1. This revision petition has been filed against the order of Civil Judge Mirpur dated 27.1.2012, whereby on the application under Section 94 of CPC filed by present Respondent No, 1, the Court ordered the petitioner and proforma respondent to furnish personal bonds to the sum of Rs, 1,00,000/- (one lac) each for not committing any breach of stay order.
2. The brief facts of the instant revision petition are that the present Respondent No, 1 has filed a civil suit for declaration-cumperpetual injunction against the petitioner and proforma Respondent No, 2 in the Court of Civil Judge Mirpur. It is stated by the plaintiff that her brother Muhammad Afzal Khan gifted land measuring 13 Marlas comprising Khasra No, 487-min, Khata No, 320/321, Khewet No, 01, situated at Mauzia Kaskalyal Tehsil Mirpur and she also constructed a house alongwith the compound wall over the said land. It is further stated that the Defendant No, 1 has also got the land measuring 2 kanals 4 marlas Khasra No, 489 Khata No, 458/486 Khewet No, 01 through Court Decree, the western side of the plot of the plaintiff. It is also stated that the defendants are going to construct a Shopping Plaza and due to which, the compound wall of the western side and the toilets were destroyed, which were reconstructed by the plaintiff on her own expenses amounting to Rs, 2,00,000/-. It is also stated that the defendants have been torturing the plaintiff by mentally and causing the loss of Rs, 4,00,000/-. The plaintiff prayed that a declaratory-cumperpetual injunction decree may be passed in her favour and against the defendants.
3. During the trial of the suit the plaintiff moved an application under Section 94 of Civil Procedure Code, stating therein that the plaintiff has got the stay order against the defendants vide Court's order dated 22.11.2011, but the defendants deliberately violating the stay order and have been constructing the Plaza without obtaining NOCs from the concerned Department and also want to change complexion of the suit land. The plaintiff prayed that defendants may kindly be restrained from violating the Court's order dated 22.11.2011 through warrant.
4. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court vide its order dated 27.01.2012 directed the defendants to submit personal bonds amounting to Rs, 1,00,000/- each, hence this revision petition.
5. Mr. Muhammad Younas Arvi, while arguing the case at length, referred Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 94 of Civil Procedure Code and assailed the impugned order that the order is a harsh order which was not permissible under law and the Court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction. It is further argued by the petitioner that the trial Court has passed the impugned order against the pleadings. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel/petitioner that as the petitioner in his written statement has taken the ground of non-availability of cause of action to the respondents, hence the impugned order is bad in law, which is liable to be vacated.
6. While controverting the arguments of the petitioner, Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, the learned counsel for Respondent No, 1 raised an objection that the impugned order is not a final order buttinterlocutory order, which cannot be challenged by way of revision petition before this Court.
7. After the Amendment of Section 115 Civil Procedure Code, this power has also been given to the District Judge in respect of all orders passed by subordinate Courts. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of the Court to Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code and submitted that keeping in view the principle laid down in supra Section, the petitioner was bound to file the revision petition before the District Judge being the lowest Court having jurisdiction and not before this Court.
8. On merit, the learned counsel for Respondent No, 1 has argued that the impugned order is well in accordance with law and well-reasoned. The discretion has been exercised by the trial Court under Section 94 of Civil Procedure Code to meet the ends of justice and the revision petition merits rejection with heavy costs. The learned counsel placed reliance upon; 1. 1992 CLC 1904, 2. 1998 Karachi 798 and 2000 MLD 729.
9. I have heard the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for Respondent No, 1 and gone through the record.
10. For the convenience sake, it is proper to reproduce Sections 15 and 115 of Civil Procedure Code and case law referred to meet the objection raised by the learned counsel for Respondent No, 1, which are as under:-- "15, Court in which suits to be instituted. Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it."
11. "[115. Revision. (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any. Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears:-- (a)to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b)to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c)to have acted in the exercise of the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that, where a person makes an application under this sub-section, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents, and order of the subordinate Court and the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the sub-ordinate Court]"
2. The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by sub-section (2) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject-matter whereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court."
12. The principle laid down by the apex Court is that revisional power under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code can be exercised by a revisional Court, if from the perusal of record of any case, which has been decided A by any Court subordinate to such Court and where no appeal lies and such Court appears to have exercised the jurisdiction vested in it by law or failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acted in exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity but when the subordinate Court has exercised the jurisdiction vested in it, in a lawful manner and there is no material irregularity in the case decided, the revisional powers cannot be exercised. The view is fortified by the following case law.
13. It has been laid down in PLJ 1998 Kar. 784, that:-- "--Making of interim order being part of working of judicial system, no separate or specific provision was necessary to empower a Court to grant main relief--Where Court had passed interlocutory orders when mala-fides was alleged in plaint and Court felt it just, proper and convenient, there was nothing wrong in those orders--Petitioner, however, would have his remedy against such order before District Court and not directly in High Court for invoking revision jurisdiction."
14. "In case where the High Court and District Court had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain revision application, the same should be filed in the District Court and not the High Court on the principles embodied in Section 15, C.P.C. This revision is, therefore, not competent before this Court. Reference. can be made to 1992 CLC (Kar.) 1904."
15. This view also finds support from 1992 CLC Karachi 1904, the relevant portions of the judgment are as under:-- "Forum for institution of suit/revision--Principles embodies in S. 15 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, provides that suit would be instituted in the Court of lowest grade competent to try the same--- Where High Court and District Court have concurrent jurisdiction for entertaining revision petition, in view of principle embodied in S.15, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, same should have been filed before District Court."
16. "---Revision---Maintainability---Proper forum--Concurrent jurisdiction vested in High Court as also in District Court for entertaining revision application---Principle embodied in S.15, Civil.
17. Procedure Code, 1908 however, provides that suit would be instituted in Court of lowest grade competent to try the same; similarly in spite of concurrent jurisdiction, District Court being of lower grade; revision should be filed before it and not before High Court, provides such revision was within its competence-- When valuation of suit was also not above pecuniary limit prescribed for filing an appeal in District Court, revision petition all the more should have been filed in District Court--Departure from such rule could, however, be claimed to case of legal exigency--No such legal exigency or strong reasons having been shown, revision filed before High Court was returned for presentation to proper Court.
18. The principle narrated in 1994 MLD 903 is also necessary to reproduce here, which reads as under:- - ----Ss. 15 & 115--West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), S. 18--Revision before High Court against order of Trial Court--Competency--Value of suit filed before trial Court was Rs,24,000 only, but revision against order of trial Court was filed directly before High Court--In normal course under provisions of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 any order passed in suit would be appealable before District Court--Sub-section (2) of S. 115,C.P.C. had also provided that District Court could exercise revisional powers conferred on High Court by subsection (1) of Section 115, C.P.C.--District Court, in such circumstances, was also invested with concurrent jurisdiction to hear revision applications against orders passed by trial Court--Principle embodied in S. 15, C.P.C. being that where more than one Court had concurrent jurisdiction/proceedings should be instituted in Court of lowest grade, revision application should have been instituted before District Court instead of High Court--Memorandum, of revision application was returned to applicant to be filed before District Court."
19. The grounds taken by the petitioner that the trial Court has exceeded his jurisdiction by asking the petitioner to furnish personal bond under Section 94 of Civil Procedure Code, which was also controverted by the counsel for Respondent No,
1. It will be convenient to reproduce Section 94 Civil Procedure Code, which reads as follows:--
94. Supplemental proceedings.--In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed--- "(a) issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show-cause why he should not given security for his appearance and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison;
(b) direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or other the attachment of any property; (c)grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold; (d)appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property; (e)make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient." , While discussing the relevant law on the subject, it is obvious that Section 94 CPC confers judicial powers upon. a Court to issue interlocutory orders. Whereas the rules prescribe the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such powers. The making of interim order is a part of the working of the judicial system and no separate or specific provision is necessary to empower a Court as is necessary to the power to grant main relief. Thus, there is nothing wrong if the trial Court passed interlocutory order when mala fides were alleged in the plaint which was verified on oath and the Court felt it just, proper and convenient.
20. Keeping in view the overall circumstances of the case, the contents of the pleadings of the parties and following the principle laid down by the apex Court in a caste titled "Tariq Mehmood Vrs.
21. Contractor Ahmed Din and 4 others" reported in 2009 SCR 294, I am of the view that:-- (a)the revision petition is not entertainable by this Court. It should have been filed before the Court of District Judge as being the Court of lowest grade.
22. (b)the revision petition also does not merit acceptance even on merit as no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the trial Court and impugned order dated 27.01.2012 passed by Civil Judge Mirpur has been passed in legal fashion by properly exercising the discretionary power.
23. The upshot of the above discussion is that finding no force in this revision petition, the same stands dismissed with no order as to costs.