' CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J.--- This appeal with the leave of the Court is addressed against the judgment of the High Court dated 26-11-2012 whereby, while accepting the writ petition filed by respondent No,1, the appellant's appointment notification dated 21-7-2011 has been quashed, declaring the office of Vice-Chancellor, Mirpur University of Science and Technology (hereinafter to be referred as MUST), vacant. The Chancellor has been directed to take immediate steps for appointment of Vice-Chancellor, strictly in accordance with the provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the Mirpur University of Science and Technology Ordinance (hereinafter to be referred as MUST Ordinance).
2. The controversy in hand relates to the appointment of Vice-Chancellor in MUST University. The President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, for establishment of University in public sector, promulgated Ordinance No,XI of 2008 which is called Mirpur University of Sciences and Technology Ordinance, 2008 (hereinafter to be referred as MUST Ordinance). The MUST Ordinance since its promulgation is repeated in verbatim. On establishment of the University, the Chancellor, vide notification dated 27th March, 2009, under the provision of subsection (3) of section 8 of MUST Ordinance conferred upon Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman, Vice-Chancellor of Azad Jammu and Kashmir University, the additional duties of the MUST University. Later on, vide advertisement published in daily newspapers, including the daily "Jung" dated 8-11-2009 applications were invited for the vacant position of Vice-Chancellor MUST University. However, through another notification dated 21-7-2011, the Chancellor, in exercise of powers conferred upon him under subsection (2) of section 41 of MUST Ordinance, appointed the appellant as Vice-Chancellor of the MUST University. For a period of three years. Respondent No,1, who in response to advertisement had submitted his application for the advertised position of Vice-Chancellor MUST University, felt aggrieved and challenged the appointment of the appellant through a writ petition in the High Court mainly on the ground that as the Chancellor, in exercise of the discretionary powers had appointed Dr. Habib- ur-Rehman as first Vice-Chancellor of the MUST University, therefore, subsequently, the Chancellor cannot exercise discretionary powers for appointment of Vice-Chancellor, except adopting the method prescribed by law, especially, under the provision of sections 11 and 15 of MUST Ordinance. It is further averred that for the office of Vice-Chancellor, Ph.D degree is a pre-requisite mandatory qualification, whereas the appellant is lacking this required qualification. The writ petition was resisted by the respondents, therein, however, finally, through the impugned judgment, the learned High Court accepted the same in the terms stated in para 1 hereinabove. The appellant feeling aggrieved, challenged the propriety of the judgment of the High Court through the petition for leave to appeal. While considering the matter as one of public importance, for expeditious disposal, leave was converted into appeal and requirement of filing concise statements was also dispensed with.
3. Mr. Khalid Rashid Chaudhry, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, after brief narration of facts, mainly stressed his arguments on the following grounds;---
(i) that the appellant is the first Vice-Chancellor of the MUST University, who has been appointed by the Chancellor under the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of the MUST Ordinance;
(ii) that the appointment of Vice-Chancellor for transitory period is totally within the discretion of the Chancellor and none of the other conditions mentioned in the Ordinance are applicable;
(iii) That the tenure for the first Vice-Chancellor is three years;
(iv) That previously, no first Vice-Chancellor was appointed, only the additional charge of the post of Vice-Chancellor was entrusted to one Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman, who was actually the Vice- Chancellor of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir University, Muzaffarabad.
' While elaborating these points, he stressed mainly on the interpretation of the word "appointment" and according to his version, the additional charge of an office assigned to a person does not amount to an appointment. He placed reliance upon the meanings of the word "appointment" as assigned in Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, at Page 96. He further submitted that in the MUST Ordinance, there is no scope of assigning the additional charge and the only mode is either the appointment of first Vice-Chancellor under the transitory provision of section 41(2) of the MUST Ordinance, or under the provision of sections 10 and 11, as permanent appointment. Thus, the High Court has fell in error of law and facts while holding that assignment of the additional charge to Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman as Vice-Chancellor, MUST University was the first appointment. While dealing with the question of requisite qualification of Ph.D for the office of Vice-Chancellor, he submitted that as the appointment was made under the transitory provision of the MUST Ordinance in which no such condition has been imposed; moreover, even this condition is also not required for permanent appointment. He further submitted that even otherwise, the appellant's appointment has not, been made in furtherance of advertisement, therefore, question of required qualification i,e, Ph.D, has no relevance according to facts of this case. To differentiate between the appointment and additional charge, he also referred to the order of sanctioning the additional charge allowance in favour of Dr. Habib-urRehman. He finally submitted that the writ petition is only competent when there is any violation of law or principle of law whereas in the instant case, neither any departure from principle of law has been made nor any provision of law has been violated, thus, the High Court has wrongly accepted the writ petition and the impugned judgment is not maintainable.
4. Raja Ghazanfar Ali, the learned Advocate-General, who represents the Government as well as Chancellor, at the very outset, frankly conceded that the appellant's appointment was not made in accordance with law that is why the Chancellor has implemented the judgment of the High Court and Engineer Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Ahmed, has been appointed as Acting Vice-Chancellor vide notification dated 28-11-2012. He fully supported the judgment of the High Court and submitted that it is quite in accordance with the spirit of law, therefore, the same be maintained.
5. Mian Sultan Mehmood, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, strongly opposed the appeal on the ground that the appellant neither fulfills the requisite qualification for appointment as Vice-Chancellor nor it can be said that he has been appointed as first Vice-Chancellor under the transitory provision of MUST Ordinance because the first Vice-Chancellor appointed under the transitory provision was Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman. He submitted that after appointment of first Vice- Chancellor in the MUST University, the Chancellor advertised the post in which the requisite qualification for appointment as Vice-Charicellor is Ph.D degree. The appellant is lacking the requisite qualification. In response to this advertisement, the eligible candidates, Including respondent No,1 submitted applications and it was enjoined upon the Chancellor to proceed according to law and make selection on merit amongst eligible candidate for the office of Vice- Chancellor but the Chancellor has failed to act according to law, hence, respondent No,1 who was one of the candidates, fulfilling the requisite qualification, being legally aggrieved, knocked, the door of the High Court for redressal. He further submitted that there is no concept in the law to assign the additional charge of any position, without appointment. The assignment of additional charge of the post is in fact the appointment, therefore, the learned High Court has rightly issued the prayed writ and the impugned judgment is quite consistent with the principle of law and justice which does not call for any interference by this Court.
6. Sardar Muhammad Raziq Khan Advocate, the learned counsel representing the MUST University and Engineer Dr. Muhammad Sarwar Ahmed, incumbent Vice Chancellor, forcefully defended the impugned judgment on the ground that the appointing authority's counsel, the learned Advocate- General has conceded on the point that the appellant's appointment was made against law and fully supported the judgment of the High Court, thus, the appellant has no case and his appeal is not maintainable. He further submitted that the powers under the transitory provision of section 41(2) of MUST Ordinance can only be exercised for once. These powers cannot be exercised in such a manner to defeat the intent and spirit of law, therefore, the arguments on behalf of the appellant that his appointment is first one is totally fallacious, misconceived and misinterpretation of law which cannot be accepted.
7. We have paid our utmost attention to the arguments advanced at bar by the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record made available. Admittedly, MUST University is established under the provisions of Ordinance XI of 2008. According to peculiar legal and factual propositions involved in this case, the most relevant provisions of Ordinance, which can be taken into consideration are; the definition clause 'Y' of section 2 subsection (3) of section 8, sections 9, 11, 15 and transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of MUST Ordinance.
8. The foremost point which requires consideration is the term "Vice-Chancellor". In the definition clause of section 2, of the MUST Ordinance, the Vice-Chancellor has been defined as "Vice- Chancellor" means Vice-Chancellor of the University. Under subsection (1) of section 10 of Ordinance, the prescribed qualification of Vice-Chancellor "10(1) There shall be a Vice-Chancellor of the University who shall be an eminent academician/scholar of international repute and shall be appointed on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
1) Whereas rest of the provisions of this section deal with the powers and duties of the Vice- Chancellor. The provisions of section 11, deal with the procedure of appointment and removal, tenure and terms and conditions of Vice-Chancellor, hence, there is no need to discuss in detail or interpret the provisions of section 11 of the Ordinance. Whereas the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 deals with the appointment of first Vice-Chancellor, which reads as under:---
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance, the first Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor for a period of three years." (underlining is ours)
' A bare reading of this statutory provision makes it clear that for the transitory period, the Chancellor is vested with the discretionary powers for appointing the first Vice-Chancellor while dispensing with the mode and procedure of appointment prescribed in the MUST Ordinance.
Keeping in consideration the whole scheme and spirit of the MUST Ordinance, we have to determine the scope and extent of the phraseology of the non obstante clause i,e, "notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance". Whether this clause vests in the Chancellor, unfettered discretionary powers to appoint any person as first Vice-Chancellor or this discretion is limited and qualified. For determination of this legal proposition, the term "Vice- Chancellor", is of pivotal importance in this case. As we have referred hereinabove, the definition clause 'Y' which speaks that "Vice-Chancellor" means the Vice-Chancellor of the MUST University whereas subsection (1) of section 10 speaks of the personal qualification of the Vice-Chancellor.
The analysis of these provisions clearly connotes that the MUST Ordinance has attached some personal qualifications with the Vice-Chancellor and whenever the Vice-Chancellor, whether permanently or under transitory provision is appointed, there is no exemption with regard to the personal qualifications mentioned in subsection (1) of section 10 of the MUST Ordinance. Without this qualification, no one can be appointed or given the status of Vice-Chancellor. While dealing with the scope and scheme of non obstante clause in the statute in a case titled A.G. Varadarajulu and another v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, reported as [AIR 1998 SC 1388], the Indian Supreme Court held as follows:--- "16. It is well-settled that while dealing with a non obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give overriding effect to a section, the Court must try to find out the extent to which the legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. Such intention of the legislature in this behalf is to be gathered from the enacting part of the section. In Aswa ni Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369, Patanjali Sastri, J. Observed: "The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously". In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85 (at 139) : (AIR 1971 SC 530) Hidayatullah, CJ observed that the non obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from other provisions of the same statute or other statute but "for that reason alone we must determine the scope" of that provision strictly. When the section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provisions which it intends to override but refers to the provisions of the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole Act and stands all alone by itself. "A search has, therefore, to be made with a view to determining which provision answers the description and which does not."
In the light of hereinabove principle of law enunciated by the Indian apex Court, it is not necessary that each and every non obstante clause in a statute excludes application of all provisions of statutes. Keeping in view the whole scheme of law, the scope of non obstante clause has to be determined. Thus, in the light of peculiar facts of this case, in our considered opinion, the phraseology of "notwithstanding anything contained" does not mean that the Chancellor can appoint any person without having regard to qualification mentioned in subsection (1) of section 10 of MUST Ordinance. The benefit of non obstante clause can be availed with regard to mode and process of regular appointment mentioned under the provision of section 11, the tenure for regularly appointed Vice-Chancellor is five years whereas under this transitory provision, the tenure is reduced to three years. Same like for appointment of regular Vice-Chancellor under section 11, a detailed comprehensive procedure, method and mechanism has been provided. While exercising the powers under the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of the MUST Ordinance, the Chancellor is vested with the discretionary powers without having regard to this procedure and mechanism for regular appointment.
9. The next aspect of the case which requires deliberation is that who can be the first Vice- Chancellor of the University. The word "first" has not been defined by the statute, therefore, while following the golden principle of interpretation of statute i,e, "the literal interpretation", we adopt the ordinary dictionary meanings of the word "first" which has been defined in the Chamber 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition, page 473 which reads as under:--- "first (furst), adj. Foremost: in front of or before all others: most eminent: Chief; referring to the speaker or writer (gram) n- one who or that which is first or of the ' first class: a place in the first class: first gear--adv. Before anything or anyone else: for the first time."
' In the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 635, the definition of word 'first' is given as under:-- - "First. Preceding all others; foremost; used as an ordinal one, as earliest in time or succession or foremost in position; in front of or in advance of all others."
' In the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary, page 494 the word 'first' is defined as under:--- "first' /f3:st/ (often written Its)-adj. 1 in counting: before all others; before the second and following ones. 2 earliest in time or order the starting object of a series of objects, 3 (the first) a the first day of the month; b golf the first hole. 4 the most important foremost in importance first prize 5 basic; fundamental first principles. 6 music a having the higher part the first violins; b. Being the principal player the first clarinet adverb 1 before anything or anyone else; 2 foremost got in feet first.
3. Before doing anything. First make sure of the facts 4 for the first time."
' In the GEM Practical Combined Dictionary, Two in one, 21st Century, ' Edition, page 286, the word 'first' has been defined as under:--- "First' (ferst) adj. Earliest in time or order; foremost; eminent or exalted."
' The above referred dictionary meanings of the word "first" clearly conveys that a person who on the establishment of the university has firstly been designated as Vice-Chancellor, he will be called as first Vice-Chancellor for the purpose of transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of the MUST Ordinance. According to the admitted facts, at the time of establishment of MUST, one Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman, Vice-Chancellor, Azad Jammu and Kashmir University Muzaffarabad was bestowed with the powers and status of Vice-Chancellor of the MUST University. According to the notification dated 27-3-2009, the Chancellor in exercise of powers, vested in him under the provision of subsection (3) of section 8 of the MUST Ordinance, entrusted him the additional charge of the Vice-Chancellor MUST University because he was holding the office of the Vice-Chancellor, Azad Jammu and Kashmir University, Muzaffarabad.
10. The most heated argument-advanced on both sides is relating to the term "appointment" and assignment of the "additional charge". According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the assignment of additional charge does not fall within the definition of appointment. Therefore, Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman cannot be treated as first Vice Chancellor of the MUST University, hence, the appellant who has been appointed under the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of the MUST. Ordinance, is the first Vice-Chancellor. Whereas on the other hand, according to respondents' version, there is no concept of assignment of additional charge without appointment.
The assignment of additional charge means the appointment, thus, while exercising the powers under the transitional provisions of subsection (2) of section 41 of the MUST Ordinance, the President/Chancellor has appointed Dr.. Habib-ur-Rehman as the first Vice-Chancellor of MUST University. For interpretation of word "appointment" both sides have relied upon dictionary meanings. The word "appointment" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition, page 99 as under:- "Appointment. The designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust.
' The exercise of a right to designate the person or persons who are to take the use of real estate.
The act of a person in directing the disposition of property, by limiting a use or by substituting a new use for a former one, in pursuance of a power granted to him for that purpose by a preceding deed, called a "power of appointment"; also the deed or other instrument by which he so conveys.
Where the power embraces several permitted objects, and the appointment is made to one or more of them, excluding others, it is called "exclusive."
' Appointment may signify an appropriation of money to a specific purpose. It may also mean the arranging of a meeting.
' Office or public function. The selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. The term "appointment" is to be distinguished from "election". "Election" to office usually refers to vote of people, whereas "appointment" relates to designation by some individual or group." (Underlining is ours)
' In the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Fifth Edition, page 55, the appointment is defined as under:--- "appointment, n. Appointing; engagement, assignation; decree, ordinance; office assigned; (usu.
PI) outfit; keep, break; an, appear, fail to appear, at fixed place and time."
11. A comparative analysis of the meanings of the word "appointment" commonly connotes that the word "appointment" is used in broader sense which includes the assignment of the duty or charge.
This concept also finds support from the Civil Service Laws. In the Civil Servants Act, 1976 and the Rules made thereunder, different modes of appointment have been mentioned which includes the ad hoc appointment, temporary appointment, contract appointment, appointment by transfer, appointment by promotion and even acting charge basis current charge basis current basis promotion on officiating basis has also been termed as appointment. Under the provisions of Civil Establishment Code, Edition 2007-2008, we have also come across the term "additional charge". Sl.
No,127 speaks of the additional charge appointments. It will be useful to reproduce here the same which is as under:--- Additional Charge appointments.--- The President has been pleased to decide:--
(a) that combination of appointments in terms of Fundamental Rules (F.R) 49 should be made as a temporary measure and should not ordinarily be made for a period of more than 6 moths; and
(b) that apart from the pay admissible under F.R 49(a) where applicable, the additional remuneration which may be granted to an Officer, including a judicial Officer of the rank of Joint Secretary or above, who is called upon to perform additional duties, should not exceed an amount equal to 10 % of his pay in the original post."
' Thus, it is clear from statutory provision of Civil Establishment Code, referred to hereinabove, that the appointment on additional charge is not a new concept but it finds its origin since long.
Thus, it can be safely concluded that the word "appointment" includes the assignment of additional charge of the post or an officev. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman was not appointed as the first Vice-Chancellor of MUST University.
12. Now the next question which requires attention of this Court is whether the Chancellor, under the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of MUST Ordinance, can exercise its discretionary powers for more than once for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor MUST University or it is only exercisable for once. The statutory provision which vests the Chancellor with the discretionary powers to appoint the Vice-Chancellor is the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 of Ordinance. According to universally accepted norms and principle of law, the scope and status of the transitional provisions is limited and it operates and remains in force till the main provision of statute comes in operation. In the book, Interpretation of Statute by B.M. Gandhi, Edition 2006, at page 83, the scope and application of the transitional provision has been discussed as following:--- "Transition means passage from one point to another and transitional means anything pertaining to transmission. Transitional provisions are, therefore, provisions for the time being. Therefore, "one feature of transitional provision is that its operation is expected to be temporary in the sense that it becomes spent when all the past circumstances with which it is designed to deal have been dealt with although it may be envisaged that that would take a considerable period of time while the primary legislation continues to deal indefinitely with the new circumstances which arise after its passage." In spite of this clarification, it must be accepted that it is not possible to give a definite description of what constitutes a transitional provision. Su ch provisions by their nature remain in force till the main provisions of the statute come into operation."
' Almost the same spirit is stated in another book, Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition 2010 in which the nature of transitory provision is mentioned as follows:--- "At times a statute contains a transitional provision which enacts as to how the statute will operate on the facts and circumstances existing on the date it comes into operation. However, "it is not possible to give a definitive description of what constitutes a transitional provision".
Therefore, the construction of such a provision must depend upon its own terms. "One feature of a transitional provision is that its operation is expected to be temporary, in that it becomes spent when all the past circumstance with which it is designed to deal have been dealt with although it may be envisaged that that could take a considerable period of time while the primary legislation continues to deal indefinitely with the new circumstances which arise after its passage.... A transitory provision may also be of the nature that it remains in force till the main provisions of the statute come into operation."
' Thus, it is clear that under the transitional statutory provisions, powers cannot be exercised for an indefinite period or to defeat the purpose, intent and spirit of the permanent provision of the statute. In the special circumstances and facts of this case, not only this transitory provision vests the chancellor with the powers for transitory period but also with the condition for appointment of first Vice-Chancellor and when once, the Chancellor has exercised his powers under this transitory provision and appointed first Vice-Chancellor, the discretionary powers under this transitory provision comes to an end. The same cannot be revived or re- exercised by appointing another person in the office of Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, from this angle, the learned Advocate-General has rightly conceded that the appointment notification of the appellant was not consistent with the provisions of law.
13. Another aspect of the matter is the personal qualification of the Vice-Chancellor. Although under the provision of subsection (1) of section 10 of the MUST Ordinance, the qualification is not prescribed in the terms of any specified academic Degree. The Phraseology of this statutory provision is very much important which speaks that the "Vice-Chancellor of the University shall be an eminent academician and scholar of international repute". In the modern era, according to prevailing educational system, the process of granting the degree of Ph.D, evolves the mechanism of participation of academicians from abroad. It will be useful to reproduce here by-laws of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir University termed as Semester Rules for Ph.D Degree Program, dealing with the process of conferring Ph.D. Degrees, especially, the procedure for evaluation of thesis. The relevant rules are reproduced as under:--- "89 . Three Examiners of the evaluation of Thesis shall be appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the persons proposed by the Advanced Studies and Research Board out of the panel of names recommended by the Board of Studies on the recommendation of the Su pervisory Committee through the Dean. One of whom shall be the external examiner within country while, two of whom must be from abroad. The external examiners for the evaluation of the Thesis shall be experts in the relevant field.
90. The examiners shall examine the Thesis and each External Examiner shall explicitly state/communicate in his report/result to the Controller of Examinations as follows:--
(a) The scholar may be recommended for the award of the degree.
(b) The Thesis is/is not of sufficient merit to justify the award of Ph.D Degree to the candidate.
(c) The scholar may be asked to revise the Thesis for re-submission.
(d) The candidate should/should not be allowed to revise and resubmit his Thesis. In such case the broad lines on which the Thesis should be revised must be clearly stated.
(e) The Thesis may be recommended for the award of M.Phill Degree.
(t) The Thesis may be rejected." (Underlining is ours)
' Thus, in the light of the process and procedure for granting the Ph.D. Degree, it can be held that not only academicians of national level but also from abroad, have to judge and evaluate the academic and scholarly levels of the candidate on the basis of examination of thesis. Although it is not a sole criterion but it is one of the criteria for determination of the status of eminent academician or scholar of international repute. No doubt, there are and there may be some extra-ordinary academicians and scholars who even without having any degree gained the international repute. Su rely, there are some personalities who by virtue of their personal knowledge, services or international recognition, have been granted the Honorary Degrees of Doctorate by the Universities while exempting all the ordinary procedures and process.
Therefore, under these statutory provisions, degree of Ph.D. Is not expressly prescribed as a qualification for the Vice-Chancellor but it includes according to the spirit and essence of law.
14. Even otherwise, it will be very strange that the academicians who are holding the Ph.D.
Degree to be placed subordinate to a person who is neither holding such degree nor due to any extraordinary qualification or services or degree of knowledge is recognized as academician of international repute. Thus, in view of the peculiar facts of this case, in our opinion, the appellant's qualification according to the record is not up to the mark, to be called as an eminent academician or scholar of international repute.
15. Another objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman was appointed under the provision of subsection (3) of section 8 of the MUST Ordinance, hence, his appointment cannot be treated under the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41, appears to be misconceived and contrary to the spirit of the statute. Under subsection (3) of section 8 of the Ordinance, the general powers and duties of the Chancellor have been enumerated which includes the appointment of Vice-Chancellor of the University. Thus, whenever the Chancellor exercises powers regarding appointment of Vice-Chancellor, he basically derives the powers from this provision, therefore, merely that the notification of appointment of Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman under this clause has been referred, thus, the appointment cannot be treated under the transitory provision is without any force, thus, the same stands repelled. Even from another angle it is totally misconceived, because Dr. Habib- ur-Rehman is a person who has been firstly appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the MUST University and under the transitory provision of subsection (2) of section 41 only the first Vice- Chancellor can be appointed. Otherwise, the appointment must have to be made in accordance with and following the prescribed manner under the provision of section 11 of MUST Ordinance.
16. According to the facts of this case, we observe that the learned High Court has misconceived one factual aspect of the matter of advertising the position of Vice-Chancellor, MUST University, in para 8 of the impugned judgment. It is not correct that the advertisement for the position of Vice-Chancellor MUST was published on 13-6-2009 in daily newspaper "Nawa-e-Waqt". The perusal of the advertisement reveals that it does not relate to the position of Vice-Chancellor, MUST University, rather it relates to Vice-Chancellor of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir University Muzaffarabad. It further finds support as Dr. Habib-urRehman, previously, vide notification dated 27-3-2009 had already been entrusted the additional charge of the Vice-Chancellor MUST University. This position has further been clarified by the Registrar of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir University Muzaffarabad, who apprised the Court that the position for the Vice-Chancellor of AJ&K University Muzaffarabad was advertised and at the relevant time, the Chancellor was of the opinion to permanently appoint Dr. Habib-ur- Rehman, as Vice-Chancellor, MUST University and in his place, in the AJ&K University Muzaffarabad, Vice-Chancellor was to be appointed. Although these findings has no practical impact or affect relating to issue in hand, just for keeping the record straight this clarification is deemed necessary.
In the light of hereinabove discussed detailed reasons, the impugned judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any fatal legal infirmity demanding for interference of this Court.
Therefore, finding no force, this appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, the judgment of the High Court attains finality and the Chancellor has to comply with the judgment in its letter and spirit. The position of Vice-Chancellor MUST University is immediately advertised and after completion of due selection process as provided under the provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the MUST Ordinance, regular appointment of Vice-Chancellor, MUST University, promptly be made so that the smooth functioning of institution and its running in accordance with the spirit of law be safeguarded.