' SHUJAAT ALI KHAN,. J.- By means of this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside of order dated 7-10-2009, passed by the learned District Judge, Bahawalnagar.
2. Briefly, respondents Nos,l to 3 filed a declaratory suit against the petitioner and respondent No,4 for cancellation of Mutations Nos,358 and 488 dated 21-2-2002 and 27-3-2003 respectively as a consequential relief. The said suit was duly contested by the petitioner and respondent No,4 by way of filing written statement. The petitioner and respondent No,4 submitted an application for rejection of plaint on the ground that the suit was intentionally undervalued for the purpose of jurisdiction and court-fee on which the learned trial Court, vide order dated 22-10-2007 directed the plaintiffs/respondents Nos,l to 3 to pay requisite court-fee of Rs, 15,000/- till 23-11-2007 which order, was assailed by the plaintiffs in revision, petition and on dismissal of the same, vide order dated 3-9-2008, plaintiffs paid court-fee on 22-9-2008. Thereafter petitioner submitted an application for dismissal of the plaint due to noncompliance of the order dated 22-10-2007 of the learned trial Court as the court-fee was deposited on 22-9-2008 instead of stipulated period till 23-11-2007-, as directed by the court, which application was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 21-2-2009 against which the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Bahawalnagar, which too was dismissed vide order dated 7-10-2009; hence this petition.
3. The resume of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that while dismissing the application filed by him for rejection of the plaint due to non-compliance of order passed, by the learned trial Court, both the courts below did not consider that even after dismissal of his revision petition, respondents Nos,l to 3 failed to furnish requisite court-fee within the stipulated time that the observation of the learned revisional Court that no specific time for payment of court-fee -was fixed by the learned trial Court is against record; that though plaint of suit deserves to be rejected when the plaintiff despite clear-cut direction by the Court failed to make up the deficiency of court-fee but the observation of the learned revisional court runs contrary to the law on the subject; that the learned trial Court vide order dated 22-10-2007 directed respondents Nos,l to 3 in unequivocal terms that they should furnish the requisite court-fee within 30 days but they failed to do so, therefore, the plaint of the suit filed by them deserves to be rejected under Order Vll, rule 11, C.P.C,; that the learned Civil Judge was not competent enough to receive the stamp papers; that both the courts below have not attended to the case-law cited by the petitioner and that the findings of both the courts below are based on suppositions. .
4. Conversely, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos,l to 3, while defending the impugned orders, states that affixation of court-fee. Is a matter between the court and the plaintiff and petitioner has nothing to do with the same; that the operation of order dated 22-10-2007 passed by the learned trial Court whereby the respondents ' were directed to deposit the court-fee was suspended by the revisional court on 7-11-2007; hence there was no stipulation for the respondents to deposit the court-fee; that soon after dismissal of their revision petition the respondents deposited the court-fee on 22-9-2008; that the law favours the decisions on merits instead of technicalities; that since valuable rights of the respondents were involved, the learned courts below have rightly declined to knock them out on the basis of technicalities and that in case the impugned orders are set aside, the respondents who have already paid the court-fee would be deprived of their valuable rights.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No,4 while toeing the lines of learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this petition may be accepted and the impugned orders be set aside.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the documents appended with this petition.
7. A glance on the documents appended with this petition brings it to light that vide order dated 22-10-2007 the learned trial Court directed respondents Nos.1 to 3/plaintiffs to furnish the court-fee of Rs,15,000 till 23-11-2007. The respondents Nos.1 to 3 challenged the said order before the revisional court which suspended the operation of the said order. In this situation the stipulation of furnishing of court-fee till 23-11-2007 became redundant. Insofar as the petitioner's contention that respondents Nos.1 to 3 were bound to furnish the court-fee within 30 days is concerned, I do not find myself in agreement with the learned counsel on this point as no time-frame in terms of days was fixed by the learned trial Court, therefore, the said fact cannot be pressed into service , by the petitioner.
8. Now coming to the most pivotal question involved between the parties as to whether the stipulation fixed by the learned trial Court for furnishing of court-fee was still operative even after suspension of its operation by the revisional Court. In this: regard, I am of the humble view that when the operation of order dated 22-10-2007 was suspended by the revisional court, the stipulation regarding furnishing of court-fee till 23-11-2007 was no more in the field. As the revision petition filed by respondents No,1 to 3 remained pending till 3-9-2008 and operation of impugned order dated 22-10-2007 remained suspended it was not binding upon them to furnish court-fee till 23-11-2007. The bona fide of respondents Nos.1 to 3 is also manifest from the fact that soon after dismissal of their revision petition, they deposited the requisite court-fee on 22-9-2008.
9. Even otherwise under section 149, C.P.C. The court has the power to extend the time. In the case in hand, after dismissal of the revision petition filed by respondents Nos.1 to 3 the court did not fix time afresh as the earlier date fixed for furnishing of requisite fee became redundant due to filing of revision petition by respondent No,3, thus, respondents Nos.1 to 3 cannot be penalized on the ground that they did not provide the court-fee within 30 days.
10. Further, concurrent findings recorded by the courts below cannot be upset in Constitutional jurisdiction until and unless they are proved perverse or result of arbitrariness. Reliance in this regard can safely be placed on the case of Farhat Jabeen v. Muhammad Safdar and others (2011 SCM R 1073) wherein the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has declared as under:- "Heard. From the impugned judgment of the learned High Court, it is eminently clear that the evidence of the respondent side was only considered and was made the basis of setting aside the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two courts of fact; whereas the evidence of the appellant was not adverted to at all, touched upon or taken into account, this is a serious' illegality committed by the High Court because it. Is settled rule by now that interference in the findings of facts concurrently arrived at by the courts, should not be lightly made, merely far the reason that another conclusion shall be possibly drawn, on the reappraisal of the evidence; rather interference is restricted to the cases of misreading and non-reading of material evidence which has bearing on the fate of the case."
' Moreover, in the case of Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others (PLD 2007 SC 45) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid the law to the following effect:- '"*The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to point out any legal or factual infirmity in the concurrent finding on the above question of fact to justify the interference of the High Court in the writ jurisdiction and this is settled law that the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction is not supposed to interfere in the findings on the controversial question of facts based on evidence even if such finding is erroneous. The scope of the judicial review ,of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in such cases, is limited to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence for if the finding is based on no evidence which may cause miscarriage of justice but it is not proper for the High Court to disturb the finding of fact through reappraisal of evidence in writ jurisdiction or exercise this jurisdiction as a substitute of revision or appeal."
' In sequel to above discussion, we are of the considered view that the interference of the High Court in the concurrent finding of the two Courts regarding the existence of relationship of land and tenant between the parties was beyond the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 199 - of the Constitution and consequently, we convert this petition into an appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow the appeal with no order as to costs."
11. When a party otherwise has a good case, it cannot be thrown out on the basis of technicalities rather the court should decide the lis between the parties after recording evidence.
12. For what has been discussed above, I see no force in this petition which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to cost.