NISAR HUSSAIN KHAN, J:- By this single judgment, we propose to decide these three petitions bearing No. 1292-P/2013, 1567-P/2013 and 1823-P/2013 as common question of law is involved in all these petitions.
2. Brief facts of W.P.No. 1292-P/2013 are that Abdul Jabbar petitioner was tried by the learned Judge Accountability Court in a NAB Reference for embezzlement of money amounting to Rs.51,54,646/- and after finding him guilty, was convicted and sentenced to 5 years R.I. with a fine of Rs.51,54,646/- or in default of payment of fine, he had to suffer two years R.I. and that fine amount was ordered to be recoverable from the movable and immovable properties of the accused as arrears of land revenue under section 33-E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. However, he was extended the benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C.
3. Petitioner filed appeal against his conviction before this court as Eh. Cr. Appeal No. 4/2006 which too was dismissed on 25.7.2007 and conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court was confirmed. He did not challenge his conviction before the august Supreme Court and as such it attained finality. Petitioner, according to his contention, underwent the substantive sentence awarded by the learned trial court as well as the sentence for default of payment of fine. The State through Senior Prosecutor NAB KPK filed an application under section 33-E read with Section 17 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for the recovery of fine imposed upon the convict which was objected by the petitioner before the Accountability Court and his that objection was turned down on 19.4.2013. As such the petitioner has filed the instant petition.
4. In W.P.No.1567-P/2013, Ghulam Dastagir petitioner was tried by the Accountability Court in Reference No.3 of 2006 for charges of embezzlement of huge public money. On finding him guilty, he was convicted under Section 9/10 of the NAO, 1999 and was sentenced to undergo 5 years R.I. and also to pay fine of Rs.94,00,000/- and in default to further two years R.I.. The amount of fine was ordered to be recovered from the movable and immovable properties of accused as arrears of land revenue in terms of Section 33-E of the NAO, 1999. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. was also extended to him. The conviction was challenged by the petitioner in Eh.Cr.A.No. 1/2008 before this court which was dismissed on 1.6.2010 whereby findings of the trial court were confirmed. Petitioner did not challenge the verdict of guilt before the august Supreme Court, as such the conviction attained finality and he served out the substantive sentence of imprisonment as well as imprisonment for default of fine. He did not pay the fine for which the State through NAB filed an application under section 33-E read with section 17 of the NAO, 1999 for recovery of the fine imposed by the trial court. This application was resisted by the petitioner by filing objection which was turned down by the learned trial court on 27.5.2013 which resulted into filing of the instant petition.
5. In W.P.No. 1823-P/2013, Tameez Gul petitioner was tried by the learned Accountability Court-III, Peshawar, in Reference No.9 of 2005 for charges of embezzlement and corruption. The learned trial court on finding him guilty, convicted him under section 10 of the NAO, 1999 and sentenced him to two years R.I. with a fine of Rs.860000/- and in default, to undergo SI for six months. The amount of fine was recoverable as arrear of land revenue from the movable and immovable properties of accused in terms of section 33-E of the NAO, 1999. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended to the accused. Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence before this court in Jail Eh.Cr.A.No.8/2008 which was dismissed on 14.11.2006. He did not file any appeal before the august Supreme Court, as such his conviction attained finality. Petitioner served out the substantive sentence as well as sentence in default. The NAB authorities filed application under section 33-E read with Section 17 of the NAO, 1999 before the Accountability Court-I, KPK, Peshawar, which was objected by the petitioner. However, his objection was turned down on 10.6.2013 which constrained the petitioner to file instant petition. As all these petitions mentioned above, involve common question of law and facts, as such are taken together.
6. Learned counsels for the petitioners argued that applications for the recovery of fine have been made after the prescribed period of six years and as such are time barred in terms of Section 70 of the PPC. They strenuously argued that proviso to Section 386 Cr.P.C. in unequivocal terms bars recovery of fine after serving out sentence for default. They maintained that after serving out sentence in default, the recovery of fine would amount to double jeopardy. They contended that no such proceedings have been initiated against alike convicts awarded punishment in the same period, as such they are being discriminated by the respondents and that recovery proceedings are without lawful authority which are liable to be quashed.
7. Learned DPG while controverting the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that limitation shall be reckoned from the final judgment passed in appeals by the High Court, as such proceedings for recovery of fine are well within time. He maintained that the recovery proceedings are in accordance with law in vogue.
8. We have given our anxious considerations to the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the pettioners and learned DPG for the respondents and analyzed the same at the touch stone of different provisions of law.
9. Pivotal legal questions involved in all the three petitions are as to : Whether the amount of fine imposed by the learned trial court and upheld by this Court can be recovered from the petitioners when they have served out not only substantive sentence of imprisonment but also imprisonment in default of payment of fine?; If so, whether such fine can be recovered after six years of passing of sentence by the trial court in terms of section 70 of the PPC? And Whether recovery of such fine would amount to double jeopardy?
10. Mr. A.K. Brohi, a Pakistani jurist, said in his book "Fundamental Law of Pakistan", " all over the modern world it is increasingly being realized that law is a social science; and further that it cannot be studied properly, if it is viewed in isolation from the many dimensional activities that are going on within the modern states". It is basic and fundamental principle of construction of legal instrument that when language of statute is plain and simple and carries a clear message, it should be given effect in the way it is couched. No other interpretation or meaning can be extracted there-from on any hypothetical consideration, extraneous to the intent of the Legislature.
In this context, Aristotle may aptly be quoted: " To seek to be wiser, than the law is the very thing which is by good laws forbidden". While American Chief Justice Marshall expressed his views in these words: " Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the law, has no existence.
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing".
11. Importance of preamble in understanding and construction of statute has been described by many a jurists'. All are unanimous on the view that it is introductory part of the Statute which states reasons and intent of the law . It serves to portray the intent of the framer and the mischief to be remedied. It affords in general a key to the construction of the statute and a clue to discover the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act and often helps to solution of doubtful points. It is regarded as a key to open the minds of the framers of the Act. House of Lords have authoritatively stated in Att-Gen. Vs H.R.H. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover: " When there is a preamble, it is generally in its recitals that the mischief to be remedied and the scope of the Act are described. It is therefore, clearly permissible to have recourse to it as an aid to construe the enacting provision The Courts are concerned with the practical business of deciding a lis, and when the plaintiff puts forward one construction of an enactment and the defendant another, it is the court's business . If they admit of only one construction, that construction will have effect even if it is inconsistent with the preamble but if the enacting words are capable of either of the construction offered by the parties, the construction which fits the preamble may be preferred".
12. In Warburton Vs Loveland ( 1831) 2 D. & /CL (H.L) 480, 489 it was said: " Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be consequences for in that case the words of statute speak the intention of the Legislature." It is expounded with persistence that even if a court is satisfied that the Legislature did not contemplate the consequences of an enactment, the court is bound to give effect to its clear language. The rule and principle of construction of a statute is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made.
The Judges may not wrest the language of parliament even to avoid an obvious mischief.
13. In Gwynne Vs Burnell ( 1840) TCL & F 572, 696 Lord Brougham said: " If we depart from the plain and obvious meaning on account of such views as those pressed in arguments, we do not in truth construe the Act but alter it. We add words to it, or vary the words in which its provisions are couched. We supply a defect which the legislature could easily have supplied and making the law, not interpreting it'. In Stowel. Vs Lord Zouch ( 1562) Plowd. 369, Chief Justice Dyer said: " If any doubt arises from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute and to have recourse to the preamble which is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress'.
14. Having discussed the principle of construction of statute, we would revert to the issue involved herein. Undisputedly, all the petitioners were charged for corruption and corrupt practices under section 10 of the NAO 1999 and having been found guilty of the offence charged with, they were convicted and sentenced as described in the earlier part of the judgment. National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is a special law which was promulgated, when other penal laws of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as well as Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were already in operation. What necessitated to promulgate NAO 1999 in presence of these penal laws, is reflected in its preamble which would also be helpful to resolve the question formulated herein above. The objective of the promulgation of the Ordinance has been discretely transcribed in eight paragraphs of the preamble encompassing all the dimensions of corruption, corrupt practices, embezzlement and other forms of misappropriation of the public money.
15. Paragraph 2 of the Preamble to NAO provides for recovery or re-payment of amount to Banks, Financial institutions from the person who has committed default and Paragraph No.3 of the Preamble is to the effect that there is grave and urgent need for the recovery of State money and other assets from those persons who have misappropriated or removed such money or assets through corruption or corrupt practice or misused their power or authority. The whole edifice of the Statute has been raised on the objectives, summary of which has been provided in the Preamble.
Section 3 of the Ordinance commands in unequivocal terms that the provisions of it shall have over riding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.
Simple interpretation of this Section which does not require any further elaboration is that all other laws will have to make way for provision of the ordinance as it is a special law enacted for specific purpose embodied therein. Section 9 of the Ordinance defines different forms of corruption and corrupt practices in its different clauses whereas Section 10 is a penal clause according to which the person found guilty of the offence charged under section 10 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 years and with fine and forfeiture of assets, found to be disproportionate to his known sources of income or which have been acquired through corruption or corrupt practices whether in his own name or in the names of any of his dependents or benamidars. Bare reading of Section 10 reflects that it provides three punishments simultaneously: imprisonment, fine and forfeiture of the assets acquired through corruption or corrupt practices. While section 11 clearly postulates that the amount of fine so imposed as a punishment shall in no case be less than the gain derived by the accused or any relative or associate by the commission of offence. By inserting Section 11, the Legislature has shown its concern that the benefits acquired by an accused shall be retrieved from him in favour of the State. And for recovery of fine Sec.33-E has been inserted in the NAO, according to which, amount of fine shall be recovered as arrear of land revenue.
16. The cursory survey of the relevant provisions of the NAO, 1999 portray a clear picture of scheme of law and intent of the legislature that it encompasses all dimensions of procedural requirements with regard to penalties and procedure for their implementation, particularly with reference to the fine. Section 17 of the Ordinance supplies the requirement, if occasion arises, of application of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 provided there is nothing inconsistent with the provision of NAO .Whereas Clause (c) of Sec. 17 empowers the court to dispense with any provision of the Code and follow such procedure as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. This saving clause is a clear manifestation of intent of the Legislature that the court may proceed with the case according to its own discretion, if it finds necessary to dispense with any provision of Criminal Procedure Code, in order to give effect to the provision of NAO.
17. Learned trial court while convicting the petitioners also awarded sentence of imprisonment for default of payment of fine which, allegedly, all the petitioners have undergone alongwith their substantive sentence. It is the main argument of petitioners that as they have undergone sentence of imprisonment for default of payment of fine, as such they are absolved from the liability of fine and proceedings of recovery initiated by the NAB authorities tantamount to double jeopardy. In general law, Sec. 64 PPC 1860 provides punishment of imprisonment in default of payment of fine.
While there is no such provision in the NAO, 1999, whereas provisions of Pakistan Penal Code are not applicable to the cases falling within the purview of the Ordinance. As such Section 70 PPC has got no relevance in the instant case. It has already been concluded that by virtue of section 3 of the Ordinance, the provisions of the ibid Ordinance have over riding and super imposing effect being a special law over the general law. Likewise, Section 386 Cr.P.C. 1898 too, on the same principle has also got no relevance in presence of section 33-E of the Ordinance which itself enunciates the procedure of recovery of fine.
18. In case of "Ahmad Ali Siddiqui Vs Sargodha Central Cooperative Bank Limited and another" ( 1989 - SCMR - 824 ), in similar circumstances when the convict had undergone the substantive sentence as well as sentence in default of payment of fine, the august Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the convict by holding that: "Where an offender having the means of paying a fine chooses to undergo imprisonment rather than pay the fine, it is a sufficient special reason to enable the court on its discretion to order that the fine may be levied notwithstanding that the offender has served the full term of imprisonment order for default of payment of fine."
19. Like wise in case titled "Siddappa Vs State of Mysore ( AIR 1957 Mys- 52) , it was held that serving the full term of imprisonment fixed for default in payment of fine shall not extinguish the liability to pay fine. The imprisonment imposed in default of payment of fine should not be taken as a discharge of the liability but only as a reasonable punishment for non-payment of fine.
20. In view of the principle enunciated herein above, the sentence awarded for default of payment of fine is actually the sentence for non-payment of fine. It cannot be termed as a consideration of the fine. Having undergone the sentence in default of payment of fine, the petitioners have not discharged their liability of payment of fine which was imposed under the special law for corruption and corrupt practices, particularly, when it is visualized in terms of section 11 of the Ordinance which manifests that the Legislature requires the recovery of the whole misappropriated amount in lieu of fine. If the interpretation and the view propounded on behalf of the petitioners is followed, it would certainly frustrate the very object of the Ordinance itself. It would be an easy task for the convict to undergo imprisonment in default of payment of fine and absolve from the liability of the benefit derived through corruption and corrupt practices and thereby grab the whole misappropriated amount. Such an interpretation would be in sheer derogation of the very object of the Ordinance itself. Thus this objection on behalf of the petitioners is repelled.
21. The contention of the learned counsels for the petitioners that recovery proceedings by virtue of section 70 PPC are time barred having been filed after six years of the conviction, is also misconceived. The petitioners were tried and convicted under the provisions of the Special Law of NAO, 1999. The provision of PPC have got no nexus with it nor the principles of the PPC have been given any room in the Ordinance. As such the limitation provided in section 70 is inapplicable to the instant proceedings. More so, this principle is further supplemented by the provision of section 17(d) of the Ordinance which stipulates that regardless of Section 234 of Cr.P.C., a person accused of more offences than one of the same kind, committed during the span of any number of years, from the first to the last of such offences, may be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of such offences. Whereas in general law Section 234 Cr.P.C. provides for joint trial of only three cases of same nature committed during the period of one year only. Even Cr.P.C. is applicable in those matters which are not provided in the Ordinance. Whereas provision of Pakistan Penal Code or application thereof has altogether been left out of the scope of the Ordinance. There is no such limitation provided in NAO for recovery of fine. As such this objection of the petitioners is also not tenable.
22. So far as reliance of the petitioners on the provision of Section 386 Cr.P.C. for non-issuance of warrant is concerned, that is also misplaced as it has already been held that provision of Section 386 Cr.P.C. are not applicable when the Ordinance provides its own mechanism for recovery of fine in Section 33-E. Recovery Procedure provided, in the Land Revenue Act is more effective and exhaustive, as such there is no room for having a recourse to Section 386 Cr.P.C. When procedure for recovery of fine is self contained in special law, provision of Section 386 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked.
23. The objection of the petitioners with regard to double jeopardy is primarily based on Article 13 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. For ready reference and to properly appreciate its legal import, it would be appropriate to have a glance of Article 13 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which is reproduced herein below:- "13. No person -
(a) shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once; or
(b) Shall, when accused of an offence, be compelled to be a witness against himself."
24. Bare reading of the Article enunciates in unequivocal terms that the person must have been prosecuted earlier for the offence charged and convicted or acquitted for the same offence for which he is specifically charged and prosecuted subsequently. What Article conveys in unambiguous terms is that there must be double prosecution of accused for the same offence. If any such proceeding is subsequently initiated for prosecution of accused, he may raise the plea of autre fois acquit or autre fois convict. Likewise an analogous provision is available in the Indian Constitution in the form of Article 20(2). Same principle is recognized by the English Law and the American Constitution in the form of double jeopardy. It being a universally recognized notion is based on the principle of nemo debet bis vaxari: No body can be vexed twice for the same cause.
25. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act 1897 is also based on the same principle which though was constituted in the pre-partition era of sub-continent but has been adopted by both countries of India and Pakistan on acquiring independence like most of the other laws now prevalent. The constitution is a document carrying an authority of superlative degree in legal parlance and may not be construed as a mere law but as machinery by which laws are made.
26. The Constitutional command & substantive provisions of General Clauses Act have their reflection in procedural laws in the form of Sec.403 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sub sec.(1) of Sec. 403 Cr.P.C. bars the second trial of an accused for the same offence. While Sub Clauses-(2), (3)& (4) of it elaborately enunciate the circumstances in which an accused can be re-tried for the same set of commission or omission constituting a different offence in different circumstances which for ready reference are reproduced in extenso as below:- "403. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.
(1). A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236 or for which he might have been convicted under section 237.
(2)_. A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, sub section (1).
(3). A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequence which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be after wards tried for such last-mentioned offence if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted.
(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any act may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.
(5). Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or section 188 of this Code.
Explanation.- The dismissal of a complaint, the stopping of proceedings under section 249, or the discharge of accused is not an acquittal for the purposes of this Section."
Like-wise, Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 runs as follows :- "26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.- Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished for same offence."
27. These provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and General Clauses Act alongwith Constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy had come under consideration before the Supreme Court of Pakistan and India on different occasions with reference to different situations and facts. In Pakistan mostly the principle of double jeopardy as enshrined in Article 13 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was pressed in the matters of service by the civil servants or employees of statutory bodies when they were departmentally proceeded against after their acquittal in a criminal charge by the court of law. In that situation, the August Supreme Court consistently held that objective of prosecution on criminal charge and departmental disciplinary proceedings are entirely different; one relates to the enforcement of the criminal liability and other is concerned with the service discipline and by holding as such, their plea of double jeopardy was repelled. In this regard, case of "The DIG Police Lahore & others Vs Anis ur Rehman Khan ( PLD 1985 - Supreme Court - 134 ), Amir Abdullah Vs Superintendent of Police and others ( 1989 SCMR - 333), Muhammad Ayub Vs The Chairman, Electricity Board, WAPDA, Peshawar ( PLD - 1987 - Supreme Court - 195 ), Muhammad Tufail Vs Assistant Commissioner/Collector ( 1989 SCMR - 316 ) may be referred.
28. In case of Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Vs Abdul Baseer Qureshi & 2 others ( PLD 1978 - Supreme Court - 121 ), a criminal charge was levelled against a police official for torturing a person who later on died. A judicial enquiry was ordered into the incident and the enquiry Magistrate recommended the accused for trial of offences under Sections 304/330/342 PPC. On request of the prosecution, accused was sent to Special Military Court for trial. In the meanwhile, the Martial Law was lifted and the trial was transferred to the ordinary court of Magistrate where, after framing of charge, due to negligence of the prosecution in producing evidence, case was closed. Later on, on application of the complainant, case was transferred to the Court of Sessions Judge for lack of jurisdiction of the Magistrate. Accused raised plea that he was tried by the Magistrate and prosecution was closed, as such he cannot be retried by the Sessions Judge and second trial amounts to double jeopardy. The High Court dismissed the plea by holding that there was no fresh prosecution as case was transferred before the conclusion of the trial. The august Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the High Court by holding that the petitioner's trial in no way can be termed as derogatory to the principles of autre fois acquit or autre fois convict, or violative of the Article 13 of the Constitution.
29. From the Indian jurisdiction, in the case of S.A. Venkataraman Vs Union of India and another ( AIR 1954 Supreme Court - 375) it was ruled by the Supreme Court of India that the ambit and contents of guarantee of the Fundamental Right given in Article 20(2) are much narrower than those of the Common Law Rule in England or the doctrine of "Double Jeopardy" in the American Constitution. They observed that Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India does not contain the principle of autre fois acquit. In order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of Clause-(2) of Article 20 of the Constitution, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of same offence. In order to press for the provision of said Article, phrase "prosecuted and punished" are not to be taken distinctively, rather both factors must co-exist. When Article 20 of the Indian Constitution and Article 13 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 are put in juxtaposition, it appears that the language of both is the same except word. "and" has been inserted between prosecuted and punished in the Indian Constitution while in the Constitution of Pakistan, there is word "or". However, both convey the identical message. Same view was expressed by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Maqbool Hussain Vs The State of Bombay ( AIR 1953 - Supreme Court - 325), Manipur Administration, Manipur Vs Thokchom Bira Singh ( AIR 1965 Supreme Court - 87) and in case of State of Rajasthan Vs Hat Singh and others ( AIR 2003 Supreme Court - 791).
30. The above brief survey of the case law in the light of the relevant articles of the Constitution clearly demonstrates that there must be a subsequent prosecution and punishment in presence of former prosecution and consequential acquittal or conviction to avail the protection of Article 13 of the Constitution. The language of Article 13 is very much plain and clear which loudly speaks against double prosecution and punishment. In the light of this clear command of the article, the courts, while applying the principle of double jeopardy and extending protection under Article 13 of the Constitution, have to see whether the accused is being prosecuted twice for the same offence or otherwise. There is no cavil with the proposition in view of the salutary command of the Constitution that nobody can be prosecuted and punished for an offence when he has already been prosecuted and acquitted or punished for the same offence by the competent court of law.
31. It follows that there is a Constitutional guarantee and legal protection against double jeopardy.
An accused proposed to be tried second time for the same offence for which he had already been tried and acquitted or convicted may legitimately plead autre fois acquit or autre fois convict.
However, if case of the accused does not come within the ambit of barring clause and fall within the exception embodied in Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Section 403 Cr.P.C., he may legitimately be tried for the same offence.
32. In the instant case, there is no denial of the fact that the petitioners have been prosecuted and punished for offence of corruption and corrupt practices under Section 10 of the NAO, 1999. But there is no second prosecution for the same offence. Rather what has been challenged in this petition is the proceeding of implementation of earlier punishment awarded by the National Accountability Court towards recovery of fine. As such these proceedings in no way can be termed as second prosecution for the same offence falling within the ambit of "Double Jeopardy". The trial court had awarded punishment of imprisonment in default of payment of fine which was for non- compliance of its judgment/order with regard to payment of fine. Petitioners did not question this finding of the trial court before the august Supreme Court after dismissal of appeal before the High Court and opted to undergo his imprisonment for default, despite having means of payment of fine.
33. The sentence undergone by a convict in default of payment of fine cannot be a substitute for sentence of fine because one sentence undergone by a convict cannot be treated as a substitute of another sentence imposed by a court of law. This analogy is neither recognized by the general law nor by the NAO, 1999. Hence the plea of double jeopardy raised by the petitioners is misplaced and as a corollary to the forgoing reasons is not tenable.
34. For what has been discussed above, the propositions formulated in earlier part of the judgment are answered accordingly and consequently these petitions being devoid of merits are dismissed.