1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order dated 13-1- 1974 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court whereby he dismissed the writ petition (W. P. No. 1425-R/74) filed by the petitioner against the orders of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the learned Settlement Commissioner setting aside the order of trans--fer passed in his favour by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, in limine.
2. The case of the petitioner was that he was in possession of a house bearing No. 280/281 Kundian, Tehsil and District Mianwali. The value of this building was less than Rs. 10,000 and was transferable under para. 7(i)(b) of the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII issued on 16-4-1966. According to the petitioner he was the sole applicant for its transfer and the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Liaqatabad after satisfying himself transferred this property in his favour by his order dated 19-1- 1970.
3. No appeal was filed against this order of transfer within period of limita--tion. However, some two years latter on 19-8-1972 a time-barred appeal was filed by respondent No. 1, who is the maternal uncle of the petitioner, before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner claiming that he was actually in posses--sion of the property since 1958. This appeal was accepted on 17-12-1973 and the property was transferred to respondent No. 1.
4. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Settle--ment Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Sargodha which, however, was dismissed on 5-6-1974. The petitioner thereupon moved the Lahore High Court by a Writ Petition (W. P. No. 1425-R/74) which, too, has been dis-- missed vide order dated 13-8-1974. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
5. Syed Muhammad Anwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised two points before us in support of this petition. Firstly, that the appeal of res--pondent No. 1 not having been instituted within limitation the property in dispute could not be transferred to him by accepting his appeal which was barred by limitation. Consequently, the finding of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner as endorsed by the learned Settlement Commissioner that respondent No. 1 was in possession of the property in dispute was not proper and legal.
6. The learned counsel has taken us through the relevant orders passed in the case and we find that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner duly attended to the plea relating to the bar of limitation raised by the petitioner and condoned the delay in view of the circumstances of the case. The plea was again reiterated before the Settlement Commissioner, who discussed it at consider--able length in his order dated 5-6-1974 and after detailing the relevant circumstances upheld the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner condoning the delay. This plea was also noticed by the High Court and was disposed of in the following words; "As regards limitation, respondent No. 1 filed an application under sec--tion 5 of the Limitation Act and his application was accepted and the Deputy Settlement Commissioner condoned the delay on the ground that due to close relationship Ibne Ali, respondent No. 1, could not think of such an action on the part of the petitioner and after the fact of allotment was disclosed to him, he made earnest attempt to get this house transferred in his name. The delay has been condoned for sufficient reasons. Although transfer order was passed on 19-1-1970 by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, respondent No. 1 came to know of it on 3-1-1972. He was not a party to the earlier application made by the present petitioner for the transfer of disputed property. On coming to know of this transfer, on 3-1-1972, he made application to the Assistant Settlement Commissioner but those remained pending for a considerable time and when no result came out of those applica--tions, he filed an appeal on 19-8-1972. Period spent thereby was to be excluded because under bona fide belief he had filed appeal on 19-1-1972 before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner and when he was of the view that there was no outcome of his applications, he filed the appeal. Since the application for condonation of delay was accepted by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for cogent reason that could not be challenged with success."
7. It will, therefore, be observed that not only the Deputy Settlement Com--missioner and the learned Settlement Commissioner have adverted to the bar of limitation and found no force in it, the High Court has given its full attention to this aspect and has upheld the findings of the Deputy Settlement Commis--sioner and the Settlement Commissioner. The question whether delay should; or should not be condoned in a given case is a matter of discretion with the forum hearing the matter and the discretion cannot be interfered with unless it' is exercised illegally capriciously or arbitrarily. We do not think this to be the situation in the present case. Hence we find no force in the first ground raised by the petitioner.
8. So far as the question as to whether the petitioner or respondent No. 1 are in actual possession of the property in dispute, after going through the relevant record we inclined to agree with the finding of the learned High Court recorded in the following words :- "Due to overwhelming evidence, the Settlement authorities rightly came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 was in actual possession of the disputed property since 1958."
9. The result is that there in no force in this petition which is, accordingly, dismissed hereby. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.