' By means of instant constitutional petition filed in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has invoked jurisdiction of this Court with the following prayer:-- "It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that in compliance to the Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 23-5-2013 passed in Criminal Appeal No,725 of 2009 under Articles 184(2), 189 and 190 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the warrants of arrest issued earlier on sequel to the Judgment dated: 24-1-2009 passed in Criminal Appeal. No,328 of 1998 by Division Bench of this honourable Court may be recalled and the respondents be directed to refrain from harassing the petitioner in any manner whatsoever."
2. Facts of the case, succinctly required for determination of the petition in hand, are that the petitioner along with 14 others was booked in case F.I.R. No,343 of 1992, dated 20-12-1992, offences under sections 302, 324, 148, 149, P.P.C., Police Station Sara-e-Mughal, District Kasur, lodged on the complaint of Rattan son of Kallu (since deceased) in which Khushi Muhammad son of Mehnga was done to death. During pendency of the challan case, the complainant opted to prefer complaint, which was clubbed together with the state case by the learned Judge, Special Court Anti-Terrorism constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Act, 1975, and the learned trial court proceeded in the spirit of law laid down in Nur Elahi's case (PLD 1966 SC 708). After conclusion of trial, the learned trial court vide judgment dated 15-9-1996 acquitted the' petitioner and 14 other co-accused while extending them benefit of doubt. Muhammad Jameel/respondent No,4 filed petition for special leave to appeal bearing Crl. PSLA No,49 of 1996 in terms of section 417(2-A) of the Criminal Procedure Code in which leave was granted by learned Division Bench of this Court and consequently Criminal Appeal No,328 of 1998 was disposed of whereby 'to the extent of the petitioner and Rehmat Ali co-convict, the acquittal was converted into conviction under section 302(b)/34, P.P.C., and the convicts were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with direction to pay Rs,50,000 each as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased and in case of default in payment thereof, to further undergo S.I. For six months. The petitioner along with his co- appellant Rehmat Ali assailed conviction before august Supreme Court of Pakistan by means of Criminal Appeal No,725-L of 2009. However, as the petitioner had opted not to surrender himself before august Supreme Court of Pakistan, therefore, to his extent appeal was dismissed being not maintainable on 24-4-2012 and subsequently vide judgment dated 23-5-2013 appeal to the extent of Rehmat Ali co-appellant was allowed in the following terms:- "7. We have heard the learned counsel and the learned Law Officer. We have perused the record of the appeal. The appeal is a right created under the statute and neither a complainant nor a witness has been conferred the right of appeal against acquittal in terms of section 7 of the Act of 1975. Section 7 of the Act of 1975 grants the Provincial Government right to prefer appeal against acquittal by directing any person appointed by it to file an appeal before the High Court. In the case in hand, the appeal against acquittal before the High Court was admittedly not filed by the State. It was the witness namely Muhammad Jamil, who preferred appeal against acquittal of the appellant and other convicts therefore, appeal before the High Court was not competent.
8. We, in the circumstances, without travelling into the merits of the case, hold that the impugned judgment has been passed without lawful authority, as the appeal before the learned High Court was not competently filed. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the learned Lahore High Court passed in Criminal Appeal No,328 1998 and acquit the appellant. He shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner while agitating his arguments submits that as by virtue of its judgment, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that the very filing of appeal before the High Court was not entertain able having not been filed competently, therefore, the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioner are without lawful jurisdiction as such the direction sought by the petitioner in the prayer clause is fully within four corners of law. Learned counsel vehemently contends that in its judgment dated 23-5-2013, the august Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the judgment of this Court having been passed without lawful authority, therefore, keeping in view the provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the same being binding upon this Court, learned counsel prays for recalling the warrants issued by this Court on 24-1-2009 and seeks direction to the respondents to refrain from harassing the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. In support of his contentions learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the dictum of law laid down in the cases of HAMEED AKHTAR NIAZI v. THE SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others (1996 SCM R 1185) and Khawaja ABDUL HAMEED NASIR and others v. NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others (2003 SCM R 1030).
4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at preliminary stage and scrutinized the material available on record on the touchstone of law laid down by superior courts on the subject.
5. As far as the judgment of august Supreme Court of Pakistan is concerned, no doubt in the essence of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the same is binding .On all other courts within Pakistan. The same is reproduced herein below for sake of reference?
"189. Any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other courts in Pakistan."
However, the instant case lies on altogether different footing as the present petitioner from the date of pronouncement of judgment by this Court became fugitive and the same situation is still going on. It is established principle of law enunciated by the superior courts from time-to-time that a fugitive from law loses normal rights as by himself frustrating the procedure of law in complete derogation of the direction recorded in the judgment passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, he cannot seek justice from a court of law. Respectful reliance in this regard is placed on the ratio decidendi of august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Hayat Bakhsh and others v. The State PLD 1981 SC 265; wherein it was held that fugitive from law if defies the order of the court cannot seek justice from any court of law. In another celebrated judgment of august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of HAYAT BAKHSH and others v. THE STATE (1982 SCM R 623) the following principle of law was laid down:- "---S.. 410---Criminal appeal---Appeal of accused, a =fugitive from justice dismissed even though appeal of his co-accused accepted."
' Similar view was held in Hayat Bakhsh and others' case (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 265) in the following terms:- ' Art. 185(2), (3) read with Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.582---Appeal (criminal)--- Absconder, held cannot get benefit of his appeal being kept pending sine die till he surrenders nor any justification exists for absconder's appeal to be separated and adjourned sine die."
' It is significant to observe that in the instant case the picture is even more lucid as during the pendency of the petition before august Supreme Court of Pakistan, the office objection was upheld and pursuant to order dated 24-4-2012 criminal appeal to the extent of present petitioner was dismissed only due to one reason that he had not surrendered himself.
6. After taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances brought before this Court, there is no second cavil to this proposition that as a specific order has been passed by august Supreme Court of Pakistan, this Court being under obligation to follow the order in the spirit of Articles 189/190 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hence no relief can be granted in the given circumstances.
7. So far as contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that as the conviction recorded by this Court was declared having been passed without lawful authority by august Supreme Court of Pakistan and same no more remains in field, hence the petitioner is also entitled to the same relief as granted in favour of his co-appellant Rehmat Ali is concerned, it is the consistent view of the superior courts that even if any judgment/order is recorded by a court without jurisdiction, appeal against that order lies in the manner as having been passed with jurisdiction. Respectful reliance in this regard is placed on the dictum of law laid down in the landmark judgment of august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ v. THE STATE (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 368); wherein it was held as under:-- "It is an equally well settled principle that if a Court not having jurisdiction wrongly exercises such a jurisdiction, an appeal lies from that decision in the same manner as an appeal lies from a decision with jurisdiction."
8. As far as filing of the constitutional petition by the after dismissal of his criminal appeal from august Supreme Court Pakistan is concerned, in Khalid Aziz's case 2001 PCr.LJ 56 following principles were laid down:- "Art. 199. A fugitive cannot maintain writ petition on ground that trial against him was held in absentia and was void. Objection to maintainability of writ petition upheld and writ ."
In view of dicta referred to above it can easily be declared that the instant petition was not entertainable, which ought to have not been treated by the office.
9. The accumulative effect of the above discussion is that until and unless the petitioner surrenders himself; thereby joining the process of law, he cannot claim the relief sought for through the instant petition which on the face of it being devoid of merit/legal justification hereby stands DISMISSED IN LIMINE.