1. CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J.--- The captioned appeal, with the leave of the Court, is filed against the order of the High Court dated 10-6-2005, whereby while accepting writ petition of the real respondents, the notifications issued by the Minister for Transport of AJ&K Government, respondent No.15, in favour of the appellant and pro forma respondents Nos.9 to 11 were cancelled.
2. 2.Precisesummary of facts necessary for disposal of this appeal is that pro forma respondent No.15, Minister for Transport of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government issued four notifications on 13-5- 2003, whereby route permits for motor vehicles in favour of the appellant and pro forma respondents Nos.9 to 11 were issued. The real respondents, herein, feeling aggrieved filed a writ petition to challenge the validity of the notifications. They averred in the writ petition that they are also running transport business and their main grievance is that the pro forma respondent No.15, (herein), has no jurisdiction to issue route permits, hence, all the route permits have been issued in sheer violation of the statutory provisions. The writ petition was resisted. After completion of the required proceedings, the learned High Court, through the impugned judgment/order granted the writ petition while cancelling the route permits issued in favour of the appellant and pro forma respondents Nos.9to11,thusthisappealisbroughtbeforetheCourtwiththe leave.
3. 3.Mr. Khalid Rashid Chaudhary, the learned counsel for the appellant, after detailed discussion of facts, vehemently contended that the impugned judgment is result of misconception of law and facts. There is difference in procedure for granting the route permit for stage carriage and contract carriage. The writ petition has been filed in presence of alternate adequate remedy as provided under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred as Motor Vehicles Ordinance) and rules made thereunder. He further submitted that for granting permit of contract carriage, there is no requirement for conducting survey or other formalities, only the reports of Administrative Authorities suffice. His most stressed argument is that the notification of delegation of powers to Minister for Transport dated 18-1-2003 has not been challenged, therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable, hence the impugned judgment is not sustainable.
4. The petitioners, before the High Court doesn't fall within the definition of aggrieved persons. In support of his contention he placed reliance on case titled Messrs Asraf and Akbar another v. Kh.
5. Abdul Khaliq and others (1995 SCR 196).
6. 4.Mr. Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, the learned counsel for the respondents, while controverting the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court is well-reasoned and consistent with the statutory provisions as well as the principle of law laid down by the superior Courts. He further submitted that the Minister for Transport has got no authority to directly issue the route permits for motor vehicles. Although, the concerned Minister has been delegated powers vested in the Government under section 50(1)(b) of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, but delegation of these powers doesn't authorize the Minister to issue route permits. He further submitted that the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding availability of alternate adequate remedy of appeal is misconceived. Against the order of the Minister, no remedy is provided under law. He further contended that it is now settled principle of law that for maintaining a writ petition, it is not necessary that one should havearightinstrictjuristicsense,ifanypersonhasanyinterest in the matter or in application of law, he can be termed as aggrieved person.
7. 5.We have considered the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record made available. In our opinion, the moot point in this case is whether the Minister for Transport is empowered to grant the route permits. Admittedly, vide notification dated 18-1-2003, the Government delegated the powers vested in it to the Minister for Transport. For convenience, the notification is reproduced as under:--- This notification refers that the Government has delegated powers vested in it under the provisions of section 50(1)(b) of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, hence we have to appreciate the relevant provisions. Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance reproduced as below:--- 50.Power to restrict the number of stage carriages and impose conditions on stage carriage permits.--- (1) The provincial or a Regional Transport Authority shall--- (a)have a thorough survey carried out; in such manner and at such times as may be prescribed by rules made by Government, of the road passenger and transport services in the province or the region in which it exercises jurisdiction; (b)fix the number of stage carriages or stage carriages of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may begranted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified routewithin the region; Provided that the Government may, whenever deemed necessary, order Azad Kashmir Transport Authority to introduce any new routes, or any number of additional permits for an existing route and grant the sameto any particular party or the parties.
8. (2)
9. (3)------------------------------------------------------.. (underlining is ours)
10. This section deals with the powers of provincial or regional transport authority in relation to stage carriage permits. The proviso attached to subsection (1) (b) of this section clearly speaks that in case of necessity, the Government shall order the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Transport Authority to introduce any new routes, or any number of additional permits for existing route and grant the same to any particular party or the parties. According to the celebrated principle of law, a delegetee cannot go beyond the powers delegated to him nor the delegator can delegate the powers which are not vested in him. Thus, it is clear under the notification dated 18-1-2003, that the Minister for Transport is delegated the powers of the Government vested in it under the proviso to section 50(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance. While exercising these powers, the Minister is only authorized to order the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Transport Authority for introduction of new routes or any number of additional permits for existing route of stage carriage and granting the same to any particular party or parties, but he cannot directly sanction the route permits himself or under the garb of this notification grant sanction for contract carriage permits. The main grievance as incorporated in ground (ii) of the memo of the writ petition. is that the disputed route permits have been issued without lawful authority. The recital of the statutory provision along with notification of delegationofpowersmakesitclearthatneithertheprovisionof section 50 deals with the matter of contract carriage permits nor any powers in relation to contract carriage permits have been delegated to the Minister.
11. 6.While interpreting the scope of above referred proviso, to subsection (1) of section 50 of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, this Court in Messrs Ashraf and Akbar and another's case [1995 SCR 196], held as under:--- "Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan contended that proviso under examination is attached to clause (b) only and not clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 50. We do not think that is correct. The proviso is in fact attached to subsection (1) as a whole. We notice that the whole of subsection (1) consists of one sentence. The sentence begins with the words "The provisional or Regional Transport Authority shall ..." and ends with the words "to any particular parties." In the whole subsection there is only full stop which is at the end of the proviso. In between there is a dash, a semicolon and a colon but no full stop."
12. In the referred case, the principle of law has rightly been laid down that the proviso is attached to both clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 50, which deals with the matter of stage carriage permits. Whereas the route permits issued in favour of the appellant and pro forma respondents are not of stage carriage but are of contract carriage. According to the scheme of law, sections 48 to 50 of Motor Vehicles Ordinance deal with the stage carriage permits, whereas sections 51 to 53 deal with contract carriage permits. The appellant and pro forma respondents claimed that they have been granted contract carriage permits and in support of their version they have placed on record the copies of the contract carriage permits issued in furtherance of the notified orders of the Minister for Transport. Thus, it would be needless to discuss the other details of the matter because the powers delegated to the Minister under section 50(1)(b), relate to stage carriage and he has nothingtodowiththecontractcarriageroutepermits.Therefore, it can be safely held that in exercising the delegated powers under section 50(1)(b) of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, the Minster for Transport has no authority to sanction or order for granting contract carriage permits to any particular party or parties. It has been rightly held by the High Court that the route permits issued in favour of the appellant and pro forma-respondents are issued without lawful authority.
13. 7.The other aspect of the case that the petitioners in the High Court were not aggrieved persons, appears to be result of misconception. The petitioners in writ petition specifically averred that they are conducting the transport business in the area. The appellant and pro forma respondents Nos.9 to 11, in their written statement, have admitted that the petitioners are running the transport business but they are the bus owners and stage carriage permits holder, thus they have no concern with the contract carriage route permits. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that the respondents are not aggrieved persons or they have no interest in the subject-matter. This Court while attending the question of aggrieved person in a case titled Ali Muhammad Chacha v. Azad Government and 4 others 2008 CLC 1648 enunciated the principle of law as following:--- "The aforesaid reports clearly contain that or proving himself as an aggrieved person it is not necessary that a person should have a strict juristic right but if his interests are liable to be jeopardized or he has some interests then he can be termed as aggrieved person."
14. 8.Another objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the writ petition in presence of alternate remedy is not competent, also appears to be without any substance. In the light of the peculiar facts of this case the Minister for Transport has issued route permits of contract carriage while exercising powers under section 50(1)(b) of Motor Vehicles Ordinance and against such like orders no alternate, efficacious or adequate remedy is provided by law. Therefore, in such like matters the only efficacious remedy is extraordinary writ jurisdiction, which has rightly been exercised in this case.
15. 9.The objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the notification dated 18-1- 2003, with regard to the delegation of powers to the Minister by the Government has not been challenged, thus the writ petition was not maintainable, is also not acceptable. Under the said notification, the powers which have been delegated to the Minister for Transport relate to stage carriage, whereas while misconstruing the powers he has sanctioned contact carriage permits, thus there was no necessity to challenge the notification of delegation of powers.
16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we don't find any illegality in the impugned judgment of the High Court, which is consistent with the spirit of law, therefore, finding no force in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.