' AJMAL MIAN, 3.-1. (a) This High Court Appeal is directed against the judgment/decree dated 17-11- 1980 passed by or learned brother Nasir Aslam Zahid, J. In Suit No, 253 of 1977.
' The brief facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who are the parents of deceased Amjad Ali aged 14 at the time of his death, filed the above suit for the recovery of Rs, 3 lacs as damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, against the appellants and the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, on the basis of the averments that on 5-8-76 the deceased with another by Mirza Ali Asghar was going on a cycle from Federal B Area, Karachi to the house of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2's house in Liaquatabad, near the bus stop Block No, 4, bus bearing registration No, KCB-1034 of Route No. 1-D and driven by the respondent No, 4 in rash, careless and negligent manner dashed from behind against the cycle on which these two boys were travelling.
Consequently, both the boys received injuries and were taken to Abbasi Shaheed Hospital. Mirza Ali Asghar was discharged after sometime, but the deceased expired on 7-8-76. The appellants were joined as at the time of the accident they were the owner of the bus. Whereas the respondent No, 3 i. e. Karachi Transport Corporation later on was joined as the defendant No, 2 as since 1-1-77 they took over the Management and assets of the appellant-defendant No. 1. The above suit was resisted by the appellants and the respondent No,
3. Both of the above defendants had filed separate written statements.
(b) On the basis of the pleadings, the following 4 issues were framed: "(1) Whether the defendant No, 3 driving Bus No, KCB-1034 rashly and negligently dashed Amjad Ali who was going on his bicycle accompanied by his friend Mirza Ali Asghar and caused fatal injuries to him?
(2) Whether the defendant No, 2 has started operations with effect from 1-2-1977 and bad no concern with the defendant No. 1, the owner of the bus on 5-8-1976? If so, what is the effect?
(3) Whether the plaintiffs have been deprived of their present and future benefits due to the death of Amjad Ali If so, to what extent?
(4) To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs?"
' In support of claim in suit the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 examined 7 witnesses, whereas no witness was examined by the present appellants, but the respondent No, 3 had examined one witness, namely D. W. 1 N. A. Baseer. On the basis of the evidence the learned Single Judge has decreed the suit for the above sum of Rs, 90,000, against the appellants and the respondent No, 4 jointly and severally. The appellants being aggrieved by the above judgment and decree has filed the present High Court Appeal.
2. (a) In support of the above appeal Mr. Dastgir, learned counsel for the appellant has made the following submissions:
(1) That the learned Single Judge erred in not appreciating that there was negligence on the part of the deceased as he was sitting on the frame of the cycle, whereas the cycle was driven by the other by.
(i0 That the learned Single Judge erred in basing calculation of the amount of damages on the assumption that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 would have survived up to the age of 65 years.
(iii) That the amount of damages have been calculated on wrong basis inasmuch as on the assumption that the deceased by have qualified as an engineer and would have earned Rs, 2,000 per month as the salary, which is highly speculative.
(b) Reverting to the first contention, it may be observed that the learned Single Judge on the basis of the evidence produced by the respondent No. 1 which included three eye-witnesses has come to the conclusion that the accident was caused on account of rash and negligent driving of the bus in question by the respondent No, 4 resulting in the fatal injuries to the deceased. The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out that the above finding is erroneous or is not in accord with the evidence on the record. In this view of the matter, in or view, the mere fact that the deceased was sitting on the frame of the cycle would not disentitle the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from maintaining the above suit. If the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving, as it has been held by the learned Single Judge, in or view, it would not make any difference that the deceased was having cycle ride along with his friend and was sitting on the frame of the cycle, instead of driving himself.
(c) With reference to the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge erred in computing the amount of damages on the assumption that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 would have survived up to the age of 65 years, it may be pertinent to observe that the learned Single Judge in para. 12 of the judgment under appeal has given cogent reasons for taking the view that the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 would have survived up to the age of 65 years, inasmuch as the evidence on the than 65 years. It is true that this Court in many cases have taken the record indicates that in the respondent No, l's family the normal life span is more view that the normal span of life of a deceased involved in a fatal accident for the purpose of computing the damages may be taken as 60 years, but there is no general principle that the amount of damages is to be computed in every case irrespective of the facts of a particular case on the basis of 60 years of age. It may be pertinent to observe that at the time of the accident the age of the deceased was only 14 years. He would have completed his education at the age of 23 or 24 years. If the amount of damages would have been calculated on the basis of 60 years of the deceased's age, in that event, it was to be assessed for a period of 35 years. But since the parent is claimants, the amount of damages has been calculated on the basis of the expected age of the parents, which is in fact to the advantage of the appellants. If the respondent No. 1 is able to satisfy the Court by cogent evidence that in his family the normal span of life is more than 65 years, in that event the Court had discretion to compute the amount of damages on the basis of 65 years of age. In this view of the matter no exception can be taken to the above basis.
(d) As regards the last contention of Mr. Dastgir that the learned Single Judge has calculated the amount of damages on the assumption that the deceased would have earned Rs, 2,000 p. m. And this basis is highly speculative. It may be observed that the deceased was aged 14 years at the time of the accident and was studying in Class VII. In such a case the calculation of the amount of damages is to be made on the basis of guesswork and not on the basis of actual facts. What is to be seen is, whether the amount calculated is on reasonable basis. In the instant case the learned Single Judge has deducted a sum of Rs, 60,000, (being the estimated amount which the parents would have spent on the education of the deceased) from the assessed quantum of damages, which indicates the reasonableness of the basis adopted. In this connection, it may be pertinent to refer to the case of Sri Manmatha Nath Kuri v. Muhammad Mukhlesur Rehman (1), which is a judgment of the Full Court of Supreme Court in which Hamoodur Rehman, C. J. Has made the following observation:- "This case also established that in an action of this nature damages can be recovered in respect of the reasonable expectation of the value of the services that the deceased might have rendered to the members of the family. If in addition to this the evidence also establishes the prospective earning capacity of the deceased than the loss for that too will certainly be compensated.
' Although no rule of mathematical calculation can be adopted in every case yet it is the duty of the plaintiff to adduce some evidence to afford the Court a reasonable basis for the ascertainment of the damages suffered. The value of the life lost, so far as the beneficiaries are concerned, does not depend upon the number of the beneficiaries but upon the earning capacity of the deceased."
' From the above-quoted extract of the Supreme Court, it is apparent that in a case of the nature in question the assessm ent is to be made on the basis of guess work. In the instant case one cannot overlook the fact that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had only one male child i. e. Deceased and that they had no expectation to have another child as the respondent No, 2 was operated upon after the birth of the third child, and, therefore, the entire burden to support their parents would have fallen upon the deceased. The learned Single Judge has calculated the amount of damages on the assumption that the deceased would have contributed Rs, 500 per month for the maintenance of his parents. In or view the above amount is quite reasonable, and even if the deceased would not have qualified as an engineer, he might have been able to earn so many amounts, out of which he could have paid Rs, 500 per month to his parents.
(e) It was also contended by Mr. Dastgir that there was nothing on the record to prove the age of the respondent No,
2. The age of the respondent No, 2 disclosed in the title of the plaint (which has also been reproduced in the title of the present appeal) is 30 years at the time of filing of the suit in 1977, whereas the age of the respondent No. 1 shown was 39 years. It is an admitted position that the appellants did not cross-examine the respondent No. 1 on the question of age. However, it was urged by Mr. Dastgir that the burden was on the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. From the judgment and decree under appeal, it seems that no such plea was raised before the learned Single Judge. In or view, the learned Single Judge could presume the age given in the title of the plaint as correct as the plaint was verified on oath.
(3) In view of the above discussion we do not find any merit in the above appeal and hence the same is dismissed in limine.
(1) PLD 1969 SC 565