' ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALL J.---This civil appeal with leave of the Court arises out of the order dated 28-11-2012, in Civil Revision No,127 of 2009, passed by learned Single Judge in Chambers of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi, whereby the said civil revision filed by the appellant "State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan" was dismissed and accordingly the judgment dated 20-8-2007, passed by the Court of VIIth Senior Civil Judge, Karachi (South) in Suit No,701 of 2002, dismissing the suit of the appellant and the other judgment dated 29-4-2009, passed by the Court of VIth Additional District Judge Karachi (South), dismissing the Civil Appeal No,141 of 2007, of the appellant, were maintained.
2. The relevant facts divulged from the case record reveal that on 20-7-2002, the appellant filed a suit for the recovery of Rs, 6,55,845 against the respondent company stating therein that they were their tenant in respect of a portion/space admeasuring 806 sq. Ft., situated at third floor of their building known as "State Life Building No,2-A" Wallace Road, Karachi, at the rate of Rs,1.50 per sq. Ft.
Per month, excluding the payment of utility charges etc. On 9-2-1992, appellant filed an application for fixation of fair rent under section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 ("the Ordinance of 1979") against the respondent, which, after due proceedings and contest by the respondent, ended up, vide judgment dated 1-12-1997, in fixation of the fair rent at Rs,12 per sq. Fit per month from the date of filing of fixation of fair rent case. First Rent Appeal No,13 of 1998, preferred by the respondent against such order was also dismissed by the High Court of Sindh, vide judgment dated 12-1-2000, however, before that, the respondent had vacated the rented premises on 31-10- 1998, with a written assurance, vide letter dated 30-9-1998, that the claim of arrears of rent of the appellant will be settled in accordance with the pending litigation before the High Court. According to further case of the appellant, on the basis of judgment of the Rent Controller dated 1-12-1997, upto the time of vacation of the rented premises by the respondent on 31-8-1998, the differential amount of rent and the outstanding total payment of rent had accumulated in the sum of suit amount, therefore, the appellant was entitled for a decree in this sum in their favour and against the respondent.
3. The respondent in their written statement filed before the Court of VIIth Senior Civil Judge Karachi (South) on 4-9-2002, made vague denial of such claim of the appellant and also challenged the maintainability of the suit on various legal grounds, including the ground of limitation. After framing of issues on 29-11-2004, both the parties to the litigation led their evidence, whereafter the suit of the appellant was dismissed by the trial Court of Senior Civil Judge Karachi (South), as time barred by placing reliance upon the provisions of Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908. The civil appeal against such judgment, filed by the appellant before the Court of VI Additional District Karachi (South) on 19-9-2007, also met with the same fate, as it was dismissed, vide judgment dated 5-8- 2009, with the observation that findings of the trial Court on the question of limitation, in view of the Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908 were correct and this called for no interference. The Civil Revision No,127 of 2009, filed by the appellant against these concurrent findings of the two Courts below on a question of law was also dismissed, vide impugned judgment dated 28-11-2012 on the same ground of limitation qua applicable bar of Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908.
4. On 4-2-2013, leave to appeal was granted in this case by recording the contention of the learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellant that in the present case the amount itself had not been ascertained until the decision of the appellate Court dated 12-1-2000. Consequently, the suit, which was filed on 20-2-2002, was well within time.
5. We have heard the arguments of Mian Mushtaq Ahmad, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellant and Mr. Sarfraz A. Mirza, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondent and with their assistance also perused the material placed on record. The relevant facts of the case, which are admitted/not disputed are that earlier to vacating the rented premises on 31-10-1998, the respondent company was tenant of the appellant in a portion admeasuring 806 sq. Fts. Of their building commonly known as State Life Building No,2-A, Wallace Road, Karachi at the rate of Rs,1.50 per sq. Fit. Per month, excluding the payment of other utility charges; the rent case under section 8 of the Ordinance of 1979 for fixation of fair rent was filed by the appellant in the year 1992 against the respondent, which was decided in their favour, vide judgment dated 1-12-1997, directing the respondent for payment of rent at the rate of Rs,12 per sq. Ft. Per month from the date of filing of rent case, instead of earlier rate of rent. This judgment of the Court of Rent Controller, Karachi (South), was challenged by the respondent before the High Court in F.R.A. No,13 of 1998, which was dismissed on 12-1-2000 and thus, the proceedings regarding fixation of fair rent attained finality.
However, in the mean time, on 31-10-1998, respondent company at their own, opted to vacate the rented premises by writing letter (Exh.P.6) to the appellant, contents whereof read as under:-- "Assistant General Manager (TS/RE) 17th September, 1998 ' State Life Insurance Corp of Pakistan, Principal Officer, SLB No,9, Ziauddin Ahmed Road, Karachi.
Attn: Mr. Arif Memon Ref: VACATION OF OFFICE PREMISES 806 SLB No,2A III FLOOR ' Dear Sir, ' We refer to your letter dated 13-9-1998 and wish to inform you as under:-- n We would vacate the above premises tentatively by 15th October, 98. n We undertake to confirm you that the premises will not be damaged during the removal of Furniture and Fixtures. n You would appreciate that the Rent Matter is pending in the High Court and we would abide by the decision of the Court as and when decided. n We would let you know about the clearance of utility bills accordingly when premises is vacated. n We believe that we would now be issued N.O.C.
For vacating the premises peacefully."
6. It was in the above background and thereafter persistent failure of the respondent to clear the claim of arrears of rent of the appellant that such suit for recovery was filed against them on 20-7- 2002.
7.
7. Learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellant strongly contended that there was no occasion for the appellant to have claimed the recovery of suit amount from the respondent until the proceedings regarding fixation of fair rent, forming basis of such claim, had finally culminated in their favour upon dismissal of rent appeal filed by the respondent before the High Court on 12-1- 2000. In such circumstances the cause of action for recovery of suit amount as payment of difference of rent amount from 9-2-1992 till the respondent vacated the case premises on 31-10- 1998 had accrued in their favour on 12-1-2000 when this payment has become due, which is within three years before the date of filing of suit, but strangely enough all the three Courts below have misread, misinterpreted and misapplied Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908 in this regard, instead of appreciating the fact that the suit for recovery instituted by the appellant on 20-7-2002 was well within three years time from the date when the rent has become due as per new rate. In support of his submissions, learned ASC placed reliance upon the cases of Attaullah Malik.v. Rashid (PLD 1972 Karachi 273), F. A. Khan v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 520) and Moulvi Abdul Qayyum v.
Ali Asghar Shah (1992 SCMR 241), which lay down as under:-- ' In the case of Attaullah Malik, learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh categorically observed that the use of word 'due' in Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908 means the date on which cause of action arise for filing a suit and in this context the rent for the entire period of 10 years and 10 months became due on 19-11-1960, when the Custodian upheld the order of Additional Custodian (Judicial) and respondents were in law entitled to sue for the recovery of arrears of rent.
As the suit was filed within three years from that date, therefore, it was within limitation under Article 110 of the Limitation Act.
' In the case of F.A. Khan, this Court, while granting special leave to appeal posed a question of law that "whether in case of dismissal of government servant, where period of limitation, for a declaratory suit, contesting order of dismissal, is to be reckoned under Article 120, Limitation Act from the time when "the right to sue accrues", such right is to be deemed to have, accrued on the date of the first order of dismissal or on the date of order of Appellate Authority confirming the first order".
' After detailed discussion regarding the above question of law, it was held that when an appeal was filed against the initial order of dismissal the matter became sub judice. In such circumstances, when the matter became sub judice the right to sue arise when it was decided finally by the appellate forum.
' In the case of Moulvi Abdul Qayyum, it was held by this Court that since the decree of the Court of first instance merged into the decree of appellate Court, which alone can be executed, therefore, for further proceedings the period of limitation will commence from the date of the appellate Court judgment.
8. Conversely, Mr. A. Mirza, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondent as Sarfrazgued that there are concurrent findings of the three forums below in favour of the respondent that the claim of suit amount as arrears of rent made by the appellant against the respondent was barred by limitation in view of the clear language of Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908 and thus such findings are unexceptionable, and this appeal is also liable to be dismissed. Learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondent however, when confronted with the query that how the rent, which has become due in terms of the order of the Rent Controller dated 1-12-1997, passed on the application under section 8 of the Ordinance, of 1979 regarding fixation of fair rent, could have been recovered before such adjudication by the competent forum and its finalization upon dismissal of F.R.A. No,13 of 1998 by the High Court of Sindh, vide order dated 12-1-2000, had no plausible defence to offer.
9. As the only legal controversy involved in the present proceedings relates to the interpretation of applicable Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908, it will be useful to reproduce it asunder:-- {{TABLE}} "Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
110. For arrears of rent. Three years When the arrears become due." {{TABLE}} ' A plain reading of above provision of law shows that three years period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit for recovery of arrears of rent is to commence from the date when payment of such arrears has become due and not from the period to which such arrears relate. In the present case, applying this principle, it is easily understandable that the suit amount, as arrears of rent for differential sum payable by the respondent in terms of the earlier order of the Rent Controller dated 1-12-1997,from the date when the application for fixation of fair rent under section 8 of the Ordinance of 1979 was filed by the appellant, became due and payable by the respondent only upon dismissal of F.R.A. No,13 of 1998 on 12-1-2000, as the earlier order of the Rent Controller then merged into it. However, in case the respondent had not challenged the said order of the Rent Controller in appeal, in that case it would have become due and payable from 1-12-1997, when the Rent Controller has for the 1st time fixed the fair rent at Rs,12 per sq. Ft. Per month from the date of filing of such rent case.
10. Having discussed as above, in our opinion, all the three Courts below fell in grave error of law in misinterpreting and misapplying Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908, which resulted in the dismissal of the suit for recovery filed by the appellant on wrong factual premises. In the facts and circumstances when the sum claimed in the suit as outstanding arrears of rent had become due on dismissal of the appeal on 12-1-2000, the period of limitation prescribed in column No,2 of Article 110 had to be computed from 12-1-2000, when suit amount as B per adjudication and fixation of fair rent has finally become due. This view of the matter is fully supported from the ratio of above cited three cases, thus, calls for no further debate on this issue. Besides, the above reproduced letter, Exh.P.6 dated 17-9-1998, written by the respondent to the appellant and received in their office on 30-9-1998 has further served the purpose of acknowledge of their liability in respect of suit amount from their side as in this letter they have clearly stated that they will abide by the decision of the appellate Court, as and when decided.
11. As a result of foregoing discussion, this appeal is allowed; judgments of all the three Courts below are set aside; Suit No,701 of 2002, filed by the appellant is decreed in the sum of Rs,6,55,845 with mark-up at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realization of the decretal amount from the respondent, with costs throughout.