AJMAL MIAN, J.-(1)(a) The petitioners are the trustees of a charitable endowment for and on behalf of Fauji Foundation. The then President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator under M. L. O. 103 on 3-12-1971 transferred Messrs Rehmani Fauji Sugar Mills Ltd. To the Fauji Foundation. The petitioners are producing and selling sugar. Their production capacity under the excise rules for the relevant period was fixed as 45,600 tons per annum. There was a shortfall in the production in the year 1974-
75. Consequently, they applied for abatement under rule 4 of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. In response thereof, respondent No. 1 through its letter dated 11-6-1975 (Annexure E,/1) addressed to the petitioners informing them that the Board of Revenue had been pleased to consider the grant of abatement of the Excise Duty in respect of the petitioners' sugar mill to the extent of Rs. 1,17,81,850 on the basis of the enclosed calculation and that the aforesaid proposed sanction would be subject to revision after the assessm ent of the factory was revised by the Collector, Central Excise & Land Customs, Hyderabad in pursuance of the Finance Bill for the year 1975-76 enhancing the Central Excise duty on sugar from 41.50 per cwt. To Rs. 68.72 per cwt. The petitioners were also called upon to take notice and to submit objections if any, to the then proposed action of the Board, in writing by Monday the 6th June, 1975. It was also stated that if the hearing was desired in person or through advocate they might appear before the Member (Central Excise) on 16-6-1975 at 10-00 a.m. It seems that in response to the above letter, the petitioners' Director (Sugar) through his letter dated 16-6-1975 (Annexure E/2) acknowledged respondent No. 1's above letter and noted the contents thereof and stated that they were agreeable to the proposed grant of abatement of Rs. 1,17,18,850 without prejudice to the stand that they might have to adopt as a result of the contemplated revision of the amount of abatement in pursuance of the Finance Bill 1975-76 raising the excise duty from Rs. 41.50 per cwt. To Rs. 68.72 per cwt.
(i5) It further seems that respondent No. 1 after the receipt of the petitioners' above letter dated 16- 6-1975 passed the impugned order dated 5-7-1975. It will be advantageous to reproduce the same as follows :- Government of Pakistan Central Board of Revenue Order No 1/Sugar/75Islamabad, dated the 5th July, 1975.
Subject.-Excise duty on production capacity-claim for abatement of Messrs Fauji Sugar Mills, Khoski.
Messrs Fauji Sugar Mills, Khoski filed their abatement claim for Ra. 1,55,66,650 for shortfall in production during the year 1974-75.
2. After verification of this claim by the Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Hyderabad, the mills were issued a notice to the effect that in the view of the Board they would be entitled to abatement of Rs. 1,17,81,850 and they were, asked to submit objections, if any to the proposed action of the Board. They were also afforded an opportunity of being heard and their representative appeared before the undersigned on 16th June, 1.975.
3. Out of the shortfall claimed in production the mills is considered to be entitled to abatement in respect of shortfall of 14.195 tons. Central Excise duty on this shortfall is calculated to be Rs.
1,17,81,850 (Rupees one crore seventeen lacs eighty-one thousand eight hundred and fifty only) which is the exercise of the powers conferred by rule 4 of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972, and with the prior approval of the Federal Government, is allowed as abatement from duty leviable under rule 3 of the said Rules for shortfall in production during the financial year 1974-75 due to reasons beyond the control of the manufacturers.
4. This order issues subject to revision after the assessment of the factory is revised by the Collector in pursuance of the Finance Act, 1975-76.
(Sd.) Aftab Ahmad, Member (Central Excise), Islamabad, dated the 5th July, 1975".
(c) Upon the receipt of the above order, the petitioners addressed a letter dated 10-9-1975 to respondent No. 1 intimating therein that the Board of Directors in their meeting resolved to challenge the deduction of 10 made by the Board of Revenue in the abatement order (Annexure E/3) to the petition). It may be advantageous to reproduce hereinbelow the contents of the above letter, which reads as follows :- "The Member Central Board of Revenue Government of Pakistan Islamabad.
Subject. Abatement case. Dear Sir, Please refer to my previous letter No. 800-6/S dated 16th June, 1975.
(1) On a consideration and discussion with our Board of Directors we request you to please amend our above letter as below;
(2) In para. (2) line (5) after words "without prejudice", the following words may please be added "to our legal rights and contentions to challenge the deduction of 10 % made by you in the abatement order and . . . . . .".
(3) Our case for full relief as stated in our application dated 5th April, 1975 may therefore not to be treated as closed and same may be proceeded for full abatement as requested therein.
Thanking you.
Yours faithfully, for FAUJI FOUNDATION (Sd.)
(Col. (Retd.) Fazal Dad Khan), Director (Sugar)"
2. After that the petitioners filed the present petition on 4-10-1975.
The respondents have filed a joint counter-affidavit to the above writ petition, in which inter alia it has been averred that the petitioners' factory's annual capacity was fixed in accordance with the guideline as specified in sub-rule (1) of rule 3 of the Rules, and that the allegation that the deduction from the rebate was illegal and arbitrary was false and that after necessary verification of the abatement claim of the petitioners' factory, they were issued a notice by the Central Board of Revenue, referred to hereinabove, asking them to file objections, but the petitioners through their reply agreed to the then proposed sanction of abatement. It has also been averred that their representative was heard by the Member of Central Board of Revenue on 16-6-1975, where he did not raise any objection against the then proposed sanction and reiterated the petitioners' acceptance to the same. It has further been averred that the abatement to the extent of 10 % annum, production capacity of the mill was not sanctioned because the Central Board of Revenue did not consider this shortfall beyond the control of the petitioners and that the petitioners' management could increase the production of sugar to this extent by better control and efficiency.
The correctness of the various grounds mentioned, in the petition has also been challenged in the counter-affidavit. It has been also averred that the petitioners accepted the then proposed abatement and issued written, agreement and consent and thus are estopped from challenging the same.
3. It may be observed that when the above case was taken up on 12-1-1981 by us Mr. Mansoorul Arfin, learned counsel for the petitioners during his arguments referred to the petitioners' rejoinder to the counter --affidavit. Thereupon, Mr. Yousuf Rafi, learned counsel for the respondents stated that he had not received the copy of the same:- it also transpired that there was no rejoinder on the files of the Court as well. However, it was submitted by Mr. Mansoorul Arfin that according to his file the copy of the rejoinder must have been filed as he had a carbon copy on his file. The case was adjourned to 15-1-1931 in order to enable Mr. Mansoorul Arfin to furnish a copy of the rejoinder to Mr. Yousuf Raft and also to file the same in the Court. It was said that the rejoinder was filed by Mr. Hyder A.I Pirzada, Advocate, who was then appearing for the petitioners to assist Mr. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada Advocate, Mr. Hyder A.I Pirzada bad appeared before us on IS-1-1981 and stated that since the matter related to March 1976, 'he could only submit that he must have been filed the rejoinder as according to the file only a carbon copy of the rejoinder is available.
Mr. Yousuf Rafi learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the contents of the rejoinder should not be looked into as he was unable to obtain instructions from the respondents as he had received the copy of the rejoinder . On 12-1-1981. It may be observed that since this Bench was working only for one week and 15-1-1981 was the last working day of this Bench we had fixed the above case for the above date. In the rejoinder the petitioners have denied the various averments of the counter-affidavit and have averred that the petitioners had accepted the abatement as then proposed without prejudice to their legal rights and contentions and that the above matter was considered by the Board of Directors of the petitioners and thereafter their decision was conveyed to the respondents. In our view, it is not necessary to examine the question as to whether the rejoinder should be looked into or not as not much turns on the contents thereof.
4. (a) In support of the above petition Mr. Mansoorul Arfin, learned counsel for the petitioners has urged the following points.
(i) That respondent No. 1 was not entitled to deduct 10 % without any basis and, therefore, the impugned order dated 5-7-1975 is liable to be quashed. Reliance has been placed on the case of Federation of Pakistan and others v. Messrs Charsadda Sugar Mills Ltd. 1978 SCMR428.
(ii) That the petitioners accepted the figure of the abatement through their letter dated 16-6-1975 without prejudice to their rights.
(iii) That in any case respondent No. I was obliged to decide the question of abatement under rule 4 in accordance with law and that there would be no estoppel against the law or statutes.
(iv) That the respondents have not been able to show as to how the petitioners are estopped from challenging the legality of the above order.
(6) On the other hand, Mr. Yousuf Rafi has urged the following contentions.
(1) That the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands inasmuch as that after making respondent No. 1 to pass the impugned order with their consent, they want to resile from the same.
(it) The petitioners are estopped from challenging the correctness of the above order, as the same was passed by their consent.
5. (a) Reverting to the first contention of Mr. Mansoorul Arfin, it may be pertinent to refer to the above case of Supreme Court namely, Federation of Pakistan and others v. Messrs Charsadda Sugar Mills Ltd., the facts of the above case were that on account of the shortfall of production for the reasons mentioned by the aforesaid sugar mill in their application claimed shortfall amounting to 3,498.69 tons for the year 1973-74. However, on 21-1-1975 the Central Board of Revenue allowed abatement in the excise duty with the prior approval of the Federal Government in the sum of Rs.
7,10,000 only, which was challenged by the mill through a writ petition filed in the Peshawar High Court. The above writ petition was allowed with the consent of the parties on 4-11-1975 and the case was remanded to the Central . Board of Revenue for fresh decision after hearing the parties.
On 5-2-1976 the Central Board of Revenue again passed an order allowing only abatement to the extent of Rs. 7,10,089.90. The mill again challenged the above order through C. P. And the Peshawar High Court quashed the impugned order through the judgment dated 21-6-1977 and remanded the case once again to the Central Board of Revenue for a fresh disposal in accordance with law.
The Federation of Pakistan filed a petition for leave in the Supreme Court against the above judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which was refused. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dismissing the petition made the following observation; "It is self-evident that the Central Board of Revenue in allowing the partial abatement was satisfied that the shortfall in the production capacity was substantial and beyond the control of the respondent but to the extent of 855.53 tops only. In disallowing the short-- fall for the remaining 2,643.16 tons of sugar claimed by the respondent the Board merely relied on its own formula by applying the 10 % cut on the total production capacity of 26,000 tons per annum. It has failed to even consider the case set up by the respondent in its application made under rule 4 of the Rules. In doing so the Board acted almost mechanically and failed to exercise the discretion vested in it under the law. It was the duty of the Board to have acted justly, fairly and reasonably having full regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before it. The Board did not even weigh and examine the merits of the claim pleaded by the respondent. This indeed, tantamount to the refusal on the part of the Board to exercise quasi judicial direction vested in it under the law. We, therefore, find that the judgment delivered by the High Court is unexceptionable and hereby dismiss this petition."
(b) From the above-quoted extract of the Supreme Court judgment, it is evident that respondent No. 1 had evolved a formula for granting abatement under rule 4 of the Rules, whereby they were to disallow 10 % abatement in all cases irrespective of the facts of each case. Mr. Yousuf Rafi, learned counsel for the respondents was unable to bring anything on the record to indicate that any individual exercise for the purpose of determining 10 % disallowance of the abatement in the instant case was made. It must therefore, follow that respondent No. I had applied the formula referred to in the Supreme Court case to the instant case as well. In this view of the matter the above Supreme Court case on all fours is applicable to the present case, and, there--fore, the impugned order cannot be sustained on merits.
6. (a) However, the question which requires consideration is as to whether in view of the fact that the petitioners had failed to file any objection before passing of the impugned order, they are debarred from agitating the above point. It may be observed that there is no reference in the impugned order to the effect that the petitioners had consented to the passing of the order.
However, there is no doubt that the petitioners' one of the directors through his aforesaid letter dated 16-6-1975 agreed to the abatement to the extent of Rs. 1,17,81,850 after deduction of 10 % capacity. It was also stated that it was without prejudice to the petitioners' stand which they might have to adopt in pursuance of the Finance Bill 1.975-76 raising the exercise duty from Rs. 41.50 per cwt to Rs. 68.12 per cwt. It has been pointed out by Mr. Yousuf Rafi that the petitioners had reserved their right only to challenge the amount of abatement in case of revision of rate of the excise duty from Rs. 41.50 per cwt. To Rs. 68.62 per cwt., but there was no reservation in respect of the quantity of the sugar which was deducted on account of 10 % deduction. This contention of Mr. Yousuf Rafi seems to be correct, but from the respondent No. 1's letter dated I1-6-1975 as well as from the impugned order dated 5-7-1975, it is evident from the abatement figure was subject to revision in pursuance of the then Finance Act, 1975-76. It is also evident that upon the receipt of the copy of the order, the petitioners sent the aforesaid letter dated 10-9-1975 challenging the right of respondent No. I to disallow 10 % of the abatement.
(b) Mr. Mansoorul Arfin has referred to the case of Government of West Pakistan v. Haji Ghulam Mohiyuddin and others (1), the case of Com--missioner of Income-tax v. Farm Muar (2), the case of Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay v. Messrs C. Parakh & Co. (3), the case of The Corpora-- petition of Calcutta v. Sati Bhusan Mukharjee (4), the case of Haji Ghulam Rasul and others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan (5), the case of Mian Muhammad Saeed and another v. Province of West Pakistan and others (6), the case of Ch. Rehmatali and others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Lahore (7), the case of Ikram Bur Service and others v. Board of Revenue , West Pakistan and others (8), and the case of Surajmull Nagoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd. (9), in support of his contentions noticed hereinabove in para. 4(a)(i) to (iv).
(i) Reverting to 1960 Peshawar, it may be observed that the facts of the above case were that certain fruit merchants of Peshawar filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 689.30, which amount was realised from the plaintiffs by Government of N.-W. F. P. By virtue of a notification issued under the N: W. F. P. Essential Articles Control (Temporary Business) Act, 1947, as the licence fee imposed on the export of fruits from the Province at the rate of Rs. 1 per md. The above suit was decreed.- In appeal before the High Court, it was inter alia urged that as the plaintiffs had obtained licences from the Government, and as they had made great profits, it was not open to them to call into question the validity of the law under which they had obtained licences. However, this contention was rejected. It was held that the plaintiffs had not taken advantage of any facility and no facility was provided in return of the above levy of fee, and, therefore, the estoppel could not be pleaded.
(ii) Reverting to the case reported in AIR 1965 (India), it may be stated that the facts of the above case were that one of the issues before the Supreme Court of India was that whether certain amount excluded from the asset's side in the balance-sheet under certain scheme could be taxed in subsequent year. It was contended by the Department that the assessee having opted to accept the scheme; having derived the benefit thereunder and having agreed to have their discharged debts excluded from the assets side in the balance sheet subject to the condition that the subsequent recoveries by them would be taxable income, were estopped from taking contrary stand, but, while rejecting the above argument,-it was observed that; "The doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel. It applies only to. The conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute.
If a particular income is not taxable under the Income-tax Act, it cannot be taxed on the basis of estoppel or only other equitable doctrine. Equity is out of place in tax law ; a particular income is either liable to tax under the taxing statute or it is not. If it is not, the Income-tax Officer has no power to impose tax on the said income."
(1) PLD 1960 Pesh. 163 (2) AIR 1965 SC 1216
(3) AIR 1958 SC 775(4) 1950 C W N,263
(5) PLD 1971, SC 376 (6) PLD 1964 SC 572
(7) PLD 1966 Kar. 31 (8) P- L D 1963 SC 564 (9)AIR1925PC83
(iii) With reference to AIR 1958 SC of India, it may be observed that in the above case the question before the Supreme Court was, as to whether the assessee could go back from his own admission contained in his accounts in respect of a sum of Rs. 1,23,719 being the amount appropriated to the profits earned by the assessee at Karachi. The contention of the Department was that the assessee could not go back from the above admission. The Supreme Court repelled the above contention and observed that "Whether the respondent is entitled to a particular deduction or not will depend on the provision of law relating thereto and not on the view which it might take on its rights and consequently, if the whole of the commission is under the law liable to be deducted against the Indian Profits the respondent cannot be estopped from claiming the benefit of such deduction, by reason of the fact that if erroneously allocated a part of it towards the profit earned in Karachi.
What is, therefore, to be determined is whether, notwithstanding the apportionment made by the respondent in the profit and loss statement, the deduction is admissible under the law".
(iv) Reverting to 1950 Calcutta Weekly Notes, it will suffice to observe that in the above case in reply to the query made by the owner of a certain premises, the Corporation of Calcutta informed him that, certain amount was due as taxes in respect of the premises in question but owning to a mistake, the amount mentioned was less than the taxes actually due. It was held by the Calcutta High Court that the Corporation was not estopped from realising the actual amount due.
(v) Reverting to PLD 1971 SC it may be observed that in the above case it was held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that the doctrine of estoppel is not confined to matters dealt with in section 115 of the Evidence Act. It was also held that in order to press into service the above doctrine there must be something in the nature of a representation by the party against whom it is pleaded as a result of which the party to whom it is made has been induced to take particular course, of conduct.
(vi) Reverting to PLD 1964 SC it may be observedthat, in the above case the owner of certain agricultural land got his case changed in revenue papers from "Rajput Minhas" to' "Shaikh" and sold his land to a Sikh non-agriculturist. Subsequently, he.. Got his case restored to "Rajput .Minhas" in the revenue papers and attempted to undo the earlier sale. In that context, it was h.-Id by the Supreme Court that no man shall take advantage of his own - wrong and that the principle that no estoppel against statutes was not applicable in that case.
(vii) With reference to PLD 1966 Karachi, it may be stated that the facts of the above case were that certain land granted to the evacuee by the Barrage authorities on instalments basis was treated as an evacuee property after migration of the grantees. However,, subsequently the Rehabilitation Commissioner excluded the above land from Rehabilitation Pool and placed it at the disposal of the Barrage authorities. It was held by the Supreme Court that the 'allotment of such land to the displaced persons by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner was not incompetent and that under section 115 of the Evidence Act no estoppel can be pleaded against the provisions of statute.
(viii) Referring to PLD 1963 SC, it will suffice to observe that the Supreme Court while construing the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act (IV of 1939) in connection with the cancellation of some route permits from the individual names and of granting the same to a limited .Company, which was to be formed, it was held by the Supreme Court that no estoppel can be pleaded against the statute.
(ix) Referring to the last cited case, namely, 1925 Privy Council, it may be observed that the question. Before the Privy Council was about the admissibility of the insurance policies covering war risks on goods shipped or to be shipped with reference to the provisions of section 2 of the Stamp Act, 1899. In that context, it was observed by the Privy Council that "No Court can enforce a valid, that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid,, nor its obedience to such enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset".
7. From the above cited cases, the following principles arc deducible.
(i) That any ;admission or consent on the part of a party if not in consonance; "conformity with the relevant provisions of law, shall not constitute an estoppel against such party.
(ii) That if a statutory functionary is required under the law to act in' a particular manner, it cannot deviate from the same by entering into some arrangement not warranted by law with the affected party.
(iii) That a consent/acquiescence on the part of a party cannot make thing valid, if otherwise invalid.
(iv) That no estoppel can be pleaded against statutes/law.
(v) That in order to press into service the plea of estoppel the party must show that the party against whom it is pleaded made a representation E as a rests of which be has been induced to act to his detriment or to adopt a particular course of conduct.
8. (a) Keeping in view' the above principles of law enunciated in the above cited cases, we may examine the relevant provisions relating to the grant of abatement on' account of shortfall in the production of sugar in a particular season. It will be advantageous to reproduce hereinabove the aforesaid rule 4 of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972, which reds as follows; "If in a financial year, the actual -production of sugar of a factory, for reasons ' which, in the opinion of the Central Board of Revenue, were beyond the control of the manufacturer falls short of its production capacity to such extent as the Central Board of Revenue considers to be substantial, the Central Board of Revenue may, in its discretion but with the' prior, approval of -the -Federal Government grant abatement of duty leviable under rule 3. At' such rate and to such extent as it may consider proper."
A perusal of the above-quoted rule indicates that the authority concerned is obliged to consider each case of abatement subjectively and, therefore, it F has to decide in each case as to whether full amount of abatement claimed by -the party is admissible or lesser amount for the reasons to which the authority concerned should advert to.
(b) In the instant case the calculation referred to in respondent No. 1's letter dated 11-6-1975 reads as follows; "Messrs Fauji Sugar Mills Limited, Khoski.
Rs.
Annual liability on capacity basis for 1974-75 3,78,48,000 Amount of duty calculated on the basis of actual production . .2,22,81,350 Difference1,55,66,650 Less duty on 10% of annual capacity (loss to be borne by the mill)37,84,800 Balance amount to be considered for grant of abatement 1,17,81,850"
From the above-quoted calculation, it is evident the It the deduction of 10 % of annual capacity by respondent 1 was not bused on any reason. What was stated was that 10% loss was to be borne by the mill. It was not said that there was any negligence/omission on the part of the petitioners which could be attributed to the loss of production to the extent of 10 % or more or less. From the Supreme Court cited case referred to hereinabove in para. (5)(a), it is also clear that respondent No. 1 'evolved a general formula, whereby a 10 % deduction was to be made in each case irrespective of the facts of such a case. It must, therefore, follow that in the present case also the above formula was pressed into service and that the authority did not advert to the question, as to how many per cent. Shortfall could be attributed to the petitioners on account of inefficiency/negligence/omission etc. In this view of the matter the authority clearly acted in violation of the above provisions of the rule.
9. (a) We were unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners have approached this Court with unclean hands. It is true that the petitioners did not file any objection to the calculation conveyed to them by respondent No. 1 along with its aforesaid letter dated 11-6-1975. In view of the above omission, it cannot be said that they have approached this Court with unclean hands. The impugned order dated 5-7-1975 does not mention that the said order was passed with the consent of the petitioners. Furthermore, after the receipt of the above order the petitioners' Board of Directors resolved to contest the right of. Respondent ,No. 1 to deduct 10% from the abatement which decision was conveyed to the respondent No. 1 through the petitioners' letter dated 15-9-1975. It may again be observed that respondent No. 1 after the receipt of the above letter or after the filing of the writ petition bas not produced any working or any document to indicate that 10 % was deducted by them after adverting to the question as to whether any' shortfall in the production could be attributed to the petitioner's inefficiency/negligence/omission. Nor Mr. Yousuf Rafi, learned counsel for the respondents was table to explain or to show any document as to warrant an interference that respondent No. 1 had acted in terms of the above-quoted rule 4.
(b) We are also unable to subscribe to the learned counsel for the respondents' contention that merely the fact that before the Passing of the order the petitioners did not file any objection to the them proposed deduction of 10 %, would constitute an estoppel as to disentitle they petitioners to contest the order. In our view it was the statutory duty of respondent No. 1 to decide the petitioners' case subjectively in accordance with law in terms of the above-quoted rule 4, which prima facie the respondent No. 1 has failed to do in the instant case. As respondent No. 1 was required under rule 4 to examine each case of the claim for abatement subjectively, any concession on its part contrary to the above provision of the rule would not have constituted an estoppel against it.
Similarly any consent on the part of the petitioners to 10% deduction on the basis of the aforesaid formula not warranted by law, would not constitute an estoppel against them. The two Indian Supreme Court's cases referred to hereinabove in para. (6)(b) (ii) and (iii) are on all fours applicable to the instant case. It may be observed that respondent No. 1 on examining the petitioners' claim for abatement subjectively may come to the conclusion that the above deduction of 10 % was not justified at all or that deduction cannot have been only 5 % or less or that it should have been 20 % or more. It may further be observed that the petitioners are cnaritable organisation, in our view, it would riot be just and proper to saddle the petitioners with the burden of about Rs. 30 lacs on the ground `that one of their Directors consented to the above deduction though not wanted by law.
10. In view of the discussion we declare that the impugned order dated 5-7-1975 is of without lawful authority. We also restrain the respondents from acting thereupon. The case is remanded to respondent No. I with the direction to decide the petitioners' claim for abatement in terms of rule 4 quoted hereinabove. There will be no order as to costs.
M. Y. M.