1. G. SAFDAR SHAH, J.--This appeal by leave of the Court, which is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 18-12-1977, arises in the following circumstances :- Appellant Shaukat Ali, who is a student, sat in the B. A. 1st Annual Examination of the Punjab University held in May, 1976, under Roll No. 28300, from Centre No. 2, Sheikhupura. On 11-5-1976, while answering the Political Science Paper "A", he was found by the Invigilator on duty copying from certain objectionable material. When the Invigilator tried to recover the said material from him he is said to have torn the same into pieces and thrown it away. It seems that during this episode the appellant tried to have a scuffle with the Invigilator, created disturbance in the Examination Hall as well as misbehaved with the members of the Supervisory Staff on duty. There is nothing on the record to show, however, if the appellant was thrown out of the Examination Hall, or else prevented from answering his paper. But respondent No. 1 subsequently served him with a charge-sheet, dated 7-6-1976, calling upon him "to submit your explanation to the above charge to the undersigned by name under a registered cover through the Principal and also show cause within ten days of the receipt of this letter why you should not be disqualified under the Regulations (12, 13 and 18) printed on reverse. You also have the opportunity to be heard in person., by the Disciplinary Committee, if you so desire". Upon receipt of the said notice, the appellant submitted his written explanation thereto on 8-6-1976 in which he not only denied the said various allegations made against him, but took stand that the entire case had been engineered against him by the Deputy Superintendent, namely, Mr. Muhammad Tufail owing to enmity that in that behalf lie had twice met the respondent No. 1, i.e. On 8-5-1976, and 15-5-1976 respectively, and during the course of which meetings, he had not only informed him that the said Deputy Superintendent was inimical to him, but also filed a written application before him that he may be shifted to another centre for taking his examination.
2. The record would show that on 11-8-1976, respondent No. 1 wrote to the appellant a registered letter, intimating therein that the meeting of the Disciplinary Committee was to be held on 19-8-1976, at 10-30 a. m. And so he may appear before the said Committee as desired by him in his reply to the show-cause notice. It is common ground between the parties that the appellant appeared before the Committee on the said date, and was heard in defence. However, the Committee was evidently not satisfied with his explanation, and consequently by its order dated 16-9-1976, informed the appellant in writing that "you have been disqualified for using unfair means in the above-- mentioned examination for the period of three years under regulations 13 and 18 (3) at page 196/97 of the University Calendar, Volume 1 (1963-64). You will not be eligible to re-appear in any University Examination earlier than Ist Annual Examination of 1979".
3. Feeling aggrieved of the said order, the appellant challenged the same through Writ Petition No. 834 of 1977 filed by him in the Lahore High Court, inter alia, on the grounds :-
(1) that the entire case had been manipulated against him by the Deputy Superintendent named, Muhammad Tufail with whom he had enmity ;
(2) that in that behalf he had met respondent No. I on two occasions, i. e. On 8-5-1976 and 15-5- 1976, as also that through a written appli--cation filed before him he had asked to be shifted to another centre to take his examination;
(3) that no objectionable material had been ' recovered from his posses--sion in the Examination Hall and so the contrary allegation made against him in that behalf was wholly baseless ; and
(4) that the impugned action taken against him by the respondents was based on no evidence, nor indeed was he afforded a reasonable oppor--tunity to defend himself.
4. Upon these allegations, the High Court asked for the comments of the respondents, before admitting the petition to regular hearing. In the comments submitted 'ay them, the respondents denied the said allegations, and maintained that the appellant had been caught red-handed, whilst copying from objectionable material in the Examination Hall, and further that he had tried to scuffle with the invigilator, as well as misbehaved with the other members of the Staff present on duty. On receipt of the said comments the High Court admitted the petition to regular hearing, but subsequently dismissed the same, vide the impugned judgment. It was in this background that the appellant filed in this Court C. P. S. L. A. No. 96 of 1978, against the judgment of the High Court, and vide order of this Court, dated 27-2-1978, leave was granted to him to consider the question of the proper construction of rule 20 (a) of the Rules of the University, for the conduct of examinations which is to the following effect :- "Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained no punishment shall be imposed unless a student accused of using unfair means in an examination has been given `reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken with respect to him."
5. The words "reasonable opportunity of showing cause" appearing in the said Rule seem to have been pointedly noted in the leave granting order, as according to the learned counsel for the appellant the said words would mean "that the evidence against the petitioner had to be recorded in his presence, and that the petitioner was entitled to cross-examine the witness or witnesses, who had given evidence against him, and that in any event, the petitioner was entitled to cross- examine Mr. Muhammad Tufail, as he had made this request in writing to the first respondent".
6. Now before we come to consider the effect of the various contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is essential, in so far as the facts of the case are concerned, to put the record straight. As already noted, the main grievance expressed by the appellant in his reply to the show-cause notice, as well as in his writ petition was (1) that Deputy Superintendent Muhammad Tufail was his enemy, anal so he manipulated a false case against him ; (2) that in order to secure his interest against any such manipulation on the part of said Muhammad Tufail, he had conveyed his apprehensions to respondent No. 1, in a meeting held on 8-5-1976, as also that he filed before him a written application in the subsequent meeting, held on 15-5-1976. Requesting therein that he may be shifted to another centre to take his examination ; and (3) that when he appeared before the Disciplinary Com--mittee, he had asked that Muhammad Tufail be made available to him for cross-examination, but his request was rejected.
7. Now in view of these allegations, it was evidently essential for the appellant to have imp leaded the said Muhammad Tufail as a respondent in his writ petition, but for reasons known to him he chose not to imp lead him therefore, the presumption would be that had he impleaded him, Muhammad Tufail would have denied the said allegations. Furthermore, except for his own ipse dixit, there is nothing on the record of the case to support him in that behalf, nor indeed is there any material to show that before the Disciplinary Committee he had made any request that Muhammad Tufail should be made available to him for cross-examination, and his request was turned down. Faced with this situation, as well as the fact that the report against the appellant had been submitted by the Superintendent of the Examination Centre (although the same had been signed by Muhammad Tufail, as well as the Invigilator on duty) the learned counsel for the appellant frankly conceded that as regards Muhammad Tufail, he would be unable to press his objection.
8. The learned counsel, however, argued that it is a case of no evidence, and in that behalf relied on what he claimed to be the affidavit filed by the Invigilator on duly, in the Examination Hall, in which he has denied to have caught the appellant red-handed whilst copying from certain objectionable material. The difficulty, however, is that this affidavit has been filed for the first time in this Court, and consequently the same cannot be taken into consideration, as to verify its consents would entail an inquiry into facts as also that no plea in that behalf has been taken by the appellant before the Disciplinary Committee of the respondents, or in the proceedings before the High Court.
9. The learned counsel next argued that the appellant was not afforded an adequate opportunity by the Disciplinary Committee of the respondents to defend himself; that none of the material, from which he was found copying in the Examination Hall, had been produced before the Disciplinary Committee, and so the impugned action taken against him was without jurisdiction. Now it is true that none of the said material had been produced before the Disciplinary Committee, but that can hardly be a ground to complain that the appellant had not been afforded a fair opportunity to defend himself. The law in this behalf has been laid down by this Court in the University of Decca through its Vice-Chancellor and another v. Zakir Ahmad (PLD 1965 SC 90) in which (at page 104 of the judgment), it was held that "the general consensus of judicial opinion seems to be that, in order to ensure the "elementary and essential principles of fairness" as a matter of necessary implication, the person sought to be affected must at least be made aware of the nature of the allegations against him, he should be given a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement putting forward his own case and to correct or controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice".
10. Of course, the person, body or authority concerned must act in good faith, but it would appear that it is not bound to treat the matter as if it was a trial or to administer oath or examine witnesses in the presence of the person accused or give him facility for cross-examining the witnesses against him or even to serve a formal charge-sheet upon him. Such a person or authority can obtain information in any way it thinks fit, provided it gives a fair opportunity to the person sought to be affected to correct o: contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to him. In other words, "in order to act justly and to reach just ends by just means" the Courts insist that the person or authority should have adopted the above "elementary and essential principles" unless the same had been expressly excluded by the enactment empowering him to so act."
11. Now the underlined words appearing in the said passage would suffice to furnish a satisfactory answer to the contention urged by the learned counsel. It is true that the material from which the appellant was caught copying was riot before the Disciplinary Committee of the respondents, but there was present before the Committee the report of the Superintendent of the Examination Centre of the appellant, duly signed by Muhammad Tufail, as well as the invigilator present on duty, in which all the relevant facts as to the unfair means adopted by the appellant had been fully mentioned. It is not the case of the appellant that the Disciplinary Committee had not apprised him of the said facts, or that he was not heard in his defence. It is no body's case that the Committee had examined any witnesses in support of the charges levelled against the appellant, but the same was not essential in the light of the view taken in that behalf in the above judgment of this Court in which it was further held :- "The necessity of maintaining discipline in educational institutions or other institutions or Departments where the maintenance of discipline is essential for the orderly conduct of the institution or Department concerned," is essential, and further that nor are we unmindful of the fact that persons in charge particularly of educational institutions must be given the fullest authority to correct those placed in their charge in the same manner as a parent or guardian would be able to do." So long as the said persons act in a manner "which includes every reasonable possibility of unfair action being taken."
12. Now on a first impression, this principle might seem to be rather harsh, but on a closer examination it should be easy enough to comprehend its innate wisdom. As observed in the above judgment of this Court, the persons in charge of the educational institutions must be given the fullest authority vis-a-vis their students in' the same manner as a parent or guardian. From this it would follow that in a case of the present nature the presumption would be that the student had indeed been proceeded against properly and without any malice, unless, of course, he would be able to discharge the said initial presumption operating against him by producing some evidence to the effect that the action initiated against him was based on mala fides. If in a given case the student is found to have succeeded in that behalf only then the burden would shift to the authorities to establish the charge against the student on the basis of evidence, which must be recorded in his presence and he afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, as well as to produce his own evidence in rebuttal. In other words, in the absence of any evidence to show that the action initiated against a students based on mala fides, it would be quite proper for the authorities, provided they afford a fair opportunity to him to correct or, contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to his interest, to proceed against him for the violation of any rules, and in that behalf the authorities would be under no compulsion to formally charge-sheet him or to examine the witnesses in his presence or to afford him the facility of cross-examining any witness.
13. The principle of law laid down in the said judgment has been followed by this Court in Abdus Saboor Khan v. Karachi University and another (PLD 1966 SC 536), Syed Arif Alf v. Vice-Chancellor, University of Karachi and another (1969 SCMR 239), Disciplinary Committee of the University of the Punjab, Lahore and another v. Malik Abdul Majid (Law Notes 1971 SC 265) although the judgment in each case proceeded on its own merits. In Controller of Examinations, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Muhammad Yaqub (P 1. D 1977 SC 69 4) however, Dorab Patel, J.
14. Disagreed with the view taken by the other two learned Judges of the Bench, namely, Salahuddeen Ahmad, Actg. C. J. And Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J., who having recalled with approval the principle laid down in the University of Dacca and another v. Zakir Ahmad nevertheless proceeded to dismiss, the petition for leave to appeal filed on behalf of the Controller of Examinations, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore, inter alia, on the grounds that the finding of guilt recorded against the student respondent was based on no convincing evidence ; that the charge- sheet served on the respondent by the Disciplinary Committee was vague ; and that in view of the fact that the respondent student had levelled definite allegations of bias against the Deputy Superintendent, it was essential for the Disciplinary Committee to have examined the latter, the moreso when the respondent had requested the Committee to summon him at his own expense but his request was turned down. The view taken by Dorab Patel, J. However, was, and in which behalf he fully relied on the University of Dacca and another v. Zakir Ahmad that since the respondent was not entitled even to a formal charge-sheet, the question of the charge-sheet served on him being vague evidently required fuller examination and consequently leave should be granted to the petitioner for the consideration of the said question. He was further of the view that since in the writ petition filed by him in the High Court, the respondent had not taken the plea of bias against the Deputy Superintendent, nor indeed had the Deputy Superintendent been impleaded by him as respondent, as also that no request had been made by him to the Committee that the Deputy Superintendent be summoned for the purpose of cross-examination, it was doubtful whether the High Court, in view of the law laid down in the above University of Dacca case, was competent to allow the writ petition, and set aside the order passed against him by the petitioners.
15. Now by going through the judgment of the majority in that case, their Lordships do not seem to have really disagreed with the view taken in the University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmad as the learned counsel for the petitioners frankly conceded that "although the so-called objectionable material placed on the record of the Centre Superintendent contained answers -to questions 4, 5 and 8 of the Question Paper of which questions 2, 3 and 5 had been attempted by the respondent, the comparison did not give the slightest indication of copying and therefore allegations of copying were obviously baseless and stood completely falsified.
16. Now in this view of the unqualified admission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is obvious that the very proceedings drawn against the respondent in that case had no basis whatever, and so the judgment of the majority was clearly unexceptionable. It is true that the learned Judges of the majority did indeed go into the further ques--tion, namely, the vagueness of the charge-sheet served on the respondent, as well as the fact that the respondent had taken a definite plea of bias against the Deputy Superintendent, and yet the latter was not examined by the Disciplinary Committee, but their decision in that behalf would really be in the nature of obiter dicta, as upon the admitted facts of that case their Lordships were really not called upon to decide the said questions.
17. It should thus be clear that the words "reasonable opportunity of showing cause" appearing in rule 20 (a) of the Rules of the Punjab University, for the conduct of examinations, have been authoritative construed by this Court in the University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmad as 'the view taken therein has been consistently followed in the subsequent judgment. In this view, it is idle on the part of the appellant contend that he had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself by the Disciplinary Committee of the respondents. After all he was served with a detailed show-cause notice, to which he replied in extenso, and thereafter he appeared before the Disciplinary Committee, which heard him in regard to the allegations made against him. In the circumstances, the test laid down by this Court in the above University of Dacca case had been fully satisfied, and consequently it must be held that the subsequent action taken against the appellant, by the Disciplinary Committee of the respondents, was entirely proper to which no exception could be taken in the writ proceedings filed by the appellant in the High Court.
18. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. But under the circum-- stances, the parties will bear their own costs.