' RAJA SAEED AKRAM KHAN, J.--- This appeal, with leave of the Court, arises out of the judgment of the High Court dated 9-2-2011, whereby Writ Petition No,378 has been accepted.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the instant appeal are that respondent No,1 filed a writ petition in the High Court on 19-12-2005, claiming therein that he was appointed as Junior Clerk in Mirpur Development Authority, Mirpur, on 11-10-1975 and was temporarily promoted as Senior Clerk on 7-5- 1980. His promotion order was confirmed on 15-7-1987 with effect from 6-7-1987. Later on the post of Senior Clerk was upgraded by the Authority with effect from 1-7-1982. He alleged that he was confirmed against this post and provisional seniority list was issued on 31-3-1989. In the final seniority list, he was placed at serial No,2 whereas the appellant, herein, was listed at serial No,5. He was granted selection grade B-11 through order dated 12-7-1989 while the appellant, herein, was granted selection grade on 27-6-1992. Respondent No,1, alleged that the appellant, herein, moved an application to the Chairman Mirpur Development Authority, Mirpur, on 3-10-2005 with regard to the seniority. The Chairman decided the application on 13-10-2005 and declared the appellant senior to him. The order of Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, dated 13-10-2005 was challenged by respondent No,1 before the High Court through a writ petition. The High Court accepted the writ petition vide order dated 9-2-2011 and set aside the order passed by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, Mirpur.
3. Mr. Bostan Chaudhry, the learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the High Court incorrectly held that the representation filed by the petitioner was time-barred. The appellant had immediately filed the representation before the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, Mirpur, in 1987. He referred to a copy of the representation which finds place at page 33 of the paper book and argued that it was enjoined upon the Chairinan, Mirpur Development Authority, to decide the representation but he failed to decide the same. He moved an application to the Chairman, Ehtesab Bureau, for redressal of his grievance who advised the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, to decide the representation according to law. The representation was not time-barred, therefore, it was rightly decided by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority after hearing both the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant further argued that the High Court was not justified in disturbing the order passed by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, who was the competent authority. He further urged that the appellant was rightly declared senior to respondent No,1 by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, vide dated 13-10-2005. The writ petition was accepted without assigning any cogent reasons. The learned High Court failed to consider the important aspect that the remedy of appeal was available before the Board and without availing such remedy, the writ petition was not competent and it was liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. He further argued that the matter pertains to the terms and conditions of service of the parties, therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. He lastly argued that the representation of the appellant remained pending before the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, for a long time which was decided on the advice of the Chairman, Ehtesab Bureau. He argued that the earlier seniority list bearing No, Admin-1(13) 9271-77/82 was rightly cancelled by the competent authority. The order of the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, was quite legal and based on cogent reasons.
4. On the other hand, Ch. Muhammad Reaz Alam, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, strongly controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and argued that the order passed by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, was illegal which was rightly set aside by the High Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction which was declared to have been passed without lawful authority. He argued that admittedly the appointment and promotion of the respondent as Junior Clerk, Senior Clerk and Head Clerk were made earlier to the appellant and against clear vacancy and he was placed senior in the seniority list accordingly. That seniority list was never challenged before any forum by the appellant. He lastly drew the attention of this Court to wards paragraph 5 of the writ petition in which the whole controversy has been mentioned and the contents of this. paragraph have been admitted by the appellant while submitting the written statement which is the part of the record. He argued that the writ petition was liable to be accepted on this sole ground. There was no need to dilate upon other points raised in the writ petition.
5. We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that as alternate remedy was available to respondent No,1, the writ petition was not competent, is devoid of any force. It is the Court to decide that the remedy available is efficacious and speedy and if an order on the face of it is illegal, that can be challenged by way of filing writ petition. It may be observed that according to law, the alternate remedy must be adequate, efficacious, convenient, beneficial, speedy and effective. Where the Court thinks proper that the order impugned in the writ petition is without jurisdiction and unlawful, there would no bar in filing a writ petition and the Court would not hesitate in entertaining the Constitutional petition although alternate remedy is available. Reliance can be placed in a case reported as Dr. Liaqat Ali Khan and another v. District Returning Officer, District Sargodha and 3 others (2002 SCM R 1632), wherein it has been observed as under:--- "The remedy of election petition provided under the Punjab Local Government Elections Rules, 2000 is available to a contesting candidate after issue of the notification of result of returned candidate but no such petition can be filed by a person who is not a contesting candidate in the election. The petitioners being no more contesting candidates in the run off election, would not be in a position to challenge the election of returned candidate through an election petition. Undoubtedly, the Tribunal on the basis of grounds mentioned in Rule 83 of the Rules, can declare an election as a whole to be void. Under the above rule, the Tribunal can exercise power only to an election petition which is filed by a contesting candidate and the petitioners being no the contesting candidates in run off election would not be in a position to avail such remedy against returned candidate, and therefore, they had rightly invoked the Constitution jurisdiction of High Court for redressal of their grievance. It would' not be out of place to mention here that even if the statutory remedy available under the law is considered inadequate and inefficacious as the relief being claimed cannot be granted to an aggrieved person in such remedy, the writ petition can be maintained."
' Similarly in a case reported as Iqbal Razzaq Butt v. Abdus Salam Butt and others 1999 M LD 634 it was held as under:--- "9. No doubt that the State Subject Certificate issued by the concerned authority can be assailed before the same authority for its cancellation and the relevant Act has provided an appeal against the order not only before the Government but Council can also be moved, but the question is as to whether these remedies are adequate and efficacious in nature. It has been held more than once by this Court that the remedy provided by way of appeal under State Subject Act is not an adequate remedy. Similarly the remedy before the District Magistrate as well as the Council is also neither adequate nor efficacious. It is in our common experience that these appeals are not disposed of for years together. In such situation the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court can be attracted."
' In another case titled The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 others (PLD 1972 SC 279) it was observed as under:--- "It is thus evident that the appellant challenged the very jurisdiction of the Capital Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the C.D.A.') to make the impugned acquisition under the Ordinance. If it had succeeded in establishing that the impugned acquisition was ultra vires the Ordinance, its appeal under section 36 would have been an exercise in futility. It was held by the Supreme Court in Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty and others (PLD 1961 SC 119), that the rule that the High Court will not entertain a writ petition when other appropriate remedy is yet available is not a rule of law barring jurisdiction but a rule by which the Court regulates its jurisdiction. It was further observed that one of the well recognised exceptions to the general rule is a case where an order is attacked on the ground that it was wholly without authority." (Underlining is ours)
' In a case reported as Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sargodha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another (PLD 1966 SC 639), it was observed as under:--- "Leave was granted in this case to consider whether the remedy by way of a suit was an adequate alternative remedy, as the order complained of appeared to be 'one purporting to be made in exercise of public power, and suitable prima facie for security in the prerogative jurisdiction.' .... So far as these writs are concerned it is now settled law that to disentitle a person from such an extraordinary relief the alternative remedy available must be a remedy in law, that is a remedium juris and one which is not less convenient, beneficial and effective, if what is sought to be enforced by such an extraordinary remedy is 'a legal right to the performance of a legal duty' of a public nature."
6. Now we advert the next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter pertains to terms and conditions of service of the parties, therefore, the writ petition was not competent. We are afraid it is not correct and do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel. It is admitted position that the Mirpur Development Authority is an autonomous body and the employees of the Authority are not governed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976 and rules framed thereunder. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has no force and is hereby repelled.
7. It is also part of the record that the application which was filed by the appellant against orders dated 11-10-1975, 7-5-1980 and 15-7-1987 which was heard by the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, while treating it as an appeal after a considerable time. Therefore, we are fully convinced that the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the action of the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, was not in accordance with law.
8. There is another aspect of the case which is not denied from the other side that paragraph 5 of the writ petition in which detail of whole controversy has been given, has plainly been admitted by the appellant. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for respondent No, 1 that the writ petition was liable to be accepted on this sole ground has some force. Even otherwise, the High Court has dilated upon all the points raised in the writ petition and decided the writ petition in a comprehensive manner. From the perusal of the record it reveals that the promotion of the respondent as Senior Clerk and Head Clerk was made on 11-10-1975, 7-5-1980 and 15-7-1987 which shows that respondent No,1 was senior to the appellant. It is also not out of place to mention here that the application of the appellant remained pending for a long time before the Chairman, Mirpur Development Authority, but no step was taken by the appellant for its expeditious decision.
He never moved any application during this period in any forum. We see no illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by the High Court which is in accordance with law.
' Resultantly, we do not see any force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.