' MRS. IRSHAD QAISER, J.---This revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25-7-2008 of the learned Additional District Judge-IV, Mansehra, whereby, appeal filed by the present petitioners against the judgment and decree dated 29-6-2006 of Civil Judge, Mansehra, was dismissed.
2. The brief and essential facts leading to the present petition are that respondent No,1 Aurangzeb Khan Instituted Suit No,29/1 on 10-5-2001 in the Court of Civil Judge, Mansehra against the petitioners and 'pro forma' respondents Nos.11 to 25 and respondent No,2 (proforma respondent No,26 in the suit) for declaration regarding the partition proceedings conducted by Tehsildar, Mansehra, being 'Hissadar' owner in possession of the disputed property to the extent of 8 'Kanals'
10 Marlas' comprised in Whasra' Nos.3063 and 3077, situated in `Mauna' Mansehra. He also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the petitioners from interference in the disputed property or to alienate the same.
3. The present petitioners contested the suit and filed written statement. Based on the, contesting pleadings, the learned Civil Judge, Mansehra framed eight issues and after recording pro and contra evidence in the case, the suit filed by respondent No,1 was decreed in his favour to the extent of his Shari Share in one half of the disputed property being legal heir of late Ali Asghar Khan and partition proceedings were also declared illegal and partition mutation was cancelled vide judgment and decree dated 29-6-2006.
' Aggrieved thereof, the present petitioners challenged the said judgment and decree before Additional District Judge, Mansehra by filing an appeal. However, the said appeal was held to be barred by limitation for four days and was dismissed vide. Impugned judgment and decree dated 25-7-2008. Hence, this revision petition.
4. Valuable arguments of learned counsel for the parties heard and available record thoroughly perused.
5. Perusal of record would reveal that the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the petitioners by invoking provisions of section 3 read with Article 152 of the Limitation Act, 1908 considering it to be barred by limitation for four days and held that the petitioners could have filed appeal before expiry of period of limitation on 27-8-2006, as the Courts of Additional District Judges, Mansehra had remained functional during summer vacations in the month of August, 2006. The practice in vogue in our province is that all the subordinate Civil as well as District Courts remain closed for civil business during summer vacations in the month of August and the District Courts mainly conduct criminal cases and only stay matters in civil cases. This Court, while keeping all the attending facts and peculiar circumstances of the present case, is of the view that the present matter squarely falls under section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The provision provided in section 4 of the Act reads that:- "4. Where Court is closed when period expires. Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred, or made on the day that the Court re-opens."
Admittedly, the present petitioners were delivered certified copies of the judgment and decree of the trial Court on 3-8-2006 and the District Courts were closed for civil business from 1-8-2006 to 31-8-2006. The limitation for presenting appeal expired on 27-8-2006 and the petitioners preferred the appeal on the very first day of reopening of Courts on 1-9-2006, which was surely filed within time in view of the aforesaid provisions of section 4 of the Act.
6. While dealing with a similar matter, the Honourable Apex Court in Muhammad Ramzan's case (1991 SCM R 716) has observed that:-- "On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, as admittedly the period of limitation for the appeal in this case expired on 28th June, 1985, on which day the High Court of Sindh was closed for summer vacation, the appeal could be competently preferred on the reopening day of the Court, which was 1st August, 1985, when indeed the appeal was presented in the High Court."
' In Rasul Baksh's Case (PLD 1960 (W.P) Karachi 741), the issue in hand was discussed eloquently and it was held as follows:-- "It is clear from these rules that according to instructions applicable to the Civil Courts in the former Province of Sind, no civil judicial work, except of an urgent nature, is to be conducted during the annual vacation. That being so, section 4 of the Limitation Act would apply, with the result that when in any appeal or suit the period of limitation expires during the vacation, the matter would be within time if instituted on the first day of the reopening of the Civil Courts after such vacation. This is exactly what has happened in the present case, whichever date is adopted as the starting point, the period of limitation expired during vacation, and the appeal was filed on 1-9-1958, which was the first day of the re-opening of the Court. The appeal was therefore within time, and could not have been dismissed as barred by limitation."
' The above issue has also been dilated upon in Ikramullah's case (PLD 1979 SC 741), Nooruddinls case (2000 SCM R 354) and Haji Zakaria's case (1989 CLC 1033).
7. This Court also considers that the most cherished goal of administration of justice is to resolve all issues on merits. This .Object has been explained by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mst.Sughran Bibi v. Mst.Jamila Begum (2001 SCM R 772) wherein it is held:- "Law favours adjudication of all disputed facts on merits after granting opportunity to the parties to prove the same so that the rights of the parties may be determined finally."
8. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the Appellate Court, while exercising the jurisdiction had not applied its conscious mind to the facts of the case and rendered its findings without legally appreciating the law applicable to the present case. Thus, the said findings warrant interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
9. Accordingly, for the reasons stated hereinabove, this revision petition is accepted, the impugned judgment and decree of the Appellate Court are set aside and the case is remanded back to the Appellate Court for decision afresh on merits for finally settling the dispute between the parties, in accordance with law.
10. As the present matter dates back to the year 2001, therefore, the learned Appellate Court is directed to expeditiously dispose of the case, within a period of six months, if not earlier, from the date of the receipt of this judgment.