' SHAHID WAHEED, J.---The petitioner, Muhammad Yousaf, through this Civil Revision Petition under section 115, C.P.C. Has challenged the judgment and decree dated 21-10-2010 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Gujranwala who affirmed the judgment and decree dated 21-12-2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge Ist Class, Gujranwala whereby his suit for possession through pre-emption was dismissed.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the suit property sold in favour of the respondents vide registered sale-deed dated 29-6-2001 (Exh.P5) was sought to be pre-empted by the petitioner on the ground of his being Shafi-Sharik, Shafi-Khalit and Shafi-Jar with the assertion that he had performed the requisite Talbs in accordance with law. The suit was contested by the respondents, inter alia, on the ground that the same was barred by limitation; and, that the petitioner had no preferential right nor performed Talbs in accordance with law. The learned Trial Court on divergent pleadings settled issues and called upon the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. The petitioner himself appeared before the learned Trial Court as P.W.3 and produced two supporting witnesses namely Qasim Ali (P.W.2) and Muhammad Nawaz (P.W.1). He also tendered documentary evidence. The respondents, however, could not produce any evidence and resultantly the learned Trial Court vide order dated 14-11-2009 by invoking the provision of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Closed the right of the respondents to produce evidence.
3. After recording evidence, the learned Trial Court decided Issue No, 1 (whether the plaintiff fulfilled the requirements of Talbs? OPP) against the petitioner and held that he had failed to make Talabs in accordance with law. Issue No, 2 (i.e, "Whether the disputed sale transaction was kept hidden by the defendants?") was decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner. The issue with regard to superior right of pre-emption was decided in favour of the petitioner. As regards the issue of sale amount, it was decided against the petitioner. Issue No, 5 (i.e, "whether the suit is within limitation?") was decided against the petitioner. The suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 21-12-2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Addl. District Judge. The learned Addl. District Judge reversed the findings of the learned trial Court with regard to issue No, 1 and held that the petitioner had fulfilled the requirements of Talbs. He, however, upheld the findings of the learned trial Court with respect to issue No, 5 and held that the suit was barred by time. In view of the findings recorded in respect of issue No,5, the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 21-10-2010.
Hence, this petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was established on record that petitioner having superior right of preemption had made the Talbs in accordance with law. The only issue on the basis of which the petitioner has been non-suited is the issue of limitation. In this context he submitted that under section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 the period of 4 months has been prescribed for filing a suit for pre-emption and the period in the instant case commenced from the date of registration of sale-deed i.e, 29-6-2001. Relying upon the judgment passed in the case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Ghulam Hussain alias Hussain (2003 YLR 2560), learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the suit of the petitioner was within limitation as the same was filed on 29-10-2001, that is, within four months.
5. Conversely the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the suit of the petitioner was barred by one day; and, that the petitioner had failed to prove the Talbs in accordance with law and, therefore, it was rightly dismissed.
6. The record of this case has been perused and with the consent of the learned counsel for both the parties, this civil revision has been heard today as a Pacca case.
7. The first question which requires determination in this case is as to whether the suit filed by the petitioner was within time or not. Admittedly the sale-deed (Exh.P5) in favour of the respondent/ vendee was registered on 29-6-2001 while the suit to pre-empt the said sale was filed on 29-10- 2001. The period of filing a suit for pre-emption has been prescribed in section 30 of the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991 which reads as under:-- "Limitation.---The period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption under this Act shall be four months from the date:
(a) of the registration of the sale-deed;
(b) of the attestation of the mutation, if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale- deed;
(c) on which the vendee takes physical possession of the property if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale-deed or a mutation; or
(d) of knowledge by the pre-emptor, if the sale is not covered under paragraph (a) or paragraph
(b) or paragraph (c)."
According to above cited section 30 the period for filing a suit for pre-emption is four months from the date of registration of sale-deed. The word "from" has been defined in section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 which reads as under:-- "Commencement and termination of time.---In any West Pakistan Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word "from" and for the purpose of including the last in a series of'days or any other period of time to use the word "to""
The conjunctive reading of section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 leads to the conclusion that while computing the period of limitation the first day is to be excluded, which is further fortified by section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1908 as also by section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The controversy, therefore, veered around the question as to when did the period of four months prescribed in section 30 of the Act ibid expired in the instant case. An answer to that question would, in turn, depends upon the meaning to be attached to the term "four months" or, to be more precise, to the expression "month".
The term "month" has not been defined under the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991. Section 2(38) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, however, defines the word "month" as under:-- "month" shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar."
The above definition does not resolve the issue for what needs to be examined is as to when a month would be complete according to the British Calendar if it were to be reckoned from the date of registration of sale-deed. Neither the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 nor the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 lends any assistance in this regard. The term "reckoned" is equivalent to the term "calculated" or "counted". If the legislature wanted a month to mean only a compact unit of a calendar month, the normal definition would have been as a British calendar month or a calendar month. How a month is to be reckoned has been the subject matter of consideration by courts.
According to Words and Phrases, permanent edition, West Publishing Company:-- "The term "month", whether employed in modern statutes or contracts, and not appearing to have been used in a different sense, denote a period terminating with the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. If there be no corresponding day of the succeeding month, it terminates with the last day, thereof."
' According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, "month" means:-- "A space of time, either (a) extending from any day to the corresponding day of the next calendar month (called 'a calendar month') or (b) containing 28 days (often) miscalled a 'lunar month'. "
' Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition; Volume 37, Paragraph 143, gives the meaning of the word "month". That paragraph states-- "When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter month."
' This question also fell for interpretation in the case of Talib Hussain and another v. Muhammad Sharif and 4 others (2000 CLC 323) and it was held as follows:-- "The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that General Clauses Act, 1898 is not applicable to the present case and that the period of four months is to be reckoned as lunar months, is devoid of any force. The period of limitation provided in the Act is simply 'four months' if the intention of the legislation was Islamic four months or 120 days, it would have specifically mentioned as 'four lunar/Islamic months'. That having not been so incorporated, I am unable to accept his contention that said four months would mean four lunar/Islamic months."
' The above said view was followed in the case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Ghulam Hussain alias Hussain (2003 YLR 2560). In the case of Ghulam Muhammad (supra) the sale mutation was attested in favour of the vendees on 8-2-1992 while the suit was filed by pre-emptor on 8-6-1992. It was held that the suit was within time. I am also in respectful agreement with the 'principal laid down in the above cited precedents. Applying the above to the instant case and excluding the date on which the sale-deed (Exh.P.5) was registered, the first month would expire on 30th July, 2001 and the succeeding three months on 30th August, 2001, 30th September, 2001 and 30th October, 2001. Thus, I am inclined to hold that the suit filed by the petitioner on 29-10-2001 to pre- empt the sale made vide registered sale- H deed dated 29-6-2001 (Exh.P5) was within time.
8. The other important issue in the instant case is issue No, 1 whereby the onus was on the petitioner to prove that he had fulfilled the requirements of Talbs. The learned trial Court decided this issue against the petitioner whereas these findings were reversed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Gujranwala. The findings of the courts below in respect of this issue are at variance and, thus, while exercising my revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C., I deem it expedient to examine this issue so as to avert miscarriage of justice. The petitioner in Paragraph No, 3 of the plaint stated that he came to know about the sale on 2-9-2001 at 12 noon but while appearing before the learned trial Court as P.W.3 he did not state the date and year of making Talb-e-Muwathibat. The statement made by the petitioner (P.W.2) in his examination-in-chief reads as follows:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' It is a settled principle of aw that where a fact is required to be proved through oral evidence, such evidence must be direct and of the primary source. The foundation of such direct evidence in the case about the proof of the fact of Talb-e-Muwathibat, is the person who had made the Talb. If the pre-emptor in his examination-in-chief neither states nor explains about the facts regarding Talb- eMuwathibat i.e, date, month and year then statement of such facts by his witnesses cannot be considered trustworthy and acceptable. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Humayun Naseer Cheema and 3 others v. Muhammad Saeed Akhtar and others (2007 CLC 819) and Haji Muhammad Usman through his legal heirs v. Muhammad Paryal (1987 CLC 552). Thus, I am persuaded to hold that the petitioner had failed to prove making of Talb-e-Muwathibat in accordance with section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.
9. It is the case of the petitioner/pre-emptor that the vendees-respondents had kept the factum of sale-deed secret for which he had no notice. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it has been stated that with regard to sale of the suit property no notice was given to the plaintiff. Paragraph 2 of the plaint reads as under:- ' Section 31(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 provides that it is incumbent upon the officer registering the sale-deed or attesting the mutation of sale to give public notice in respect of such registration or attestation within two weeks as the case may be. Subsection (2) thereof envisages that the notice given under subsection (1) shall be deemed to have been sufficiently given if it is displayed on the main entrance of a mosque and on any other public place of the village or the place where the property is situated. Presumption of regularity is attached to all official acts. It is not the case of the petitioner that officer registering the sale-deed did not comply with the requirement of section 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The petitioner in Paragraph 2 of the plaint has pleaded that with regard to disputed sale no notice was given to him. Section 31 does not contemplate personal notice but instead requires public notice in respect of registration of sale-deed. The petitioner has not led any evidence qua the non-issuance of public notice by the Registering Authority. It would, therefore, be presumed that the petitioner had due knowledge of the registration of sale-deed of the suit-land within two weeks from the issuance of public notice under section 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. In the case in hand, the petitioner sent notices of Talb-e-Ishhad (Exh.P1 and Exh.P2) to the respondent on 11-9-2001 while sale-deed was registered on 29-6-2001. Talb-e-Ishhad was required to be made by sending notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses under registered cover acknowledgment due, to vendee within two weeks of knowledge of sale. The petitioner did not comply with requirement of section 13(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and sent notice of Talb-e-Ishhad after prescribed period of time. The petitioner had failed to make Talbs in accordance with law, therefore, right of pre-emption is not available to him. In this regard reliance may be placed on Muhammad Rafique v. Muhammad Ashiq and 2 others (1996 SCM R 441), Mian Asif Islam v. Mian Muhammad Asif and others (PLD 2001 SC 499) and Muhammad Ramzan v. Lal Khan (1995 SCM R 1510).
10. The C.M. No, 1-C of 2013 moved by the petitioner under Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. For production of additional evidence has been dismissed vide separate order of even date.
11. This petition sans merit and is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.