1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This petition, seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated the 14th of June, 1980, is barred by 84 days. In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that when the matter came up for arguments before the High Court, the petitioner was not present, as he had not been informed of the date of hearing by his counsel or by the High Court; and that he came to know of the dismissal of his revision petition only three months later on the 13th of September, 1980, through a friend, named Muhammad Waris, who was employed in the Lahore High Court; and that on acquiring this knowledge the petitioner came to Lahore and applied for a copy of the High Court's order on the 15th of September, 1980, which was furnished to him on the 16th of September, 1980. The application further states that having obtained a certified copy of the High Court's order, the petitioner returned to his village on the 18th of September, 1980, for making arrangements for filing the present petition in the Supreme Court, but he had an attack of enteric fever and remained confined to bed till the 30th of October, 1960, and it was with great difficulty that he was able to travel to Rawalpindi thereafter and arranged to file the present petition on the 5th of November, 1980.
2. In support of these averments, the petitioner has placed on the record a copy of a certificate issued by Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Ntazi of Al-Razi Hospital, Mianwali, to the effect that: "Mr. Sher Muhammad son of Jehan is suffering from enteric fever and is under my treatment. Therefore, he is advised complete rest with effect from 18-9-1980 to 30-10-1980". We may first dispose of the medical certificate relied upon by the petitioner. From the photostat copy of the certificate, as well as the original placed on the record, it appears that the certificate was signed by the Doctor on the 18th of September, 1980. It is, indeed, surprising that on the 18th of September, 1980, the Doctor could anticipate that the petitioner needed complete rest with effect from the 18th of September, 1980, to the 30th of October, 1980, that is the date on which he was eventually able to travel to Rawalpindi for making arrangement for the filing of the present petition. It is clear that the certificate was obtained by the petitioner as an afterthought and cannot be accepted as a genuine document.
3. Reverting now to the original delay, which has taken place on the part of the petitioner, we find that his case is that his counsel or the High Court did not inform him of the date of the hearing of the revision petition ; nor did the counsel inform him subsequently of the dismissal of the revision petition on the 14th of June, 1980. It is the settled practice of the High Court that if a counsel has been engaged the intimation of the date of hearing is not given directly to the litigants, and, accordingly, nothing turns on the fact that the petitioner was not informed by the High Court 'that his revision petition was to be head on a certain date. It was undoubtedly the duty of the petitioner's counsel to inform him, if not of, the date of hearing at least of the result, namely, the dismissal of the revision petition, but the counsel failed to perform this duty, and the petitioner learnt of the High Court's order only through a friend three months later. Even if these fact are accepted as correct, this would not constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay, as observed by this Court in Mustafa v. Settlement Commissioner (1974SCMR104) and Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Sakina Bibi (1974SCMR223). In the first mentioned case the petitioner's counsel had, in fact, sent an intimation to the petitioner, which somehow did not reach him in time. The Court observed that: "We are not satisfied that the explanation for the delay put up by the petitioner is either genuine or convincing. It is obvious that the petitioner has been negligent in not keeping himself informed about the fate of his case."
4. In the second case, the delay was attributed to the negligence of the counsel in the matter of furnishing intimation to the petitioner about the dismissal of the case by the High Court. It was observed by the learned Judges that:- Even if the above explanation is to be taken at its face value, it would not constitute a sufficient cause for the condonation of long delay that has taken place in the instant case. The initial obligation was of the petitioners to enquire about the decision in their appeal, or to arrange with their counsel to inform them about the decision if it is announced in their absence. Even if it be assumed that their counsel neglected to inform them that per se would not be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, when a valuable right has accrued to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. We are not satisfied that the petitioners were diligent or took due care in the matter."
5. We are of the view that the observations made in the two precedent cases are fully attracted to the facts of the present case, and, accordingly, no justification is at all made out for condoning delay of 84 days. The petition, therefore, is dismissed as being barred by time.
6. It is for the petitioner to decide whether he would like to move for disciplinary action against his counsel in the High Court for his alleged negligence. He may, if so, advised, move the Provincial Bar Council in this behalf.