' MALIK MANZOOR HUSSAIN, J.---The petitioners through instant Constitutional petition, seek declaration to the effect that action taken by the respondents for sealing the premises, occupied by the petitioners, are unlawful, against the principle of natural justice and without lawful exercise of jurisdiction, thus liable to be quashed. Further prayed for direction be issued for restoration of possession of the premises, to the petitioners.
2. Briefly, facts of the case are that the petitioners were tenants of Cantonment Board/respondent No,1 on monthly rent basis with effect from 15-4-1976. The agreements were extended from time to time till 2010. Vide office order dated 26-9-2011 the respondents agreed to further extend the period of lease for two years with the condition of increased rent. The petitioners were also required to provide non-judicial stamp papers for execution of tenancy agreements within 7 days. The petitioners were aggrieved of unilateral enhancement of rent, thus through representation requested for re-consideration of unjustified increase in the rent. The said representation was turned down vide order dated 19-4-2012. Thereafter, the Cantonment Board issued notice for vacation of rent premises on the ground of re-construction. The rent was paid till December, 2012 and thereafter the respondents refused to accept the same. Between the night of 16th and 17th of May, 2013, the respondents sealed the rent premises and restrained the petitioners from entering into respective premises previously occupied by them. The petitioners approached this Court through instant Constitutional petition, for redressal of grievance.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the action was taken in violation of Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 as well as the Cantonments Act, 1924; that the action taken having without force of law and without notice. He further contended that illegal action of the respondents amounts to unlawful interference in the lawful business of the petitioners and it depicts the highhandedness of the respondents. The learned counsel further contended that the respondents are usurper and not owner of the disputed premises, thus until and unless they produce a valid document of title before this Court, they could not proceed further to claim possession of the premises. Lastly, it was argued that no prior notice was given to the petitioners as per provision contained in section 24-A of General Clauses Act and in this regard relied upon the judgment reported in Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager an others (1998 SCM R 2268).
4. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that petitioners were inducted as tenant/lessee through a written agreement and their last tenancy agreement was valid up to 3- 6-2010 and beside the fact that extension was approved vide order dated 26-9-2011, the petitioners failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the same. No agreement was executed for extended period, as the petitioners failed to provide non-judicial stamp paper for execution of tenancy agreement within the time prescribed in letter dated 26-9-2011. He further argued that neither the rent was paid as per sanction letter dated 26-9-2011, nor any effort was made to fulfil the requirements. As per contention of learned counsel for the respondents, action was taken against the petitioners under Central Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession)
Ordinance, 1965, as the petitioners were "unauthorized occupant" of the premises and action was taken under sections 3, 5 and 7 of the Ordinance, 1965. Attention of this Court has already been drawn to Cantonment Board Resolution No,20 dated 12-9-2012, whereby it was resolved that the petitioner/tenants may be asked to vacate the premises within 15 days of issuance of notice positively so that the Cantonment Board can make new construction on the site.
' The valuable arguments of the learned counsel for the parties heard and the available record of the case thoroughly perused.
5. From perusal of the record, it reveals that petitioners were inducted in the premises through agreement dated 15-4-1976, in consideration of rent reserved and stipulated in the lease agreement. It is also an admitted fact that the agreements were extended from time to time till 2010 and thereafter no fresh agreement exists between the parties. Admittedly, the rent was paid by the petitioners till December, 2012 and between night of 16th and 17th of May 2013, the premises were sealed and' taken over possession by the Cantonment Board Authorities, with the assistance and in presence of local administration.
6. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the action was taken in disregard of Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, is concerned, we do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on the ground that under section 3 of Act, 1963, ibid, the same is not applicable to the property, which belongs to Cantonment Board. For the convenience, section 3(b) is reproduced, which is as under:- "3. Act not apply to certain buildings.---Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to --
(a) ................
(b) any property owned by the Central Government, any Provincial Government, Railway, Port Trust or Cantonment Board and any property owned, managed or controlled by any other local authority under the administrative control of the Central Government of Provincial Government"
7. We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for Cantonment Board that the Ordinance 1965, ibid, is applicable to the property in dispute. The property owned by the Cantonment Board definitely falls within the definition of property owned and controlled by Central Government. The Central Government Land and Building (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965 is fully applicable to the property in dispute. Under section 2 Sub-Clause (e) (ii), every member of the lessee or licensee who remains in occupation of the land or building after the determination of the lease or license in respect of the same, comes within the definition of "unauthorized occupant". Section 3 of Ordinance, ibid, further provides that in case of expiry of period of any lease or license, any officer authorized by the Central Government in this behalf may, not withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being enforce or in any contract, at any time enter upon the demise land or building and recover possession of that land or building by evicting the lessee or licensee and may also demolish and remove the structure. In the present case, not only notices were issued six months prior to the action taken by the respondents but after a proper resolution passed by the Board. The petitioners were in notice of the decision taken, that is why, they approached the respondents with different suggestions and held meeting with the Board, as is admitted by the petitioners.
8. As per record some of the lessees/tenants, in response to notice, handed over the possession of the premises to the Cantonment Board, with the reservation that after construction of Commercial Plaza, the Cantonment Board shall rent out sufficient space to the existing tenants/lessees. The documents annexed as Annexure R/3, Annexure R/9 were produced with the comments by the Cantonment Authorities in support of these contentions. The Cantonment Executive Officer was duly authorized by notification as "Officer Authorized" by the Central Government in this behalf.
Once it is established that the occupation of the petitioners comes within the definition of "Unauthorized Occupants", The respondents were authorized for recovery of possession under section 6 of Ordinance, 1965,after the expiry of lease.
9. Issuance of lease does not create a vested right, which has already been expired. Lease was granted on the strength of an agreement between the parties, which was not renewed after 2010, cancellation of such lease agreement or taking of possession was within authority of the respondents.
10. Keeping in view the circumstances of the present case, the petitioners who were un-authorized occupants, cannot seek equitable relief until and unless they came to Court with clean hands.
There is plethora of law on the point that no writ lies for retention of ill-gotten gains and the writ is issued to right a wrong and not to perpetuate a B wrong committed by the petitioner. The petitioners were bound to hand over the possession of the property in question, after expiry of lease period, in terms of agreement executed between the parties. The premises were required for reconstruction and establishment of a multi purpose commercial plaza.
11. In respect of title of suit premises, we do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents have no lawful title of the premises and until and unless they produce a valid document of title in this Court they could not disturb the possession of the petitioners. We do not agree with this contention as the petitioners cannot turn around and deny the title of the respondents in qrder to prolong their possession. Even in ordinary rent cases, conducted under West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, once it has been C established that if the lessee/tenants were inducted under a written agreement, they could not challenge the title of the owners/lessors without first surrendering the possession to them. Reliance can be made to the case of Madrassa Dar-ul-Uloom Vs. The Additional District Judge and another (PLD 1992 SC 401). In another case, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that in all cases, if a tenant wishes to dispute title of person with whose permission he obtained possession as tenant, tenant must first surrender possession before doing that. In such an eventuality the lessee/tenants are morally bound to hand over the possession and then agitate the issue of title.
Reference. Can safely be placed on Province of Punjab Through Education Secretary v. Mufti Abdul Ghani (PLD 1985 SC 1) and Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad and another (1983 SCM R 1064).
12. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that their valuable articles were lying in the suit premises or the same have been damaged, by the acts of respondents that can be proved through a regular civil suit and such exercise cannot be undertaken in Constitutional jurisdiction.
' For what has been discussed above, we find no force in the instant petition, which is dismissed with all the miscellaneous applications fixed for hearing.