This Petition for Special Leave to Appeal filed under Section 417(2), Cr.P.C, is directed against the order dated 28.10.2003 passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, Multan, whereby he while accepting the application of the respondent, dismissed the complaint mainly on the ground that copies the statements, required in terms of Section 241-A, Cr.P.C, were not provided to the respondent.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the provisions of Sections 241-A, Cr.P.C. are directory in nature and a reasonable time ought to have been granted to the petitioner to comply with the provisions of law, if the same were not earlier complied with. Further contends that copies were supplied to the respondent and the Ahlmad concerned had signed the receipt of talbana. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on Karim Dad us.
Muhammad and 4 others (1980 P.Cr.L.J. 1272 [Lahore] and Jehanzeb vs. The State and another (2002 P.Cr.L.J. 1929).
3. Arguments heard. Material available on the file perused.
4. The respondent-Abdul Gayyur was alleged to be the accused of polygamy by the petitioner, as, in terms of proviso (6) to Section 5 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the respondent had not expressed the intention of subsequent marriage, thus, injured the rights of his wife, i,e, the present petitioner. To me, whatever be the nature of crime, no body could be put to rigors and agony of trial entailing punishment. As a matter of fact, respondent was entitled to receive copies and the learned counsel for the petitioner rightly relied upon the case law cited by him at bar. There is no cavil with the proposition that the provisions of Section 241-A, Cr.P.C. are directory and not mandatory in nature and the learned trial Magistrate ought to have given , a reasonable opportunity to ensure the compliance of the aforesaid previsions of law. On the contrary, it is also well settled that nonobservance of the said provision or law would not declare the subsequent marriage illegal. Now after long time of almost nine years, the remand of the case to the learned trial Magistrate is not justified. After such a long time, the parties must have adjusted their matrimonial lives. The remand of the case and opening of trial would tell upon the interest of the children and the parties attached thereto. I see no justification to allow this appeal resulting in remand of the case. Consequently, this appeal is dismissal.