' WAQAR AHMAD SETH, J.---Ghulam Mustafa and others petitioners seek review of judgment and decree dated 15-10-2012 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No,52-A of 2005, inter alia, on the grounds that the Honour'able Judge while passing the judgment and decree ignored the record of rights, the report of local commission, long standing entries recorded in favour of petitioners right from the settlement of 1948-49 till 1982-83 and reversed the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts below.
2. Arguments heard and record perused.
3. A perusal of impugned judgment would reveal that learned counsel for the parties advanced lengthy arguments in the case and it has been pronounced on 15-10-2012 in presence of the parties and their counsel after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and appraisal of the record of the case. It would be appropriate rather just for appraisal purposes of the facts to reproduce the relevant portions of the impugned judgment for sake of convenience, as under:- ' The main grievance of the petitioner was that he as per revenue record is owner in possession of khasra Nos. 1631 and 1632, which are the out-come of khasra Nos. 366 and 374 'after the new settlement. As per revenue record the disputed khasra numbers are mentioned as Ghair Mumkin Rasta in exclusive possession of the petitioners being co-sharers. Prior to the Settlement these two khasra numbers were part and parcel of the previous khasra numbers mentioned above. At the time of preparation of settlement record respondents had moved an application before the Deputy Commissioner/Settlement Officer wherein it was categorically stated that the petitioners wanted to enter the same in the revenue record as path being their sole ownership. This application was moved on 28-11-1983 and after submitting of that application respondents kept mum till filing of suit dated 9-6-1991. No explanation or reason has been mentioned in their plaint that why respondents/plaintiffs kept mum after the settlement proceedings when they were in know of the impugned entries in the revenue record. The learned lower Courts had wrongly interpreted the law, the revenue record and report of local commissioner. It is an admitted fact that petitioner No,2 is not only a co-sharer like plaintiffs rather is also a co-heir of the suit property.
The entry made in revenue record in favour of petitioners has never been challenged before the revenue authority, hence, presumption of truth is attached to said entries. According to the report of local commissioner the approach from the houses of respondents leads towards west and south which is connected with two main roads. It is wrongly held that there is a roof intervening the suit path and there is every likelihood that in case the roof is demolished or damaged the suit path leading towards western and southern sides will be affected. In fact as per local commissioner's report the suit path has no nexus with the roof of the houses of the respondents as in any case if respondents want to use these two approaches including the suit path they have to travel from the said roof of the houses of the respondents. It is also in the report that respondents are using the path from their own land leading towards Rehmat Abad road, which excludes the suit path. The main contention of the respondents is that being a co-sharer, the petitioners cannot declare the suit path as private partition between the parties is still to be carried out, hence, till partition every co-sharer is owner of every inch of land which also includes the suit path.
7. The cited case-law produced by the respondents reported as PLD 1994 Peshawar 197, 2011 SCMR 521, 1989 SCMR 130, 2011 CLC 1906 is humbly to say that the said authorities have no nexus with the present case. All the referred cases relate to joint property which was subject to partition and correction of revenue record or alienation of the property by co-sharers. The present case has different history as these two khasra numbers have been separated from khasra Nos. 366 and 374 and given separate suit khasra numbers during the settlement proceedings conducted in the year 1982-83 and have expressly been declared path. As per revenue record, the petitioners are exclusive owners in possession of suit path in the column of cultivation. Both the Courts below have not appreciated the difference between a thoroughfare and a private path. Thoroughfare is described as a shamilat used by all co-villagers or residents of the locality whereas private path has different criteria, which. Is meant for private use of the owners of adjacent property. In the present case petitioners are adjacent owners of the suit path wherein houses have been built and path is exclusively used by the petitioners being its owners. Moreover, the revenue record i,e, Aks Shajra Kishtwar, the register of owners even report of local commission does not disclose that the suit khasra numbers (suit path) is connected with any other adjacent khasra number(s) shown as a path, which leads to the houses of respondents.
8. Respondents/plaintiffs never raised plea of easement on the basis of prescription because not only they have alternate approach rather adjacent to the suit path they also own private path for their approach to Rehmat Abad road. Thoroughfare and private path have been properly described in the case of Raees Khan and others v. Samar All Shah and others reported as 1997 CLC 349, which reads as under:- "there is difference between the thoroughfare and a private path. A thoroughfare which happens to be Shamlat, is used and enjoyed by every person of the village irrespective of the fact whether he is owner or not, and a person recorded its owner cannot convert it to his own use as laid in PLD 1996 Peshawar 19, but if there is a private path, then an owner thereof shall certainly have a right of use and conversion according to his own requirements and choice".
9. It is also settled law that a co-sharer can holds and enjoys the property in his possession in a specific khata/Khasra number which is in his possession till official partition is carried out. This law has been settled by the apex Court in the case of Muhammad Sharif v. Ghulam Hussain reported as 1995 SCMR 514 and also in case of Muzaffar Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf Khan reported as PLD 1959 SC 9.
4. Further, the grounds, on which review can be sought, are enumerated in Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C.
The Court may 'allow review on three specific grounds, namely,
1. Discovery of new and important matter of evidence, which A after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made;
2. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
3. For any other sufficient reason;
5. Under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. a judgment may be open to review, inter alia, if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error, which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C..
6. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be re-heard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise..
7. The judgment sought to be reviewed was pronounced on 15-10-2012 in presence of the parties and their counsel whereas the petitioners applied for and obtained the certified copies of its judgment and decree on 19-2-2013 and filed the instant review petition on 2-3-2013, which was also got amended through Review Petition No,336-A of 2013 on 1-11-2013. The petitioners if felt aggrieved from it, they can approach the apex Court by filing appeal against the said judgment, which was an appropriate remedy available to them under the law whereas scope of review is narrow one. No good ground exists for revival of impugned judgment.
8. Consequently, this review petition being without substance is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.