The petitioner is occupying House No. 3 situated in Muslim Insurance Scheme, near Shah Noor Studios, Multan Road; Lahore, since October, 1962, as tenant. This house was purchased by Wali Bahadur, respondent No. 1 and his wife Mst. Surayya Tabassam, respondent No. 2, from its owner Syed Mustafa Shah for Rs. 40,000 by means of registered sale dead dated 18-2-1975. After the sale of the house in favour of the aforementioned respondents, the petitioner attorned to them and started paying rent at the rate of Rs. 150 per month. On 3-1-1976, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for the e, ejectment of the petitioner from the rented house on the sole ground that they required it in good faith for their own occupation as they were occupying a small portion of a house situated in Street No. 8, Aziz Road, Misr; Shah, Lahore, which was unsuitable and insufficient for their requirement.
2. The petitioner, contested the application and raised a number of preliminary objections regarding its maintainability. He pleaded that his ejectment from the rented house had not been sought in good faith by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 as after purchasing the house they had asked him to enhance its rent and on his refusal to accede to their above demand, they filed the application for ejectment against him. He also contended that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had sufficient accommodation in the house occupied by them as there were as many as ton rooms in the house out of which the respondents 1 and 2 had leased out two rooms to tenants. Following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller, respondent No. 3, for the disposal of the application for ejectment ;
(1) Whether the petitioners require the property in dispute for, personal use for occupation is nod faith ?
(2) Whether the application of the petitioner is not maintainable in view of preliminary objections Nos. 1 to 7 ?
(3) Relief.
Issue No. 1 was found against respondents Nos. I and 2 and Issue No. '2 was decided against the petitioner. As a re' t. Of the above findings the application for ejectment against the petitioner dismissed on 6-11-1978.
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller which was allowed by the- learned Additional District Judge; respondent No. 4, vide order dated 11- 1219'19. The petitioner was required to deliver the vacant possession of the rented house to respon-- dents Nos. 1 and 2 within 30 days from the date of the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforementioned ardor, the petitioner filed an appeal in the court which , however, abated as a result of amendment made in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Ordinance) by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980. The petitioner thereafter filed the present writ petition which has been contested by respondents Nos. I and 2.
4.. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is sufficient material on the record to show that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had filed the application for the ejectment of the petitioner with mala fide intention: In this connection he has referred to Annex. 'E', a photostat copy of draft valuation list pertaining to the house situated in Street No. 8, Misri Shah, Lahore, to show that respondent No. 1 alone is the owner of the house and that he is occupying eight rooms in the said house. In the application for ejectment filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2, they had alleged that the aforementioned house was jointly owned by respondents No. 1, his two brothers and two sisters and that he was occupying only a small portion of the house. After the filing of the application for ejectment when the petitioner produced a copy of the draft valuation list pertaining to the aforementioned house showing respondent No. 1 alone as its owner, he moved the assessing authority and got the names of his brothers and sisters incorporated in the valuation list to show that the house was a joint property. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the above conduct of respondent No. 1 clearly indicated his mala .Fide intention that he had got the entries in the valuation list changed during the pendency of the proceedings to meet the objection raised .By the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that in order to prove their contention that the house occupied by them was a joints property and that they were not in possession of the entire house, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had led evidence to show that two rooms in the house had been leased out to the tenants by the other co-owners. One of these rooms had been leased out by Irshad A.I, sisters son of respondent No. 1 to Mian Irshad Ahmad: Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 examined Mian Irshad Ahmad as A. W. 3 but they did not produce Irshad A.I who had leased out the rooms, as witness. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, their omission to examine Irshad A.I, as witness, raises, an adverse presumption against them under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872.
5. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that one of the reasons given by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in their application for ejectment regarding unsuitability of the house occupied by them was that their daughter, who was studying in the Lahore College for Women, was facing inconvenience because of lack of, proper transport facilities but the evidence produced by the petitioner showed that there were three ladies buses which daily plied on the route between Misri Shah and Lahore College for Women.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the onus to prove that the rented house was required by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in good faith for their own occupation was initially on them and, as such, it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove their male fide intention by any positive evidence. Respondents Nos. I and 2' had intentionally concealed the fact that the house occupied by them was owned by respondent No. 1 alone, which later on came to light when valuation list pertaining to the house was produced by the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 also bad made misstatement that there was. No proper transport arrangement in the locality where be was residing and that his daughter faced difficulty in going to her college. He had failed to prove that two rooms in the house situated in Misri Shah had been in possession of the tenants. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner all these facts were sufficient to disprove the contention of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that the rented house was required by them in good faith for their own occupation.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the petitioner had produced evidence to show that the application for his .Ejectment from the rented house had been filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 after the petitioner had refused to accede to their demand for enhancement of rent and as such the plea taken by them in their application for ejectment that the rented house was required by them for their own occupation was not genuine. They were required under law to satisfy the Rent Controller that the rented house was required by them in good faith for their own occupation. The term good faith used in section 13(3) (a) (!) (a) of the Ordinance was interpreted with reference to the definition contained in section 2(2) of the Ordinance in Mushtag Ahmad v. Mrs. Mumtaz Zohra RIM PLD 1978 Kar. 188 as under :- "This definition of the expression 'good faith' necessarily, therefore, implies that the demand for possession of the rented premises must be honestly made. Honesty is a State of mind and is, therefore, a psychological fact capable of proof or disproof only by evidence or conduct. The word 'bona fide' in the context of the provision in question would also appear to mean the same as 'good faith'."
8. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, on the other hand, has submitted that the respondents had proved that the rented house was required by them in good faith for their own occupation as they were in possession of only two rooms in the house situated in Misri Shah which was both insufficient and unsuitable for their needs. In this connection learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has referred to para. 4 of the application for ejectment which is reproduced below :- "The petitioner No. 1 is a business man and deals in Scientific Stores. His show room is situated at Maclagan Road, Lahore. His monthly income is more than Rs. 9,000. He is an income-tax assessee.
The petitioners have three young/college school-going children and a maid servant. They are in occupation of a small portion of a house built on four marlas of land which is owned by the three brothers and two sisters of the petitioner No. 1 (including himself). This small house is situated at; Street No. 8 Aziz Road, Misri Shah, Lahore and, is unsuitable and insufficient for the petitioners and their family. The present residence of the petitioners being situated at Misri Shah their family members are facing great difficulties. This locality is widely known for its uncleanliness and almost is cut off from the rest of the town in rainy season. Throughout the year neither Taxi Drivers nor Rickshawwalas are prepared to go to this locality. The young daughter of the petitioners who is studying in Lahore College has to face conveyance problem daily. To overcome a!1 these problems, the petitioners purchased the house in dispute. They want to occupy an independent an commodious house befitting to their standard and suitable for needs situated in a better end healthier locality. They require the house in dispute in good faith for their own occupation and occupation of their family members. The house in dispute has been purchased by the petitioners to occupy themselves and not to let out the same on higher rent to any--body else."
Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has also referred to the following reply submitted by the petitioner to para. 4 of the application for ejectment :- "That the petitioners are in occupation of their own personal house which consists of 10 rooms out of which two rooms have been rented out to different tenants, therefore, ,the application under reply is absolutely based on false facts and is not competent under the law."
9. It has been contended by learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that Wali Bahadur respondent No. 1 had substantially proved the averments made in para, 4 of the application for ejectment by his statement on oath made by him while appearing as A. W. 5, which alone was sufficient in view of the decision of this Court in Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din v. Sooba Khan PLD 111777 Lab. 1004, He had clarified the position regarding ownership of the house situated in Misri Shah that originally it was owned by his father and after his death he along-with his brothers and sisters had become its owners as his legal heirs. He frankly admitted that he got the entries regarding ownership of the house to the draft valuation list corrected when it came to his notice that he alone had been shown as the owner of the house in the said list. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1.
And 2, has argued that no dishonest motive can be attributed to the respondents merely because during the pendency of the proceedings Wali Bahadur respondent No. 1 made a representation to the Assessing Authority for correction of entries regarding ownership of the house situated in Misri Shah as shown in the draft valuation list. The petitioner had not led any evidence to controvert the statement of Wali Bahadur respondent No. 1 that the house situated in Mieri Shah was owned by him along with his brothers and sisters.
10. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has further submitted that the statement of respondent No. 1 made by him on oath that he and his family members were occupying only two rooms in the house situated in Misrt Shah had remained unchallenged. Statement of Irshad Ahmad A. W. 3 on solemn affirmation was sufficient to prove that he was occupying one of the rooms in the aforementioned house as tenant of Irshad.A.I and it was not necessary for the respondents to have led any further evidence in that behalf. Consequently, no adverse presumption could be drawn against them for their failure to examine Irahad All who had leased out the room to Irahad Ahmad A. W.
3. Entries in the draft valuation list showing that eight rooms in the building were in the occupation of the owner did not mean that respondents Nos. t and 2 were in possession of the said eight rooms because, as noticed above. The building was not owned by respondent No. 1 alone.
11. As regards the evidence produced by the petitioner that three ladies buses of the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation daily ply on the route between Misri Shah and Lahore College for Women, learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the petitioners had not stated in their application that there was no bus service for the locality to which the house occupied by them was situated. They had only pointed out difficulties being faced by them due to leak of proper transport facilities in the locality. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has argued that even if it be accepted that the respondents' daughter can go to the College by bus it cannot be said that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 do not require the rented house in good faith for their own occupation bemuse there are other reasons also on account of which they want to occupy the rented house and one of these, reasons is that the rented house is situated in a better locality as compared to the locality in which the house presently occupied by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is situated.
12. Learned counsel for respondents Nos,1 and 2 has stated that there is no substance in the petitioner's contention that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had initiated proceedings for his ejectment from the rented house merely because he was not agreeable to the enhancement of the rent of the house because the oral evidence produced by the petitioner in support of his contention was not reliable. Syed Fakhar Alam R. W. 4 who was one of the witnesses examined by the petitioner in support of his above contention, had clearly admitted in his cross-examination that the rented house was required by respondent No. l .For his own occupation. Even otherwise a landlord's applica--petition for ejectment of tenant on the ground that the rented building is required by him in good faith for his own occupation cannot be thrown out merely because sometime before filing the application for ejectment he had asked the tenant to enhance the rent of the building.
13. The sole question for determination in the present case is whether respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have satisfied the legal requirement that the rent house is needed by them in good faith for their own occupation. The term "good faith" used in section 13(3) (a) (f) (a) of the Ordinance, which is relevant for the present case has not been defined in the Ordinance itself. There. Is no doubt that an act done with dishonest intention cannot be considered to be an act done in good faith. Thus, if a landlord initiates proceedings for the ejectment of a tenant on the plea that the rented building is required by. Him for .His own use but in fact he has no intention to use it himself as, for instance, he intends to dispose it of by sale or otherwise or he wants to relet it to some person, it can be said that he has initiated the ejectment proceedings with dishonest intention as his object to get the rented premises vacated is not for using it himself as pleaded by him in his application for ejectment but it is for some other purpose. Similarly, where a landlord seeks the ejectment of a tenant on the ground that the rented building is required by him for his own occupation but he is already in occupation of some residential building in the same urban area where the rented building is situated and the said building is suitable for his requirement, it can be said that the landlord has filed ejectment proceedings dishonestly as the object of getting the rented premises vacated is not for using it himself but for some other reason. After carefully examining the relevant provisions of the Ordinance, one may say that the framers of the law were conscious that a landlord might not seek the ejectment - of his tenant on a false pretext that the rented building was required by him for his own use and as such while providing that he could ask for the eviction of the tenant only if the rented building was in good faith required by him for his own use, it was considered necessary to provide safeguards against -male fide action by the landlord in the Ordinance itself. In section 13(3) (a) (i) (b) of--the Ordinance, it was provided that before a landlord could seek the eviction tenant from a residential building on the ground that he required it for his own use, he must show that he was not already occupying such building in the same urban area in which the rented building was situated or if he was in occupation of a residential building in the said urban area, the same was not suitable to meet his requirement. It was further provided in section 13(3x4)(1)(r) that he must also show that he had not vacated such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Ordinance in the same urban area in which the rented building -was situated. After making provisions for a landlord who was already in occupation. Of a building suitable for his needs that he should not be allowed to seek 'the eviction of his tenant on the ground that he required the rented premises for his own use, the framers of the law also made a provision in the Ordinance to ensure that the rented building should be actually occupied by the landlord after the eviction of the tenant. Subsection (4) of section 13 of the..
Ordinance required the landlord who had obtained possession of a building on the ground of personal use to occupy it within one month of the date of obtaining possession, and further that he should not relet it within two months of his occupying the building to any person other than the original tenant. To ensure the imple--mentation of the above provision it was further provided that the tenant who had been evicted from the rented premises could apply to the Rent Controller for restoration of possession of the said building if the landlord had failed to occupy it within one month from the date of his obtaining its possession or he had relet it to some other person within two months from the date of his occupation. Thus, it may be seen that the framers of the law had made provisions in the Ordinance itself to make it impossible for a landlord to seek the eviction of a tenant from a residential building on the ground that it was required by him for his own use where the land--lord had no intention .To occupy it either because he was already occupying a residential building suitable for his requirement or he intended to dispose it of through sale or otherwise or relet it to some other person. In the latter case, the limitation placed on the landlord was only for a period of two months after occupying the rented building. In other words, a landlord 'can transfer the rented premises through sale or otherwise or he can relet it after occupying it for two months. If the term "good faith" used in. Section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) of the Ordinance is considered in the light of what has been noticed above, it will be seen that landlord's bona fide can be doubted only *if it can be shown that he is already occupying a residential building in the same urban area in which the rented premises are situated and that the same is sufficient to meet his requirement because only then it can be said that the object of initiating ejectment proceedings by him is not to use the rented premises himself after the eviction of the tenant. It is, therefore, in this context that it has been found that the bare statement of the landlord that he requires `the rented premises for his own use is sufficient to prove his bona fides: In Baji Ghutam Muhammad v.
Abdul Qadir (P L, D 1975- Lah. 200), while examining the question and mode of proof of good faith and bona fides of a landlord, it was observed :- "This observation is subject to the consideration that the mode of proof of reasonableness and/or good faith/bona fides is dependent upon various factors and it cannot be ignored that one of the material items of evidence for consideration, of course, would be the statement on oath of the landlord himself. Unless .He makes a statement in this behalf, asserting his requirement, it will not be possible to visualise from circumstances alone that he has a bona fade personal need."
It may be seen that it is the assertion of the landlord himself which he makes in . His statement on oath that determines his bona fides in seeking ejectment of tenant on the ground that the rented premises are required by him for his own use. In Muhammad Siddiq v. Mistri Muhammad Aslant (P L.D 1975 Lah. 308which was a case of residential building, the nature. And quantum of evidence required to-prove good faith by the landlord, was thus stated :- "If a landlord asserts that. He or his son needs particular premises for personal use and it is also proved on record that he or his son is not occupying in the same urban area any building for the purposes of his business suitable for his needs or has vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause then the question with regard to bona fides of good faith will have to be determined in context of the provisions as contained in subsection (4)- of section 13 of the Ordinance. What is after all require by a landlord or his son to prove his good faith or bona fides in regard to personal use, he has to make a statement with regard to factual position as it stands, and if the same is disproved in rebuttal in context of the conditions as laid down in sub-paras. (b) and (c) of para. (ii) of sub--section (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance, then it can safely be said that the landlord or his son has not been able to prove his bona fides or good faith."
Relying on the decision in the case of Muhammad Siddiq v. Mistri Muhammad Aslam, referred to above, I. Mahmud, J. In Hassan Khan v. Munawar Begum PLD 1976 Kar. 832observed :- "The effect is that the assertion or claim on oath by the landlord that he required the premises for his personal use, should be accepted by the Rent Controller as bona fide, if such claim or assertion, although by itself may be insufficient yet is consistent with his averments in the application and is not shaken in cross-examination or disproved in rebuttal."
Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mst. Mumtaz Zohra Rizvl, referred to above by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was observed; "In actual practice a landlord would be deemed to have satisfied the aforesaid conditions by leading evidence of the reasonableness of his deeds and if he succeeds in doing so, the onus would shift to the tenant to prove facts which militate against their existence of good faith or which positively establish the dishonesty of purpose on the part of the landlord to claim possession of the premises on the ground of personal need." bona fides cannot be questioned on any of the grounds stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The onus to prove that the rented house was required by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in good faith for their own occupation was fairly discharged by the statement made by respondent No. 1 on solemn affirmation.
14. The petitioner's contention that the rented house was not required by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for their own use and that they had initiated ejectment proceedings against him simply because he had not acceded to their demand for enhancement of rent, does not merit any consideration, firstly, because the evidence produced by the petitioner in support of the said contention was not reliable and, secondly, bona fides of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to get the rented house vacated for their personal use could not be doubted for the reason that some time before the filing of ejectment t procerdings against the petitioner, he was asked to pay enhanced rent. Reference in this connection may be made to Badarud Din Hasan Farooqi and another v. Manghi Industrial Home (PLD 1976 Kar. 620which was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Pirzada Rafiq Ahmad v. Ch. Abdur Rehman (1980 SCMR 772that a demand of higher rent by itself did not cast any doubts about the personal bona fide requirements, if the factum of bona fide requirement was independently proved.
15. Having regard to the above facts and considerations, I am of the, view that the order of the learned Additional District Judge, respondent No. 4, passed by him on 11-12-197 while exercising the powers of Appellant Authority under section 15 of the Ordinance, against the petitioner is not C open to question and there is no force in the present writ petition, which is hereby dismissed with costs. The petitioner shall deliver the vacant possession of the rented house to respondents Nos. I and 2 within two months from the date of this order.