' ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN, J.--- This common judgment shall dispose of the instant writ petition as well as Writ Petition No,362-B of 2013, filed by Gul Nawaz and others, as identical controversy is involved in both the petitions.
2. Petitioners, who are the employees of Police Force, are aggrieved from the orders passed/issued by respondent No,4 (Deputy Inspector General Police (RPO), Bannu Range Bannu) bearing Nos.2606- 09/EC dated 7-11-2013 and 2654-58/EC dated 8-11-2013, vide which their services have been suspended, thus, seek issuance of a writ declaring the impugned orders as illegal, ultra virus null and void and to direct and require the respondents to desist from giving effect to the impugned orders and any action ancillary/consequential thereto.
3 Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that nothing adverse against the petitioners is available with the respondents to justify the impugned orders, which is the result of political and extraneous influence; that the impugned orders are against the spirit of principles of civil service and thereby has caused grave miscarriage of justice to the petitioners; that the petitioners have been discriminated and victimized apparently due to extraneous and political interference and without any lawful justification withholding and ignoring law, rules and good governance. He went on to say, that the moment orders of suspension have been passed, self respect and dignity of the petitioners have been grossly impaired in the society. The learned counsel while challenging the legality and propriety of the impugned suspension orders vehemently argued that the same being directly passed by the appellate authority depriving the petitioners from the right of appeal are illegal and in utter disregard of the law and rules on the subject. He while concluding his arguments contended that while knocking at the door of the Service Tribunal and getting relief therefrom, it will take sufficient time thus in the interest of justice, the petitions be entertained by this Court.
4. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and have gone through the record annexed with the petition.
5 Admittedly, the petitioners being employees of police force are civil servants and a government servant against whom action under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servant (Efficiency and Disciplinary) Rules, is proposed to be initiated, may be placed under suspension of a period of ninety days if in the opinion of the competent authority, suspension is necessary or expedient and if the period of suspension is not extended for a further period of ninety days within thirty days of the expiry of initial period of suspension, the Government servant shall be deemed to be reinstated.
From the above referred provisions of rules, it is manifest that suspension is one of the incidents of terms and conditions of civil service. To understand the genesis of the expression "Suspension", we deem it appropriate to refer to the following observations of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled, "East End Export Karachi v. Chief Contractor of Import and Export, Rawalpindi" (PLD 1965 SC 605).
"Suspension may be a punitive suspension or one in aid of an enquiry. An order in the nature of punishment is always required to be proceeded by a properly constituted enquiry. The other kind of suspension is designed to facilitate the due prosecution of the enquiry. Such a temporary suspension is deemed to be an implied term in every contract of service. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act also lays down that an authority who has got power to appoint has also the power to suspend. It has therefore, been held that if an authority when holding an enquiry, is satisfied that the charge against the public servant is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude, he can suspend him pending the inquiry."
6. Vide letter No,84-PA/E dated 4-11-2013, the Provincial Police Officer Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar has directed the competent authority to initiate proper departmental action against the petitioners being reportedly highly corrupt and indulged in illegal activities, earning a bad name to police, as a consequence whereof, the impugned orders have been passed by respondent No A, suspending the petitioners from service. Suspension is not a punishment. Suspension of a government servant during the course of his service simply means that no work is to be taken from him during the period of suspension. Suspension is only a temporary measure, wherein the petitioners are entitled to receive their full emoluments in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled, "Government of N.-W.F.P. v. I.A. Sherwani (PLD 1994 SC 72), they have no case to complaint.
7. It is not disputed that either the grievance of the petitioners i.e, suspension pending disciplinary action germane to the terms and conditions of their service and appeal against such order is maintainable before a Service Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to scrutinize the same is ousted. The constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, in such like matters, is ousted by explicit provision of Article 212 of the Constitution. In the instant case, suspension orders of the petitioners have been issued by the authority, which have also been conveyed to the petitioners and the same have attained finality. There could be no cavil with the observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar's case (1985 SCM R 63), that if an order of suspension had attained finality, it would be questioned before the Service Tribunal and jurisdiction of this Court would be ousted. Moreso the writ jurisdiction can only be invoked by an aggrieved person when there is no alternate or efficacious remedy available to him. In the instant case, the petitioners have alternate remedy by approaching the proper forum i.e, Service Tribunal. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that proceedings before the Service Tribunal would take sufficient time is unpersuasive which would not vest jurisdiction in this Court under Art.199 of the Constitution or to remove the bar of jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution. What has been agitated by the learned counsel for the petitioners before us, would be good grounds but before the proper forum.
8. With these observations, both the writ petitions along with C.Ms, being not maintainable, stand dismissed in limine. However, the petitioners are at liberty to approach the proper forum for redressal of their grievance.