CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J. --- These appeals have been addressed against the judgments of Shariat Court dated 6.2.2008 and 2.6.2012, whereby the appeal No. 6/2008 filed by the accused- appellant and cross appeal filed by Ansar Mahmood & others, complainants against the acquittal of Mazir Hussain accused, have been dismissed and the reference made by the District Criminal Court, Mirpur is confirmed while maintaining the death sentence awarded to Yasir Mehmood accused. Having involved common question of law and facts, both the appeals are proposed to be disposed of through this single judgment.
2. Necessary facts giving rise to these appeals as narrated are that Ansar Mehmood, complainant lodged ,a written report at Police Station, Afzalpur on 20.9.2006 at 11:00 p.m. Alleging therein that he alongwith his brothers, Muhammad Asghar, Muhammad Irian and parents; Muhammad Akram and Mst. Irshad Begum, was present at home when at about 11:00 a.m., the accused-appellant Yasir and his father Manazir (who are brother-in-law and father-in-law of Muhammad Irfan), entered in the house. Manazir Hussain, entered into the veranda of complainant's house and asked that he wants to take her daughter, Mst. Saiqa Perveen with him. But her husband Muhammad Irfan told him that he may take her with him in the morning by tomorrow. Meanwhile, Yasir, accused who was armed with a pistol, entered in the house and started firing. The first fire hit on the left side of the complainant's abdomen, whereas second one hit Muhammad Asghar upon the right side of his neck whereas the third one hit Muhammad Irfan on his chest, who got seriously injured and was taken to D.H.Q., Mirpur. The complainant alongwith his brother, Muhammad Asghar and parents; Muhammad Akram and Mst. Irshad Begum witnessed the occurrence. The motive behind the occurrence is stated to be a family dispute and resentment. On this report, a case under Sections 324, 458 & 34 of Azad Penal Code, was registered against the accused at Police Station Afzalpur.
Later on, Muhammad Irfan succumbed to the injuries.
3. The dead-body of Muhammad Irfan was taken to Rural Health Centre, Pindi Subherwal. Dr. Shakeel Asif, Civil Medical Officer conducted the post-mortem. Bloodstained clothes of deceased and injured complainant party were also taken into possession.
4. On 21st September, 2006, Nadeem Arif, S.I. (P.W.16) alongwith police party prepared inquest report. He also made recoveries and prepared recovery memos. Accordingly. Injury forms of deceased, Muhammad Irfan, the complainant and Muhammad Asghar were also prepared.
5. The accused-persons were apprehended by Police on 24.9.2006. Recoveries were made from them. All the incriminating articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for examination.
According to the report of Forensic Science Laboratory, Lahore, the crime empties were found to be fired by 32 bore revolver recovered from Yasir Mahmood, accused.
6. After necessary investigation, a challan for commission of offences under Sections 302, 324, 337- D, 337-F(iii), 337-F(iv) and 458, A.P.C., read with Section 13 of Arms Act, 1965 was presented before the District Criminal Court, Mirpur on 13.10.2006. The charge was framed against the accused under Section 242, Cr.P.C. But they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution was directed to produce evidence in support of its case. The prosecution produced 16 witnesses in support of its case.
7. After completion of prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 342, Cr.P.C.
But they again refuted the prosecution evidence and also did not choose to be examined on oath under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. No evidence was produced in defence.
8. The District Criminal Court, Mirpur, after necessary proceedings, vide judgment dated 30.11.2007, convicted and sentenced Yasir Mahmood, accused to suffer punishment of death as 'Ta'zir' under Section 302 (b), A.P.C. For committing the murder of Muhammad ,Irfan. The accused was also awarded sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment alongwith sentence of Rs. 30,000/- as 'daman' under Section 337-F(iv) for causing injury to Muhammad Asghar. He was also awarded sentence of 'daman' under Section 337-F(viii), A.P.C., for causing injury to Ansar Mahmood. The amount of "daman" after realization shall be paid to Muhammad Asghar and Ansar Mahmood, injured. The accused was also sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment for commission of the offence under Section 13 of Arms Act, 1965. The benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. Was extended in his favour whereas Manazir Hussain accused was acquitted of the charge by giving him the benefit of doubt.
9. The judgment of District Criminal Court dated 30.11.2007 was challenged by both the parties through cross appeals before the Shariat Court. The complainant challenged acquittal of Manazir Hussain, accused whereas the convict-appellant challenged the conviction awarded to him by the District Criminal Court, Mirpur. Whereas a reference was also made by the District Criminal Court for confirmation of the awarded sentence. The learned Shariat Court, vide impugned judgments dated 6.2.2009 and 2.6.2012, while concurring with the findings recorded by the District Criminal Court, Mirpur, dismissed the appeals filed by both the parties and answered the accordingly. Now both the parties have challenged the judgments of Shariat Court through separate appeals before this Court. An application for condonation of delay in filing appeal on behalf of Yasir Mahmood accused was also filed which has been accepted vide order dated 21.11.2013.
10. Mr. Abdul Majeed Mallick, Advocate, the learned counsel for the convict-appellant confined his arguments only to the extent of the point of quantum of punishment. On this proposition, while elaborating the arguments, he submitted that: (i) according to the prosecution story and the material brought before the Court, there is no enmity between the parties. No evidence regarding previous strained relations has been brought on record rather the parties are shown as closely related and their relations are very much cardinal; (ii) the prosecution story on the face of it does not appeal or is acceptable to the mind of a prudent person. Therefore, it is obviously clear in these circumstances that the incident has not taken place in the.Manner as the prosecution has brought the story rather the prosecution has deliberately suppressed some material facts. Thus, in this state of affairs, awarding of capital death penalty is unwarranted. Therefore, while accepting this appeal and considering the questions of quantum of punishment, the death sentence may kindly be converted into some proper punishment of imprisonment. He placed reliance upon the cases reported as Hasnain Shah v. The State [1999 SCM R 1937], Safarish Ali and 2 others v. The State [1998 P.Cr.L.J. 79J, Muhammad and others v. The State [1993 P.Cr.L.J. 1632] and finally submitted that in view of the arguments, while accepting this appeal, the impugned judgment requires modification.
11. Conversely, Raja lnamullah Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the complainant, strongly opposed the arguments of learned counsel for convict-appellant and submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond allow of doubt. The convict appellant is a desperate person. There is direct ocular evidence against him. The Courtys have recorded concurrent findings of facts against the convict-appelant. So far as the cause/motive or reason for commission of offences is concerned, it is always in the mind of an accused. Merely on the ground of absence of motive, no one can be given pi emium or license for commission of offences to take life of the others. He further submitted that the Courts below have fell in error of law while acquitting the accused, Manazir Hussain who is fully implicated in commission of alleged offences. He further submitted that the whole prosecution story is admitted by the convict-appellant and he has failed to take any defence plea. Hence, no question of lesser punishment arises. He also submitted that according to law, death sentence is a legal punishment. He referred the cases reported as Zahir Hussain Shah v. Shah Nawaz Khan and 3 others [2000 SCR 1231 and Abdul Aziz v. Muhammad Lal and 2 others, [2000 SCR 375], Azad Govt. & others v. M/s. Kashmir Polytex Ltd. [2001 SCR 140], Muhammad Khurshid Khan v. Muhammad Basharat and another [2007 SCR 1] and Imam Bux v. The State [PLD 1983 SC 35] in support of his version.
12. Mr. Muzaffar All Zaffar, the learned Additional Advocate-General, supported the arguments of counsel for the complainant-appellant.
13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also paid our utmost attention to the points raised in the arguments. Both the Courts below have awarded punishment of death as "Ta'zir" to the convict-appellant under the provision of Section 302(b) of Azad Penal Code. Before proceeding further, we deem it proper to reproduce here the statutory provision of Section 302(b), A.P.C., which reads as follows:- "302. Whoever commits Qatl-i-Amd shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter be:--- punished with death or imprisonment for life as ta'zir having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, if the proof in either of the forms specified in Section 304 is not available.
A bare reading of this section connotes that in case of Ta'zir, punishment for Qatl-i-Amd, under clause (b) of Section 302, A.P.C., is death or life imprisonment. This statutory provision further speaks that the quantum of punishment shall be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, it hardly requires any further deliberation that according to enforced statutory provisions, both the punishments, i.e. Death and imprisonment for life are normal punishments. It cannot be said that only the death sentence is a normal punishment.
14. The perusal of the judgment of learned Shariat Court reveals that in the opinion of Shariat Court, only the death sentence is a normal penalty. But in our opinion, in view of clear statutory provision the punishment of death or life imprisonment as 'Taizir' are alternate sentences, hence, both can be treated as normal sentences. Our this view finds support from the latest judgment of the apex Court of Pakistan handed down in the case reported as Hassan and others v. The State and others [PLD 2013 SC 793]. It will be useful to reproduce here the relevant portion of the judgment which speaks as under:- "23. Upon the strength of the provisions of subsection (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C., it has been maintained before us that the normal sentence for an offence of murder is death and while considering a prayer for reduction of a sentence of death passed against a convict this Court may remain mindful of that statutory stipulation. We have found such a submission to be suffering from multiple misconceptions. Sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Povides as follows: '(5) If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, then the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed.'
We have not been able to find anything in the said provision of law even hinting at the sentence of death being the normal sentence in such a case. Section 302(b), P.P.C. Clearly provides for two alternative sentences, i.e. Sentence of death or sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence of murder and it does not state that any one of those sentences is to be treated as the normal sentence. As a matter of fact Section 302(b), P.P.C., itself mentions that any one of the two alternative sentences provided for therein is to be passed "having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case". There are cases wherein "the facts and circumstances of the case" do not warrant a sentence of death and what is required by sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Is that such facts and circumstances of the case ought to be mentioned by the Trial Court in its judgment so that the higher Courts may straightaway become aware of the same while entertaining or deciding a challenge thrown against the Trial Court's judgment. We believe that the general misunderstanding or misconception about the true import of the provisions of sub-section
(5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Entertained by the legal community, including the Courts, in this regard needs to be removed and rectified, The other misconception about sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Is that it is considered to be applicable to the entire hierarchy of Criminal Courts whereas that is not the case. Sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Is placed in Chapter XXVI of Part VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Part VI of the Code pertains only to 'Proceedings in Prosecutions' before a Trial Court. The matters pertaining to the appellate and revisional Courts are provided for in Part VII of the Code and that Part of the Code does not contain any provision akin or similar to that of sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. It is, thus, evident that the requirements of sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Are relevant only to Trial Court and they have no application to an appellate or revisional Court. The provisions of Section 423(i)(b), Cr.P.C. Unambiguously show that it is well within the powers of an Appellate Court seized of an appeal against conviction to reduce the sentence of a convict and the requirement relevant to a Trial Court, as contained in sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C., is not to be found in Section 423(1)(b), Cr.P.C. The powers conferred upon a revisional Court under Sections 435 and 439, Cr.P.C. Also clearly demonstrate that while exercising revisional jurisdiction a sentence can be reduced and, again the requirement relevant to a Trial Court, as contained in sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C., is not to be found in Sections 435 and 439, Cr.P.C. It, therefore, goes without saying that when an Appellate or Revisional Court is considering a question of propriety or otherwise of a sentence passed against a convict the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 367, Cr.P.C. Cannot be pressed into service before it and any question of the sentence of death being the normal sentence is hardly relevant before the appellate and revisional Courts."
Thus, in the light of the statutory provisions as well as principle of law enunciated by the apex Court of Pakistan, it can safely be concluded that in the punishment as "Ta'zir" for Qatl-i-Amd, the sentences of death and life imprisonment are alternative and both are normal sentences.
15. In view of the statutory provisions, for determination of the quantum of punishment, the Courts have to regard the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, in the light of the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, reappraisal of the evidence and examination of the material is felt advised by us.
16. According to the crux of the prosecution evidence, both the parties are closely related. There is no previous enmity or hostility against one and another. At the time of occurrence, there was no occasion of provocation or even there is no exchange of harsh words rather the accused-party being close relatives came there in ordinary manner who were welcomed by the complainant- party. All of a sudden, according to the prosecution story, the incident of firing took place.
17. According to facts and circumstances of the case, the prosecution version regarding the available witnesses is plausible that in such circumstances only the inhabitants of house can be the natural witnesses. But in this case, the circumstances speak that two ladies were present in the house at the time of occurrence; one is the mother of the deceased victim whereas the other is deceased's wife. The wife of deceased victim has not been cited as a witness whereas despite recording the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., and citing as witness, the mother of deceased has not been produced before the Court. From over all appraisal and appreciation of the prosecution story and evidence in juxtaposition with the defence version, inference can be drawn that some part of the story remained unveiled. Both the parties have not brought on record the whole story. It is shrouded in mystery that why some portion of the story has not been unveiled by the parties.
18. As it has already been observed that both the parties are closely related. The sister of convict Yasir Mehmood is daughter of the accused Manazir Hussain, and wife of the deceased victim and the mother of his son. This may be a reason that some portion of the story has been skipped for the sake of the future of the deceased's widow and son or relations of other family members on both sides.
19. The argument of the learned counsel for the convict-appellant in this regard is not without substance, especially when judged with the fact that an important witness the mother of deceased despite availability has not been produced by the prosecution. It leads to draw an inference that if the lady would have appeared as a witness, she might have stated the true story.
20. Another important factor of the case to be considered is that according to the prosecution story, two bullets; one recovered from the place of occurrence; and the other recovered from the body of the deceased allegedly fired by the convict-appellant, were sent to firearm expert. The report of the firearm expert is not supportive to the prosecution version. The opinion of firearm expert relating to both these bullets has been brought on record of the Trial Court's file by the prosecution as Exh. "PWW" which speaks that:--- "2. The crime lead bullets of .32 bore marked as B-1 and B-2 do not bear sufficient data for comparison. Therefore, nothing can be opined as to whether or not these crime lead bullet marked as B-1 to B-2 had been fired from the revolver 32 bore body signed."
In the light of peculiar facts of this case, the opinion of firearm expert cannot be over sighted and ignored especially, while determining the quantum of punishment with reference to the statutory provisions of clause (b) of Section 302, A.P.C.
21. No doubt, there are concurrent findings of facts against the accused, therefore, we would not like to enter into discussion on credibility or incredibility of the witnesses or admissibility of their evidence but the facts and circumstances of the case especially the opinion of the firearm expert regarding the recovered bullets and non-production of Mst. Irshad Begum, the mother of deceased shall be taken into consideration. Same like, non-recording of the statement of the widow of the deceased, Mst. Saiqa Bibi during investigation, coupled with the fact that the story appears to be shrouded under mystery especially the firing by the convict-appellant without any plausible or reason appealing to the prudent mind, are the factors which lead to draw the inference that both the parties have not come forward with true story and tried to suppress their own part in the occurrence.
22. The above discussed facts and circumstance in a murder case when are examined and judged in the light of statutory provisions as well as principle of law enunciated by the Courts, it appears that the Courts are always in favour of life imprisonment. In the case reported as Hasnain Shah v.
The State [1999 SCM R 1937], the apex Court of Pakistan while considering the factor of suppression of some part of the occurrence observed as follows:--- "12. From the circumstances discussed above, it appears that both sides have not come forward with the true story and have tried to suppress their own part in the occurrence and the genesis of the fight is not clear, and it cannot be said with certainty what transpired between the parties prior to the occurrence. The possibility of chance encounter can also not be ruled out."
After consideration of the facts and circumstance of the case, the apex Court of Pakistan despite proof of the charge of murder altered the sentence of death into life imprisonment.
23. The learned counsel for the complainant has referred to the case reported as Muhammad Khurshid Khan v. Muhammad Basharat & another [2007 SCR 1] but this case is also not helpful to the version of learned counsel for the complainant rather it supports the version of convict- appellant especially, when the motive is not proved. This Court in this regard while determining the quantum of punishment has held as under:--- "38. As stated above, the case of murder of Mst. Farzana is proved against the respondent. Now the next important question arises about the quantum of sentence. Whether this is the case in which the sentence of Qisas is justified or some other sentence will be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. The question of sentence requires utmost care. The same must be weighed in the golden scale and should be properly balanced to cater rest of society from the commission of crime without being unnecessary harsh. In the instant case the motive alleged by the complainant party was that Mst. Farzana was not having good relations with the mother, brother and wife of brother of her husband Muhammad Basharat and Muhammad Basharat was also having strained relations with her, therefore, he committed the murder. Now the question emerges whether the prosecution has proved the motive as alleged by the prosecution. In the instant case, there was no evidence regarding the relations of mother of Muhammad Basharat, his brother, wife of brother with Mst.
Farzana on the record rather the prosecution has not produced any strong and cognent evidence for establishing the motive. The motive alleged by the prosecution remained obscure and could not be positively proved. The motive alleged by the prosecution remained obscure and could not be though not a sine qua non bringing the offence of murder at home but it has importance regarding the quantum of sentence. This view finds support from a case reported as All Hussain and another v. Mukhtar and 2 others [1983 SCM R 806]. It is a well-settled principle of law that where the motive for the offence is shrouded in mystery then the extreme penalty of death is warranted, not warranted. The sentence of life imprisonment should be sufficient to meet the ends of justice.
This view also finds support from a case reported as Muhammad Ali v. The State [1988 P.Cr.L.J.. 307].
It is a celebrated principle of law that where the motive for the offence is either not proved or not satisfactorily established, it is a circumstance where the extreme penalty of death is usually avoided and lesser penalty of life imprisonment is awarded...."
Consequently, the Court deemed proper to award the life imprisonment.
In another case reported as Muhammad and others v. The State [1993 P.Cr.L.J. 1633], the factor of absence of enmity between the parties was also considered for determination of the quantum of punishment. The Court has observed as follows:--- "... The next point which requires consideration is quantum of sentence. There was no previous enmity between the appellants and the deceased. Absence of such enmity is an extenuating circumstance, which justifies lesser punishment. On this point reference can be made to the cases reported in (1) Satya Vir v. State AIR 1958 All. 746. (2) Fateh Khan and others v. The State 1984 P.Cr.L.J.
1168. In Allahabad case the following was observed:--- 'The absence of cause of enmity between the accused and the deceased is an extenuating circumstance justifying the award of lesser punishment of imprisonment for life.
In Fateh Khan's case, the following was held:--- 'As admittedly there is no background of any previous enmity and the appellants caused an injury each by using the wrong side of the hatchet to the deceased, the learned Trial Judge justifiably refrained from inflicting capital punishment, a normal penalty under Sections 302/34, P.P.C. On them.'
The normal sentence for murder is death, but the Court may if the circumstances so justify, award lesser penalty. This offence seems to have been committed ex facie, due to communal feelings.
Since the deceased had beaten a relative of the appellants, therefore, revenge was taken from him. In the instant case, the three appellants had caused injuries to the deceased and it is not known that who had given him fatal blow. In such a situation, normally lesser penalty is awarded.
On this point, the reference can be made to the cases reported in (1) Barkat and 3 others v. The State 1969 P.Cr.L.J. 518. (2) The State v. Muhammad and another 1976 P.Cr.L.J. 489 (3) Allah Dad, etc. v. The State 1981 P.Cr.L.J. 46. (4) Mukhtar Hussain and another v. The State 1985 SCM R 479. In Barkat's case, it was observed that fatal injury on deceased was not possibly ascribable to any one or other of several accused, and under such circumstances the accused was awarded lesser penalty. In the State v. Muhammad's case, it was held that deceased was given a solitary injury proving fatal and there was nothing to ascertain as to which of accused persons was responsible for the same.
For this reason, lesser punishment of transportotion for life was awarded to accused. In Allah Dad case also, the above rule was followed. In Mukhtar Hussain case, Honourable Supreme Court had given lesser penalty to the accused and one of the grounds for giving lesser penalty was that it was not clear from circumstances as to who had fired fatal shot at the deceased. In the case in hand it is not clear as to who had given fatal blow to the deceased. Accordingly, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled to lesser penalty viz. Imprisonment for life.
In consequence, the conviction of all the appellants under Sections 302/34, P.P.C. Is maintained, but their sentence of death is altered to imprisonment for life." ,The Division Bench of Lahore High Court in a case reported as Safarish Ali and 2 others v. The State [1998 P.Cr.L.J. 79], while considering the factor of non-proving the motive and family dispute, converted the death sentence into life imprisonment. Observation of the Court reads as follows:--- "24. From all what has been said and discussed above we are of the view that since the facts involve a family dispute and a female question is involved, the motive not being proved beyond doubt, it is not a case where sentence of death should be imposed or confirmed.
25. Hence for the reasons enumerated above we dismiss the appeal of the appellants, maintain their conviction under Section 302(b), P.P.C. However, the sentence of death awarded to each appellant is converted to imprisonment for life. The order awarding compensation is maintained.
Sentence of fine is set aside as there being no provision under the new amended law."
Same like the apex Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Muhammad Tariq v. The State [2003 SCM R 531], while considering the fact of immediate cause of fateful occurrence being shrouded under mystery converted the death sentence into sentence of life imprisonment. Relevant part of the Court's observation reads as follows:--- "... In the given circumstances, we are of the view that the sentence of imprisonment for life would be adequate to meet the ends of justice. The learned Trial Judge without giving effect to the provisions of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. Imposed the fine upon the appellant which was not legal.
Therefore, we while setting aside the fine direct that the appellant shall pay an amount of rupees one lac as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C.
For the foregoing reasons we convert the sentence of death awarded to the appellant into the imprisonment for life. The appellant shall be entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. The sentence under Section 324, P.P.C, is maintained which shall run concurrently with the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302, P.P.C. With the above modification in the sentence this appeal is dismissed."
This Court also in a recent judgment reported as Fazal Begum and 2 others v. Muhammad Yaseen and another [2013 SCR 389], while taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case in relation to determining the quantum of sentence of 14 years' imprisonment has observed as under:--- "20. After above analysis of the evidence, in our considered opinion, although the prosecution has established the firing by the accused Razaaq, which resulted into death of Jahangeer, deceased, but the exact part of the story and scene of firing in the light of the analysis of the prosecution evidence, specially the variation in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, remains cloudy.
Keeping in view the admitted relationship of some of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased, the capital punishment is too harsh, therefore, we deem that a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment will meet the ends of justice. While accepting the appeal filed by the convict-accused, Muhammad Razzaq and setting aside the impugned order of the Shariat Court, the sentence of death as 'Qisas' is converted into 14 years' rigorous imprisonment. According to the statutory provision, the benefit, as provided under the provision of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., is also extended to the convict."
The same view has also been followed in an unreported judgment in the case titled Shaukat Khan v. The State and another (Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 2011, decided on 10.1.2013), whereby while considering the factor of suppression of true story, the Court converted the death sentence into life imprisonment.
24. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove and after survey of the case-law, in our opinion, it is a fit case in which the death sentence awarded to the convict be converted into life imprisonment. Therefore, while accepting the appeal filed by the convict-appellant, the conviction order stands modified in the terms indicated hereinabove. The benefit of Section 382B, Cr.P.C. Shall also be given to the convict-appellant.
25. So for as the appeal filed by the complainant against the acquittal of other accused, Manazir Hussain is concerned, the learned counsel for the complainant has also half-heartedly argued the case and remained unsuccessful to point out any illegality in the impugned acquittal order. It is now settled principle of law that for setting aside the acquittal order, there must be some very strong and valid legal reasons. According to law, presumption of innocence is also multiplied by the competent Courts in cases of acquittal which normally cannot be interfered with. In our opinion, the Courts below have rightly acquitted Manazir Hussain, accused on the basis of the analysis, comparison and appreciation of the material brought on record by the prosecution.
Therefore, we are not convinced to interfere with the acquittal orders concurrently recorded by the Courts below.
Thus, both the appeals are disposed of in the terms stated above. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.