ent of the evidence collected against an accused person or likely to be produced in the trial against him, in order to reach the conclusion whether there appears a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for 10 years. The provision under consideration here is proviso to the same sub-section, and, therefore, it will be reasonable to construe it in the same manner authorizing a Court to take into consideration the evidence collected by the prosecution for purposes of determining whether the accused is a criminal of the categories prescribed therein. Of course the Court can take into consideration and indeed in most of the cases it will take into consideration other materials produced by the prosecution in order to show that the case falls within the prohibitions contained in the 4th proviso."
The same view has been reiterated in a subsequent case reported as Jalal v. Allahyar and another [1993 SCMR 525]. The apex Court of Pakistan has observed that the manner of commission of offence is very much necessary to be considered while declaring an accused as hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. In this case almost the allegation and facts were some what identical. The incident was shown to have taken place at a public road in order to take revenge.
Relevant= portion of the judgment reads as follows:--- "6. There cannot be any cavil with the proposition of law enunciated in the above two judgments.
However, the question is, as to whether in the present case, the learned Judge in chamber Was justified to admit respondent No. 1 in the above two appeals to bail on the ground of statutory delay of two years under third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 497, Cr.P.C. We are unable to subscribe to Mr. Abdul Mujaeeb Pirzada's contention that the learned Judge in chamber has solely relied upon the report of the Jail Authorities about the conduct of respondent No. 1 in the jail. On the contrary, the learned Judge has pointed out that there was nothing on record to show that the above respondents were the persons of criminal nature or they were previously involved in any other matter. It is true that the learned Judge in chamber has not referred to the manner of the commission of the two murders specifically but the above observation that there is nothing on record to indicate the above respondents were persons of criminal nature or they were involved in any other crime, was sufficient to conclude that they were entitled to bail under the above third proviso to subsection (1) of Section 497, Cr.P.C.
7. We have gone through the F.I.R. And we find that even the manner of the commission of the offence committed by respondent No. 1 in the above two appeals does not indicate that they were hardened, desperate or dangerous criminals. Respondent Allah Yar allegedly has fired one shot at the left arm of one of the deceased and so also Ghulam Rasool as per F.I.R. The above acts attributed to the above respondents do not indicate that they were desperate, hardened or dangerous criminals. If the above respondents could have killed the deceased in a brutal way by cutting the bodies into pieces or by indiscriminately firing by Kalashnikovs or would have dragged the dead-bodies in order to disgrace the deceased and other members of the family, one could urge that the manner of the commission of offence was such which indicated that the respondents were hardened, desperate or dangerous criminals in terms of fourth proviso to subsection (1) of Section 497, Cr.P.C., but this is not the case."
(underlining is ours)
The apex Court of Pakistan also followed this principle in the case reported as Jaggat Ram v. The State [1997 SCMR 361].
In the case reported as Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The State [1998 SCMR 190], the apex Court of Pakistan, while dealing with the scope of proviso of Section 497, Cr.P.C. Has observed that in view of use of word "shall", the right of granting bail cannot be defeated except if delay in trial is caused due to accused person. Relevant part of the judgment on the legal proposition reads as follows:- "10. The above case-law indicates that under the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 497, Cr.P.C. An accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right if the statutory period mentioned either in clause (a) or clause (b) has expired and the trial has not been concluded in view of the use of the word 'shall'. This right can be defeated only if the state or a complainant shows that the delay in trial is attributable to the accused person concerned. Once it is shown the above right is forfeited.
Reference may be made to the case of Akhtar Abbas v. The State (PLD 1982 SC 424), in which this Court while declining a petition for leave against the refusal of bail observed as under as to the effect of delay caused by an accused in the finalization of the trial:--- '4. We regret we are not impressed by these submissions, as we find that the requirements of the law is not fulfilled in this case, as at least on eight occasions adjournments were sought by the defence for one reason or the other. In such a case it does not appear to be the intention of the law to calculate the amount of delay caused by the defence. All that is necessary is to see whether the finalization of the trial has, in any manner, been delayed by an act or omission on the part of the accused. In the present case, the delay is partly attributable to the accused. The submission that the date in question was not fixed for the hearing of the case is not correct. On the contrary, it is clear from the order sheet of the Trial Court on these dates most of the witnesses were summoned and were present, but their examination had to be postponed owing to the request made by the defence counsel.'
11. To put it precisely, we are inclined to hold that the right under the above third proviso cannot be defeated for any other ground than the delay mentioned in the above clause and the grounds provided in fourth proviso, namely:--
(a) That the accused concerned is previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;
(b) That in the opinion of the Court the accused person is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is involved in terrorism.
As regards the category of the accused mentioned in fourth proviso, it will not be out of context to refer to the case of Moundar and others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934). In which a Full Bench of this Court comprising the then learned Chef Justice and four companion Judges (the author of the judgment was Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J.), very succinctly enunciated the import of the aforesaid fourth proviso as follows:--- "It is quite plain that the normal rule stipulated in the third proviso to Section 497 was that an under trial prisoner shall be released after expiry of the respective period, without the trial concluding. The fourth proviso is in substance an exception to the -aforesaid general rule contained in the third proviso. Before the Court applies the exceptional provisions of the fourth proviso, it has to form an opinion that the accused was a previous convict or a criminal of one of the categories described therein. The words are 'in the opinion of the Court.' Such opinion cannot be obviously subjective but must be based upon materials placed before the Court, reasonably supporting the conclusion that the person concerned is a criminal of the classes described. The word criminal' has not been defined, It will no be proper and indeed would be difficult to define it or give it a specific meaning, However, it is a common world of the English language.
According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary the word carries several meaning, including the meaning - a person accused of a crime. In the context of the provisions under construction, we feel that the word cannot be construed in the technical sense, merely, that a formal accusation must be made against the person or that he should have been adjudged guilty of a charge in a Court of law. It appears to have been used in the sense of a person who violates the law of the land. The three adjectives qualifying the word 'criminal' may also be examined.
According to the same dictionary the word "hardeh" has been defined to mean, inter alia, (1) to render or make hard; to indurate, (2) to embolden, confirm (3) to make callous or unfeeling and (4) to make persistent or obdurate in a course of action or state of mind. The word 'hardened' has also been defined to mean 'made hard' indurated; rendered callous; hardhearted; obdurately determined in a course.
The same dictionary gives the meaning of the word 'desperate' inter alia, in relation to person: driven to desperation hence reckless, violent, ready to rise or do anything.
The same dictionary meaning of the word "dangerous' inter alia, as fraught with danger or risk; perilous, hazardous, unsafe."
9. This Court in the case reported as Muhammad Aziz v. The State [2000 SCR 1], while dealing with the proposition has observed as under:--- "5 It is evident from the above observations that while dealing with the question of the applicability or non-applicability of the aforesaid proviso alongwith the literal meaning of the words employed in the proviso, the circumstances of each case and the fallout of the act attributed to the accused on the victims and society should be kept in view."
Same like in the case reported as Naeem Akram Khan v. Mumtaz Ahmed and another [2002 SCR 409], this Court while dealing with the proposition and discussion for making opinion to bring the accused as dangerous criminal has taken into consideration some extraordinary factors. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:--- "6 So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the accused-respondent has master minded conspiracy to put the life of lshtiaq Akram, deceased, to an end is concerned, prima facie, the recovery of the pistol, belongings of the deceased from him and his conduct of filing a report at police chowki Kohala after the incident clearly shows that if at all he is a 'criminal', he is not an 'ordinary criminal' but a "dangerous criminal' within the meaning of proviso to Section 497, Cr.P.C. According to the prosecution story, despite the alleged illicit relations of the deceased with the wife of the accused-respondent, he kept friendship with the deceased and at the long lost he killed him by hiring the services of the co-accused. When the dead-body of the deceased was found from river Jhelum, at Dhangali, the legs of the dead-body were found tied with a rope and fire-arm injuries were found on the person of deceased. The alleged recoveries of pistol and the belongings of the deceased from the accused-respondent also, prima facie, connect him with the commission of the offence with which he has been charged. It may also be pointed out that the learned Judge in the Shariat Court did not consider these aspects of the matter and simply mentioned in the impugned judgment that in the circumstances of the case the accused- respondent was entitled to bail; the learned Judge in the Shariat Court did not rebut the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court that the accused-appellant was 'dangerous criminal' within the meanings of the relevant proviso. It may be further observed here that whether the accused person is 'hardened', 'desperate' or 'dangerous' criminal or not, is to be ascertained from the circumstance of a particular case, material placed on record, manner in which the offence was committed and the motive to commit the offence. A reference may be made to an un-reported case titled Muhammad Aziz v. The State (Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1998, decided on 15.5.1998), wherein it was held as under:- "5... We are of the opinion that the question as to whether an accused is hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal within the meaning of the aforesaid proviso is to be seen in the light of the circumstances of each case, i.e., (i) the motive for murder, (ii) the part which each of the accused played in the completion of the offence, (iii) prima facie evidence in support of the incriminating act attributed to the accused persons, and (iv) the effects of the act of the accused on the family of victims and on the society at large."
In the light of the above survey of case-law on the subject, it is obviously clear that for bringing the accused within the scope of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal, there must be some extraordinary, abnormal, brutal, reckless, violent and callous manner of commission of offence like cutting the body into pieces or indiscriminate firing and dragging the dead-body in order to disgrace the deceased; Or there must be some previous record of conviction but mere commission of offence without any brutal or extraordinary manner attributed to the accused person normally does not bring him within the scope of hardened, desperate and dangerous criminal. While applying this criterion in the instant case, as only single fife shot is attributed to the accused, neither any material regarding his previous involvement in criminal acts nor any .Previous conviction order has been brought on record. Same like nothing is attributed to his conduct or manner regarding the commission of offence to show that he acted in brutal, callous or extraordinary manner. Thus, in our opinion, the learned Shariat Court has not formed correct opinion while recalling the bail granted by the Trial Court, therefore, on this ground the impugned judgment is not sustainable.
10. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the trial couldn4 be concluded within statutory period of two years due to the conduct 'of the appellant-accused is concerned, we have minutely examined the interim orders recorded by the Trial Court. The examination of the interim orders of the Trial Court reveals that hearing of the case has not been adjourned on the request of any of the reasons which can be attributed to the accused-appellant.
Regrettably,. The interim orders of the Trial Court speak that proceeding has been conducted in a very casual manner. In this serious murder case, the challan was submitted in the Trial Court on 8.5.2009 but regrettably for a period of more than one and half year the statement of not a single witness has been recorded. The, proceedings have been adjourned due to absence of the counsel for the prosecution, the prosecution witnesses or on the request of the counsel for the prosecution or prosecution witnesses. Even some of the adjournments have been granted for the reason that Court time is over-Some adjournments have been granted for the reason that due to non- availability of the police, the accused persons have not been produced before the Court. The counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance upon the cases reported as Abdul Majeed and another v. The State [2011 MLD 490].
11. We are not satisfied with the mode of 'conducting the poceedings by the Trial Court The Trial Court is directed that in a murde case, the trial should be conducted consciously according to the statutory provisions and not in such-like casual manner. Specially in murder cases, without compelling reasons, the grant of adjournments for frivolous reasons should be discouraged.
Therefore, according to the record no delay in conclusion of trial of the case can be attributed to the accused rather the conduct of prosecution speaks of exercising the delaying tactics which is against the principles of administration of justice, thus, the. Objection stands repelled.
12. We have considered the judgments referred to by counsel for the complainant. In the light of factual legal proposition involved in the case, in our opinion, they have no nexus with the case in hand, therefore, need no discussion.
For the detailed reasons discussed hereinabove, we are of the opinion that bail granting order passed by the Trial Court is reasonable which stands restored. While accepting this appeal, the impugned judgment to the extent of accused-appellant stands recalled. However, keeping in view the trend of abscondance cf accused after availing concession of bail, in our opinion enhancement of the amount of personal bond and surety deems proper, hence, it is ordered that the accused shall be set at liberty if he is not required in any other case or offence provided he furnishes bail bond in sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- (twenty lac) consisting of two sureties and personal bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of any Member of District Criminal Court Mirpur.