DECISION The services of the appellants who was appointed on probation as Assistant Store Keeper in the respondent establishment, vide their letter, dated 8th March, 1979, and whose period of probation is said to have been extended on two occasions, were terminated with effect from 16th August, 1979, vide letter of even date issued by the respondent escablishment. The appellant challenged the order of his termination of services before the learned Fifth Labour Court which has dismissed his grievance petition on the ground that the appellant was not confirmed or permanent workman and hence his service could be validly terminated by the respondent establishment. 1 have heard Mr. Lqbal Anwar Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant whose main contention was that upon the completion of three months period of probation the appellant ceased to be a probationer and consequently the authorities in the cases of Glaxo Laboratories v. Industrial Tribunal and Muhammad Sidique Javed v. Government of West Pakistan upon which the learned Labour Court has relied would not be applicable in the instant case. There is undoubtedly considerable force in the con tention of the learned counsel. According to clause (c) of Standing Order 1, "a 'probationer' is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed three months service therein ". It is thus clear that upon completion of three months' service a probationer will cease to fall within the above definition. It is important to notice that satisfactory completion of three months' service is not an essential requirement of the definition except where a probationer claims to have become a permanent workman. In the instant case, although the appellant had completed three months' service as a probationer, his work was not found satisfactory and accordingly he was given two chances to improve his work, first by the letter, dated I7th June, 1979, and the second, by the letter, dated 17th July, 1979. In both these letters1 2 it was explicitly indicated that the appellants performance of work had not been found satisfactory and hence his probationary period was being extended. The extension of the probationary period after the completion of three months' service by the appellant may not have had the effect of the appellant continuing to serve as a probationer, in view of the definition of probationer contained in Standing Order 1, but since the appellant had not satisfactorily completed his probationary period he cannot rightly claim to be a permanent workman, in view of the definition of permanent workman in Standing Order 1. It has been held by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of P.
I. A. v. Sind Labour Court No, V that a workman cannot become permanent workman solely on ground of having been in employment for more than nine months. There is still less force in the claim of a workman to have become permanent when he has not satisfactorily completed the period of probation though he may have been continued in employment thereafter. The question as to how a workman was to be considered, whose period of probation had been extended beyond the period of three months specified in Standing Order 1, was examined by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Deutache Dampschiefahrts Gesellschaft 'Hansa' v. Muhammad Aquil and others, where it was held as follows :- "Mr. Nizam Ahmed, the learned counsel for petitioners, contended that though the petitioner had by letter dated 27th December, 1979 purported to extend the respondents' period, this letter in fact amounted to fresh employment of the respondent No. 1 for which a fresh period of probation was prescribed, We are afraid we cannot read a letter which expressly does not terminate the services of respondent No. 1, but extends his probationary period, as a fresh letter of appointment. So that as it may, the question that arises for or consideration is whether or not the respondent became a permanent employee of the petitioner on the expiry of his first period of probation. Under Standing Order 1 the respondent would have become a permanent workman only on satisfactory completion of the probationary period of three months and since he had not completed this period to the satisfaction of the employer he did not become permanent. Furthermore in the present case the respondent No, I had accepted the extension of his probationary period, by accepting the petitioner' s letter dated 17th December, 1971: When the petitioner did not confirm the respondent after the extended probationary period, it was not only acting in terms of' the letter dated 17th December, 1971 but even In law it was not obliged to confirm him."
2. As in the reported case of Muhammad Aquil the appellant had accepted the extension in his probationary period. In any case, he is to be considered only a temporary workman and not confirmed or as permanent workman. Now, as provided in clause (2) of Standing Order 12, the services of a temporary workman can be terminated at any time without notice. This was precisely what has been done by the respondent establishment. No doubt, even the service of temporary workman cannot be terminated on the ground of misconduct without following the prescribed procedure in Standing Order 15, as provided in clause 5 of Standing Order 12, but the services of the appellant were not terminated on the ground of misconduct but only on the ground that his work bad not been found to be satisfactory. In other words, he had not come upto the mark. This does not constitute misconduct for the purposes of Standing Order 15. Consequently, the provisions of either clause (5) of Standing Order 12 or Standing Order 15 are not attracted in this case.
3. For the reasons discussed by me above, I am of the view that the services of the appellant were terminated by the respondent establishment in accordance with the law and that his grievance petition was rightly rejected by the learned Labour Court. I would accordingly, dismiss this appeal. 1962 PLC 362 PLD 1974 SC 3933 4 1 2