' IJAZ UL AHSAN, J.--- Petitioner No,1, which is a banking company seeks an order from this Court suspending operation of the judgment dated 20-1-2012 passed by the Punjab Labour Court No,IV, Faisalabad, while the appeal filed against the said judgment is pending before the Chairman Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore.
2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No,1 is an employee of petitioner No,
1. Her services were terminated on the basis of a charge sheet alleging that she has misappropriated certain funds. Aggrieved of her termination, respondent No,1 filed a grievance petition under section 37 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 (PIRA) before the Punjab Labour Court No,IV, Faisalabad.
The petition was contested. Vide judgment dated 20-1-2012, the learned Labour Court ordered the petitioner to reinstate respondent No,1 in service with back benefits.
3. The petitioners challenged the judgment of the Labour Court by way of an appeal before the Chairman Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLAT) Lahore. The appeal was admitted to regular hearing. By way of interim relief, the operation of the impugned judgment of the Labour Court dated 20-1-2012 was suspended vide order dated 20-2-2012 passed by the learned PLAT. In terms of section 47(4) of the PIRA, the said stay order has lapsed after expiry of 120 days. Through this petition, the petitioners seek relief to the effect that this Court should suspend the operation of the judgment of the learned Labour Court during pendency of the appeal before the Chairman PLAT.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that there was ample justification for termination of services of respondent No,1 and all legal and procedural formalities were fulfilled. He submits that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that respondent No,1 did not fall within the definition of worker/workman and was therefore, precluded from approaching the Labour Court under the provisions of PIRA. He adds that respondent No,1 falls within the definition of an "employer". As such the jurisdiction of PIRA was barred. He further argues that respondent No,1 had not served a valid grievance notice upon her employer against her termination before filing the petition before the Labour Court, therefore the grievance petition was liable to be dismissed summarily. Additionally, he argues that since the appeal filed by the petitioners has not been decided within a period of 120 days, this Court should interfere to the extent of suspending judgment of the Labour Court till decision of the appeal. By way of alternate relief it is prayed that after hearing this petition on merits the judgment of the Labour Court be set aside. It may be pointed out that this is not the prayer in the petition. However during the course of arguments the learned counsel has made this prayer.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at length and gone through the record. To my mind, two legal questions arise of the present petition namely:---
(1) Whether the judgment of the Labour Court dated 20-1-2012 can be challenged through a constitutional petition before this Court while an appeal against the said judgment is available and pending before the Chairman PLAT ?
2. Whether this Court would extend the statutory period of 120 days provided in Section 47(4) of PIRA after which the stay order granted by the Chairman PLAT automatically lapses.
6. As far as the first question is concerned, the position is clear and unambiguous. There is an order dated 20-1-2012 passed by the Punjab Labour Court, Faisalabad. An appeal is provided against such order in section 47 of the PIRA. As appeal has been filed and is sub judice before the competent forum. There is no valid reason why a matter which is admittedly sub judice before a competent appellate forum should be adjudicated upon by this Court in exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. All grounds taken in this petition have also been taken in the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction and competence to adjudicate the appeal on all grounds and grant relief that may be found due in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not advanced any argument that may persuade this Court nor do any circumstances exist that may necessitate overriding or bypassing the appellate tribunal provided by the law and direct interference by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.
To that extent I find that the instant petition is pre-mature and not liable to be entertained. In this regard reference may be made to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in Civil Appeal No,275 of 1977 in case titled Imtiaz Ahmad and others v. The Pakistan National Council of Arts, Islamabad and others. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the constitutional petition filed in similar circumstances was pre-mature and interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction constituted an action in excess of the jurisdiction of the High Court. The same view was taken by this Court in an order passed in W.P.No,23120 of 2009 titled MCB v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, in which it was observed as follows:--- "In view of the above, the petition is not only pre-mature on merits but any order passed by this Court would not only offend against the letter and spirit of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 but would also be an exercise in futility at this stage."
7. In order to answer to the second question, it may be useful to reproduce the provisions of Section 47(11) and (12), which read as follows:--- "(11) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3), if in an appeal preferred to it against the order of a Labour Court directing the reinstatement of a workman and the Tribunal'makes an order staying the operation of the order of the LabOur Court, the Tribunal shall decide such appeal within ninety days.
(12) If an appeal under subsection (11) is not decided within the period of ninety days, the interim order of the Tribunal shall stand vacated on the expiration of that period."
A bare perusal of the relevant provisions of section 47(11)(12) reproduced above indicates that where a workman has been re-instated, the PLAT has jurisdiction to stay operation of the order of the Labour Court. However, subsection (12) clearly and unambiguously places a time limit after expiry of which the stay order shall stand vacated even if the appeal has not been decided. The grant of interim relief is backed by the word of statute. However, the law maker, in his own wisdom, has placed a time limit after expiry of which the stay order would lapse even if the appeal has not been decided. The time period is statutory and the stay order lapses automatically. The legislature has not placed any condition or visualized any circumstances in which the stay order can be extended in case the Appellate Tribunal does not decide the appeal. The rationale for placing a time limit and providing for automatic vacation of the stay order on expiry of 90 days, is a conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the law-maker to protect the interest.Of the employee. Where a workman (who is on the weaker end of the economic spectrum) been reinstated by a trial court, he cannot be kept out of his job indefinitely on the basis of a stay order issued by an appellate court, On a balance of respective inconveniences and financial strengths, the employer is much better placed to be able to pay a reinstated employee for work done compared tP a workman, who has succeeded before the trial court and may have to. Wait indefinitely for the Appeal to be decided, where he is in no position to do.
8. In these circumstances, extending the stay order beyond the period of 120 days would in effect constitute an amendment of the statute by extension of a period which is fixed by the statute. Such course of action is not permissible under the law, it would defeat not only the spirit of law in question but also the intent of the legislature which is apparent from the plain language of the statute.
9.
It is settled law that constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to deflect express provisions of statutory law. Where the statute is clear that interim relief would automatically lapse after 120 days, extension of same beyond statutory period while the main appeal is pending before PLAT, is neither justified nor supported by sound principles of interpretation. In this regard reference can usefully be made to Mumtaz Hussain alias Bhutta v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore and another (1976 SCM R 450) and the judgment of his Court reported as Habib Bank Limited through President and 2 others v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal through Member and another (2011 PLC 223).
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a judgment of this Court reported as Adamji Insurance Co. v. Sarwar Rana and others (1986 PLC 588). I have gone through the aforesaid judgment. The same has been rendered in a different set of facts and circumstances and does not support the case of the petitioner. Further in the said judgment, the respondent was held entitled to receive current benefits during pendency of the appeal. However, this Court refused to extend the period of limitation provided in the statute. As such the said judgment does not help the petitioner.
11. For the reasons recorded above, I do not find any merit in this IB petition. It is accordingly dismissed.