' SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.---Through the instant petition under section 497(5), Cr.P.C, the petitioner has called into question the vires of order dated 9-7-2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha; whereby the petitioner was granted post arrest bail in case F.I.R. No,15, dated 19-1-2012, offence under sections 324, 341, 355, 148, 149, 337 F(v), 337 F(vi), 336, P.P.C., registered with Police Station, Midh Ranjha, District Sargodha.
2. Learned Additional Prosecutor General submits that impugned order dated 9-7-2012 has been passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha without observing the mandatory provisions of law. It i. Argued that the respondent No,1 is named in the crime report with specific allegation. It is contended that the respondent is the main stalwart of the whole occurrence as he raised commanding lalkara, upon which his co-accused caused firearm injuries to the complainant/injured P.W. Learned Additional Prosecutor General further contends that during the course of investigation the respondent was found guilty. It is argued that the respondent is a notorious person and as many as 43 cases of different nature have been registered against him and even in a murder case he was awarded death sentence, but later on he made compromise with the complainant party. It is contended that previous conduct of the respondent is highly objectionable. Moreover, the respondent is extending threats of dire consequences to the prosecution witnesses and in this regard rapts have been lodged with the police. Moreover, sufficient incriminating material is available on the record to connect the respondent with the commission of offence as such the impugned order dated 9-7-2012, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha is liable to be set at naught.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No,1 has opposed this petition with vehemence.
4. Arguments advanced pro and contra have been heard and available record perused.
5. Bare reading of the crime report reflects that he has only been ascribed the role of raising lalkara while being present at the place of occurrence empty handed. As per report submitted by the Inspector General of Police Punjab before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, the respondent was stated to be not present at the time of occurrence as such this aspect of prosecution case was falsified. As the respondent was empty handed, therefore, the question of any recovery do not arise. When confronted, learned Additional Prosecutor General about the material available on the record qua hatching of conspiracy/abetment, he remained absolutely unable to refer any material collected by the investigating agency in this regard. No specific date, time and place of hatching conspiracy has been mentioned. Even the contention of learned Additional Prosecutor General that the respondent has advanced threats of dire consequences to the prosecution witnesses is not substantiated from any concrete material. Mere recording of rapts in roznamcha is not sufficient to substitute the same with the judicial order. It is established principle of law that considerations for grant of bail and cancellation thereof are entirely on different footings. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case of "Tariq Bashir and 5 others v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34, wherein the august .Supreme Court of Pakistan in para No,9 of the judgment had held as under:-- "The considerations for the grant of bail and for cancellation of the same are altogether different.
Once the bail is granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, then strong and exceptional grounds would be required for cancellation thereof."
' The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in its salutary judgment in the case of ""Mian Dad v. The State and another" " (1992 SCM R 1286) has observed as under:-- "----S.497(1)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 304, Part-II---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)---Leave to appeal was granted to examine the proposition advanced that it might be possible to hold that when a case was made out under S. 304-I, P.P.C., the offence being punishable with imprisonment for life bail was prohibited under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. But while under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. The Court had no jurisdiction to grant bail if on merits such a finding was rendered, as the word used for such command was "shall", considerations when determining the question of "cancellation" were different because S. 497(5), Cr.P.C. Under which power was exercised did not command the Court to cancel the bail even B when the offence was punishable with death or imprisonment for life and even if the grant of bail was prohibited under S.497(1), Cr.P.C. And discretion left in the Court under S.497(5), Cr.P.C. Was pari materia with the principles which apply to the setting aside of the orders of acquittal".
' Even otherwise it has been consistent view of superior Courts of the country from time to time that there should be extraordinary circumstances for recalling the order once passed in favour of accused. Reliance in this regard is placed on the cases of ""State of Gujrat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal (AIR 1968 SC 700), "Falak Sher v. The State" (1979 SCMR 103) "Punjab National Bank and others v.
Surendra Prasad Sinha" (1994 PSC (CrI) 768), "Ghulam Ali v. Javid and another" (1989 PCr.LJ 507), "Shaukat Ali Sagar v. Station House Officer, Police Station Batala Colony, Faisalabad and 5 others (2006 PCr.LJ 1900). "
' As far as the contention of learned Additional Prosecutor General qua previous involvement of the respondent in 43 cases is concerned, the same is of no use for the prosecution as admittedly the respondent is a political figure, who remained member of Provincial Assembly and in this background mere registration of cases against him is no ground to withhold grant of bail to the respondent/cancel the bail. Reliance is placed on the dictums of law of august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cases of "Moundar and others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934) and Muhammad Rafique v. The State (1997 SCMR 412). "This Court is conscious of the fact that liberty of a person is a precious right which cannot be denied to a person of an advanced age, who is suffering from heart ailment as well. If result of the investigation and other circumstances are weighed in the judicial parlance, the equilibrium goes in favour of the impugned order. In the case of ""Muzaffar Iqbal v.
Muhammad Imran Aziz and others " (2004 SCM R 231), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:-- "Ss. 497(5) & 497(1)---Cancellation of bail---Principles---- Consideration for cancellation of bail are different from the considerations for the grant of bail----Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Prohibits the grant of bail for offences punishable with death or imprisonment of 10 years or over----Section 497(5), Cr.P.C. Does not command the Court to cancel the bail even when the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and even if the grant of bail is prohibited under section 497(5), Cr.P.C. The discretion is left in the Court under section 497(5), Cr.P.C. Which is "pari material" with the principles which apply to the setting aside of the orders of acquittal".
Though it has vehemently been argued by learned Additional Prosecutor General on behalf of the State that the respondent has misused the concession of bail, but that is not substantiated from any cogent material. D Even if the concession of bail has been misused by the respondent, then too the same cannot be recalled only on the ground that the order was not properly structured by the learned trial court. In cases of cancellation of bail even if the Superior Courts are not in consonance with the observations of the trial court, but still the primary and foremost consideration to cancel/recall bail granting order is misuse of the concession of bail, which is to be proved by adducing cogent/convincing material, which absolutely is missing in the instant case. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case of "Shahid Arshad v. Muhammad Naqi Butt and 2 others (1976 SCM R 360), wherein the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-- "----Ss. 497/498---Bail---Supreme Court on being informed by counsel for State that inquiry proceedings were likely to conclude soon refusing to interfere with High Court's order refusing bail to respondent---High Court, nevertheless, subsequently granting bail to respondents---Supreme Court, though not happy about order thus passed, nevertheless, in view of there being nothing to show misuse of their privilege by accused not feeling advised to interfere with High Court's order at such stage----Petitioner advised to approach High Court for cancellation of bail should any one of respondents misuse privilege of bail at any time".
Bare reading of impugned order dated 9-7-2012 reflects that the same is well versed, well reasoned and quite in accordance with law F and the same calls for no interference by this court.
For the foregoing reasons, I find no force in the instant petition, which is accordingly dismissed.