' ABDUL RASOOL MEMON, J.---Petitioner has challenged the order dated 16-7-2012 passed by the XVI Family Judge South (Mrs. Aliya Malik) whereby she has allowed an interim maintenance to four minors plaintiffs (not made party to the instant petition) fixing Rs,20,000 per month for each of them payable on or before 14th of every calendar month by respondent No,1 from July 2012 till disposal of the suit.
2. Brief facts of the matter as depicted from the pleadings of the parties are that the petitioner Syed Mohsin Shah married respondent No,1 Mst. Mommal Aftab on 17th February, 2000 settling Rs,100,000 as dower in lieu thereof. Their marriage was discontinued when the petitioner on account of strained relations between the spouses pronounced divorce vide Divorce Deed dated 10-9-2011 and with said divorce deed he sent a cheque of Rs,50.000 to the respondent as remaining dower when the respondent, according to petitioner, was residing in the house of her parents along with the four minor children namely Simeren Shah, Sameer Shah, Suzzan Shah and Shahzain Shah born during marriage. Afterwards respondent No,1 filed a suit seeking, inter alia, directions against the petitioner to pay maintenance of her "Iddat" period at the rate of Rs,50,000 from 9-8-2011, Rs,8,1300 per month as future maintenance to the minors at the rate of Rs,2,71.500 for each child with 25% increase per annum and also for past maintenance as well at the same rate. During pendencey of the suit respondent No,1 filed an application in terms of section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The petitioner resisted the application and took several pleas in his defence amongst others on the ground that his father Ali Gohar Shah had deposited Rs,50,00,000 (rupees fifty lacs) in the name of minors in the year 2010 in some profitable scheme and respondent No,1 was authorized by him to operate the said account and collect profit accrued thereon, to maintain the minors. The petitioner also challenged the rate of the maintenance same being exorbitant.
3. The learned Family Judge vide impugned interim order disposed of the application under section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 with an interim arrangement of maintenance allowance mentioned hereinabove, hence this constitutional petition.
4. It has been argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the quantum of interim maintenance allowance fixed by the learned Family Judge is exorbitant same being beyond the means of the petitioner; that the petitioner had met a road accident as a result of which his spinal cord stood damaged and that he was jobless, therefore, not in a position to pay the said interim maintenance allowance. It has further been argued that the writ jurisdiction can be invoked against an interim order keeping in view the fact that there is no other adequate or efficacious remedy available to the petitioner against the interim order; lastly it has been argued that this court has ample powers to interfere in the interim order even if it is tentative in nature. Therefore, he argued that the impugned order passed by the learned Family Judge be declared illegal void and same may be set aside accordingly. He has placed his reliance on the case of MAKHDOOM ALI V. MST. RAZIA SULTANA and others (2007 MLD 41).
5. The counsel for the respondent on the other hand has opposed that the petitioner is a man of means, financially sound and is in a better position to comply with the impugned interim order until and unless the controversy is decided finally by the Family Court after appreciating evidence of the respective parties; that the petitioner has filed this petition against an interim order which is not maintainable in the eyes of law inasmuch as he raised disputed facts regarding his income and social status which cannot be threshed out by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in absence of evidence to be recorded by the Family Court, therefore this petition may be dismissed.
He has cited the following case-law.
(1) MUHAMMAD HASSAN V. JUDGE, FAMILY COURT (2008 YLR 1826).
(2) MUHAMMAD KHALID JAVEED V. MST. SHAHIDA PARVEEN (2007 YLR 1366)
(3) MUHAMMAD MASOOD V. JUDGE FAMILY COUT (2011 YLR 1276)
(4) ABRAR HUSSAIN V. MEHWISH RANA and 3 others (PLD 2012 Lahore 420).
6 I have heard the counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record made available on file. I have also gone through the cases cited by the counsel for the parties and relevant law on the subject.
7. The impugned order allowing interim maintenance has been passed under section 17-A which reads as under:- "17-A Interim order for maintenance.---At any stage of proceedings in a suit for maintenance, the Family Court may pass an order for maintenance, whereunder the payment shall be made by the fourteenth of each month, failing which the Court may strike off the defence of the defendant and decree the suit."
8. Perusal of the above provisions of law shows that a Family Court may at any stage pass an interim order for maintenance where under the payment shall be made by fourteenth of each month. Under impugned order the Family Judge has passed the interim maintenance payable not beyond fourteenth of each month hence it cannot be said that the Family Court passed the impugned order beyond his jurisdiction; rather the order has been passed with jurisdiction strictly within the terms of section 17-A ibid.
9. Now coming to the question whether the impugned interim order could be challenged in writ jurisdiction, it will be appropriate in the first place to refer section 14 of the Family Court Act, 1969 which reads as under:--
14. Appeal.---(I) Notwithstanding anything provided in any other law for the time being in force, a decision given or decree passed by a Family Court shall be appealable:- (a)
(b) .
(2)
(a) ..
(b) ..
(c) ..
(3) No appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order passed by a Family Court.
A careful pefusal of the above provisions clearly indicates that the legislature has specifically prohibited filing of appeal against an interim order. Thus, in my humble opinion, it is evident from the above provisions that the legislature did not intend to make the interim order challengable. The interim order is to merge in final verdict which shall be appealable and going against that arrangement by exercising writ jurisdiction would not be proper because in that case the object of legislature shall be frustrated. I am fortified by case-law cited as ABRAR HUSSAIN V. MEHWISH RANA and 3 others (PLD 2012 Lahore 420) passed in similar circumstances. In this case relating to family matter, while relying on a case reported as 1996 SCMR 1165 it has been observed as under:-- "In these circumstances, when the Legislature has specifically prohibited the filing of an appeal against an interim order and if the Constitutional petition is allowed to be filed against such order, it would tantamount to defeating and diverting the intent of the Legislature. Reference is made to Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province pf Sindh through Chief Secretary S and G A D, Karachi and others (1996 SCMR 1165), in which the honourable Supreme Court was pleased to holds as under:-- "Constitutional jurisdiction, exercise of, Statute excluding a right of appeal from the interim order could not be bypassed by bringing under attack such interim orders in constitutional jurisdiction.
Party affected has to wait till it matures into a final order and then to attack it in the proper exclusive forum created for the purpose of examining such order."
' It has also been observed in the said judgment as under:- "The petitioner has got an adequate remedy available to him by challenging the impugned order in appeal which, he may file against the ultimate order/judgment if the same would be passed against the petitioner. This petition is also hit by Article 199(1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hence, cannot be entertained."
10. The case-law cited by the counsel for the petitioner' is distinguishable to the circumstances of this case as in the said reported case the point of exercising writ jurisdiction in respect of interim orders was neither agitated nor decided.
11. Having, discussed the case as above, I am of the opinion that the petition merits no consideration and is dismissed accordingly.
12. However, I deem it appropriate in view of the nature of the matter to issue directions to the learned trial Court/Family Judge to decide the matter on merits preferably within a period of two months after the receipt of this judgment.