1. ' MUSHTAK Au KAZI (CHAIRMAN).-This is an appeal under section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973, against the order of Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Karachi, rejecting the departmental appeal filed by the appellant against his removal from service as Sub-Inspector of Police by the Superintendent of Police Headquarters, Karachi.
2. ' The facts of the case in brief are that the appellant was appointed as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police on 10th October, 1955. He was promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspector in the year 1971. He was sent out on deputation to the Federal Investigation Agency on one step promotion as Police Inspector in May, 1975. He was posted in the National Bank Unit, Karachi.
3. ' On 18th February, 1976 a case was registered against one Mirza Rahman Beg, Ex-Manager, National Bank of Pakistan, Mahmoodabad Branch, Karachi on the complaint of the Senior Manager Inspection Mr. S. R. H. Rizvi. It was alleged that Mirza Rehman Beg had opened two fictitious accounts in the name of Assad Hussain and Muhammad Jaffar with Rs, 5 and 10 respectively and had then allowed overdrafts on the basis of these accounts to the tune of Rs, 34,995 and Rs, 500 respectively with,,ut obtaining sanction from the head office. The case was handed over to appellant Mr. Warsi for investigation on the same day i. e. 18th February 1976. Mr. Warsi contacted accused Mirza Rehman Beg posing himself as legal Adviser of National Bank. He took accused Mirza Rehman Beg on the pretext that he was required by the Senior Vice-President. On the way he stopped at Cafe Rio for taking a cup of tea. He revealed his identity to the accused and informed him that he was under arrest. The accused begged for mercy whereupon he was asked to pay Rs, 2,000 when he would be permitted to arrange for bail before arrest. The accused got the amount reduced to Rs, 1,500 and promised to pay the amount on the following day as he was already under suspension. He asked his mother who took Rs, 1,000 on loan from one Mr. Ashraf Ali. This amount was paid to appellant Mr. Warsi. The accused succeeded in obtaining interim bail before arrest from the Court of Special Judge Central, Karachi on 21st February, 1976. The appellant then received the remaining amount by two further instalments of Rs, 300 and Rs, 200. No investigation was done from 18th February, 1976 to 21st February, 1976 and no diaries of the case were issued for these dates by Mr. Warsi. The bail before arrest was however, cancelled by the Special Judge on 1st April, 1976. The accused was not arrested until 12th April, 1976 when his application for anticipatory bail was also rejected by the High Court. From 13th April, 1976 to 26th April, 1976 accused Mirza Rehman Beg remained in Police custody when the appellant pressed him for a further amount of Rs, 5,000 for closure of the case against him. He gave the accused a chit showing his residential address where the money was to be paid. The matter was then brought to the notice of Mr. Abdul.
4. Hague, Deputy Director, F. I. A. He held a preliminary enquiry and examined several witnesses including Mst. Amina Begum, mother of the accused. The chit giving the residential address of the appellant was a so produced before Mr. Abdul Hague. He gave his report to Mr. Abdul Rashid Khan, Director F. I. A. Who reverted the appellant to his parent department, after holding a regular enquiry through Shaikh Abdul Ghafoor another Deputy Director. The appellant held the post of Sub- Inspector of Police under Superintendent of Police Headquarters, Karachi to whom the enquiry papers were referred by the Deputy Inspector General. The appellant had been charge-sheeted by the Director, F. I. A., Mr. Abdul Rashid Khan as Authorized Officer and after completion of the enquiry the file was sent to the office of Inspector General of Police, Karachi. Since the appellant was posted on reversion as Sub-Inspector of Police Headquarters, the file was referred to Superintendent of Police Headquarters. The Superintendent of Police had called the written explanation of the appellant and had then given his finding that the charge had been proved against the appellant and he was guilty of corruption. The Superintendent of Police Headquarters accordingly dismissed the appellant from service with effect from 14th December, 1977.
5. ' The appellant Mr. Warsi then preferred a departmental appeal to Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Karachi who rejected the same by his order dated 17th May, 1978. Copy of this letter was communicated to Sub-Inspector Shamsul Qamar Warsi through the Superintendent of Police Headquarters, Karachi but in those days the appellant Mr. Warsi was not traceable. His father-in- law gave the statement that Mr. Warsi had left his house and his whereabouts were not known. It so transpired, that on 24th August 1977 the appellant had been trapped while accepting Rs, 500 as illegal gratification from a litigant. His case had been sent up before the-Military Court and the appellant was being escorted to the said Court by the staff of Anti-Corruption Establishment when the appellant, succeeded in getting away from their custody and absconded. He had then gone underground and had remained untraceable from 24th August, 1977 till 17th May, 1978. The order rejecting his appeal could not, therefore, be served on him by Superintendent of Police Headquaters in spite of his efforts to do so. The appellant had meanwhile filed an application for quashment of the proceedings of the second case in the High Court through an Advocate. This application had been allowed by the High Court on technical grounds. Thereafter the appellant came out of his hiding and made an application to Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Karachi for copy of the order deciding the department appeal. This application was dated 8th July, 1979. He was informed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police that his appeal against the order of dismissal had been rejected by an order dated 17th May, 1978 and the copy had been endorsed to him through the Superintendent of Police Headquaters. The appellant then filed his appeal before the Tribunal on 11th August, 1979 stating that the D. I -G.'s order had been received by him only on 8th July, 1979 when he had applied for a copy of the said order.
6. ' The first question that arises for consideration is whether this appeal is barred by time. Obviously the order of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police rejecting the departmental appeal is dated 17th May, 1978, and this appeal has been filed on 11th August, 1979 after more than 12 months. The burden is on the appellant to explain this delay. He has based the date of acknowledgement of the order on the duplicate copy of the order received by him on his own application when he came out of his hiding. The record of the Superintendent of Police Headquaters has been perused. The letter containing the relevant order had been sent by Superintendent of Police Headquarters to the appellant by registered post on 29th May, 1978. The envelope had come back undelivered on 31st May, 1978. The letter was then sent through a messenger but it could not be delivered because the appellant had gone under-ground and the statement of the father-in-law of the appellant showed that the appellant was not traceable. However admittedly no further efforts had been made for service of this order by substituted service. The order was not communicated either by publication or by affixing the same on his last known place of residence. Under these circumstances the appeal! Cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation.
7. ' The appellant has taken certain legal pleas and has tried to show, that the procedure adopted for his dismissal from service was illegal and defective. The first objection raised is that the enquiry should have been conducted under the police Rules and not under Efficiency and Discipline Rules.
8. However action had been taken under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules prior to the notification dated 11th August, 1979 excluding Police Officers upto the rank of Inspectors from being governed by such rules. The appellant had defended himself during the enquiry and had not raised any objection to that effect, nor had he claimed or shown any preference for enquiry to be conducted under the Police Rules. The appellant has then argued that since he was borrowed from Provincial Government the enquiry should have been held under the Sind Civil Servants Act and not under the Federal Efficiency and Discipline Rules. However, the Assistant Advocate-General has rightly pointed out that the Provincial and Federal Efficiency and Discipline Rules are almost identical. No prejudice has therefore, been caused to the appellant on that ground.
9. ' The appellant has then argued that since the Superintendent of Police was not his Appointing Authority. He could not be dismissed by an order passed by the Superintendent of Police Headquarter. The A. A.-G. Has pointed out that the appellant had been initially appointed as Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and at the time of the order he was Sub-Inspector of Police in Grade-8. That the Superintendent of Police Headquarters was an Officer in Grade-18. That under Services and General Administration Department's notification Grade-8 Officer could be appointed by Head of Office if in Grade-18, otherwise, by the Regional Head of the Department. That the Superintendent of Police was, therefore, competent to appoint or remove him. The substantive post of the appellant was of Sub-Inspector of Police in Grade-8 and not of an Inspector in Grade-11.
10. Under the circumstances he could be removed by order of Superintendent of Police Headquarters under whom he was serving at the time of his removal.
11. ' It has then been pointed out that the appellant had been absolved of the charges by the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer was, however, not the authorized Officer, who could determine whether the charges were proved or not. The charge-sheet had been issued by the Director who was the Authorized Officer and he had sent his finding to the Inspector-General of Police Sind that the charges had been sufficiently proved against the appellant on evidence. The Inspector-General of Police had then referred the papers to Superintendent of Police Headquarters who had given a further opportunity to the appellant to show cause why a major penalty should not be imposed on him. The procedure would, therefore, appear to be in order and no irregularity has been committed.
12. ' Lastly it has been argued by the appellant that on facts and evidence the findings are perverse because they are based on testimony of interested witnesses. That the evidence of these witnesses is also full of contradictions. It may be stated in this connection that the Mother and Cousin Brother etc. Of Mirza Rehman Beg were the most natural witnesses who could depose in respect of the payment of illegal gratification to the appellant. Such transactions do not take place in public in presence of the so-called independent witnesses. There is no reason why the Mother and other relations of Mirza Rehman Beg should have gone out of the way to falsely implicate the appellant in a case of this nature. The appellant was not tile complainant and he had neither arrested accused Rehman Beg nor taken any part in investigation from the day he received papers till the day the interim bail was granted by the Special Judge. He had thus tried to favour the accused and there was no reason for the relations of the accused to have falsely implicated him. Regarding the so called contradictions, it has been rightly pointed out by the Director, F. I. A. In his report that minor discrepancies or contradictions in the depositions of witnesses are quite natural and cannot be the basis for rejecting the evidence and disbelieving the witnesses. That these contradictions merely relate to the dates On which the appellant visited the house of the accused. The main allegation was that the appellant contacted the accused at his house and made efforts to receive illegal gratification which was paid. That these allegations stood proved in spite of the minor discrepancies in evidence.
13. ' Thus there are hardly any defects or irregularities in the procedure, rendering the order of dismissal illegal ; nor can it be said that the order is perverse on facts and merits of the case. There are, therefore, no grounds for interference. In the result, the order of Superintendent of Police Headquarters and the order passed in the departmental appeal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police are maintained and the appeal is dismissed. No order is made as to costs under the circumstances of the case.