DECISION ' The issue which falls to be considered in the instant case is whether an order by a Labour Court dismissing an application to restore a grievance petitiaamder section 25-A,
1. R.
0., is appealable to this Tribunal.
2. The circumstances which have given rise to this appeal, shortly stated, are that on 17-6-1980 the appellant filed a grievance petition under section 25-A, I. R.
0., against the termination of his services by his employer, the respondents herein. By an order, dated 24-5-1980, the appellant's grievance petition was dismissed because of the absence of the appellant and his representative. The appellant, on 27-5-80, filed an application for restoration of his grievance petition. The said restoration application was fixed for hearing on 13-7-1980 on which date both the appellant and his learned Representative were again absent and consequently the restoration application was also dismissed in default. The appellant has now came up in appeal against the order dismissing his restoration application.
3. Under subsection (3) of section 37, I. R.
0., an appeal lies only against a decision given under section 25-A, I. R.
0., and not against every order made under the said section. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the impugned order is a "decision" for the purpose of section 25-A, I. R.
0. Subsection (4) of section 25-A provides that upon a grievance petition being preferred before a Labour Court, it is required to give its decision thereon within seven days. Originally, the Labour Court was required to give an "award" as a grievance petition was to be dealt with as if it were an industrial dispute. However, by Act V of 1972 the expression "answered" was substituted by the word "decision". It would, thus, appear that the term "decision", as used in sections 25-A and 37, I. R.
0., is applicable to the final adjudication by the Labour Court of a grievance petition and not an interlocutory order or an order on a miscellaneous application. ##TSE# A decision need not necessarily be on merits, for the other side may admit the claim of the aggrieved worker or the applicant/claimant may withdraw his claim or there may be a settlement or the grievance petition may be dismissed on technical grounds, including default by the worker or his counsel. The dismissal of a grievance petition by reason of default could thus be reasonably construed as a "decision" for the purpose of sections 25-A and 37(3), I. R.
0., as it disposes of the petition, so far as the Labour Court is concerned, mid hence an appeal would lie against such dismissal. However, I am inclined to the view that the same reasoning would not apply to orders passed on a restoration application. In my opinion, an order dismissing a restoration application cannot be construed as a "decision" for the grievance petition already stands dismissed and it is the dismissal of the grievance petition which amounts to a decision. As such, while the appellant could have preferred an appeal against the order, dated 24-5-1980, dismissing the grievance petition, which was not challenged, no appeal lies against the impugned order.
4. For the reasons discussed by me above, the appeal is dismissed on the ground that it does not lie. The impugned order is only subject to suo motu revisional powers -of this Tribunal, as provided in subsection (3-a) of section 38. However, there appears to me no valid grounds for the exercise of such powers, particularly on the basis of a memo. Of appeal by an aggrieved party.