Muhammad Azam Khan, C.J.--The captioned appeal with the leave of the Court arises out of the judgment of the High Court dated 13.6.2008 whereby Civil Revision Petition No, 4/2006, filed by the appellant, herein, has been dismissed.
2. Precise facts of the case are that the appellant filed a preemption suit in respect of Survey Nos, 258 and 283, situate in village Chatrora, Tehsil & District Bagh. The suit was dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge Bagh on 25.6.2005. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff appellant, filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge Bagh. The District Judge accepted the appeal on 22.9.2005 and directed the plaintiff to deposit the decretal amount on or before 25.10.2005. On the last date i,e, 25.10.2005, the plaintiff filed an application for extension of time for depositing the decretal amount. The District Judge, on 24.11.2005, dismissed the application. The appellant challenged the said order through a revision petition before the High Court. A learned single Judge in the High Court dismissed the revision petition through the impugned judgment dated 13.6.2008.
3. Mr. Tahir Aziz Khan, advocate, counsel for the appellant, argued that the application for enlargement of time is competent under Section 148, C.P.C. The decree was passed on 22.9.2005 and it was ordered that the plaintiff shall deposit the decretal amount on or before 25.10.2005. The application for extension in time was moved on 25.10.2005, which was the last date. He referred to the cases reported as Syed Bashir Hussain Shah & 11 others vs. Ghulam Akram & 6 others [PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 174] and Jehandad Khan us. Muhammad Arif Khan [1991 M LD 2109]. The learned counsel made submission that the decree was passed on 22.9.2005 and a devastating earthquake occurred on 8.10.2005. The appellant had purchased a defence saving certificate of Rs, 100,000/- which had matured and he was to be paid the amount of Rs,2,90,000/- but the building of the post office and the place from where the certificate was purchased, were destroyed in the earthquake.
Due to destruction of record it was not possible to get cashed the defence saving certificate.
Moreover, one daughter of the plaintiff appellant died in the earthquake and his one son was injured, who was under treatment in a hospital at Rawalpindi, therefore, he couldn't manage the requisite decretal amount. This was a sufficient ground for extension of time. He requested for acceptance of appeal.
4. While controverting the arguments of the counsel for the appellant, Mr. Mansoor Pervaiz Khan, advocate, counsel for the respondents, argued that the judgment of the High Court is perfectly legal. After passing a final decree the Court becomes functus officio and under Section 148, C.P.C., it cannot extend time because it has no jurisdiction in the matter. He referred to the cases reported as Mst Hanifa Begum vs. Hassan Sheikh & 3 others [PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 163] and Mst. Zulekha Khatoon vs. Ch. Muhammad Yasin & 5 others [2004 SCR 535].
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is undisputed that the decree for possession on the basis of right of prior purchase against an amount of Rs, 3,30,000/-, together along with the costs, was passed in favour of the appellant on 22.9.2005 by the District Judge Bagh while accepting the appeal. The District Judge directed the plaintiff to deposit the decretal amount on or before 25.10.2005. He moved an application for extension of time on following grounds:--
(i) That he had purchased a defence saving certificate of Rs,100,000/-, which, on maturity, is now of the value of Rs,2,90,000/- but due to devastating earthquake on 8.10.2005, the whole system is paralyzed. The governmental and semi-governmental institutions are not working. The certificate was purchased from the post office and the amount cannot be paid to him due to the reason that all the record in the post office is disturbed. The Court system is also disturbed. The buildings have been collapsed, therefore, he couldn't arrange the decretal amount.
(ii) That during the earthquake one of his daughters died and his son was injured, who is under treatment in CMH Rawalpindi.
(iii) That the defendant has also filed an appeal in the High Court against the decree.
The District Judge dismissed the application on the ground that there is no sufficient cause shown by the plaintiff.
6. Before determining the sufficient cause we will deal with the question whether under Section 148, C.P.C., after passing of final decree, the Court becomes functus officio or it can pass an order for extension of time. Section 148, C.P.C., postulates that when any period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may, under its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted has expired. The Section is applicable in the case where the Court has fixed any period for doing an act. The Court has power to enlarge and extend the time if it has seisin over the matter. If the Court has passed a preliminary decree and the matter is subjudice before the Court, then the Court has power to extend time but when the Court has passed a final decree and the matter is not pending before it, the Court after passing such final decree, becomes functus officio and cannot enlarge the time. The decree normally puts an end to the suit and the power of the Court to pass any other order with regard to that particular suit thereafter also comes to an end and the Court becomes functus officio. However, in preliminary decree the Court doesn't become functus officio but still retains control over actions and has power to make orders including extension of time. In a pre- emption suit the decree is passed under Order XX, Rule 14, C.P.C., we deem it proper to reproduce Order XX, Rule 14, C.P.C., which is as under:-- "14. Decree in pre-emntion suit.--(1) Where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase-money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall--
(a) Specify a day on or before which the purchase-money shall be so paid, and
(b) Direct that on payment into Court of such purchase money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs.
(2)
(a)
(b)
A perusal of above-reproduced rule reveals that while passing a preemption decree, the Court shall fix a date on or before which the purchase-money is to be paid and the Court shall direct the plaintiff to deposit in the Court the purchase-money together with the costs on or before the day referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1). If the decretal amount is not paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs. Such decree is final one and the Court becomes functus officio. The Court has no control over the matter after passing the decree. While passing the final decree, if the Court orders that if a decree-holder fails to deposit the decretal amount on or before a particular date the suit shall stand dismissed, in that case the order operates automatically but while passing the decree, if the Court orders that if the decree-holder fails to deposit the decretal amount on or before a particular date, the suit will be dismissed, in that case a separate order in default is necessary for the dismissal of suit and the Courts always have control over the matter. The proposition came under consideration of this Court in the case reported as Syed Bashir Hussain Shah & 11 others vs. Ghulam Akram & 6 others [PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 174], wherein, in para 13 it has been observed as under:-- "13. This section, it would appear, gives power to the Courts to extend the time previously fixed or granted for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure. They can do so even after the period originally fixed has expired. This section, it is now settled, does not apply where the period if fixed by a decree in a suit unless the decree is in the nature of preliminary decree or the Court still retains seisin over the action. The principle upon which it has been so held is that since a decree normally puts an end to a suit, the power of the Court to pass any other order with respect to that particular suit thereafter also comes to an end and the Court becomes "functus officio" with regard thereto. Exception made in the case of preliminary decree is also on the same basis that in the case of such a decree the Court does not become "functus officio" but still retains control over the action and, therefore, has full power to make necessary order thereunder including an order for the extension of time."
7. We have also considered the authority referred to by the counsel for the respondents i,e, Mst.
Zulekha Khatoon vs. Ch. Muhammad Yasin & 5 others [2004 SCR 535]. The captioned case relates to the deposit of 1/5th of the consideration amount. The proposition before the Court was that when the plaintiff has moved an application that instead of 1/5th amount he may be allowed to furnish the security in the like amount. The trial Court at one side dismissed the application and on the other side extended the time. This Court observed that after expiry of time the Court has become functus officio and no order can be passed, as the provisions of Section 21 of the Right of the Prior Purchase Act are mandatory. The authority is not helpful to the case of the respondents.
8. For determining the question whether the decree is final and operates automatically or some further order has to be passed, we have to look into the decree passed by the District Judge. The District Judge passed the following decree;-- {{URUD TEXT}} The District Judge in unequivocal terms, has ordered that if the plaintiff/appellant deposits Rs,3,30,000/- the total decretal amount together with the costs of the sale-deed up to 25.10.2005 in the trial Court, then the decree shall become final, otherwise the suit filed by the plaintiff/ appellant shall stand dismissed. The language of the decree is crystal clear and leaves no doubt that the decree is final and it operates automatically. Had the Court not passed a final order, then it had jurisdiction to extend the time. The case of the plaintiff, appellant herein, is not covered under the provisions of Section 148, C.P.C.
9. Since we have reached to the conclusion that after passing the final decree, the Court was no more seized with the matter and it had become functus officio, therefore, the question of sufficient cause is not relevant for the decision of the appeal. It will be an exercise in futility.
The result of the above discussion is that finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with no order as to the costs.