' This order shall dispose of Writ Petition No,21921 of 2014 as well as I.C.A. No,760 of 2014, arising from Writ Petition No,21892 of 2014 for the reason that identical questions of facts and law have been raised therein.
2. In Writ Petition No,21921 of 2014, the following prayers were made:--- "Respondents may kindly be directed to remove the hurdles created through containers; ' Respondents be directed to release the members of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf who are detained/arrested without any legal justification; ' Supply of petrol be ordered to ensure, so right of movement of the citizens may not be disturbed;"
3. In Writ Petition No,21892 of 2014, the following prayers were made:--- .... The respondents may be directed to immediately remove all the containers and other hindrances for the people of Pakistan and not to create any hindrance to exercise their right of movement, freedom, assembly, association and speeches etc.; ' It is further humbly prayed that pending disposal of the instant writ petition, an ad interim injunction may kindly be passed directing the respondents to remove all the containers and other hindrances in Lahore and other areas of the Punjab and to allow the people intended to participate in the proceedings of YoumeShahadat i,e, reciting of the Holy Quran, Dua; ' It is further humbly prayed that the respondents may kindly be directed to release all the persons so far arrested by the Punjab Police in different districts who were intended to participate in the aforesaid Youm-e-Shohada and release all the vehicles including motorcycle etc."
4. In Writ Petition No,21921 of 2014, it has been maintained by the petitioner that he is senior Vice- President of Insaf Lawyers Forum Punjab. Azadi March of Tehrik-e-Insaf shall proceed from Lahore to Islamabad on 14th of August, 2014. The grievance of the petitioner is that the Government of the Punjab has blocked all the roads to and from Lahore by placing containers on the roads. This barricade aims at frustrating and thwarting the plans of Tehrik-e-Insaf to take out processions from Lahore up to Islamabad. It is further alleged by the petitioner that supply of petrol to the petrol pumps is being disrupted and has virtually been discontinued so as to keep the motor vehicles off the roads. According to the petitioners, the action of the government is tantamount to abridging and curtailing fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 9 and 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The petitioner seeks directions to the respondents to remove the barriers put up by them and to release all the activists of Tehrik-e-Insaf, allowing them to participate in the Azadi March.
5. In Writ Petition No,21892 of 2014, Muhammad Alamgir Khan, the petitioner maintained that he is a resident of Model Town Lahore. Incidentally, Iddara Minhaj-ul-Quran is also housed in a complex, situated in Model Town Extension. He alleged that the Head of Iddara Minhaj-ul-Quran intended to observe a martyr day (Youm-e-Shohada) on the 10th August 2014. Instead of facilitating the participants, the Government of the Punjab took stringent and stern measures to prevent the people from reaching there. It went to the extent of blocking all roads and routes, leading to Model Town and adjoining areas. Heavy contingents of police were posted at the entry and exits of Model Town, thereby creating immense problems for the inhabitants of Model Town and other citizens living in the vicinity. Allegations of setting up road blocks by placing containers were also made.
The petitioner also sought a number of directions to be issued to the respondents, which have been reproduced in paragraph No,3 and need not be reiterated.
6. The learned Single Judge in chambers dismissed Writ Petition No,21892 of 2014 by the order dated 9-8-2014. Through I.C.A. No,760 of 2014, this order has been under challenge.
7. In support of Writ Petition No,21921 of 2014, Mr. Ahmad Awais Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the contentions raised in the writ petition. Likewise, Mr. Mansoor-urRehman Afridi Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant in I.C.A No,760 of 2014 recounted and narrated the facts in which Iddara Minhajul-Quran was poised to observe the martyr day on 10th August, 2014. He alleged that 14 persons were murdered by the police on the 17th June, 2014. Both the learned counsel made repeated references to Articles 4, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
8. Learned Advocate-General Punjab controverted, rebutted and refuted the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the appellant. He took exception to the maintainability of the Intra-Court Appeal. It was vehemently argued by him that the police was vested with the authority under Article 124 of the Police. Order, 2002. In order to reinforce and buttress his arguments, he read out extracts from the judgments reported as Vari Abdul Hameed Qadri v.
District Magistrate, Lahore and another' (PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lahore 213), Syed Abul Ala Mauddodi and others v. The Government of West Pakistan and others' (PLD 1964 Supreme Court 673) at 787, 'The State of Madras v.V.G. Row' (AIR 1952 (sic) 196) and `Akbar Ali v. Additional I.-G. Police and others'
9. Before proceeding further, it is expedient to reproduce hereunder the relevant Articles of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,1973, Police Order, 2002 and Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 around which the arguments of the counsel and learned Advocate General Punjab revolved.
Article 4 of the Constitution, 1973 ' Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law, etc.
(1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan.
(2) In particular--
(a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law;
(b) no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited by law;.
And
(c) no person shall be compelled to do that which the law does not require him to do. Article 9 of the Constitution, 1973 ' Security of person. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with the law.
Article 14 of the Constitution, 1973 ' Inviolability of dignity of man, etc. (1) The, dignity of man and, subject to law, the privacy of home, shall be inviolable.
(2) No person shall be subjected to torture for the purpose of extracting evidence. Article 15 of the Constitution, 1973 ' Freedom of movement, etc. Every citizen shall have the right to remain in, and, subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest, enter and move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof. Article 16 of the Constitution, 1973 ' Freedom of assembly. Every citizen shall have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public order. Article 17 of the Constitution, 1973 ' Freedom of Association.--- (1) Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality.
(2) Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to form or be a member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the. Interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declares that any political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be final.
(3) Every political party shall account for the source of its funds in accordance with law. Article 124 of the Police Order, 2002 ' Erecting of barriers in streets, etc.--- Any Police Officer may in an emergency temporarily close any street or public place through erection of barriers or other means, to prohibit persons or vehicles from entering such area. Article 181 of the Police Order, 2002 Persons interested may apply to annul, reverse or alter any rule order.--- In the case of any rule or order made under an authority conferred by this order and requiring the public or a particular class of persons to perform such duty or act, or to conduct or order themselves or those under their control in a manner therein described, it shall be competent for any interested person to apply to the authority issuing such rule or order to annul, reverse or alter the rule or order aforesaid on the ground of its being unlawful, oppressive or unreasonable: ' Provided that the appropriate Government shall exercise jurisdiction for revision against such orders. Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972
3. Appeal to High Courts in certain cases.
1. An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
2. An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court Trom an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under clause (1) of Article 199 of (the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan) not being an Order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of that clause: Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 199 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal (or one revision or one review) to any Court, Tribunal or authority against the original order."
10. We would first like to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the learned. Advocate- General Punjab as to the maintainability of the Intra-Court Appeal filed by Muhammad Alamgir Khan Advocate. As noted above, it was stressed by him that under Article 124 of the Police Order, 2002, a Police Officer is invested with the powers to order the fencing off streets, roads etc. Temporarily so as to prohibit persons or vehicles from entering such area. Once such an order is made, it was propounded by him, that the vires thereof could be challenged by making a representation before the higher authority in the police hierarchy. A person still feeling aggrieved might file a revision before the government of the Punjab.
11. When Mr. Zulfiqar, the C.C.P.O. Lahore and I.-G. Police, Punjab, Mr. Mushtaq Sukhera was asked to produce the order under which Model Town Lahore or the adjoining areas were barricaded or being barricaded, they showed some traffic plans of various dates, but it was admitted by both of them that neither they passed any order under Article 124 of the Police Order, 2002 nor was any such order to have been passed by another police officer in the police hierarchy was ever conveyed to them or brought to their knowledge. They took refuge in a certain order allegedly passed by D.I.-G. (Operations), Lahore, but no such order was shown to the Court and we have formed the opinion that no such order was in fact passed by any police officer to put up barriers or to place containers on the roads. It seems that some subordinate police officers were verbally ordered to do so. The very fact that no such order exists knocks the bottom out of the plea of the learned Advocate-General Punjab, that the Intra-Court Appeal was not maintainable in the face of the Provisions contained in Article 181 of the Police, Order, 2002. It bears repeating that unless an order in writing was passed by a police officer, no citizen could challenge the same before the next higher authority in the police hierarchy. Furthermore, we have noticed that no specific order passed by any police officer was assailed in Writ Petition No,21892 of 2014. Therefore, the order passed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers dated 9-8-2014 in the said writ petition is appealable.
12. This brings us to the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate-General Punjab that in order to safeguard life and property of citizens, the Constitution empowers the government to impose reasonable restrictions on the movements of persons and vehicles. In order to fortify his arguments, he particularly made reference to the following extract from the judgment of Abul A'la Maudoodi (supra): "It seems to me that the use of the word "restrictions" by itself indicates that the primary and initial test in that the restriction cannot amount to a complete denial or total prohibition of the right for all times to come or for an indefinite period. By its very nature, therefore, the use of the word "restriction" makes the extent of the encroachment a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness thereof. This again cannot be divorced from the nature of the right sought to be restricted and the nature of the restriction itself, for, under certain circumstances even the total prohibition, if it is for a limited period or to meet a specific well-defined mischief, may be upheld as a reasonable restriction. Thus both the nature of the restriction imposed and its extent would be relevant for determining the validity of a law, encroaching upon a fundamental right."
13. As to the test of reasonableness of restrictions contemplated by the Constitution, the learned Advocate-General, Punjab heavily relied upon the following observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of The State of Madras v. V.G.Row (supra): "The test of reasonableness, wherever describe, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the rights alleged to have been infringed, the underline purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent an urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of the values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part... "
14. We are constrained to observe that the stance adopted by the Government of Punjab is equivocal. The ambivalence of the Government can be judged by the fact that the highest police officer in the Province of the Punjab expressed his ignorance as, to who passed order in Lahore to set up barriers on the roads. We also drew a blank from him when he was asked as to the number of containers placed on the roads throughout the Province of the Punjab. He appeared to be evading the questions and did not give a definite answer as to the data collected and audited by him regarding the seizure of containers from the private persons. However, it was admitted by him that all the containers placed on roads belong to the private persons. They appeared to have been commandeered. It is a disturbing question as to whether the government could resort to such operation in disregard of the Constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution, 1973. Since none of the owners of those vehicles/containers has plucked up courage to come forward, we are exercising restraint to dilate upon this aspect of the imbroglio. On the other hand, the crux of the arguments made by the Principal Law Officer of the province is that the restrictions imposed on the movements of persons and vehicles were in the public interest and that the hand of the government was forced to do so with the object to maintain public order.
15. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that we had required the respondents to file reports and parawise comments in Writ Petition No,21921 of 2014, but they have opted not to do so. As a result, we were left with the oral submissions made by the learned Advocate-General Punjab, assisted by other Law Officers and the C.C.P.O., Lahore as well as the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab.
16. It seems that the Government is in a mode of denial. The electronic media and the print media are abuzz with reports and video footage to bear out the contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the appellant. Going by those reports, the judicial notice whereof is being taken; the roads have been blocked by placing containers and putting barriers. The question is whether the Government has the unfettered powers to impose restrictions upon the right to freedom of movement enshrined in Article 15 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and whether it affected or has the potential to affect the lives of citizens and lesser mortal.
Again, whether such restrictions are not in breach of Article 9 of the Constitution. We are convinced that wholesale blockade of roads is not envisaged by Article 15. When people are confined to one city or one place, separating them from other parts of either the same district or the province, such a restriction cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as reasonable. We also wonder how the same can be regarded in the public interest. Such restrictions negate the assurance held out by the State to the citizens that they are free to enter and move throughout Pakistan. Needless to add, Article 15 is followed by Article 16, guarantying freedom of assembly. When citizens are not allowed to go from one place to another in the name of imposing reasonable restrictions and maintaining public order, the right to freedom of assembly is likely to be impaired and abridged.
17. Now we move on to Article 9 of the Constitution, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law. The question arises whether the word "life" denotes and connotes the vegetative life or bare existence or it has to do with all other aspects of life. Since this Article has repeatedly come up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, it would be worthwhile to allude to a few of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in this behalf.
18. In Shehla Zia v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693), it was held as under:--- "Article 9 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty save in accordance with the law. The word "life" is very significant as it covers all facts of human existence.
The word "life" has not been defined in the Constitution but it does not mean nor it can be restricted only to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from conception to death. Life includes all such amenities and facilities which a person born in a free country is entitled to enjoy with dignity, legally and constitutionally."
19. The echo of the aforesaid judgment has been heard in the latest pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Suffice it to make reference to the judgments reported as Petition regarding miserable conditions of the school (2014 SCM R 396), and Human Rights case No,20107-G of 2013 (2014 SCM R 287).
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the appellant drew the attention of the Court to the miserable and wretched conditions of the lesser mortals, who were and are forced to crawl under the containers to go across the roads. They also made reference to the media reports and video footages, in which bridegrooms were stranded and stuck up at various points of entry and exit of Lahore. They also made much of the reports regarding the ambulances carrying the sick which were also not allowed to reach the hospitals on time. They asked whether the restrictions imposed by the Government of the Punjab are in conformity with the guarantee of life enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution. Again, whether the conditions created both in Lahore and other cities of the Punjab are for the public good. Curiously enough, the learned Advocate-General Punjab responded to the same, declaring such assertions as baseless, ill-founded and unfounded, and a part of the vicious campaign unleashed by the vested interests. Be that as it may, when he himself came out with the assertions that the restrictions have been placed in public interest and to maintain public order, how could the Government deny the consequences, repercussions and ramification of its actions and restrictions?
21. We would also like to dispose of the objection that the petitioner and the appellant are not aggrieved persons within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution, 1973. Incidentally, both the petitioner and the appellant are lawyers by profession, who are vigilant enough to knock at the door of the Constitutional Court not only for themselves but for other concerned citizens. It goes without saying that the old concept of aggrieved person has undergone a change. It was held by the apex Court in the case of "Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (PLD 1969 SC. 223) that:- "the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding of this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege or liberty or franchise."
22. To return to the writ petition and appeal under consideration, it was maintained by both the petitioner and the appellant that they are facing immense hardships in carrying out their professional duties as well as in reaching out to other people. It was also claimed by them that they have every right to take part in processions and carry out other political activities, which have been hindered in consequence of the restrictions imposed by the Government of the Punjab. We are, therefore, satisfied that the two Constitutional Petitions Nos.21921 of 2014 and 21892 of 2014 are maintainable and since fundamental questions relating to the enforcement of fundamental rights have been raised, we are not inclined to dismiss these petitions on hyper technical grounds.
23. In view of the discussion made above, we hold as under:---
(a) Writ petitions complaining of infringement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and seeking their enforcement are maintainable.
(b) Peaceful protests and taking out processions, without carrying arms, by the disgruntled to voice their grievances are inherent in democracy. Unreasonable restrictions imposed by the Government such as blocking all roads, routes, highways. Motorways by putting up barriers and placing containers are tantamount to denying, curtailing and abridging the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 15 and 16 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The wholesale blockades on roads, highways, Motorways are unwarranted, unlawful and unconstitutional.
(c) Locking down a whole province and/or restricting the movements of the public at large, bordering on their confinement is contrary to the Constitutional guarantee contained in Article 15, besides being offensive to Article 9 of the Constitution, guaranteeing that "no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law".
(d) Large-scale arrests intended to prevent citizens from participating in processions are abhorrent to the spirit and mandate of the Constitution.
(e) The forcible disruptions to the supply of petrol to the petrol pumps are violative of Article 9 of the Constitution, 1973 inasmuch as this act of the Government tends to deprive the citizens to enjoy decent life and if such acts aim at keeping the motor vehicles off the roads, they are in negation of Article 15 of the Constitution as well, for such acts of the Government do not come within the purview of reasonable restrictions imposed by law on the right to freedom of movement. This innovative technique to regulate and control processions lacks any sanction of law behind it.
24. For the foregoing reasons, Writ Petition No,21921 of 2014 and ICA No,760 of 2014 are allowed in the above terms, setting aside the order dated 9-8-2014 passed in Writ Petition No,21892 of 2014.