' ABDUL LATIF KHAN, J.---This revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 6- 9-2006 passed by the Additional District Judge-II, Haripur, whereby, appeal filed by the present petitioner against the judgment and decree dated 14-3-2006 of Civil Judge-VI, Haripur was dismissed.
2. The brief and essential facts leading to the present petition are that the present petitioner instituted a suit for possession exercising his right of preemption in respect of property comprised in 'Khasra' No,1111 to the extent of 8820/84672 shares, 'Khasra' No,1110 to the extent of 14700/150528 shares and Khasra No,1070 to the extent of 3300/38016 shares measuring 1 'Kanal' 11 'Marlas; situated in 'Mauza Mankarai, Tehsil and District Haripur, which was transferred in favour of respondent vide registered deed No,378 dated 25-1-2003, on payment of Rs,31,000, on the basis of cosharership, contiguity and participation in amenities and appendages.
' It was averred in the plaint that the petitioner got knowledge of the disputed sale on 6-3-2003 at 6.00 p.m. In his house at village Mankarai, Tehsil Haripur through Zafar Iqbal son of Muhammad Rafique, resident of 'Makhnan' and he declare his intention to pre-empt the suit transaction in presence of Zafar Iqbal, informer and the petitioner issued notice of 'Talb-i-Ishhad' to the respondent on 17-3-2003 through registered-AD.
3. The suit of the petitioner was contested by the respondent by filing written statement. Based on the contesting pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following seven issues:
(1) Whether the plaintiff has got cause of action? OPP
(2) Whether the plaintiff is estopped to sue? OPD
(3) Whether the suit is bad in its present form? OPD
(4) Whether plaintiff has got right of pre-emption? OPP
(5) Whether plaintiff has fulfilled talbs in accordance with law? OPP
(6) Whether Rs, 200,000 entered in suit mutation as sale consideration has been fixed in good faith and actually paid? OPP
(7) What is the market value of suit property? OP (parties).
(8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for? OPP
(9) Relief
4. The parties produced their evidence and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the petitioner. Aggrieved thereof, the present petitioner impugned the same in appeal, which was also dismissed by the learned appellate Court. Hence, this revision. .
5. Valuable arguments of the learned counsel for the parties heard and the available record of the case thoroughly considered.
6. Perusal of record would reveal that the plaintiff has appeared in the Court as P.W.6 and reiterated the stance taken in the plaint. P.W.7 is the informer, who fortified the claim of the plaintiff/petitioner. Only two contradictions prevailed before the learned trial Court in the statements of the witnesses to non-suit the plaintiff/ petitioner. Firstly, in the statement of informer (P.W.7) that he got no knowledge about khasra number of the suit property and that he was on the way from his village to city on foot, whereas the plaintiff/ petitioner has said that the informer was accompanied with vendor and vendee in a Suzuki, where he got entire information.. These contradictions are minor in nature, which was made basis for non-suiting the petitioner and secondly, the sending of notice of 'Talb-i-Ishhad' at the place mentioned in the sale-deed. Perusal of record would show that the registered deed contains the address of the vendee as, Village Mankarai, which has been mentioned in the plaint by the petitioner/ plaintiff. The written statement filed by the defendant reveals that at the footnote, the defendant herself admitted that his address given in the plaint is correct. The findings of Courts below that admittedly the husband of the defendant is residing at France, therefore, the notice sent on the address of village is not compliance of the provisions of section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, which is misconceived, for reasons that the address mentioned in the plaint was admitted by the defendant rather in the written statement at its bottom, the defendant herself has admitted that her address has rightly given in the plaint. Moreover, the notice was served upon the defendant at her given address, which was received by one Ghulam Akbar Subedar, A who had admitted the receipt of notice while appeared in Court as DW-1 and deposed as attorney of the defendant, power of attorney on behalf of defendant exhibited as Exh.DW 1/1.
' If the vendee was residing with her husband in France, she has not disclosed this fact in, the written statement, rather admitted that the address has rightly mentioned in the plaint. The attorney of the defendant has also admitted the receipt of notice. Ordinarily the notice is to be sent on the normal ordinary address of the vendee under registered cover Acknowledgement Due and would amount to sufficient compliance of section 13 of Pre-emption Act and on this score; the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner cannot be defeated. So the findings of the Courts below on this issue are the result of too technical approach to the matter and are set aside. Reliance in this regard may be placed on Pervaiz's case (2006 SCM R 4), wherein, it was observed by their Lordship in the apex Court that:- ' "The plain reading of the above provision of law would show that service of notice of TaIb-e- Ishhad at the ordinary postal address of the vendee under registered cover acknowledgement due, is sufficient."
' It was also made basis to non-suit the plaintiff/petitioner that P.W.8, marginal witness of the notice of ' Talb-e-Ishhad' had deposed that he is unaware of the contents of notice. The bare reading of the statement of the said witness would reveal that he has supported the version of the plaintiff/ petitioner. In his examination-in-chief categorically admitted his signature on the notice in the Court and deposed that he along with plaintiff and other marginal witness put their signatures and as such attested the notice by two marginal witnesses. In cross-examination, he shown ignorance about the contents of deed but this alone would not be made basis to non suit the plaintiff for the reasons that knowledge of contents of document cannot be attributed to the attesting witness rather it is the execution of the document and its attestation, which has been confirmed by the witnesses. Reliance is placed on Nawab Khan's case (2000 YLR 621), wherein, it was held that:- "It is settled proposition of law that knowledge of the contents of the document cannot be attributed to a person attesting the same as a witness."
8. In this regard, in Muhammad Rashid Ahmad's case (PLD 2002 SC 293), it has been held by the apex Court that:- "To our consideration there is no mandate of law to hold that testimony of a witness can be disbelieved merely for the reasons that witness has failed to explain that in which connection he visited the petition writer for executing the' agreement and due to this reason, version of the petitioner writer marking presence of parties before .Him for execution of agreement was held to be inadmissible."
' The testimony of witness could not be discarded for his failure to explain the contents of the document nor the document can be held inadmissible in evidence solely on this ground. The plaintiff has specifically mentioned in Para-2 of the plaint that he acquired knowledge of sale transaction in village Mankarai through Zafar Iqbal and later on 17-3-2003, he has scribed notice from petition writer and duly witnessed by Zafar Iqbal and Abdul Qayyum and as such complied with the provision of section 13 of the Pre-emption Act. There is no material contradiction in the statements of witnesses. The minor contradictions pointed out by the trial Court are not of pivotal nature, especially when the evidence was recorded after a period of more than two years. The normal variations are but in accordance with the human nature shows that the witnesses were not tutored. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the registered deed was attested on 25-1- 2003 while 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' was allegedly made after forty days on 6-3-2003 and contended that it was barred by time but the arguments hold no water for the reason that it is the knowledge of the plaintiff, which is to be taken into consideration. The plaintiff has categorically averred that he had acquired the knowledge about the sale transaction on 6-3-2003 at 6.00 PM in his house in village Mankarai and thereafter declare his intention to preempt the same and subsequently sent notice of Talb-i-Ishhad, in para No,2 of the plaint, which is evasively denied by the defendant and while appearing as DW-1, attorney of the defendant has not taken the plea that 'Talbi-Muwathibae is barred by any time and has just made a passing by plea only to this extent. That the plaintiff has not performed in Talb so at this stage the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that it is - the barred is not appreciated. Both the points prevailed before the trial Court as well as appellate Court is contrary to the law in peculiar circumstances of the case. The impugned registered Deed No,378 dated 25-1-2003 contains the amount of Rs,200,000 as sale consideration.
Plaintiff has claimed Rs,31,000 in his plaint but no, cogent evidence has been produced in this regard to prove this fact.' The evidence available on file in shape of one yearly average Exh.P.W.2/D-1 shows that the market value of the suit-land comes to Rs,354,034.4, which appears to be bona fide entered by the defendant in the deed. Consequently, it is held 'that the amount mentioned in the deed was rightly fixed. And paid as such. The defendant is also entitled kir the amount of expenses incurred upon the stamp paper etc.
9. Accordingly, for the reasons stated hereinabove, this revision petition, is accepted, the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner is decreed in his favour, who is directed to deposit the remaining pre-emption before the Trial Court, within 30 days along with expenses on attestation of registered deed in shape of stamp duty, failing which, the suit shall stand dismissed.
' No order to costs